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The question 'Where does she begin and I endT, asked in Virginia Woolf's The Years, voices a modernist 
concern with the limits of self-identity and related questions of egoism and altruism. In this thesis I argue 
that this concern is informed by a pre-history of thinking about selfhood, psychic boundaries and the 
spiritual mainly ignored by readings of modernism which map the psyche via psychoanalysis, or Freud's 
'discovery of the unconscious'. Our thinking about the self has become colonised by the literary doctrines of 
better known canonical figures of the modernist period, generating a way of thinking about the limits of the 
psyche which is both literally and metaphorically circumscribed. A reading of more eccentric discourses 
explicitly engaged in negotiating the boundaries of individuality can provide a history of the psychic 
underpinnings to the modernist conception of the self. The representation of marginal states of 
consciousness, or epiphanic moments, is crucial to the literature of modernism: interpretation of these altered 
states, or edges, can be refigured through readings of Vernon Lee, Evelyn Underhill, May Sinclair, Dion 
Fortune and Jane Harrison: five women writing between 1880-1930 for whom pre-Freudian forms of 
dissolution and challenge to self-unity are palpably present in the form of telepathy, subliminal selves, 
oceanic consciousness and internal multiplicity. In addition to writing non-fictional texts which variously 
explore the psychological, philosophical, ethical, spiritual and occult implications of the modernist position, 
each of these women, excepting the classical scholar Jane Harrison, also wrote fiction. The aesthetic 
questions of modernism dovetail into the theoretical arguments of the writers in this thesis, inviting a 
different reading of its psychological sub-text and to suggest that where 'stream-of-consciousness' is 
stylistically indispensable, the'oceanic', as counterpart, thematically haunts the modernist aesthetic. 
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'The mind is certainly a very mysterious organ, I reflected, drawing my head in from the 
window, about which nothing whatever is known, though we depend upon it so completely. 
Why do I feet that there are severances and oppositions in the mind, as there are strains from 
obvious causes on the body? What does one mean by "the unity of the mind"? I pondered, for 
clearly the mind has so great a power of concentrating at any point at any moment that it 
seems to have no single state of being. It can separate itself from the people in the street, for 
example, and think of itself as apart from them, at an upper window looking down on them. 
Or it can think with other people spontaneously, as, for instance, in a crowd waiting to hear 
some piece of news read out. It can think back through its fathers or through its mothers, as I 
have said that a woman writing thinks back through her mothers. Again, if one is a woman 
one is often surprised by a sudden splitting off of consciousness, say in walking down 
Whitehall[ ... ] Clearly the mind 
is always altering its focus, and bringing the world into 
different perspectives. ' 
Virginia Woolfl 
I Woolf, A Room of One's Own, (1929; repr. London: Grafton, 1988), pp. 92-93. 
INTRODUCTION 
'What we identify with ourselves': 
Frederic Myers, William James and the 'world of mind' 
'The actual universe is a thing wide open, but rationalism makes systems, and 
systems must be closed. ' 
William Jamest 
'Have no screens, for screens are made out of our own integument; & get at the thing 
itself [ ... ] The screen making 
habit, though, is so universal, that probably it preserves 
our sanity. If we had not this device for shutting people off from our sympathies, we 
might, perhaps, dissolve utterly. Separateness would be impossible. ' 
Virginia Woolf2 
'The most dangerous of the sciences is only now beginning to come into action. I am 
thinking less of Psychoanalysis or of Behaviourism than of the whole subject which 
includes them. it is very probable that the Hinderburg line to which the defence of 
our traditions retired as a result of the onslaughts of the last century will be blown up 
in the near future. If this should happen a mental chaos such as man has never 
experienced may be expected. ' 
T. S. Eliot3 
'If I let go (1, this one drop, this one ego under the microscope-telescope of Sigmund 
Freud) I fear to be dissolved utterly. ' 
II. D. 4 
If reading modernist texts in search of representations of a precarious selfbood has for some time 
been common practice among literary critics, it continues to fascinate. In a review of the newly- 
edited Katherine Mansfield Notebooks in London Review of Books, Lorna Sage finds her interest 
most aroused by Mansfield's scribbled notes which 'question the assumptions we make about the 
I William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Old Ways of Thinking, The Works of William James, ed. 
Frederick. 11. Burkhardt (1907; repr. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 20. 
2 31 Jul. 1926, The Diary of Virginia Woolf, cd. Anne Olivier Bell, iii (Ilarmondsworth: Penguin, 1981), 
p. 104. 
3 T. S. Eliot, 'The Modem Mind' in The Use of Poetry and The Use of Criticism: studies in the relation of 
criticism to poetry in England (London: Faber & Faber, 1933), p. 124. 
41I. D., Tribute to Freud, (Manchester: Carcanet, 1970), p. 116. 
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nature of people's interiority, and particularly about writers' inner lives,. 5 When Sage specifies the 
inner lives of a writer, she reveals a contemporary assumption about the plurality and complexity of 
'interiority': in late twentieth-century, post-modem thinking, the suggestion of a complement of 
'inner lives' to accompany the singular life we appear to live is, if anything, de rigueur - offering 
comfort rather than threat. 
6 Sage cites Mansfield's comment, made in 1920, that we seem to have 
"hundreds of selves. For what with complexes and suppressions, and reactions and 
vibrations and reflections - there are moments when I feel I am nothing but the small 
clerk of some hotel without a proprietor who has all his work cut out to enter the 
names and hand the keys to the wilful guests. ' 7 
We will see the metaphorical 'housing' of the psyche recur within literature of this period as an 
image which addresses not only the conceptual shifting of internal contents, but also questions of 
possession. Of course during the war domestic arrangements had been literally disrupted, adding a 
more real threat of displacement. In this instance, however, Mansfield's 'hotel' can be read in 
response to the emerging discourse of psychoanalysis. Casting herself ignominiously as 'nothing 
but the small clerk', she offers a playful diminution of the customary status assigned to the 
experiencing 'I', or ego, which hints at an exasperation with this toppling of authority which has 
complicated self-identity. The clerk's employment is to record the 'names' of the guests, keeping 
abreast of the new terminology which is in part the language of the dynamic processes of the 
unconscious: 'complexes and suppressions, and reactions'. The proprietorless hotel ruled by 'wilful 
guests' echoes, however purposefully, Freud's own image of the radically decentring effects of his 
'discovery' of the unconscious as causing the ego no longer to be 'master in its own house'. 8 
Nonetheless, Mansfield observes that her own and fellow modernists' writing continues to pander 
to a 'persistent yet mysterious belief in a self which is continuous and permanent', most obviously 
in the literary 'rage for confession, autobiography, especially memories of early childhood'. 9 Loma 
Sage suggests that in this post-war period we witness 'the quest for the elusive one true self [ ... ] 
becoming more urgent than ever'. On the one hand we see modernist experimentation with new 
forms of writing which express the self in its discontinuity and impermanence, while on the other 
5 Loma Sage, 'I, too write a little', London Review of Books, 18 June 1998, p. 9. The Katherine Mansfield 
Notebooks, 2 vols. ed. by Margaret Scott (Canterbury, NZ: Lincoln University Press, 1997). 
6 In interview, psychoanalyst Christopher Bollas suggests 'we seem to go into fashions where there are 
these polarizations of one side of a binary process, and I think we are now over-privileging the multiple' 
(Freely Associated., Encounters in Psychoanalysis, cd. Anthony Molino, London: Free Association 
Books, 1997, p. 30); John Rowan (Discover your subpersonalities, our inner world and the people in it, 
London: Routledge, 1993) encourages us to play host to a party of inner selves. See also Ian Hacking, 
Rewriting the Soul., Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1995). 
7 Katherine Mansfield, The Katherine Mansfield Notebooks, ii, p. 204. 
8 'fluman megalomania will have suffered its third and most wounding blow from the psychological 
research of the present time which seeks to prove to the ego that it is not even master in its own house, 
but must content itself with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously in its mind' 
(Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, 1922; repr. The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, xvi, trans. and ed. James Strachey, London: Ilogarth, 
1966-74, p. 285). 
9 Katherine Mansfield, The Katherine Mansfield Notebooks, 2, p. 204. 
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hand the 'persistent yet mysterious belief in a self' does not vanish. Freud's theories were 
sometimes unpalatable, but how disorientating were they to the quest for 'the one true self'? 
Woolf's diary entry 27 April 1925 states 'my present reflection is that people have any number of 
states of consciousness (second selves is what I mean) &I should like to investigate the party 
consciousness, the frock of consciousness' 10 'Second selves' are innocuous when described as 
6states of consciousness', as social and superficial as the 'party' and 'frock'; yet the terminology 
itself testifies to a legacy of questions raised by conceptual isations of the psyche prior to 
psychoanalysis. In fact Freud himself never suggested that we had more than one self, only that we 
were unconscious of much of our own psychic activity. Freud's account of the unconscious gave a 
convincing content to what had been the subject of much speculation: the notion of self now 
incorporated conflicting, unruly, discordant desires only some of which were known to the 
conscious self and many of which, it was feared, would disgrace the self if they did become known. 
There was certainly dissent within - we recognise Mansfield's 'wilful guests' - yet the self was 
essentially unitary and the unconscious was personal, containing the repressed memories of 
childhood experience; indeed Freud's psychology was explicitly welcomed as affirming a psychical 
unity by delivering back to the self the bizarre and inexplicable phenomena of the dream world. If 
psychoanalysis disallowed the reassuring belief in a 'continuous and permanent self' due to the 
undermining activity of the unconscious, it was a belief which had already, as I will argue in this 
thesis, been more radically unsettled. 
I would like to introduce into the context of modernist debates about 'interiority' a different 
challenging of categories of self identity to suggest that, as we will see, psychoanalytic meaning 
gradually replaced more open-ended theories of the psyche. Psychoanalysis can be read as resolving 
and reducing some of the pre-existing debates precisely by referring all experience to intra-psychic 
dynamics, or interiorising the psyche. Freud initiated a cultural transformation in the way we see 
memory as a key to personal identity, encouraging the 'consoling belief that all the freaks and 
aberrations of human identity can be explained through reference to the individual's past') I 
Freud's psychic topography, it could be said, keeps the self house-bound. Indeed Mansfield's 
guests do not all hail from psychoanalysis: the 'vibrations and reflections' own a quite different 
origin, as we will go on to see. The continuous self does not just refer to self-continuity but a 
continuity with something else beyond itself in which case the idea of the self as continuous and 
permanent, can be read as notjust as a throwback to pre-psychoanalytic thinking but as a throwback 
to other more disruptive ways of conccptualising the psyche antecedent to, or contemporary with 
Freud. 
10 The Diary of Virginia fVooU*, ed. Anne Olivier Bell, iii (I larmondsworth: Penguin, 198 1), p. 12. 
11 Rhodri I layward, 'Review' of Ian I lacking, Rewriting The Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences 
of Alemory in Journal of the Society for Psychical Research (hereafter JSPR), 6 1, no 847 (April 1997), 
401-4, p. 403. 
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Psychoanalysis has been described as 'the only depth psychology of the late nineteenth century to 
persist into the ultra-orthodox era that followed'. 12 Most recent scholarship into the substantial 
changes in the discipline of psychology no longer focuses solely upon the investigations into 
hysteria by Sigmund Freud and Josef Breuer in Vienna, or Pierre Janet, Jean Charcot and Hippolyte 
Bernheirn in f in-de-si&le France, but also looks towards Frederic Myers and the original work done 
by the Society of Psychical Research (set up in 1882). When Sonu Shamdasani claims 'the 
discovery of the unconscious breached the metaphysics of subjectivity and rendered inoperative 
classical notions of foundation, propriety and authorship', he is not referring to the work of 
psychoanalysis; rather, he continues, 'a massive reinstallation of such notions took place, all of 
which subsumed this 'discovery' under the proper name of Freud'. 13 In his account psychoanalysis 
rebuilds rather than dismantles the structures which have already been undermined by earlier 
accounts. If recent histories of psychology have revised history so that the 'discovery' of the 
unconscious is no longer a founding moment attributed to Freud, within the discipline of literary 
criticism Freud's account of the unconscious continues to play a dominant role in understanding 
the development of the modemist aesthetic: Stephen Kern's Culture of Time and Space while 
brilliantly examining the shifts in modem thought at the turn of the century predictably ascribes to 
psychoanalysis the pulling down of 'old conceptual walls between self and world'. 14 Prior to the 
publication of Freud in English by the Hogarth Press, texts both by William James and Frederic 
Myers were available to a wide readership. Frederic Myers' and William James' contributions can 
be seen as crucially relevant, indeed formative to the intellectual world from which Freud's account 
of the unconscious was to emerge. An indication of the multiple meanings ascribed to the 
6subconscious' at this time is evident in the record of a 'Symposium on the Subconscious' held in 
1908 by the Journal ofAbnorinal Psychology, where six different meanings were debated without 
resolution by psychologists from France and America. 15 The subconscious was offered here as a 
description alternatively of the fringes of our consciousness of which we have diminished 
awareness; of inert but active ideas dissociated from the main personal consciousness of which the 
subject is unaware; of a separate, self-conscious 'self' or personality 'which can speak of itself as an 
T; of the storage place for dissociated ideas and potential memories of all past conscious 
experience; of a superior subliminal self out of which the personal consciousness emerges; or of a 
purely physiological brain process which is not psychical at all. 16 
12 Eugene Taylor, lVilliam James on Consciousness Beyond the Margin, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1996) p. 186. 
13 Sonu Shamdasani, 'Automatic Writing and the Discovery of the Unconscious, ' Spring 54 (1993), 
P. 109. 
14 Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space 1880-1918, (Cambridge, Mass: I larvard University 
Press, 1983), p. 204. 
15 'A Symposium on the Subconscious', Journal of Abnormal Psychology 2: (April-May 1907), 25-44; 
(June-July 1907), 58-80; repr. Ilugo Monsterberg, Theodore Ribot, Pierre Janet, Joseph Jastrow, Bernard 
Hart, Morton Princc, Subconscious Phenomena (London: Rcbman, n. d. ). 
16 'A Symposium on the Subconscious', Journal of Abnormal Psychology 2 (April-May 1907), 25-44, 
p. 26. 
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Whereas Loma Sage emphasises the question of 'interiority' in her review, I would like to draw 
attention to the relation of the self to the outside world, to a question of limits, rather than 
contents, which is crucially connected to the modernist discussion of self, inflecting as it does, a 
different understanding of the quest for a 'continuous' self that Mansfield spoke of In an article 
written in 1889, discussing the phenomenon of automatic writing, William James considers 'the 
great theoretic interest' to be found in 'the questions [which] awaken as to the boundaries of our 
individuality'. 17 Although left unspecified, these questions about the 'boundaries of individuality' 
were addressed in ensuing debates-about the nature of consciousness by William James and his 
friend and colleague Frederic Myers whose key involvement as founder member of the Society of 
Psychical Research conducting experiments into 'supernormal' phenomena constantly challenged 
assumptions regarding these 'boundaries'. The title of William James' article 'A Suggestion about 
Mysticism', indicates James' consistently exploratory and open-ended approach: here, he reports his 
own experience of awakening from three simultaneous dreams seemingly belonging to 'three 
different dream-systems at once'. The range of questions and their intensely diverse but equally 
disturbing implications gives a measure of the hermeneutic instability of the experience: 
'Presently cold shivers of dread ran over me: am I getting into other people's dreams? Is 
this a 'telepathic' experience? or an invasion of double (or treble) personality? Or is it a 
thrombus in a cortical artery? and the beginning of a general mental 'confusion' and 
disorientation which is going on to develop who knows how far? 'I 8 
The fluidity of the debates around the self at this period suggested by James here will be a recurrent 
preoccupation within this thesis, signifying as it does the disjunction, or gap, between individual 
experience and the theory which came to represent that experience. For James at least, the attraction 
of this psychology, a science founded upon individual introspection, is that no answer is more 
conclusive than the experience itself 
William McDougall, the British psychologist whose Outline of Psychology (1923) and Outline of 
Abnormal Psychology (1926) were standard textbooks, attributed 'true openness of mind' to 
Frederic Myers and 'wonderful open-mindedness' to William James. 19 Henry James described his 
brother William's mind as being 'incapable of the shut door in any direction'. 20 Indeed, both 
Myers and James were literally and metaphorically open-minded in their theories of consciousness. 
William James was a psychologist and philosophcr; Myers a Victorian poet, classical scholar and 
17 William James, 'Notes on Automatic Writing', Proceedings of American Society for Psychical 
Research (1889): 'Of course, the great theoretic interest of these autornatic performances, whether speech 
or writing, consists in the questions they awaken as to the boundaries of our individuality', p. 555. 
18 William James, 'A Suggestion About Mysticism' (first published in Journal of Philosophy, 
Psychology and Scientific Methods, 1910,85-92) repr. Collected Essays and Reviews, ed. R. B. Perry 
(London: Longmans & Green, 1920), p. 507. 
19 William McDougall, 'Critical Notice of F. W. 11. Myers' Human Personality and its survival of bodily 
death', Mind, 12 (1903), p. 526; William McDougall, 'In Memory of William James'PSPR, 25 (1911), 11- 
29, repr. William McDougall, Explorer of the Mind: Essays in Psychical Research, ed. Raymond Van 
Over and Laura Oteri (New York: I lelix, 1967), 86-100, p. 88; 'I prefer an open mind of inquiry' (Letter to 
Ilenry Rankin, I Feb. 1897, The Letters of William James, London: Longman, Green, 1920, p. 58). 
20 Henry James, Autobiography, ed. by Frederick W. Dupee (New York: W. 1 LAllen, 1956), p. 430. 
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psychical researcher. Although not formally trained as a psychologist, Myers is described in 
William James' memorial essay as 'a cultivator and promoter of the science of the Mind,. 21 
Myers is remembered for his role in introducing Freud's early writing on hysteria to an English 
readership. He was also responsible for coining the term telepathy. Yet his concept of the 
subliminal self has received little acknowledgement beyond the history of social sciences. It is 
given its most thorough exposition in his hefty two volume work Human Personality and its 
Survival Of Bodily Death published in 1903.22 One of the founders of the Society for Psychical 
Research established in 1882, Myers involved himself in the collecting of data, in order to 
establish through experiment and observation - the methods of science - whether or not there 
existed a 'spiritual world'. 23 Choosing not to align himself with the spiritualists who believed that 
automatic writing and hallucinations evidenced communication with discamate spirits, Myers 
initially emphasised the unexplored potential of 'man's incarnate personality,. 
24 Between the years 
1880 to 1900 Myers responded to the wealth of abnormal reported activity first with the doctrine of 
telepathy, which broadly described a distant communion of mind with mind, and later developed a 
theory of the 'subliminal self' to describe a submerged yet 'profounder faculty' of consciousness. 
25 
According to William James, Myers' formulation of the subliminal will 'figure always as a rather 
momentous event in the history of our Science'. 
26 William McDougall described Myers' doctrine 
of the subliminal as 'a novelty of the first importance for the science of psychology'. 
27 In light of 
these accolades it is striking how completely Myers has been written out of the intellectual climate 
from which modernism developed, given their mutual preoccupations. While William James is 
more fashionably remembered, many of his ideas drew upon Myers' premise. 
At that time, the idea of a 'threshold' of consciousness above which thoughts and feelings must 
rise before entering our conscious mind was familiar. The significance of Myers' definition of the 
subliminal was in extending the concept to embrace 
21 William James, 'Frederic Myers's Service to Psychology', Proceedings of the Society of Psychical 
Research, 17 (May 1901), 13-23, p. 13 (rcpr. in William James on Psychical Research, ed. by Gardner 
Murphy and Robert Ballou, London: Chatto & Windus, 1961). 
22 F. W. 11. Myers Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death 2 vols, (London: Longmans, 
Green, 1903; first published as a series 'Subliminal Consciousness I-VIl' in Proceedings of the Society 
of Psychical Research, 7-9,1892-1894. 
23 Frederic W. H. Myers, Professor I lenry Sidgwick, Sir William Barrett and Edmund Gurney founded the 
Society for Psychical Research in 1882 to investigate 'those faculties of man, real or supposed, which 
appear to be inexplicable on any generally recognised hypothesis': this embraced the phenomena of 
clairvoyance, automatism, mesmerism and thought transference, many of which were examined as 
potential evidence for the survival of and communication with the dead ('Statement of purpose' from 
Journal of the Societyfor Psychical Research). 
24 F. W. 11. Myers, Human Personality (abridged edition), (Norwich: Pilgrim Books, 1919), p. 9. 
25 Ibid. p. 13. 
26 William James, 'Frederic Myers's Service to Psychology', PSPR, 17 (May 1901), p. 17. 
27 William McDougall, 'Critical Notice of F. W. H. Myers' Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily 
Death', p. 514. McDougall cites Theodore Flournoy's commendation of Myers' work as 'extremely 
remarkable and worthy of the serious attention of even official and university psychologists'. 
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'all that takes place[ ... ] outside the ordinary margin of consciousness; - not only 
those faint stimulations whose very faintness keeps them submerged, but much else 
which psychology as yet scarcely recognises; sensations, thoughts, emotions, which 
may be strong, definite, and independent, but which, by the original constitution of 
our being, seldom emerge into the supraliminal current of consciousness which we 
habitually identify with ourselves., 28 
The concept of Myers' subliminal self unsettled what we 'identify with ourselves', indeed it 
unsettled the assumption that we could identify ourselves at all. Furthermore, what was out of 
consciousness was no longer insignificant, but equal, or even superior to a conscious self - it could 
be 'strong, definite and independent'. Thus conscious awareness was no longer a measure by which 
thoughts or experiences could be held superior. In The Varielies of Religious Experience, William 
James highlights 'the most important step forward' in psychology as the 'discovery, first made in 
1886, ' that beyond our everyday consciousness with its centre and margin there are 'memories, 
thoughts and feelings which are extra-marginal'. 29 For James' psychology the indeterminate 
margin not only blurs the boundaries between what is conscious or not, it also points towards a 
wider, intersubjective consciousness beyond the personal. If, as I have suggested, we could say of 
psychoanalysis that it keeps the self indoors, then Myers' subliminal psychology offers a more 
extensive prospect: as William James remarked, 'the door into this region seems unusually wide 
open,. 30 
James describes the subliminal 'as the enveloping mother-consciousness in each of us, from which 
the consciousness we wot of is precipitated like a crystal'. 31 To give one suggestion of the kind of 
links I will be exploring here: in a chapter on May Sinclair we will see crystal become a key image 
in the construction of her own philosophy and aesthetic. Whereas in Principles of Psychology 
published in 1890 self is conceived in terms of passing thought: the self is a series of momentary 
durations in a flow of time and consciousness, William James' later speculations of 1903 propose a 
less transient existence: the self dissolves not into its next fleeting appearance in a stream but into a 
larger, impersonal consciousness, a 'mother-sea'. Myers' speculations were central to James' cosmic 
consciousness. As James asks: 
'Assuming this common reservoir of consciousness to exist. [ ... ]the question is, What is 
its own structure? What is its inner topography? This question, first squarely formulated 
28 F. W. 1 1. Myers, Human Personality (abridged), p. 14. 
29 William James, Varieties of Religious Experience, (1902; Ilarmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), p. 233. 
30 James, Varieties, p. 484. Psychology of this time popularly invoked the 'threshold' to designate 'the 
point at which one state of mind passes into another' (ibid. p. 134); the threshold symbolically connects 
inside and outside, the familiar and the strange (see Ruth Padel, In and out of the mind., Greek images of 
the tragic self, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 
31 William James, 'Frederic Myers's Service to Psychology', PSPR, 17 (May 1901), p. 17. 
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by Myers, deserves to be called 'Myers' problem' by scientific men hereafter. What are the 
conditions of individuation or insulation in this mother-sea?, 32 
In the history of modernism, William James is most famous for coining the expression 'stream of 
consciousness'; his idea of the 'mother-sea' of consciousness has however, received less attention. 
The stream-of-consciousness was enthusiastically assimilated as a literary critical term, intrinsic to 
the modernist representation of consciousness. I suggest that where stream-of-consciousness was 
stylistically indispensable, the oceanic, as counterpart, thematically haunts the modernist aesthetic. 
The stream of consciousness signalled the dissolution of a more fixed identity in a free-flowing 
narrative style. Dissolution suggests a stable entity to be dissolved: yet William James description 
of an 'unf mished-seeming front' as the best mark of health for a science still in the process of self- 
definition, is also an appropriate description for his representation of the individual mind in which 
fixity of individual selfhood is not guaranteed. 
33 In this connection it might be said that Nancy 
Chodorow's idea of merging and fluid ego boundaries as an ethical property of women is a recent 
resumption on behalf of feminism of a position which held quite different meanings when it first 
emerged. 34 
Myers hoped to undo the conception that the conscious and unconscious, being linguistically 
opposite counters, should represent mutually exclusive states. He resolutely refuses to translate 
them into the abstract A and not-A of the algebraist: 'As soon as we endeavour to attach a concrete 
definite meaning to the two terms here used, we find that the whole difficulty lies in knowing what 
really is A and what is not A, and what kind of relations the two do in fact bear to one another., 
35 
in a sense this again is a founding preoccupation of modernist aesthetic doctrine: the differentiation 
between self and other, or self and world. In his review of James' Principles of PsycholosD, Myers 
maintains that the relation which one mind bears to another cannot be prejudged. Ile concludes: 
'how wavering and provisional is our line of demarcation between "real" and "unreal" things,. 36 
32 William James, 'The Final Impressions of a Psychical Researcher', first published American 
Magazine, (Oct 1909); rcpr. in William James, Atemories and Studies (New York: Longmans, Green, 
1911); repr. in William James on Psychical Research, p. 324. In the James family 'nothing was more 
vigorously interrogated than the self' (Ross Posnock, The Trial of Curiosity: Henry James, William 
James and the challenge of modernity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 199 1, p. 18). 
33 William James, preface to Principles of Psychology, i (New York: Dover, 1890), pvii. 
34 See Nancy Chodorow, The reproduction of mothering, psychoanalysis and the sociology of gender 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). 
35 F. W. H. Myers, 'Further Notes On The Unconscious Self', JSPR, 2 (1885) 122-13 1, p. 127. 
36 F. W. H. Myers, 'The Principles of Psychology' [Review of William James, The Principles of 
Psychology], PSPR, 7 (1891-2) 111-33, p. 125. Charles Taylor proposes that the way we think of 
ourselves in terms of what is within and what is without is a symptom of a particular Western form of 
self-interpretation: the unconscious is always figured as inner, we have inner depths, inner lives, 
unexplored inner realms: 'the opposition of subject to object is one way in which the... strong 
localization arises. Another is the fixing of a clear boundary between the psychic and the physical' 
(Sources of the Self. the making of the modern identity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, 
p. 188). 
Introduction 
Subliminal - antiquated and/or revolutionary? 
There is however, another, almost contradictory strand to this body of thought. We will see the 
.,, 
one way and another, in each of the writers to be considered in this thesis. same tension emerging 
If we look at an early article by Myer's we also see a preoccupation which will develop into a 
central tenet of theory of the subliminal self. while proposing the impermanence of what we think 
of as self, his next move is to reinstate a self more pen-nanent than we might have ever hoped. In 
'Multiplex Personality' published in 1886 Frederic Myers reflects upon the recent increase in cases 
of multiple personality which prefigure by a century a similar cultural epidemic in which a single 
self suffers drastic alterations in character. 
37 Using the well-documented case of Louis Vive, a boy 
aged fourteen with six distinct characters, Myers reports how the patient's behaviour and attitude 
shifts with each of his several personalities: these can be accessed and activated through the use of 
hypnosis or simply touching his body with metals. Myers proposes that this previously 
unrecognised 'modifiability' of personality can be used to practical advantage: if subjects can be 
artificially induced to enter alternative states of consciousness under hypnosis, why not use similar 
methods to deliberately manipulate personality with the aim of moral improvement. Myers 
speculates further that banishment of pain might become possible: 'not only pain itself, but 
anxiety, ennui, intellectual fatigue, may be held in abeyance by hypnotic treatment and 
suggestion., 38 Whereas multiple personality was more frequently interpreted as evidence of a 
disintegration, or dissociation of the psyche, caused by constitutional weakness by experimental 
psychologists such as Janet, Prince and Flournoy, Myers distinguished himself by proposing 
hypnosis as a panacea for the modem malaise. The 'modifiability' of personality in his view 
heralded psychic cure rather than chaos. 
While optimistic about its salutary potential, Myers was alert to the threat he posed to the notion 
of a stable and singular self by depicting a self so susceptible to outside influences. To allay the 
fears of readers who 'dread that this invading analysis may steal their very self away', Myers shifts 
the terms of his argument in a concluding paragraph in which he offers a redefinition of this 'very 
self'. Beginning with the supposition that the individual's life is fundamentally a striving for 
pleasure, Myers locates experience of the 'very self' in those moments when we attain 'our intensest 
joy'. Yet when are these moments? In answer, he offers, 
'Do not our thoughts in answer turn instinctively to scenes and moments when all 
personal preoccupation, all care for individual interest, is lost in the sense of spiritual 
union, whether with one beloved soul, or with a mighty nation, or with 'the whole 
world and creatures of GodT 
The 'very seir is experienced most at the moment when it is apparently forgotten in romantic, 
patriotic or religious identifications. Just as James' questioning characterises the desiccation of 
37 Multiple Personality Disorder 'matured in the eighties, ' Hacking, Rewriting the Soul: Multiple 
Personality and the Sciences of Memory, p. 39. 
38 F. W. 11. Myers, 'Multiplex Personality', Nineteenth Century, (Nov 1886), 648-666, p. 664. 
Introduction 10 
meaning in relation to experience, Myers demonstrates the opposite formulation which is the 
pinning down of experience with a key, transcendent, meaning; if James' questions are suggestive 
of an inconclusiveness inspired by his researches, Myers' conclusions are no less fundamental to an 
understanding of the dual alternatives offered by this psychology. The pinnacle of joy finds 
expression for Myers in the paradoxical epithet 'If I lose myself I find myself' which he interprets 
as 'a hint that much, very much of what we are wont to regard as an integral part of us may drop 
away, and yet leave us with a consciousness of our own being which is more vivid and purer than 
before'. 39 This simultaneous loss and retrieval, or self-discovery conditional upon loss works to 
mollify the threat exposed in his paper, namely thatwhat we think of as stable is in fact permeable 
and multiple; Myers reassures that the certainties we lose are not, perhaps, integral to a secure 
identity. What we think of as ourselves is 'a web of habits and appetencies, of lusts and fears [and] 
is not, perhaps, the ultimate manifestation of what in truth we are. ' 'What in truth we are' is 
discovered only when we lose what we think we are. A conclusion which offers tenuous 
consolation - self is only fully experienced at its own vanishing point - it also points to the 
dilemma inherent in the new psychology which made mutable that which had been given 
permanence, and multiple that which was singular. What we thought of as ourselves, Myers 
proposes, is a 'web', a 'cloak' which we can afford to let slip, and must learn to refashion and shift 
in the confidence that within there is something more 'ancient and glorious' to be found. 
It would be misleading to imply, as Myers does, that 'loss of self' is always synonymous with 
6greatest pleasure'; however, despite being founded upon an experience which could be profoundly 
disorientating and disturbing, the early-twentieth-century empirical account was frequently glossed 
with theoretical ideals of unity and absorption. The self is thus not completely dissipated or 
marginalised but made central, if invisible, in a disappearing act which brings its own reward. 
In writing about Myers' psychology William James identifies as 'The corner-stone of his 
conception [ ... ] the fact that consciousness 
has no essential unity. It aggregates and dissipates[ ... ]. 
Having evolved, it may also dissolve'[italics mine]. 40 At the same time as accepting the 
multiplicity or modifiability of our psychical selves he claims a compensatory security from a 
transcendental realm. Just as his theory of the self enters 'free-fall' it is caught in the safety net of 
an enduring soul. Spiritual certainties enable a freer investigation of the psychological without 
having to be responsible for moral and spiritual implications. Was Myers just looking for a 
'vehicle for religious values' as J. P. Williams suggests in 'Psychical Research and Psychiatry,? 41 
Shamdasani suggests that Myers' theory was aimed at proving to himself, the crucial question of 
survival beyond the grave. Yet however safeguarded by the spiritual, the 'phenomenal' shows itself 
39 Ibid. p. 665-6. 
40 William James, 'Frederic Myers's Smice to Psychology', PSPR 17 (May 1901), p. 20-21. 
41 J. P. Williams, 'Psychical research and psychiatry in late Victorian Britain: trance as ecstasy or trance 
as insanity', Bynum, W. F., Porter, Roy, Shepherd, Michael (eds. ), The Anatomy of Madness: essays in the 
history ofpsychiatry, i, (London and New York: Tavistock, 1985) pp. 233-254, p. 247. 
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as weird, wonderful and unreliable. Anticipating Freud whose case studies, famously by his own 
account, sounded like fictions, Myers' 'clinical records sound like fairy tales'. 42 
in conceiving personality as not unitary, nor known in its entirety to the ordinary waking self 
Myers is recognised as part of the zeitgeist: 'Whereas till recently the personality of man was 
regarded as something that was bounded by the limits of the normal consciousness, we now 
know[ ... ] that, like an 
iceberg, which floats with most of its bulk submerged, the human mind, 
from its first day to its last, has more of itself below the level of consciousness than ever appears 
above it,., 43 We see from another psychologist Binct, just how widespread was the belief in an 
essential disunity of selE In Alterations of Personality (1896), Binet describes the 'division or 
dismemberment of self whereby 'the normal unity of consciousness is broken up and several 
distinct consciousness are formed, each of which may have its own system of perceptions, its own 
memory, and even its own moral character'. 
44 According to Binet, an individual may have a 
$plurality of memories, a plurality of consciousnesses, and a plurality of personalities': a belief 
which recalls Mansfield's exasperation with the 'hundreds of selves' bequeathed to the individual in 
the early decades of this century as a legacy of this psychology. 45 In his opinion this is not a rarely 
observed pathology but a phenomena making itself increasingly evident across disciplines and 
between countries to those 'who do not belong to the same school nor even to the same country, 
and who are not working in the same lines or with the same objects, and who, moreover are largely 
ignorant of one another'. 46 The simultaneous occurrences suggest an uncanny contagion of minds. 
As we will see, dissociation of selfbood often brought with it, not just a redeeming core of singular 
and unique being, but something more like a continuum - aesthetic empathy or occult 
connectedness - between bodies and souls. 
Yet the zeitgeist was not consistently with Myers, the communion of minds not complete: the 
ideas advanced by Myers in 'Multiplex Personality' also provoked outraged disbelief. 'Personality 
is unity' argues Nicholas Butler in a paper which - directly responding to Myers' - bears witness to 
the disorientation of established belief threatened by Myers' renegade claims. In the case study 
presented by Myers, as Butler puts it: 
4personality ceases to be the stable unit we have always held it to be, and becomes 
capable of transmutation at a command or by the application of a bar of steel to a 
portion of the physical organism. The consequences, near and remote, of such a 
theory as this fairly takes one's breath away. It revolutionizes philosophy and science 
42 James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 235. 
43 W. H. Mallock, 'The Gospel of F. W. H. Myers', The Nineteenth Century and After, 53 (April, 1903), 
628-644, p. 629. 
44 Binet, Alterations of Personality, trans. I lelen Baldwin, (London: Chapman & Ila] 1.1896), p. x. 
45 Ibid. p. 355. 
46 Ibid. p. x. 
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and necessitates the reconstruction of theories of religion and morality. What can it 
all mean?, 47 
In defence of his own 'stable unit', Butler is determined that it should not mean a great deal. 
Incredulous not of Myers' evidence but his interpretations, 'carried away by the force of his own 
zealous ingenuity', he holds that Myers makes a virtue out of an aberration, constructing a model 
of psychological health upon a case of pathological abnormality. This is not dissimilar to the 
charges later levied at Freud. He reiterates: 
'Personality in its unity and permanence is a dictum of consciousness and a necessary 
condition of all knowledge. It cannot be explained away nor even invalidated by any 
evidence based merely on types of disease. The consciousness of personal identity is 
an essential element in psychical health. Its loss or weakening is in itself a sign of 
disease. [ ... ] not set up as a standard of normal action. ' 
In his argument which we can see resonating in the debates of modernism, personal identity is 
inviolate since any contrary indications are pathologised. 
Myers anticipates the double charges which will be levied upon his theory of subliminal 
consciousness 'both as antiquated and as revolutionary'. 48 Antiquated in his conception of a soul 
which precedes and outlasts the body and revolutionary in suggesting that such a metaphysical 
entity manifests itself in such bizarre physiological phenomena. Classical and modem: perhaps 
there is more than one Myers? In a sense, his own doubleness was disconcerting: his theory of 
subliminal self was incompatible with the theologians' identification of soul with ego, which made 
consciousness the means towards attaining the highest good. Myers' theory subverted the 
psychological ly-m inded by incorporating the spiritual into the ego, and challenged the religious- 
minded by focusing on what was deemed pathological. Yet rather than alienating himself from both 
religion and science he hoped to forge a synthesis: 'I regard each man as at once profoundly unitary 
and almost infinitely complex., 49 Myers became increasingly committed to using the subliminal 
as evidence to point towards a religious synthesis and to refute the Victorian 'crisis of faith' which 
threatened spiritual isolation and solitude: 
'Such fears [of spiritual extinction or solitude], I say, vanish when we learn that it is 
the soul in man which links him with other souls; the body which dissevers even 
while it seems to unite; so that "no man liveth to himself nor dieth to himself', but 
in a sense which goes deeper than metaphor, "We are every one members of one 
another". Like atoms, like suns, like galaxies, our spirits are systems of forces which 
vibrate continually to each other's attractive power., 50 
47 Nicholas Murray Butler, Manifold Personality, (New York: Columbia College, 1889), n. p. 
48 Myers, 'The Subliminal Consciousness I: General Characteristics of Subliminal Messages', PSPR, 7 
(1892), 298-327, p. 304. 
49 Myers, Human Personality (abridged), p. 19. 
50 Ibid. p. 278. 
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Myers' image points up the potential solace, or solidarity, afforded by such a communion of 
minds, or souls: it also suggests that the 'vibrations' which Katherine Mansfield listed among the 
4guests' entering her hotel of the mind derived from 'galaxies' quite foreign to psychoanalysis. J. P. 
Williams identifies Myers' subliminal as a vehicle to promote the cultural and values of an 
educated social elite, a charge which has often been brought forcefully and recently institutionally 
against modernism. 
51 Most accounts of Myers reclaim his significance for psychology only to 
marginalise his contribution as an excuse for the reinstatement of the soul. 
52 Yet, as we will see, 
this double aspect of his psychology, both ancient and modem, embodies contradictions which 
continue to preoccupy modem thinking, and in particular modernist thought in the early twentieth 4D 
century. 
Aesthetics of the mind 
The potential aesthetic implications of these discussions were also visible at the time. In his lecture 
Beneath the Threshold of 1931 T. W. Mitchell, a British psychoanalyst, characterises the 
distinction between Freud's unconscious and Myers' subliminal as between 'rubbish heap' and 
'treasure house', yet he also suggests that they each found what they were looking for: Myers' 
approach is 'less restricted' while Freud's preoccupation is specifically with the repressed contents 
of the unconscious. 53 Myers argues for the supernormal powers of the subliminal, associated with 
genius and creativity: the inspiration of genius is evidence of the sudden emergence of the 
subliminal into consciousness, described as a 'subliminal uprush': 
4we may ask ourselves in what kind of subliminal uprush this hidden habit of wider 
symbolism, of self-communion beyond the limits of speech, will be likely to 
manifest itself above the conscious threshold. The obvious answer to this question 
lies in the one word Art., 54 
The acquisition of knowledge which cannot have been arrived through the ordinary channels of 
sense is the prerogative of the subliminal according to Myers. 55 This view, writes Mitchell, 'finds 
little support in the teachings of psychoanalysts, except in so far as intellectual and artistic 
creations are regarded as sublimations of primitive unconscious instinctual urges'. 
56 Jung's 
psychology of the individual can perhaps more profitably be compared to Myers, in his 
51 Lawrence Raincy, Institutions of Modernism: Literary Elites and Public Culture (New Haven & 
London, Yale University Press, 1998). 
52 John Cerullo, The Secularisation of the Soul (Philadelphia: Institute for the study of Human Issues, 
1982); Sonu Shamdasani, 'Introduction' to Thdodore Flournoy, Front India to the the Planet Afars: a 
case of multiple personality with imaginary languages, (1899; new ed. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), p. xv. 
53 T. W. Mitchell, Beneath the Threshold: The Frederic W. H. Myers Lecture, 1931 (London: Methuen, 
1931), p. 13. 
54 Myers, Human Personality (1903) i, p. 100-1; see Myers, 'llysteria and Genius', Notes on General 
Meeting, JSPR. 8 (April 1897-8), 50-9. 
55 The supernormal, a term introduced by Myers, describes 'a faculty or phenomenon which goes 
beyond the level of ordinary experience, in the direction of evolution, or as pertaining to a transcendent 
world' (Mitchell, Beneath the Threshold, p. 22). 
56 T. W. Mitchell, Beneath the Threshold, p. 18. 
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incorporation of an impersonal aspect in his psychology of the individual, namely the collective 
unconscious from which issue insights, wisdom, and inspiration. Yet whereas in Myers' model the 
subliminal communicates a spiritual, transcendent content to consciousness, Jung's collective 
unconscious is the sediment of a human history, the 'deposits of the oft-repeated experiences of 
humanity'. 57 If inspiration comes from the collective, it is from the timeless wisdom of inherited, 
primordial images, beyond the individual memory or past, yet not transcending the human as such. 
As we will see, T. S. Eliot more commonly exercised caution in ascribing religious significance to 
states of consciousness, yet his introduction to an anthology Thoughtsfor Meditation advises: it is 
'intended for everyone who is curious about those emotions, and states of soul, which are to be 
found, so to speak, only beyond the limit of the visible spectrum of human feeling, and which can 
be experienced only in moments of illumination, or by the development of another organ of 
perception than that of everyday vision., 
58 
Myers' subliminal insights beyond the usual spectrum of consciousness can be compared to the 
modernist moments of being. Tim Cribb makes the point that in the case of Joycean epiphanies - 
typically associated with expressions of the unconscious - the Freudian model of the unconscious 
gives an inadequate medical model. The epiphany reveals what is beyond the consciousness of the 
participants and even of the writer: 'its meaning is already given from some source outside him. 
59 
We can see that the epiphany is better explained in terms of Myers' subliminal uprush in which the 
bounds of the conscious or experiencing self are transgressed. Furthermore, Myers' subliminal 
uprush while unsettling the hold of the conscious self, threatening its autonomy, also offered 
empirical evidence of an immortal soul more enduring and unitary than the unreliable, fragmenting, 
ever-changing conscious. 
While Myers is dismissed for keeping hold of a soul in a psychology, we can re-read modernist 
epiphanies as moments which similarly describe a psychological experience and hint at a spiritual 
iconography not current to a Freudian psychology. As we will see these subliminal epiphanic 
moments of modernism belong as much to less-known psychological debate of this time as the 
Freudian ideas which have passed so effortlessly and repetitively into modernist criticism. Leon 
Surctte describes 'a spiritual or nournenal realm that I have found to be ubiquitous in the period'; 
Susan Stanford Friedman writes of a 'modernist poetics centrcd in heightened moments of 
57 Ibid. p18. 
58 T. S. Eliot, 'Preface' to Thoughts for Meditation; a way to recovery from within ed. N. Gangulee, 
(London: Faber & Faber, 1951) p. 11. Myers compared the human mind to a spectrum to which 
consciousness corresponded to the visible part: 'such organic processes as are unconscious he compared 
with the infra-red part of the spectrum. From the part of our life comparable with the ultra-violet come the 
insight of the poet and the inspiration of the prophet, religion, mysticism and love' (Robert Thouless, 
The Psychology of Religion, 1923; repr. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 196 1, p. 104. ) 
59 Tim Cribb, 'James Joyce: the Unconscious and the cognitive epiphany', in Peter Collier and Judy 
Davis (eds. ), Modernism and the European Unconscious (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), p. 65. Richard 
Ellman defines Joyce's epiphany as both 'a sudden spiritual manifestation' and 'moments of artistic 
radiance' (James Joyce, Poems and Shorter Writings, ed. Richard Ellman, A. Walton Litz and John 
Whittier Ferguson, London: Faber, 1991, p. 137). 
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consciousness', the 'reawakening of the spirit'; Tillyard in The impact of modernism 1900-1920 
describes early modernism as 'imbued with religiosity'; Post-impressionism had its own 
affiliations with the doctrine of transcendence, according to Clive Bell, post-impressionist art 'may 
satisfy the religious needs of an age grown too acute for dogmatic religion'. 
60 This emphasis on 
the beyond, and a questioning of its meaning, lies, one could say, very close to the concern with 
consciousness so often placed at the heart of modernism's concerns. 
if, as I will be arguing, these preoccupations rejoin and extend debates in modernist aesthetics, they 
also, correspondingly, demonstrate their own aesthetic concerns, a preoccupation with the limits of 
language and words. McDougall says of the subliminal self that it is a conception 'too unfamiliar, 
too subtle, and too profound to be set forth precisely in words! fie continues: 'Myers.. nowhere 
attempts this feat, but strives to introduce the conception to our minds by displaying in successive 
chapters what he believes to be [its] manifestations'. 
61 In Human Personality the subliminal self 
never achieves definition: it is described through its effects - like the modernist representation of 
character. Aiming for 'profound synthesis', Myers' subliminal self is host to a 'monstrous 
confusion of things that are by nature disparate and distinct', it is an 'elaborate and gratuitous 
mystification'. 62 
Myers urges a 'thicker harvest of facts' in the hope that patterns of meaning will emerge to 
elucidate the 'confused and complex content' of subliminal messages. 
'We are collecting, so to say, from palimpsest and mummy-case fragments of writing 
in many languages and in many alphabets. Some of these alphabets are still in use. 
Others are found in bilingual inscriptions, which give a clue to their significance. 
Others are as yet absolutely indecipherable. At first sight our ever-growing collection 
appears a meaningless chaos. But we are sure that there must be an order beneath the 
confusion, since from that order our modem world has grown. And enough is already 
interpretable to encourage us to further effort; to show us that we are in the presence 
of things ancient and wonderful, and of thoughts other than those we know., 
63 
Myer's metaphor is also quite literal, since his theory of the subliminal self, at first named 
fisecondary' self, were drawn from his study of experiments involving 'automatic writing'. 64 While 
very much a Victorian in his determination for order, searching like George Eliot's Casaubon for 
the 'Key to All Mythologies', the confusion is not always contained by his theory. If our 'modem 
60 Leon Surette, The Birth of Modernism: Ezra Pound, TS Eliot, W. B. Yeats and the occult (Montreal & 
Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), p83; Susan Stanford Friedman, Penelope's We& 
gender, modernity, ILD. 's fiction (Cambridge: Camridge University Press), p. 11, p. 9; S. K. Tillyard, The 
impact of Modernism 1900-1920: early modernism and the arts and crafts movement in Edwardian 
England (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 54; Clive Bell, Art, (London: Chatto, 1914), p. 282. 
61 McDougall, 'Critical Notice of F. W. H. Myers' Human Personality', p. 515. 
62 Ibid. p. 526. 
63 Myers, 'The Subliminal Consciousness 1', p. 327. 
64 See Sonu Shamdasani, 'Automatic writing and the discovery of the unconscious', Spring, 54 (1993), 
100-131. 
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world' is produced as evidence of order beneath the confusion: his work, and the 'modem world' 
could equally point to confusion beneath any apparent order. 
Myers' description also reads like an account of modernist representation, paralleling the 
impressionistic narrative method which is resolved into order however seemingly disparate, by the 
unifying 'I' or perceiver. In Myers case the belief in order increasingly requires a leap of faith - 
from chaos. The link with aesthetics is made explicit as is the foregrounding of interpretative 
boundaries. It also shares a preoccupation, which we will see reappear as central to the modemist 
aesthetic doctrine, with pure outlines and the beauty of academic neatness. 
According to William James the 'world of mind' at the beginning of the twentieth century had 
forsaken 'the beauty of academic neatness'. Writing in 1901 he describes the idealist or materialist 
conception of mind typical of the late nineteenth-century and the recent change which he has 
identified: 
'A sort of sunlit terrace was exhibited on which [the mind] took its exercise. But 
where that terrace stopped, the mind stopped; and there was nothing farther left to tell 
of in this kind of philosophy but the brain and the other physical facts of nature on 
the one hand, and the absolute metaphysical ground of the universe on the other. 
But of late years the terrace has been overrun by romantic improvers, and to pass to 
their work is like going from classic to Gothic in architecture, where few outlines are 
pure and where uncouth forms lurk in the shadows. A mass of mental phenomena are 
now seen in the shrubbery beyond the parapet. Fantastic, ignoble, hardly human, and 
frankly non-human are some of these new candidates for psychological description. 
The menagerie and the madhouse, the nursery, the prison, and the hospital, have been 
made to deliver up their material. The world of mind is shown as something 
infinitely more complex than was suspected; and whatever beauties it may still 
possess, it has lost at any rate the beauty of academic neatness., 65 
once again we see the metaphorical housing of self, this time in a Gothic mansion - or folly. 
66 
William James is describing the passage from a classical to romantic aesthetic. But not only has 
the architecture of the building been elaborated or corrupted, (where the building represents the 
individual), also the phenomena of the mind have extended 'beyond the parapet', that is to say, 
beyond the prior limits assigned to the individual. The forms in the shrubbery are half-known, 
sinister, gothic: they are suggestive of his brother Henry James' Turn of the Screw with its 
ambiguous 'ghosts' lurking in the garden about which we wonder to whose mind they belong. We 
will see one particular forceful manifestation of this gothic making-present of the psyche, and its 
65 William James, 'Frederic Myers's Sen ice to Psychology', p. 14-15. 
66 See Roden Noel's response to Myers' 'subliminal' hypothesis: 'Now have we glided, peradventure 
unawares, into Alice's Wonderland, and are we perchance listening to the Hatter, the Duchess, and the 
White KnightT (Light, Nov. 1885; cited Shamdasani, 'Automatic Writing'. n. 52, p. 127). 
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accompanying terrors, in the writing of May Sinclair. The catalogue of 'new candidates' - 
grotesque additions of gargoyles and absurd follies to the traditional architecture - are also the 
persona non grata of Nordau's Degeneration. 
67 James does not deny there is a new form of 
aesthetic beauty, but marks the loss of the classical in form, the 'neat' and the ordered. He is 
introducing a new psychology which heralds a new aesthetic and indicating an anxiety about the 
traversing of limits, and forms of dissolution, which lie at its very centre. In his combined 
review/obituary of Myers, William James describes how in Myers' psychology 'nature is 
everywhere Gothic not classic. She forms a real jungle, where all things are provisional half-fitted 
to each other, and untidy'. 68 
In upsetting tidy distinctions between things, now only 'half-known', 'half-fittcd', we can see 
connections here, not just to stream of consciousness but also to the philosophy of Henri Bergson 
in which real time, or 'durde' is an indivisible flux which becomes tidied up, so to speak, into neat 
units by the spatialising effect of the intellect. Bergson's celebration of the 'untidy' or irrational is 
often cited in association with one strand of the modernist aesthetic. Wyndham Lewis strongly 
disapproved of what he called Bergson's 'time-mind': 
'As much as he enjoys the sight of things 'penetrating' and 'merging' do we enjoy 
the opposite picture of them standing apart - the wind blowing between them, and 
the air circulating freely in and out of them., 
69 
As Stephen Kem states, Lewis accused Bergson of conspiring 'to remove clean lines from art and 
separate faculties from human perception,. 
70 As we see Myers' subliminal psychology also 
endorsed the removal of clean lincs. 
71 
Making links 
The question 'At what limit of feet or inches does one identity stop and another beginT, which 
Myers asks in 'Further notes on the unconscious self' in 1885 finds its echo throughout literary 
modernism, perhaps most resonantly in Virginia Woolf's fiction. 
72 Compare Peggy's wondering, 
from The Years: 'Where does she begin and I end? [Peggy] thought... On they drove. They were 
two living people, separate bodies; two sparks of life enclosed in two separate bodies. '13 Similarly 
Myers endorsed open minds: 'men's minds must needs have a certain openness to other mysterious 
67 Max Nordau Degeneration (London: Heinemann, 1895). 
68 William James, 'Frederic Myers's Service to Psychology', p. 21. 
69 Wyndham Levvis, Time and lCestern Man, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1927) p. 428. 
70 Stephen Kern, The Culture of Space and Time, p. 27. 
71 Frederic Myers and Ilenri Bergson corresponded on the subject of telepathy: see Shamdasani, 
'Automatic Writing', n. 37, p. 125. 
72 'Further notes on the unconscious self', JSPR, (Dec. 1885), p. 124. Originally posed by Noel in the 
form of a nonsense or impossible question (Light, October 24,1885), Myers repeats the question to 
demonstrate that it is a legitimate query, and in its most material application 'a recognised form of 
medical inquiry in cases of monstrous birth' (Myers, 'Further notes', p. 125). 
73 Virginia Woolf, The Years (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 317. 
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transmissions[ ... I and in a sense to sit loose to the conception of Space, regarded as an obstacle to 
communication or cognition., 74 
When he asks, 'why is being an individual so much prouder an achieverneriff Myers is querying 
the worth of what was a primary assumption in Victorian England. 75 It was almost a tautological 
question, like asking why is it better to be good? In fact, in his support of man's openness to other 
minds, Myers is slightly misquoting William James' less rhetorical 'And why is the being-an- 
individual in some inaccessible metaphysical way so much prouder an achievement?, 76 James is 
distinguishing between the benefits of maintaining oneself 'as a closed individual' for practical 
purposes and an actual belief in this insularity of personal consciousness. James' position is the 
pragmatic maintenance of oneself 'as if' an individual. Inside these ideas is a potentially radical 
proposition: the individual as a self-enclosed unity or identity is a fiction or 'as if'. Time is 
demarcated for our convenience, but we experience it as fluid; likewise life is less chaotic if we 
represent ourselves as closed units even if it belies the true nature and experience of identity. The 
problem - one confronted or addressed in different ways by all the writers I will be discussing - is 
that to argue or suggest such a radical openness of selthood is to undermine the psychology which 
defined itself as a science of individual experience. Indeed, Jane Haff ison (the subject of the final 
chapter) was accused by Wyndham Lewis of displaying a 'perfect time-mind: an attitude which he 
conflates with 'the communistic or collectivist' and, further, with 'a ready contempt for a mere 
"individual. ", 77 
We can see this question of 'being an individual' as it emerges in William James' psychology. 
Initially, in The Principles of Psychology (1890) James established as beyond question the 
existence of 'personal consciousnesses, minds, selves, concrete particular I's and you's"I Thoughts, 
or states of consciousness, exist only in so far as they are attributed to a particular mind: 
'Each of these minds keeps its own thoughts to itself. There is no giving or bartering 
between them[ ... ] Absolute 
insulation, irreducible pluralism, is the law. It seems as 
if the elementary psychic fact were not thought or this thought or that thought, but 
my thought, every thought being owned. Neither contemporaneity, nor proximity in 
space, nor similarity of quality and content are able to fuse thoughts together which 
are sundered by this barrier of belonging to different personal minds. The breaches 
between such thoughts are the most absolute breaches in nature., 79 
74 Myers, Human Personality, ii, p. 262. 
75 F. W. H. Myers, 'The Principles of Psychology' [Review of William James, The Principles of 
Psychology], PSPR, 7 (1891-2) 111-33, p. 120. 
76 William James, The Principles of Psychology, i, p. 350. 
77 Wyndham Lewis, Time and Western Afan, p. 240-1. 
78 William James, The Principles of Psychology, i, p. 226. 
79 Ibid. 
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Yet this certitude does not remain steadfast ag , ainst 
his own subsequent inquiry. In The Varieties of 
Religious Experience (1902), an exchange across the breaches is no longer such a violation of 
natural order: rather he re-reads these barriers as man-made for pragmatic convenience. One of 
James' last essays 'The Confidences of a 'Psychical Researcher' published in 1909 gives as a final 
statement this belief. - 'there is a continuum of cosmic consciousness, against which our 
individuality builds but accidental fences, and into which our several minds plunge as into a 
mother-sea or reservoir. ' Individuality is sustained by barriers which are 'but accidental fences' 
erected by chance, suggesting the contingency of self-identity. 
These 'barriers' - 'accidental fences' - spanning both positions containing and breaching the self 
are, as we will see here, crucial to the modernist exploration of self, as crucial as, or a further 
extension to, the dissolution of selthood and its fragmentation for which modernism is most 
renowned. Compare Virginia Woolf s diary entry for 27 April 1925: 'people secrete an envelope 
which connects and protects them from others'. 
80 Or, again from the epigraph to this introduction, 
her plea at once to 'have no screens' and yet to maintain such: 'If we had not this device for 
shutting people off from our sympathies, we might, perhaps, dissolve utterly. Separateness would 
be impossible. ' In Principles of Psychology, still maintaining the belief that 'unity is the rule of 
each man's consciousness, ' James explicitly questions assumptions as to the 'definitively closed 
nature of our personal consciousness': 'As for insulation, it would be rash, in view of the 
phenomena of thought-transference, mesmeric influence and spirit-control, [ ... ] to be too sure about 
that point either. '81 This was not just James' observation, but emerged as a more widely held 
speculation: 
'If we are not entirely mistaken, the labours of psychical research are calling this 
notion of a psychically hermetically closed imaginal private universe into 
question., 82 
This - one could say - undermines the idea of a psychology: if we are not sure about where 11' 
ends, how can we say where the world begins? Or, returning again to William James' question: 
'What are the conditions of individuation or insulation in this mother-seaT 
Varieties of Religious Experience is almost entirely devoted to interpreting personal religious 
experiences which question the 'boundaries of our individuality'. Principles of Psychology, written 
before James encountered Myers' subliminal consciousness, would later be termed 'ordinary 
psychology' by James: it is interesting to see here how he accounts for experiences which would 
subsequently prove a subliminal life. 
83 He presents the psychological, non-idealistic view of 
thought, in other words objects do not just exist through thinking them: on the one hand there is 
80 The Diary of Virginia Wootf, iii, p. 12. 
81 William James, The Principles of Psychology, i, p. 350. 
82 Anonymous 'Review' of H. Wildon Carr, The New Idealist Movement in Philosophy (1918) in Quest, 
10 (Oct. 1918-19), p-280. 
83 William James, Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 232. 
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an external reality and on the other hand there are thoughts about external reality. This is an 
irreducible dualism (which we will see much challenged by May Sinclair's defence of idealism): 
'Neither gets out of itself or into the other, neither in any way is the other, neither makes the 
other., 84 However, there are occasions when these irreducible distinction between thought and 
object, self and other are lost and a dissolution of boundaries is experienced. One such instance is 
cited as a physiological side-effect of an anaesthetic: 'one has at a certain moment a vague, limitless 
infinite feeling -a sense of existence in general without the least trace of distinction between the 
me and the not me., 85 James propose3 it as the re-emergence of a 'primordial condition': a 
consciousness of objects which is unmediated by the reflective, self-conscious condition which is 
our habitual adult state of mind. In the primordial condition the object world is not experienced as 
separate from oneself, 'the me and the not me' remain undiscriminated, a childlike state which we 
can see Freud inheriting and incorporating into his model of the child's earliest states of mind. The 
primordial is succeeded by a differentiated relationship, where 'the me and not me' are experienced 
as suitably different. An experience which would be cited by Myers, and later entertained by James, 
as an example of intimacy with a greater consciousness, or beyond, is here described as a condition 
into which 'we seem to lapse', a 'primitive' state to which we return when the boundaries and 
distinctions acquired by the adult mind are forsaken. Whether this state is a lapse or an attainment 
is a question which will be examined by each of the writers to be discussed here. 
As John Mepharn puts it in relation to Woolf's 'Modem Fiction', arguing that she was in fact 
frustrated with the passive impressionism of the stream of consciousness method, - 'She is not 
interested in the stream-of-consciousness for its own sake[ ... ]It only concerns her when it sweeps 
us "beyond" what are for her the trivial details of the material life., 
86 On Joyce's Ulysses, she 
wrote that we feel trapped within a self which 'never embraces or creates what is outside itself and 
beyond'. 87 Yet as we will also see, this openness carries its own ambivalence - it can be imbued 
with a significance or dreaded as a gulf into which we dissolve. The beyond might not always be 
more profound than, nor even reliably beyond the self. Despite recommending Joyce's 'lightening 
flashes of significance', Woolf also described reading Joyce as claustrophobic and ascribed her 
impression to 'our sense of being in a bright yet narrow room, confined and shut in, rather than 
enlarged and set free, to some limitation imposed by the method as well as by the mind'. 88 To cite 
Mepham again, the 'beyond' can refer to hidden depths and transcendent reality; Woolf turned her 
attention to both: 'towards the unconscious and towards the transcendent., 89 As I will argue in the 
Evelyn Underhill chapter these two categories can with difficulty be told apart. 
84 William James, The Principles of Psychology, i, p. 218. 
85 Professor Iferzen (Revue Philosophique, 21, p. 671) q. v. James, Principles of Psychology, i, p. 273; also 
q. v. Myers, 'The Principles of Psychology' [Review of William James, The Principles of Psychology], 
p. 115. 
86 John Mepham, Virginia Wool(- a Literary Life, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), p. 73. 
87 Woolf, Collected Essays, ii, ed. Leonard Woolf, (Chatto & Windus, 1966-7), p. 108. 
88 Woolf, 'Modem Fiction', The Common Reader. (London: Illogarth, 1925), p. 191. 
89 Mepham, Virgina Woolf, p. 119. 
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In Woolf's 'An Unwritten Novel' (1920): the narrator imitates the subject in order to understand 
her, to experience her meaning rather than construct it out of material details: 'She begins to 
become her'. 90 Hermione Lee describes the 'story's ideal of a free union between writer and 
subject, art and life. [ ... ]a relinquishing and refinding of the self through the entry 
into another 
life'. 91 Much more emphasis has been placed on the first than second half of this quotation, on the 
loss rather than connectedness of self. Woolf's quote can be compared with Vernon Lee's empathic 
identifications and Myers' opening up of the question of what we 'identify with ourselves'. In fact 
Hermione Lee marks 'An Unwritten Novel' as Woolf's rite of passage into modernism, opening up 
new possibilities of representation and broaching the dangers. In her diary Woolf wrote: 'arrived at 
some idea of a new form for a new noveQ ... ]I figure that the approach will be entirely 
different 
this time: no scaffolding; scarcely a brick to be seen., 
92 Woolf's hostility to the category of the 
ego is famous. It might be then that already here Woolf s new form for a new novel' had the 
elimination - or unhousing - of the ego in mind with a view to a self-traversing empathy. 
Hermione Lee describes the 'longing for loss of self, entry into another, is one of the deepest plots 
of [Woolf s] books'. 93 
This 'vague, limitless infinite feeling' with which William James represents the state of non- 
distinction between the 'me and the not-me' can be said to haunt, or grace, the work of Vernon Lee 
(1856-1935), Evelyn Underhill (1875-1941), May Sinclair (1863-1946), Dion Fortune (1890-1946) 
and Jane Harrison (1850-1928), whether interpreted as a physiological, mystical, psychological, 
aesthetic or socialising moment. I have concentrated so much on William James and Frederic 
Myers since we find within their thought the same preoccupations which we will see surface in 
these writers, each one of whom bears their own individual inflection of these concerns and each 
one extends their insights. Exploring the 'me and not-me' invariably involves relationships 
between self and object world, the conscious and unconscious, even mind and body. As we will 
see, negotiating what is me and not me takes us into considerations of empathy (Vernon Lee); the 
transcendent (Evelyn Underhill); madness and sublimation (May Sinclair); the occult (Dion 
Fortune); and the social as a form of connectedness (Jane Harrison). 
If the representation of marginal states of consciousness is intrinsic to the literature of modernism, 
interpretation of these altered states, or edges can be refigured through the reading of less canonical 
writers, writers who were explicitly engaged in debates concerning the nature of self and its 
relationship to the unknown. The aesthetic questions of modernism dovetail into the theoretical 
arguments of the writers in this study to suggest that the psychic underpinnings of modernism can 
90 Ilennione Lee, Virgina Wootf, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1996), p. 406. 
91 Ibid. p. 407. 
92 January 1920; Woolf, Diary, ii p. 14-13. See Wooirs letter to Ethyl Smyth, July 1934: 'the state of 
reading consists in the complete elimination of the ego' (The Letters of Virginia Woolf, v, ed. Nigcl 
Nicolson and Joanne Trautmann, London: llogarth Press, 1975-80, p. 319). 
93 11crmione Lee, Virginia Woolf, p. 410. 
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be found in more eccentric discourses of the self than usually maintained. Just as the 
psychoanalytic account of the self has dominated our understanding of the psyche, at least in 
academic institutions, so our conceptualising of the self in the modernist period has become 
colonised by the better known canonical figures, generating a way of thinking about the limits of 
the psyche, and its relation to the outside which is both literally and metaphorically circumscribed. 
I suggest that more familiar terms of modernist aesthetic debate - stream of consciousness, 
fragmentation and dissolution of self - offer just one way of permuting the binaries and that, if we 
look at the writers examined here, other imaginative possibilities are available. 
As we have seen, Katherine Mansfield refers to the 'rage of confession, of autobiography' as if this 
is the site where self is both most interrogated, or attacked, and most preserved. While 
autobiographical writing may be the genre most conscious of self, at times restrictingly self- 
conscious, in this thesis I argue that questioning of the 'boundaries of individuality' or what 'we 
identify with ourselves' can be traced beyond autobiographical writing by women to fiction and 
non-fictional texts. Whether philosophical, theological, esoteric, anthropological or psychological, 
a related but often unique set of questions are being invoked. All of the women writers in this 
thesis are writers of non-f ictional texts; all, with the exception of Jane Harrison, also write fiction. 
In Modernisms: A Lilerary Guide, Peter Nicholls distinguishes between an earlier and later 
modernist aesthetic. The former, represented chiefly by T. S. Eliot, Ezra Pound and Wyndham 
Lewis, is characterised by a concern 'with outlines and borders which protect against the 'chaos' of 
subjectivity, ' its privileging of an authorial impersonality, and an emphasis upon constructing-, the 
self from the outside, in terms of locating it in a cultural tradition and historical process. 
94 This 
preference for objectification and distance, over identification and empathy ineradically carries a 
gender politics: it can be interpreted as a defence against the mimetic tendencies presumed to be 
represented by the masses (associated with women) whereby the collapsing of the self into the 
other, in which the other was usually female, carried a threat to male autonomy. 
95 Nicholls cites 
T. S. Eliot's critique of writing which fails to differentiate self from other: Woolf's writing, Eliot 
argues, '[makes] its art by feeling and contemplating the feeling, rather than the object which has 
excited it or the object into which the feeling might be made'. 
96 Nicholls reads the second line of 
development in twenties' modernism as being concerned with the 'contents of consciousness' and 
the 'inner movements of sensibility' in response to the former canon of 'high' modernism: this 
strand is represented by the women modernists, Woolf, II. D. and Gertrude Stein. Yet even if we 
take Peter Nicholls' distinctions between the 'Men of 1914' and the women modernists, the frame 
which he puts around those women's challenge to male modernism is a cautious one which avoids 
94 Peter Nicholls, Modernism: A Literary Guide (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), p. 196. 
95 Ibid. p. 251. 
96 T. S. Eliot, 'London Letter', Dial, 71 (Aug. 1921), 213-7, p. 216-7. 
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the complexity and disturbing ramifications of what a mind becomes for them. 97 Furthermore, as 
we will see, concern with consciousness frequently showed itself as a preoccupation with the outer 
limits rather than as more often suggested, the inner contents of the mind. 
In each of the writers I have chosen we see links between modernist engagement with consciousness 
and their concerns. Each one adds vitally to the discussion on modernism by expanding the 
boundaries of the mind. None of this, however, happens without difficulty. Every one opens up the 
boundaries of the psyche beyond limits which seem, ultimately unmanageable for themselves. 
Firstly, in the case of Vernon Lee, what I will call her 'empathic aesthetic' in its exploration of 
ideas of connectedness between self and world, has, I suggest, a hitherto unacknowledged relevance 
to the modernist aesthetic. Vernon Lee's interest in psychological aesthetics and the concept of 
aesthetic empathy marks an explicit commitment to exploring the connection between self and 
world; yet her writing witnesses a failure to sustain the idea of such connectedness. A reading of 
the work of Evelyn Underhill in the second chapter will show that mysticism carries significant 
links to modernist aesthetics in an uneasy relation which belongs to and resists the psychological 
component of that aesthetic. May Sinclair was particularly interested in what she described as 'the 
Borderland': occupied by psychic powers, this is the region where 'Mings happen'98. As the third 
chapter suggests, the aesthetic, ethical and spiritual 'crystalline' ideals sustained in May Sinclair's 
philosophical and critical writings are disturbed by her own fiction as it reveals undercurrents which 
her allegiances to Imagism, idealism and the psychoanalytic concept of sublimation, were designed 
to avert. 
Leon Surette in The Birth of Modernism: Ezra Pound, T. S. Eliot, W. B. Yeats and the Occult aptly 
refers to a "scholarly phobia of the occult"99 and proposes a rehabilitation of the subject for literary 
scholarship through a study of occultism as "metaphysical speculation.. about the nature of 
ultimate reality and of our relation to it. "100 Dion Fortune, whose writing we read in the fourth 
chapter as having strong links with H. D. 's visionary aesthetic, represents a specifically modem 
occult engagement with the self, which extends the realm of the unified T further and perhaps more 
successfully than the other writers discussed here. What modemist narrative does in its stress on 
subjective states is precisely give them a concrete and embodied form which is very close to what 
Dion Fortune is doing. In the fifth chapter, we see Jane Harrison's view of the T as always 
embedded, beyond itself, in empathic connections on which she bases her own vision of social life, 
but as I argue, the T reasserts itself against her more outreaching, self-transcendcnt impulse. We 
see Jane Harrison lose faith in her unique conception of a social anti-individualism, in part under 
97 'Men of 1914' is Wyndham Lewis' phrase from Blasting and Bombadiering: An Autobiography 
(1937; repr. London: Calder & Boyars, 1967), p. 252. 
98 May Sinclair A Defence of Idealism: Some Questions and Conclusions, (London: Macmillan, 1917), 
p. 350. 
99 Surette, The Birth of Modernism, p 16 1. 
100 Ibid. p13. 
Introduction 24 
the burden of the very Freudianism that has so come to dominate modem versions of the psyche 
and their literary-critical counterparts. 
Finally, by way of introduction, it is worth pointing out that there were a number of lived points 
of contact, both personal and intellectual, between the writers I explore here: May Sinclair and 
Evelyn Underhill shared a friendship which included commenting on each other's manuscripts - 
each acknowledge the other, respectively, in their major works, A Defence of Idealism (1912) and 
Mysticism (1911). May Sinclair also cites "Jane Harrison is my authority": we find a copy of 
Harrison's lecture 'Rationalism and Religious Reaction'(1919) among Sinclair's private papers, and 
Harrison is further referenced in the unpublished 'Way of Sublimation'. 10 1 Further. Harrison's 
Ancient Art and Ritual (1913) is cited by Vernon Lee as an authority upon 'art-evolutional 
questions' in The Beautiful (1913): Lee and Harrison shared mutual friends and did themselves 
correspond. 102 Finally Dion Fortune, in defining a modem occultism, draws upon Underhill's 
study of mysticism. Each of these women were an acknowledged authority in their own discipline 
during their lifetime. As Virginia Woolf remarks in A Room of One's Own: 'women no longer 
write novels solely. There are Jane Harrison's books on Greek archaeology; Vernon Lee's books on 
aesthetics [ ... ] There are 
books on all sorts of subjects which a generation ago no woman could 
have touched. 'l 03 
101 Sinclair, A Defence of Idealism, p. 274. Sinclair cites Evelyn Underhill as 'one of the most 
distinguished authorities on Western Mysticism' (Defence, p. 281). 
102 Mary Beard, The Invention of Jane Harrison (Cambridge, Mass: I larvard University Press, 2000), 
pp. 87-94. Vernon Lee recommends Jane Harrison's Ancient Art and Ritual for 'art-cvolutional questions' 
(The Beautiful: an introduction to psychological aesthetics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1913). 
103 Woolf, A Room of One's Own, (1929; LondonGrafton, 1977). p. 76. 
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'Our own potentialities regrouped in our mind': 
Vernon Lee's empathic aesthetic 
'What would the world be, he said to himself.. without "I" in itTI 
'Man is certainly not the centre of all things, but I do not see what else is to be his centre 
save himselP, 2 
'Outside authority' or 'inner voice'? 
in his 1923 essay 'The Function of Criticism', T. S. Eliot defines his aesthetic according to whether the 
artist owes his allegiance to an 'Inner Voice' or'Outside Authority'. 
3 Reiterating the well-known tenets 
of 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', Eliot advocates the artist's submission to an existing literary 
canon: 'There is ... something outside of the artist 
to which he owes allegiance, a devotion to which he 
must surrender and sacrifice himself in order to earn and to obtain his unique position. '4 Such an 
6allegiance' bespeaks a martyrdom of individuality, requiring extinction of the personal on the shrine of 
an external authority, 'something outside'. Self-abdication in favour of a classical tradition was not, of 
course, an undisputed measure of artistic excellence in the modernist period. In an exchange of articles 
between T. S. Eliot and John Middleton Murry during 1923-24, published respectively in the Criterion 
and the Adelphi, the rival poles of both classicism and romanticism were championed in the name of a 
modernist aesthetic. 5 David Goldie suggests that the two critics manoeuvred each other into 
I Virginia Woolf, The Years (1937; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 230. 
2 Vernon Lee, Pital Lies, p. 193. Vernon Lee, born Violet Paget (1856-1935). 
3 T. S. Eliot, 'The Function of Criticism', Criterion, 2, (Oct. 1923), 31-42; repr. Selected Prose of TS. Eliot, cd. 
Frank Kermode (London: Faber & Faber, 1975), p. 72. Eliot borrows these terms from John Middleton Murry: 
'The English writer, the English divine, the English statesman, inherit no rules froom their forbears: they 
inherit only this: a sense that in the last resort they must depend upon the inner voice. ... I Catholicism stands for the principle of unquestioned spiritual authority outside the individual; that is also the principle of 
classicism in literature' (J. M. Murry, 'On Fear; and on Romanticism', Adelphi, 1, Sept. 1923,269-277, p. 275- 
6). 
4 T. S. Eliot, 'The Function of Criticism', p. 68. 
5 J. M. Murry, 'On Fear; and on Romanticism', Adelphi, I (Sept 1923), 269-277; 'More About Romanticism', 
Adelphi, I (Dec 1923), 557-69; 'Romanticism and the Tradition', Criterion, 2 (April 1924), 272-95; T. S. 
Eliot, 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', Egoist, (Sept. and Dec. 1919); 'The Function of Criticism', 
Criterion, (Oct. 1923); repr. Selected Prose of TS. Eliot, ed. Frank Kermode (London: Faber & Faber, 1975). 
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formulating a distinctive manifesto with the terms 'classicism' and 'romanticism' contributing to 
polarising a debate which was itself less than clear-cut. 
6 For the sake of Eliot's argument classicism and 
romanticism signalled an obvious choice between 'the complete and the fragmentary, the adult and the 
immature, the orderly and the chaotic. ' Eliot's endorsement of classicism answered an equivalent 
commitment from Murry to a more personal, self-validating aesthetic which he in turn considers a mark 
of maturity, and defines as 'a search for reality through the self, and an acceptance of what one discovers 
there... Romanticism is the discovery and discrimination of inward reality'. 
7 Murry charges the 
principle of classicism in literature as standing for 'unquestioned spiritual authority outside the 
individual' and it is in picking up these standards of battle laid down in Murry's essay, provocatively 
entitled 'On Fear: And On Romanticism', that Eliot defines the aesthetic difference as a question of 
allegiance to an 'Inner Voice' or 'Outside Authority', sovereign leadership or self-rule. 
As a supporter of 'what Mr Murry calls Classicism', Eliot maintains the belief 'that men cannot get on 
without giving allegiance to something outside themselves'. 
8 In the artist's case this is 'the existing 
order' or aesthetic tradition; similarly the critic's purpose is 'to arrive at something outside of ourselves 
which we may provisionally call the truth'. 
9 For Murry, those whose loyalty is to an 'Inner Voice' are 
beholden not to a literary tradition, but to the responsibilities incurred through the vicissitudes of self- 
knowledge. Murry maintains those who 'dig deep enough in their pursuit of self-knowledge... will 
come upon a self that is universal. '[Eliot's italics] 
10 Murry's metaphor of excavation represents 
romantic introspection as a purposeful activity which leads not to chaos but to a democracy in which 
the artist's 'inner voice' ultimately speaks for Everyman. Yet Eliot recommends an aesthetic restraint 
towards such voyages of inner discovery: 'there are definite positions to be taken' by the artist or critic 
which preclude exploration of the psyche in favour of adherence to an outside structure. 
11 For Eliot, 
self-rule heralds anarchy: he conflates the 'Inner Voice' with desire, or "doing as one likes", 
rechristening it the noise of 'Whiggery', in dissenting established authority: aesthetic, secular and 
spiritual. 12 In Eliot's exaggerated schema, supporters of the 'inner voice' tune in to the yell of a mob 
and the base urgings of primitive man: they 'ride ten in a compartment to a football match at Swansea, 
listening to the inner voice, which breatles the eternal message of vanity, fear, and just'. 
13 According 
to Eliot, the inner voice is inarticulate, breathing only the mutiny of the instincts. In contrast, outside 
6 On the imprecision of the terms classicism and romanticism in the early 1920's see David Goldie, A Critical 
Difference: T. S. Eliot and J. Middleton Murry in English Literary Criticism 1919-1928 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1998), pp-96-119- 
7 Murry, 'On Fear; and On Romanticism', p. 276. 
8 T. S. Eliot, 'The Function of Criticism', p. 70. Erik Svarny describes the opposition between the Catholic- 
Classicist doctrine of outside spiritual authority and Protestant-Noncon form i st 'inner voice' as informing 
nearly all Eliot's critical judgements ('The Men of 1914'. T. S. Eliol and Early Modernism, Milton Keynes: 
Open University Press, 1988), p. 173. 
9 T. S. Eliot, 'The Function of Criticism', p. 76. 
10 Murry, 'On Fear; and On Romanticism', p. 275; q. v. Eliot, 'The Function of Criticism', p. 7 1. 
II Eliot, 'The Function of Criticism', p. 70. 
12 Ibid. p. 73, p. 71. 
13 Ibid. p. 71. 
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authority is associated with truth: impersonal, perhaps metaphysical, in all accounts 'outside', or 'other' 
to the self. 
In Eliot's argument allegiance to an external authority or non-ego object predicates an aesthetic which 
remains unswamped by a chaotic subjectivity, a self-negation which intends to avoid egoism and the 
unconscious. In Modernisms: a literary guide, Peter Nicholls outlines a preoccupation of 
Anglo/American modernism with fixing the self in relation to boundaries and objects: the artist is 
depicted as '[going] in search of objects sufficient to the task of stabilising the self, closing it to the 
turbulent movements of desire by discovering that desire as the property of some external object'. 
14 In 
place of the ventriloquists' art of projection, Eliot in these essays locates desire internally, yet 
determines that its voice remain unheard. Nicholls describes Eliot's 'refusal to collapse art into life': an 
insistence upon preserving the autonomy of the art form from bodily and psychic disruptions. 
15 
However, the modernist aesthetic betrays an inherent tendency towards solipsism, repeatedly foundering 
upon the self despite attempts at self-renunciation. In a later essay, now more 'Whiggish' himself, Eliot 
recalls poetry's rhythmic origins in the primitive drumbeat and suggests that poetry can speak to 'the 
deeper, unnamed feelings which form the substratum of our being, to which we rarely penetrate; for our 
lives are mostly a constant evasion of ourselves'. 
16 Yet if we are always practising self-avoidance do we 
ever truly escape ourselves? As Maud Ellmann deftly argues, the self survives its repudiation by Eliot 
due to the conceptual instability of 'the doctrine of impersonality': 'in "Tradition and the Individual 
Talent", the terms "self-sacrifice", "depersonal izat ion", "continual extinction" purport to define 
impersonality, but really launch it on a metaphoric odyssey. '17 
If Eliot's defining of his aesthetic position in tenns of inner voice or outside authority lacks precision, 
he preempts any cavilling over his enlisting of such loose terms: 'I am aware that "outside" and "inside" 
provide unlimited opportunity for quibbling, and that no psychologist would tolerate a discussion 
which shuffled such base coinage. '18 However, the 'base coinage' is sufficiently adequate both for 
Eliot's purpose ('If you find that you have to imagine it as outside, then it is outside) and for my own 
intention to show how the modernist tendency to map an aesthetic founded upon the relationship 
between self and world was relevant to, and partly determined by, contemporaneous psychological 
debates: 'outside' and 'inside' were the counters with which both aesthetic discussion and psychological 
investigation were plotted (in addition to metaphysical distinctions). Yet, Eliot's parenthetical 
acknowledgement of the limitations of such terms also registers their problematic differentiation: his 
aesthetic is founded upon a fragile terminology forever subject to debate. In this chapter I take up the 
14 Peter Nicholls, Afodernisms: A Literary Guide (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1995), p. 194. 
15 Ibid. p. 197. 
16 T. S. Eliot, The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism, lectures first given in 1932, rcpr. in Kcrmode (cd. ), 
Selected Prose of TS-Eliot, p. 95-6. 
17 Maud Ellmann, The Poetics of Impersonality: TS. Eliot and F--ra Pound (Brighton: I larvcster Press, 1987), 
p. 39. 
18 T. S. Eliot, 'The Function of Criticism', p. 70. 
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'unlimited opportunity for quibbling' offered by such terms through a reading of what I will call 
Vernon Lee's 'empathic aesthetic', which I suggest, in its exploration of ideas of connectedness between 
self and world, has a hitherto unacknowledged relevance to the modernist aesthetic. Vernon Lee's study 
of empathy offers alternative ways of permuting these binaries of inside, outside, self and world so 
crucial to the articulation of modernist literary doctrine. Vernon Lee's interest in psychological 
aesthetics and the concept of aesthetic empathy marks an explicit commitment to exploring the 
connection between self and world, inner voice and outer authority; yet her writing witnesses a failure to 
sustain the idea of such connectedness, finally reaching a position where all relations to the outer world, 
as an artist or individual, are determined by our own past experience. The empathic relation plays itself 
out as a charade for an unremitting solipsism which never reaches beyond the personal, or inner voice. 
Her observations make explicit the modernist reversion towards self, a tendency which has been well 
documented in the modernist period. At the same time the resonance of past experience, as personal 
memory or tradition, despite the intrinsic failure of the self to connect authentically in the present with 
an outside world, speaks of a temporal recurrence, which allows its own form of connectedness beyond 
the self. Lee therefore gives her own unique inflection to Eliot's terms. If empathy reverts to self, you 
can still be connected to a reality beyond self The distinction between inner and outer realms of 
selfliood are not always so clear. 
Psychological aesthetics: 'The practical creation of a new subject' 
The debate between Eliot and Murry, and the inconsistencies within each of their arguments, bears 
witness to the 'persistent ambiguity in early modernism' identified by Michael Levenson. 
19 A 
Geneology of Modernist Doctrine disentangles modernist fidelities both to an individualistic, and 
impersonal aesthetic - the inner voice and outer authority - demonstrating that modernism was not only 
heterogeneous in its inception but that the supposedly divergent artistic agenda were less discrete than 
was convenient for their articulation. T. E. Hulme, spokesperson for Imagism and a modernist theory of 
art, is foremost amongst those modernists whose allegiances were subject to divided loyalties. In 1914 
Hulme declares that form should be autonomous: a 'striving towards structure and away from the 
messiness and confusion of nature and natural things., 
20 Yet in the sketched outline for an unwritten 
bookadddressing 'Modem Theories of Art, he identifies the central issue for aesthetics to be an enquiry 
into the nature and definition of aesthetic emotion, asking: what is the emotion we associate with 
beauty? how do we define aesthetic emotion? 21 This focus upon subjective feeling response as relevant 
to an understanding of beauty was inspired by Hulme's acquaintance with the German psychologists 
Theodor Lipps and Karl Groos during a pre-war visit to Germany; their writing in the f ield of aesthetics 
19 Michael Levenson, A Genealogy of Modernism (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1984), p. 135. 
20 T. E. 1 fulme, 'Modem Art' in Speculations: Essays on Humanism and the Philosophy of Art, cd. I lcrbert Read 
(London: Kegan Paul, 1924), p. 96. 
21 'Method (a) Taking modem arts as known, ask this question - Is there any specific emotion which 
characterises them all and found in no other activity? -a specifically aesthetic emotion, the experiencing of 
which constitutes beauty [ ... ] if there is, then what is the nature of this emotion, how can 
it be dcrincd; this the 
problem of aesthetics and the one this book principally deals with' (T. E. Ilulme, 'The Plan for A Book on 
Modern Theories of Art', Appendix B, Speculations, pp. 2614, p. 262). 
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he describes as 'astonishing and intensely interesting literature entirely unknown in England. '22 
Hulme's questions indicate the unprecedented nature of this approach which is 'astonishing' for 
studying psychological response rather than forming a taxonomy of objects. Described by T. E. Hulme 
as 'the practical creation of a new subject' -a convergence of the new science of psychology with 
" connoisseurship' - it was an aesthetics founded upon the experience of the subject rather than the 
attributes of the object. 23 Unsympathetic to the modernist dictum to keep art separate from life, it 
focused not only on feeling but listened to the inner voice of the reader, or spectator, bypassing the 
allegiances of the artist. Art existed in its beholding as much as its creation; it was an aesthetics which 
depended upon relationship, analysing the specific connection between individual and object. 
Hulme's description of the literature of psychological aesthetics as 'entirely unknown in England' is not 
entirely accurate: in 1912, the same year that T. E. Ilulme became enamoured with the German 
psychologists, Vernon Lee, an Englishwoman resident in Italy, published a collection of essays, some 
written as early as 1897, entitled Beauty and Ugliness and other studies in psychological aesthetics. 
Using the technique of 'aesthetic introspection' Vernon Lee noted the effect of art objects upon an 
experiencing subject. 24 These inquiries into the nature of aesthetic emotion and the process of 
perceiving form provide a detailed engagement with thequestions prospectively raised by Ilulme (what 
is the emotion we associate with beauty? how do we define aesthetic emotion? ), and can be read as 
elaborating a previously unacknowledged psychic subtext of modernism. Psychological aesthetics was, 
in Vernon Lee's words, a 'recent and immature' science; to some extent it never fully came of age, 
hampered by a speculative basis when the developing science of psychology demanded increasingly 
rigourous verification and competing with Freud's theories of the mind which more compellingly 
occupied popular attention. 
25 It was a hybrid discipline -'the most God-forsaken little comer of mental 
science, avoided equally by psychologists who have no aesthetic perceptions and by art critics who have 
no psychological education' -a no-man's land, in which Vernon Lee was peculiarly well-suited to take 
up female occupation. 
26 in the preface to 011ilie (1883), Vernon Lee's f irst fictional work, she identifies 
herself as an 'Essayist... an amphibious creature', recognising her versatility and nonconformity: the 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Vernon Lee and Clementina Anstruther Thomson, Beauty and Ugliness and other studies in psychological 
aesthetics (London: John Lane, Bodley Ifead, 1912), pviii. Ilulme did in fact know of Lee's work, but did not 
agree with her conclusions: the notes for hulmc's unwritten book include plans for a chapter on 'Lipps - the 
greatest writer on aesthetics - the characteristics of his method - Vernon Lee's incorrect account of it; What is 
Einfuhling? ' (Hulme, Speculations, p. 264). 
25 Ibid. p. 2. Ileinz Kohut notes introspection and empathy - the method of psychological aesthetics - as the 
'observational tools of a new science', the use of which was the 'first step' towards Freud's thcorising of the 
unconscious (Ileinz Kohut, How Does Analysis Cure?, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 21 1). 
Freud admits to Wilhelm Fliess that 'I found the substances of my insights stated quite clearly in Lipps, 
perhaps rather more so than I would like' (31 Aug. 1898, The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm 
Fliess 1887-1904, cd. Jeffrey Moussaief Masson, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 325). 
26 Vernon Lee, 'Introduction' to Richard Semon, Alnemic Psychology, trans. Bella Duffy (London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1923), p. 3. 
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amphibian inhabits contradictory mediums, crossing from one discipline to the other, truly at home in 
both and neither habits. 27 
Not only was it remarkable for a woman to engage in the debates provoked by psychological aesthetics, 
more idiosyncratic was that Vernon Lee's 'aesthetics' resulted from a collaboration between herself and a 
close friend Clementina Anstruther-Thomson, known as Kit. Their combined practical experiment and 
theory initially produced 'Beauty and Ugliness', a long article published in the Contemporary Review 
of 1897, followed by a questionnaire presented to the Psychology Congress in Paris (1901); Beauty and 
Ugliness (1912) collects together an annotated update of this early essay with more detailed accounts of 
the current theories in psychological aesthetics, and excerpts from their gallery diaries. After their 
partnership ceased, Lee also published The Beautiful (1913): a short introduction to aesthetic 
psychology, and edited Art and Man (1924): a posthumous collection of Anstruther-Thomson's 
unpublished writings. In addition to applying psychological aesthetics to the visual arts, Vernon Lee 
investigated aesthetic response to music in Music and Its Lovers (1932), and to literature in The 
Handling of Words (1923). In keeping with the bias of psychological aesthetics, The Handling of 
Words is a 'literary psychology' which discusses the reader's experience rather than the writer's craft. 28 
For her close analyses of randomly selected passages in this text, untypical of the current literary 
criticism, David Lodge nominates Vernon Lee as 'one of the unacknowledged prophets of modern 
criticism' and David Seed describes her as moving towards 'a Saussurean position' in her attention to 
the meanings produced by structure. 29 
Yet apart from aspects of The Handling of Words, these texts, which address themselves to the study of 
a psychological form of aesthetics, have been described as 'among the most dated of [Lee's] 
writings'. 30 Indeed even at the time of their publication they were considered esoteric. Roger Fry was a 
rare admirer of Vernon Lee's work on aesthetics, writing in 1933 'to thank you for having written that 
fascinating book of Music Lovers. It is full of new and stimulating ideas and opens up all sorts of new 
possibilities for aesthetic enquiries. ' lie stresses how much he has always enjoyed her work and his 
regret that 'you have never had anything like the recognition you deserve'. 3 I As Fry rightly 
acknowledges, her work on the psychology of aesthetics was not widely read, yet in her lifetime Vernon 
Lee was well-known as a Victorian essayist and fiction writer of formidable intellect (for which II. G. 
Wells described her 'a marvellous brain clothed as a woman'). Until recently her work has tended to be 
consigned to brief citation, or complete omission, and is only now gaining the attention it deserves. 32 
27 Oitilie: An Eighteenth Century 411 (London: T. Fishcr Unwin, 1883), p. 7. 
28 Vernon Lee, The Handling of Words and other studies in literary psychology (London: John Lane, 1923), 
P. viii. 
29 David Lodge, The Novelist at the Crossroads (London: Routlcdgc & Kcgan Paul, 1971), p. 275; David 
Seed, 'Introduction' to Vernon Lee, The Handling of Words (1923) (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 1992), p. xii. 
30 Seed, 'Introduction', p. v. 
31 Letter, Roger Fry to Vernon Lee, June 8,1933, Vernon Lee Papers, Special Collections, Miller Library, Colby 
College, Waterville, Maine. 
32 There is no entry for Vernon Lee in Cambridge Guide to Literature in English (cd. Ian Ousby, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), while the Bloomsbury Guide to Women's Literature (cd. Claire Buck, 
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The reviewer Desmond Macarthy explained that if Lee suffered from a lack of readers it was 'because 
most people prefer a compendious form of statement, and do not enjoy chasing an idea as it flies. They 
will only attend to it when it is pinned, set and classified, like a butterfly in an etymologist's drawer, 
while "Vernon Lee" takes them out, over hill and dale, brandishing her net., 33 Vernon Lee's 
enthusiastic pursuit of an idea ran to a verbosity disdained by Virginia Woolf who notes in her diary of 
1919: 'Nor can one let the pen write without guidance; for fear of becoming slack & untidy like Vernon 
Lee. her ligaments are too loose for my taste., 34 Yet if Lee's narrative limbs at times lacked cohesion, 
Woolf elsewhere suggests the author herself suffers from excessive resolution of form, describing 
Vernon Lee as having 'completed her shape and was sun-dried and shell-like'. 35 
Vemon Lee's first work, Studies ofthe 18M century in Italy (1880), was published at the precocious age 
of twenty-four and she continued to write, living an increasingly reclusive life in Italy, until her death 
in 1941, publishing collections of travel sketches, short stories and critical essays, biography, novels 
and two dramatic works. In addition to her published works, I draw substantially on Vernon Lee's 
unpublished writings housed in Colby College Library in Maine, which include a series of large 
notebooks faithfully kept between 1926-36 in which Vernon Lee recorded her responses to her current 
reading, with book titles and authors extensively listed in the flyleaf to each notebook, and from which 
Vernon Lee compiled a series of notes on psychology, 'The Lore of the Ego, and 'Psychology Essays'. 
These manuscripts make explicit Vernon Lee's continued engagement in questions of how the self and 
world are constituted in relationship to one another, her particular exploration of the edges of the 
mind. 36 
Understanding empathy 
In his sketch-plan for the unwritten book 'Modem Theories of Art', Ilulme notes his intention to 
include two chapters on the German psychologist Theodor Lipps, 'the greatest writer on aesthetics' and 
the 'Einfahling theories', which he esteems the 'essential aesthetic phenomena'. 37 The word 
London: QPD, 1992), provides brief reference to Lee's 'prolific' publications. See Gillian Beer, 'The Dissidence 
of Vernon Lee: Satan the Waster and the Will to Believe' in Suzanne Raitt and Trudi Tate (cds. ), Women's 
Fiction and the Great War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 107-13 1; Catherine Maxwell 'From Dionysus 
to "Dioned": Vernon Lee's portraits', Word & Image, 13 (July 1997), 253-269. 
33 Desmond Macarthy ('The I lawk') New Statesman (Feb. 10,1923). p. 542. 
34 20 April 1919, The Diary of Virginia Woolf i, p. 266. 
35 Woolf, The Letters of Virginia Wootf, vi, (cd. Nigel Nicolson and Joanne Trautmann, New York: I larcourt, 
Brace, Jovanovich, 1976), p. 406. 
36 Lee's 'Notebooks' (1926-36) were preceded by a series of 'Commonplace books' kept between 1887-1900, 
and subsequently edited by Lee in 1920. Vernon Lee's library. housed in the British Institute in Florence, 
witnesses the vast extent of her reading, including books on: 'geology, geography (physical and cthnic), and 
meteorology; zoology, botany, biology, physiology; origins, physio-psychology and pathology of sex; 
psychology (empirical and analytical); language (origins of signs and symbols, expression, style); history 
(general and in relation to geography and climatology), prc-history; economics, politics (especially socialism 
and Marxism), industrial relations, position of women, international relations; origins of magic and religion, 
comparative religion; philosophy (general, epistemology, logic, foundations of science. ethics, aesthetics - 
studies of form, music, etc. )' (Peter Gunn, Vernon Lee: Violet Pagetl856-1935, Oxford: Oxford Univcrsity 
Press, 1964, p-8). 
37 T. E. Ilulme, Speculations, 'Appendix B', p. 262-4. Theodor Lipps (1851-1914) - German philosopher and 
psychologist - was said by Freud to have 'the clearest mind among present-day philosophical writers' (Letter 
'Our own potentialities... ' 32 
'Einfitililing', first used in the field of German psychological aesthetics in the late nineteenth century, 
came from sich einfiWen, meaning to feel oneself into, literally 'to transport oneself into something in 
feeling'; however it did not gain an English equivalent until its translation into 'empathy' in the early 
twentieth century. 38 Empathy is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as 'the power of projecting 
one's personality into (and so fully comprehending) the object of contemplation'. Although now widely 
used to describe a capacity for understanding and experiencing another person's feelings, with particular 
bearing on the therapeutic relationship, 'empathy' initially referred quite specifically to the 
4comprehending' of art objects. The concept of aesthetic empathy has been dated as flourishing in 
Europe between 1870 and 1930, yet the time lapse between publication of key texts in German and their 
translation into English (major texts were only available in English from 1899) accounts for its delayed 
arrival onto the Anglo/American literary scene in the early twentieth century. 
39 Empathy, or the process 
of comprehending the object of contemplation, was minutely analysed in the literature referred to by 
Hulme and in Vernon Lee's work, dealing explicitly with the individual's inner response to external 
forms. 
Comprising a complex psychological investigation of certain subsequently aesthetically formulated 
components of modernism, the EinfUhling theories demand closer attention. At the heart of the 
discussion about empathy, according to Vernon Lee, was the recognition that 'there exists... an act of 
attribution of our energies, activities, or feelings to the non-ego%40 Since to attribute is to 6considcr as 
belonging', this act of attribution can be read as embracing the object world as an intimate other. In 
Professor Lipps' words 'such attribution brings outer things closer to us, makes them more intimate 
and in so far more seemingly intelligible... on this depends... [the] happy consciousness of our own 
power., 41 Yet, 'outer things' are only 'seemingly intelligible': the possible mis-attribution recalls 
empathy's relation to the 'pathetic fallacy' of the Romantic poets in which the 'energies, activities, 
feelings' attributed to the natural environment are understood to properly belong to the subject. 
in coining the term 'pathetic fallacy' Ruskin described what he believed to be an inappropriate colouring 
of the natural object world with human emotion; to impute human traits to nature was to belie the 'true 
appearances of things to us', with emotion producing a 'falseness in all our impressions of external 
things'. 42 Despite the comparison, psychological aesthetics, in its analysis of the rapport between self 
to Wilhelm Fliess. Aug. 26 1898, The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887-1904, p. 324- 
5). 
38 Theodor Lipps was the first to apply the term 'Einfahling' specifically to aesthetics; according to Vernon 
Lee, 'einfahling' was not given the English translation 'empathy' until 1909 by Edward Titchencr (1867. 
1927), an English psychologist living in America from 1892: 'This is, I suppose, a simple case of empathy, if 
we may coin that term as a rendering of Einfahling' (Lectures on The Experimental Psychology of The Thought 
Processes, London: Macmillan, 1909, p. 21). 
39 F. E. Sparshott, The Structure of Aesthetics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1963), p. 243. 
40 Lee and Anstruther-Thompson, Beauty and Ugliness, p. 47. 
41 Theodor Lipps, q. v. Lee and Anstruther-Thompson, Beauty and Ugliness, p. 44- 
42 William Ruskin, Xfodern Painters, 3, part iv, chapt. 12, (1856). Lee identifies the first clear statement of the 
way we interpret form according to our own inner experience to Lbtzc: 'We extend equally to lifeless things 
these ficelings which lend them meaning. And by such feelings we transform the inert masses of a building into 
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and world, is less interested in pursuing the 'true appearance' than studying the subjective 'impression'. 
Yet disagreement arose precisely over the nature of the 'attribution': Vernon Lee herself is mentioned by 
Hulme in his notes alongside 'Einfahling' for her 'incorrect account of it' - she took exception to 
Lipps' metaphysical representation of the ego losing itself in the object, suggesting more hermetically 
that we find, not lose, ourselves in the work of art. When Hulme, citing Goethc, asks: 'Does the 
outside world answer to your own feelingsT his question resonates throughout the study of aesthetic 
empathy and the articulation of a modernist aesthetic doctrine. 43 The consideration of where feelings 
properly belong informs the aesthetic choices made by Eliot in the name of classicism. Aesthetic 
empathy, which attributes our energies to the non-ego, suggests a psychological account of Eliot's 
aesthetic which prescribes that the individual gives allegiance, something of himself, to something 
outside. 
Vernon Lee's and Kit's psychological aesthetics found their origins in Kit's observed responses to the 
natural environment. Vernon Lee recalls: 'At first we did not think of them as having anything to do 
with psychology: it is probable that in those distant pre-Freudian days the word psychology meant 
nothing very definite to either of us, especially not to Anstruther-Thomson, who went on calling her 
studies "trying to find out what IT" (viz. a work of art) is doing' or more familiarly still "what it is all 
about"., 44 During walks near Anstruther-Thomson's home in Scotland, Vernon Lee witnessed Kit 
endowing nature with a numinous quality, which she describes in prose worthy of the romantic 
conception it communicates: 
'When the last red of sunset shone like enmeshed threads among the thin hill-side 
spinnies, and the dusk rose from the half-reaped cornfields into the green clearness of the 
sky, and, under the mixed twilight and moon, the sea seemed to curdle and swell in livid 
marble masses beyond the salmon-nets, she would point with her chin, as it were, and 
without removing her eyes from it all, say in a hushed voice (her voice was of a very 
lovely dark but clear medium) and not without mystery: "Now we have become mere 
intruders. Now it is Mey who are in possession. "' 
Despite the emotional redolence of this moment for Vernon Lee, her friend's imbuing of the landscape 
with divine, or other-worldly presence is given a straightforwardly psychological explanation: 
'I came to understand that she was not speaking of anything besides the landscape; in 
fact, only of the landscape itself, its lines, planes and colours and the way it affected her. 
So that the only personality in the matter was her own ways of feeling, her own modes of 
being, but stripped of all personal circumstances and motives, which she projected into 
so many limbs of a living body, a body experiencing inner strains which we transport back into ourselves' 
(Atikrokosmos, 1856, q. v. Lee and Anstruther-Thoinson, Beauty and Ugliness, p. 17.18). 
43 T. E. I fulme, 'Modem Art and its Philosophy'. (1914), Speculations, p. 88. 
44 Vernon Lee, 'Introduction' to Clcmentina Anstruther-Thomson, Art and Afan: Essays and Fragments 
(London: John Lane, 1924), p. 75. 
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the sights and sounds of nature and of art, only to receive them back, as if no longer her 
own, rather as one receives one's own voice and words back from an echoing hill., 45 
Lee's analysis strips away the mystery, divesting the landscape of emotion and locating 'the only 
personality in the matter' as Kit's own 'modes of being'. Anstruther-Thomson's unsettling assertion 
that 'it is they who are in possession' is refuted with the suggestion that the feelings in question are 
merely on loan from the observer 'so that what is in reality the beholder's response comes to feel, as if 
it were an activity intrinsic to that shape. '46 The movement is traced as a projection outwards by Kit of 
what is her own, followed by its reexperiencing as being other to the self. Lee's researches transport her 
away from the natural environment to investigate the minute physiological changes affecting the 
individual's 'own modes of being'. In support of this self-reflexive dynamic Lee cites lines from 
Coleridge's 'Dejection Ode', his 'aesthetic principle': 
'We receive but what we give 
And in our life alone does nature live., 47 
Aesthetic empathy proposes a theory of connectedness between self and object world which Vernon Lee 
struggles to articulate at first through minutely examining her own and Kit's bodily responses to the 
perception of objects, and later accepting Lipps' interpretation of empathy as a psychological 
phenomenon. However, her subsequent understanding of this proposed engagement with the world 
emphasises the individual's previous experience as determining how we respond both to the world of 
objects and other people. Embracing current theories of organic memory (which locate the past as 
contained within the individual body in the form of individual memory and heredity), Lee's privileging 
of past over present experience refers both to a Victorian and psychoanalytic model of self, and can be 
read as a failure to sustain the challenge of connectedness represented by the concept of aesthetic 
empathy. Vernon Lee's account, or according to Hulme her 'incorrect account', entrenches the 
psychological subject further within the self rather than inviting playful identifications with the object. 
The empathic aesthetic collapses art back into solipsism, symptomatic of a modernist reversion to self. 
Only in the second half of the twentieth century did the concept of empathy shift from describing the 
knowability of objects to denote a genuine experiencing of another person's subjective world. Empathy 
is defined by the psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut as 'the capacity to think and feel oneself into the inner life 
of another person., 48 The humanistic psychologist Carl Rogers, for whom empathy was at the heart of 
the healing relationship, describes the process as an imaginative entering of another person's experience 
without ever losing the 'as if' quality. 
49 The empathic relation begs identification while at the same 
time demanding that it be resisted: indeed in a therapeutic context total empathy with a client would 
45 Ibid. p. 13-14. 
46 Ibid. p. 36. 
47 Ibid. p. 75. 
48 Kohut, How Does Analysis Cure?, p. 78. 
49 Carl Rogers, 'The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Therapeutic Personality Change' (1957), Howard 
Kirschenbaurn and Valerie Land Henderson (cds. ), The Carl Rogers Reader (London: Constable, 1990), p. 226. 
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preclude its remedial effects, erasing the relation of difference. Gillian Beer conjures a less comfortable, 
bolder description of the 'as if experience: empathy, for Vernon Lee, keeps the subject 'poised on the 
edge of mimicry but taking also the risk of identity,. 50 Empathy is heralded in a recent text as a 
'postmodern' tool of psychoanalysis for allowing connection and communion without undermining 
autonomy and individuality: 'Empathy replaces neutrality. Intersubjective interaction replaces Freud's 
Lockean image of the analyst as a tabula rasa for the patient's projections., 51 Jones proposes empathy 
as a two-way, inter-psychic relation resolving the antinomies of separateness and relationship. 
According to Vernon Lee's study, such a suggestion misreads the solipsism inherent in the definition of 
empathy as a feeling oneself into the life of another and avoids the issue of the analyst's own misplaced 
attributions. Under the name of 'sympathy for others', Vernon Lee does explore empathy in relation to 
knowing a person: her thoughts leading her to question how much genuine experiencing was actually 
possible. Her work uncovers both the perils (risks of merged identities, loss of selfhood) and failures of 
the empathic position. 
The mysterious relation of knowing 
As T. S. Eliot recognised, 'inside' and 'outside' - or how we differentiate between self and other, 
subject and object - could be made much of by his psychologist friends. It continues to occupy 
discussion in psychoanalytic literature, particularly in the field of object relations which follows the 
complex unconscious processes of projection and introjection whereby the objects of the world become 
appropriated as psychic contents, and the contents of the psyche are identified as belonging to the world 
of objects (which includes other people). Discussions of empathy employ the language of 'projection' 
and taking in', or internalising, although in a pre-psychoanalytic context. Object relations 
psychoanalysis is itself preceded by a philosophical tradition of exploring the metaphysics of the self- 
other relation, inaugurated by Kant's distinction between subject/object and modified by Ilegel and 
German Idealism. It is from the parent discipline of philosophy and its debates over problems of 
cognition that the psychological study of consciousness emerged and within which Vernon Lee's study 
of empathy is orientated. If object describes what is other to the self, whether a person, idea, or actual 
object, how can it become known? Does it lose its status of object through being known, or entering 
into a relation with the self? William James describes 'the relation of knowing as the most mysterious 
thing in the world'. 52 In addressing the issues of knowing an object or person, the concept of empathy 
plays a central role throughout Vernon Lee's work, both in her study of aesthetic empathy and in her 
exploration of the empathic relationship in her fiction and essays: scrutinising in turn the knowability 
50 Gillian Beer 'The Dissidence of Vernon Lee: Satan the Waster and the Will to Believe' in Raitt and Tate 
(eds. ), Women's Fiction and the Great War, p. 118. 
51 James Jones, Contemporary Psychoanalysis and Religion: Transference and Transcendence (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1991), p. 18, p. 27. 
52 William James, Principles of Psychology, ii, (1890; New York: Dover, 1950), p. 216. According to Gerald 
Myers the problematic distinction between subjectivity and objectivity always preoccupied William James: in 
assuming a dualism between 'mind knowing and thing known' (James, Principles of Psychology, p. 218) 
psychology was inadequate to resolve the problem, thus the cognitive relation between the two remains an 
epistemological gulf (William James: his life and thought, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986, p. 262, 
p. 272, p. 292). 
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of objects and of people. According to Vernon Lee's empathic aesthetic how much real encountering 
between self and world is accounted for as possible? 
Object relations theory describes a psychic reality which unconsciously rcfjgurcs the formal boundaries, 
or properties of the external world. Freud interpreted 'oceanic' feeling' as symptomatic of a pathological 
regression to the pre-oedipal - this will be central to my discussion in the Evelyn Underhill chapter. 
Object relations theory, on the other hand, structures the realm of the pre-oedipal upon mechanisms of 
unconscious projective and introjective fantasies which blur psychic identities through mistaken 
attributions rather than merged subjecthood. Amidst such mis-appropriation of the contents of our own 
psychic experience, a question raised by Harry Guntrip: 'How far can we know and be known by one 
anotherT is pertinent both to the practice of object relations and Vernon Lee's study of empathy. 
53 
Object relations, like the empathic aesthetic, implies a model of self which is relational rather than 
autonomous. However, since the object relations systems are primarily internal rather than derived from 
actual experiencings in the world, object relations theory also describes a self whose complex inner 
world of relations can eclipse what might be called the 'Not-Me' object world. 
54 The psychoanalyst 
Michael Eigen describes the experience of object-relating as being 'closed in on oneself,. 55 The 
unconscious mechanisms of projection and introjection borrow the object world as a physical 
framework, of which we have little realistic notion, to narrate a version of self-other relations which is 
infinitely self-referential and perhaps never refers to the external environment. The affective power and 
dynamism of our inner subjective world plays itself out in external space, colouring and confusing self 
with world and inner with outer, suggesting that the question of where I end and the object world 
begins finds its answer in the self experienced as endless. Without wishing to draw too neat a parallel, 
object relations, similarly to Lee's empathic aesthetic, can seem to suggest an insular psychology in 
which the other subject can never be known, nor the object recognised as truly Not-Me. 
56 
in a series of brief 'Portraits', written by Virginia Woolf and unpublished in her lifetime, where 
anonymous characters are overheard through snatches of their speech, one such sketch carries 
intermittent references to Vernon Lee. The fictional character begins: 
53 1 larry Guntrip, Schizoid Phenomena, Object Relations and the Set( (London: Karnac, 1968), p. 389. 
54 Winnicott uses 'not-me' to describe what is repudiated as other to the scif, or recognized as external 
(Winnicott, 'Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena', 195 1, in Playing and Reality, I larmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1974, p. 2). Although the 'not-mc' can be created by projective fantasies, I am using it here to describe 
the physical object environment. 
55 Michael Eigcn, 'The Area of Faith in Winnicottt, Lacan, and Bion', International Journal of Psycho- 
Analysis, 62 (1981), 413-33, p. 414. 
56 This critique of object relations is aimed at the metapsychology of Melanie Klein and W. D. Fairbairn, rather 
than Winnicott whose concept of 'good enough' mother was part of his own critical response to Klein 
insufficiently stressing the effect of the outside world. Guntrip proposes that object relations omits 
conccptualising Martin Bubcr's 'I-thou' relationship: object relations can be said to forego what might be 
called 'subject-relations' to speak exclusively of 'I-it' relationships. Certainly in Klein's and Fairbairn's 
metapsychology the development of the ego can be read as solipsistic with internal psychic contents projected 
onto a blank parental screen. See Martin Bubcr, I and Thou, trans. W. Kaufmann (1923; Edinburgh; T. Clark, 
1970); Jay Greenberg and Stephen Mitchell, Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory (Cambridge, Mass.; 
Harvard University Press, 1983); R. D. Ilinshelwood, A dictionary of Kleinian thought (London: Free 
Association Books, 1989). 
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'Yes, I knew Vernon Lee. That is to say we had a villa. I used to get up before breakfast. 
I used to go to the Galleries before they were crowded. I'm devoted to beauty... No, I 
don't paint myself; but then one appreciates art all the better perhaps... But I was saying, 
I knew Vernon Lee. She had a villa. We had a villa. One of those villas hung with 
wisteria - something like our lilac, but better - and Judas trees. Oh why does one live in 
Kensington? Why not in Italy? But I always feel, still, I do live in Florence - in the 
spirit. And don't you think we do live in the spirit - our real life? But then I'm one of 
those people who want beauty, if it's only a stone, or a pot -I can't explain. Anyhow in 
Florence one meets people who love beauty... And one day as I was standing in the road, 
outside my villa, a little old woman came along leading a dog on a chain. It might have 
been Ouida. Or Vernon Lee? I never spoke to her. But in a sense, the true sense, I who 
love beauty always feel, I knew Vernon Lee. '57 
The 'portrait' by Woolf was written in about 1937, two years after Vernon Lee's death. In an echo of the 
passage, today her name remains familiar, while the details specific to her literary production have been 
forgotten; her name still evokes a ghostly presence or shadowy outline which has not been given 
substance by popular memory. The recurrence of Vernon Lee's name within this monologue makes of 
her a talismanic reference for the idealisation of beauty associated with the aestheticism of the 1890's, 
and nominally implicates her with the elitist dilettantism of the speaker. 
58 Leaving aside this 
tangential, yet provocative characterisation (Vernon Lee disparaged 'art for art's sake'), I would like to 
draw attention to the elision between the identity of the speaker and the figure of Vernon Lee, which, 
however deliberately, evokes Vernon Lee's own preoccupations. 'She had a villa. We had a villa': the 
first sentence produces an easy substitution which can pass as similarity or imitation, raising the 
question of how identity is achieved through mimcsis. 
59 Vernon Lee emerges as a ghostly presence, 
haunting the identity of the speaker, who claims to 'know' her yet has never met her, possibly never 
caught sight of her. Although Woolf's fragmentary portrait may be read only for its parody of an 
aspiring aesthete, I suggest that it introduces interesting possibilities of knowing which are directly 
related to Vernon Lee's own proposals: in this case can you 'know' someone without having met them? 
'But in a sense, the true sense, I who love beauty always feel, I knew Vernon Lee. ' Woolf's intention 
may be to mock 'I who love beauty' whose self-identity is defined by her aesthetic quest but, at the 
same time, Vernon Lee becomes associated with a kind of subjective knowing (in 'the true sense'? ) 
57 Woolf, 'Portraits', (previously unpublished typescripts), The Complete Shorter Fiction (London: Triad 
Cirafton, 1987), p-329- 
58 Vernon Lee corresponded with Patcr during the early 1880's before she developed her interest in the 
psychology of aesthetics. Pater habitually responded with praise and admiration during this period, 
describing the 'peculiar cxccllcnce' of her work for its 'very remarkable learning', 'very remarkable power of 
style, ' and 'the treatment of very difficult matter' (Letter to Violet Paget, 1884, Vernon Lee Papers). 
59 Karl Groos - second only in importance to Theodore Lipps in the field of psychological aesthetics - defined 
empathy in terms which cmphasiscd the bodily resonance, naming it 'Inncr Mimicry' (Einleitung In die 
Aesthetik, 1892). Although Lee would later regret her choice of words, her early article 'Beauty and Ugliness' 
describes external forms as being 'mimcd' by the beholder (Part 11, Contemporary Review 72, Nov 1897. 
p. 686). 
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which relies on feeling, and in this case can miss the object of contemplation altogether. The possibility 
is raised that the physical form is irrelevant, the actual object is superfluous to our cognition of the 
world, substituted by our 'real life' in the spirit. We learn that the speaker (like Vernon Lee) does not 
paint - she has no contact with the medium - being satisfied with visual appreciation at a distance. The 
passage gestures at the solipsism of aesthetic appreciation: do Lee's bodily exacerbations bring her 
closer to experiencing the object or herself? Issues pertinent to Vernon Lee's writing and her own 
aesthetic are raised here concerning the relationship between psyche and object world which question 
how far the other can be known or 'ftilly comprehended'. 
Writing about her collaboration with Kit, Vernon Lee describes a harmonious absorption in their work: 
'For when two people work together in complete mutual agreement they are apt to shut out from their 
view all the rest of the world., 
60 Yet despite Lee's ideal of joint insularity, it is questionable how 
&mutual' the agreement was: in the years following their initial publication, Kit withdrew from the 
enterprise, abandoning her collaborative input and the friendship as a result of nervous exhaustion. In 
1901, Vernon Lee writes to Kit imploring: 'I wish you would be quite frank with me on this point. If 
you have a notion that aesthetics made you ill and continues making you ill, you must tell me so and I 
shall understand., 61 Whether due to the stress of producing adequate data for publication under Lee's 
intellectual leadership, or the demands of their friendship, Kit's absence from the project was permanent 
and she would not be persuaded into returning; occupying herself instead as nurse to a more tacit female 
companion. Yet although the union was short-lived in comparison to the period of time over which she 
continued to write about psychological aesthetics, Vernon Lee somehow keeps the collaboration alive, 
publishing Beauty and Ugliness underjoint authorship despite Kit's limited involvement, and rewriting 
narratives of their early discoveries; it is as if Kit becomes one of the 'imaginary friends' who people 
her mind, and whose physical absence is not determining of her influence. The text functions both as a 
posthumous memorial and apologia to Kit's achievements: Lee wonders whether Kit ever 'grasped the 
psychology of that Empathy which she had helped to discover'. 
62 In her introduction to Art and Man 
(1924) Lee attempts to approach the 'subject' of Kit yet concludes that 'the reality gets hidden behind 
an image which, just because it is of the stuff of our heart and the handiwork of our mind, can achieve 
more for us than could, perhaps, any existing being'. 
63 Parallels can be found in the collaboration 
between Vernon and Kit and the vexed relationship between the subject and object: how much can the 
object of perception be known, except through our own already established 'modes of being'? Is 
empathy really a collaboration, between subject and object, or just 'the stuff of our heart and the 
handiwork of our mind [which] can achieves more for us than ... any existing being? ' 
60 See Phyllis Mannochi, 'Vernon Lee and Kit Anstruther-Thomson: A study of love and collaboration 
between romantic friends', Women's Studies, 12 (1986), pp. 129-148; Ethel Smyth, What Happened Next 
(London: Longman, 1940), p. 27. 
61 Palm Sunday, 1901, Letter to Kit Anstruther-Thomson, Vernon Lee Papers. 
62 Vernon Lee, 'Introduction', Art and Man, p. 74. 
63 Ibid. p. 74. 
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in unpublished notes entitled 'Lore of the Ego', Vernon Lee accedes: 'this little drama of each little one 
of us, secret incommunicable to others, is the only reality of which we have direct knowledge, our 
subjective self'. 64 Throughout her writing Vernon Lee returns to her belief in the separateness of 
individual experience and the self's isolation, which is most graphically realised in an essay published 
in 1892: '1 am getting to believe more and more, with every day which comes and goes, that, despite 
all friendships and all loves, we must rest content to live alone with our own soul. Our thoughts, our 
aspirations, our only valuable confessions and penances, come to us only and alone; our veritable 
intellectual and moral life, like our veritable physical life, takes place in isolation., 
65 Using the visible 
limits of physical form as analogous to psychic boundaries, Vernon Lee continues: despite the 
ministrations of loved ones, 
'There is a point beyond which no soul can come within sight of ours - an inner 
sanctuary where we are alone with ourselves. The destruction of such a boundary would 
be the destruction of oneself; you might as well bleed yourself into your friend's veins; 
you and he would die, and your lives would have been none the less separate in those last 
moments. There is something solemn and sad in this knowledge; and, next to the fact of 
death, there is none so full of awe, I think, as that of such inevitable isolation; next to the 
knowledge that time will be when we must be separate for ever, comes the knowledge 
that, in reality, we can never be fully united. ' 
A literal transfusion between friends is imaged as the ultimate bond, an exchange of life blood which at 
the same time destroys both individuals. Compare Woolf in Three Guineas: 'Complete understanding 
[between people] could only be achieved by blood transfusion and memory transfusion -a miracle still 
beyond the reach of science., 
66 If Lee's passage indicates an insular model of the self, it also powerfully 
introduces a desire for the contrary and the annihilating potential of such union. Intimacy, or merging, 
is equivalent to death: 'the destruction of such a boundary would be the destruction of oneself. 
'Exchangeable properties': The Legend of Madame Krasinska 
Introducing a new edition of The Handling of Words, David Seed writes that Vernon Lee's 'emphasis 
on inward processes led her to understate the extent to which consciousness is intersubjective'. 
67 I 
suggest, to the contrary, that Vernon Lee's essays, fiction and unpublished notes attest to a continued 
fascination with intersubjective consciousness or interpsychic connections. Through the device of 
haunting her protagonists with their connections to past lives, or in expressing her own sense as a writer 
of being haunted by imaginary selves, Vernon Lee represents possibilities of merging, or sharing the 
experience of the other, which at the same time recognise the intrinsic limits to such a communion of 
64 Note dated Nov 20,1932, 'Lore of the Ego', Vernon Lee Papers. 
65 'on Friendship', Alihea: A Second Book of Dialogues on Aspirations and Duties ( London: Osgood, 
McIlvanie, 18941894), p. 1 15. First published as 'The Friendships of Baldwin: A Dialogue', Contemporary 
Review, 61 (May 1892), 653-73. 
66 Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas (1938; I-larmonsdworth: Penguin, 1977), p. 9. Woolf goes on to propose 
that autobiography and biography can enlarge the realm of our actual experience and must, in the 
circumstances, substitute for blood and memory transfusion. 
67 David Seed, 'Introduction', p. ix. 
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selves: these mysterious forms of kinship habitually carry restricting conditions or tantalise the subject 
with unconsummated meetings. That to be an individual is to be isolated was a verdict of which 
Vernon Lee was finally convinced, yet much of her fiction conjures a less insular model of experience 
where powerful and inexplicable affinities develop between people. Although, as I intend to 
demonstrate, Vernon Lee's writing finally witnesses the failure of the empathic relation, her short 
stories invite consideration for evidencing the seductive perils of such connectedness. 'The Legend of 
Madame Krasinska', published in Vernon Lee's collection Vanitas: Polite Stories (1892), starkly 
dramatises the transfusional possibilities introduced by the idea of consciousness as intersubjective or, 
indeed, interchangeable. 
'The Legend of Madame Krasinska' is a story about the transfusion, or overlapping, of properties 
between selves. This imbrication is reproduced in the Jamesian narrative chain of the story: 'It is a 
necessary part of this story to explain how I have come by it or rather, how it has chanced to have me 
for its writer., 68 Uncertainty regarding the grammatical subject of the sentence, 'I have come by it' or 
'it has chanced to have me', anticipates the exchangeability of subjecthood in the 'Legend': is the 
narrator in possession of a story or has the story taken possession of its writer? The story is being 
written down at the request of a nun from an order called Little Sisters of the Poor, whose face, though 
serene, bears a 'trace of terrible past suffering'. The narrator's attention is drawn to her when 
accompanying the artist, Cecco Bandini, on a visit to the convent run asylum. However, she does not 
make her appeal directly to the narrator: the narrator is witness to a surprising encounter between the 
nun and Cecco Bandini, who are obviously startled to recognise each other and it is some time later 
before Cecco Bandini elaborates upon the mysterious 'dumb scene' which has passed between him and 
the Little Sister of the Poor. The silent encounter, a wordless exchange, exacts the promise of a written 
story; it is the lady's narrative although she did not speak it directly to Cecco Bandini: 'the story which 
[Bandini] had undertaken to get me to write' but which 'he did not expect me to believe very literally... 
The lady only wished me to write down her narrative without any comments, and leave to the heart of 
the reader the decision about its truth or falsehood. '69 It is appropriate that the tale demands the 
collaboration of the reader, appealing to the heart as arbiter of value just as the physiological response to 
the visual , auditory and 
literary art form would later be monitored by Vernon Lee. 
The tale narrates how Madame Krasinska, now a nun, had once been a wealthy widow, 'very young, 
very pretty, and very smart' [p. 1621. On a visit to Bandini's studio she once expressed interest in a 
sketch he had made of a notorious madwoman of Florence, called 'Sora Lena', desiring to hear the 
madwoman's 'story', a story which will overlap with her own story in ways for which she is 
unprepared. Sora Lena has been wandering the streets for thirty years; the 'legend', echoed in the title 
'The Legend of Madame Krasinska', recounts that she went mad upon the deaths of her two sons who 
were killed as Volunteers, and has made her way to the station every day since, in her best clothes, now 
68 Vernon Lee, 'Madame Krasinska' in Eanitas: Polite Stories (London: Heinemann, 1892), p. 159. 
69 Ibid. p. 160-1. 
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much bedraggled, to meet the young men. Sora Lena's life has been psychically fixed at the point prior 
to the traumatising event, bound to endlessly repeat the actions of that day. Or so the story goes: as 
Bandini says in a phrase which echoes the nun's earlier plea: 'May be. To my mind it doesn't matter 
much whether the story be true or false; it is fitting' [p. 164]. 'Fitting' is a word aptly chosen in the 
ensuing context of investiture in which dressing up in someone else's clothes constitutes taking their 
identity. 
Having borrowed the sketch from the artist Bandini, Madame Krasinska subsequently appears at a fancy 
dress ball dressed exactly as Sora Lena. Her mask is applauded as exceedingly witty and novel by 
everyone except Cecco Bandini, perhaps alert to the power of mimicry, who considers the costume to be 
in poor taste. Her 'lumbering, hideous figure' hung with faded, grimy rags of clothing juxtaposes itself 
against the splendour of the ball-room in an image reminiscent of Bandini's prior observation in his 
studio of the 'strange, strange contrast, these women [formed], the one in the sketch and the one 
standing before him. ' [p. 164]. In the story these differences become, in the words of Vernon Lee's 
introduction, 'exchangeable properties': in the past 'there would have been no waste of the supernatural 
in teaching my Madame Krasinska that poor crazy paupers and herself were after all exchangeable 
properties., 70 'Exchangeable properties' expresses the social comment implicit in Lee's tale, that 
identity is economic rather than an intrinsic condition; it also suggests that properties of the self are 
unstable, the internalised object world is exchangeable, not possessed, not proper to the self. 
71 Where 
May Sinclair's 'Flaw in the Crystal', describes the possibilities of a communication which transcends 
selves, Lee's 'Madame Krasinska' represents a transmission between selves in physical terms; 
appropriately the language is less figurative than Sinclair's, staying close to the 'literal sense of the 
words'. 
On the same night that the ball takes place, Sora Lena's body is found hanging from the rafters of her 
lodgings: her death coinciding with Madame Krasinska's assuming her identity for the masqued ball. 
The following day, Madame Krasinska feels aimless and dispirited for the first time in her life. These 
feelings develop into unprecedented and inexplicable depression which is at first experienced as an 
attack from without: she finds herself 'invaded suddenly by a confused sadness or boding of evil, she 
did not know which'. 'It was she who was all wrong. It was, in the literal sense of the words, what she 
supposed people might mean when they said that So-and-so was not himself.. Whereas she... Why, in 
her case, she really did not seem to be herself any longer., 72 Madame Krasinska's symptoms increase: 
her mind becomes blank, she bursts into tears and feels 'as if someone else were speaking in her place' 
[p. 176]. Gradually she begins thinking unfamiliar thoughts, about experiences she has not had, things 
70 Ibid. p. 5. 
71 An entry in Lee's 'Commonplace Book' headed 'Slavery of sex to sex' comments: 'If women receive the 
franchise we may perhaps witness the curious phenomenon of a politically free creature whose person, instead 
of its work, is a marketable commodity' (Book VI, September 19, Vernon Lee Collection). 
72 Lee, 'Madame Krasinska', p. 174, p. 175. See also Vernon Lee, Louis Norbert: a two-fold romance (London: 
John Lane, 1914); Ralph Pendrel in Henry James' unfinished novel, A Sense of the Past, repeats: 'The point is 
that I'm not myselfl' (New York: Scribner's, 1917), p. 97. 
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she never knew: her interior monologue confuses observation and experience, both perceiving an old 
woman and becoming her: 'How did she come to know about this woman? She had never been inside 
that house over the tobacconist's, up three pairs of stairs to the left; and yet she knew exactly the pattern 
of the wallpaper. ' [p. 181]. The thoughts 'which would go on inside her' [p. 183] describe the sensations 
felt by the poor old woman, her aching bones, her wet feet; Madame Krasinska knows the inner 
experience of the woman, yet she still names her as a person outside her self. the old woman. As the 
interior narrative progresses, the story being told about the old woman becomes Madame Krasinska's 
own story: the narrative is increasingly introjected, personalised, subjectified until she is no longer 
narrating but narrated by: 
'Lord, Lord, how wet the poor old woman's feet are! And no fire to warm them by. The 
best is to go to bed when one can't dry one's clothes; and it saves lamp oil. That was 
very good oil the parish priest made her a present of.. Ai, ai, how one's bones ache on 
the mere boards, even with a blanket over themV [p. 182] 
Grammatically, the 'poor old woman' occupies the position of the third person, yet her physical 
discomfort is expressed with the ambivalent 'one': both personal and impersonal. The old woman 
gradually loses distinction as an object in Madame Krasinska's thinking as a more intimate relation is 
approached. The interior voice of Madame Krasinska coincides with that of the old woman, with the 
first use of the pronoun 'I' identifying the subject with the object of the thoughts, which emerges with 
the mention of San Bonifazio, the madhouse: 'Don't speak of San Bonifazio! I have seen it. It is where 
they keep the mad folk and the wretched, dirty, wicked, wicked old women' [p. 183, my italic]. It is 
significant that the congruence of selves occurs in association with the 'madhouse'. 'The thought of that 
strange, lofty whitewashed place, which she had never seen, but which she knew so well, with an altar 
in the middle, and rows and rows of beds, each with its set-out of bottles and baskets, and horrid 
slobbering and gibbering old women. ' [p. 183] In an echo of Woolf s 'portrait' of the woman who 
knows Vernon Lee without having met her, this passage suggests a capacity to know an object as it 
resonates with an inner world of experience however incompatible with external circumstances. Yet only 
when the physical transformation betrays the inner changes does Madame Krasinska resolve: 
"'Ah, I am she -I am she -I am mad! " 
For in that sudden voice, so different from her own, Madame Krasinska had recognized 
the voice that should have issued from the cardboard mask she had once wom, the voice 
of Sora Lena. ' [p. 184] 
The coincidence of 'I' with 'she' demolishes entirely a conception of boundaries proper to the self. it is 
automatically associated with madness, heralding a radically unreliable, and mistakenly appropriative 
relationship between self and world. The theme of dressing in another's clothing, established by the 
masqued ball, becomes extended to the investiture of the world with one's own psychic states. 
The story ends with Madame Krasinska instinctively making her way to the home of the deceased Sora 
Lena, climbing the stairs to her derelict room and mechanically repeating the movements made 
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previously by the old woman: 'she went straight to the dark comer, where she knew that the staved-in 
straw chair stood. She dragged it into the middle of the room, where the hook was in the big rafter. She 
stood on the chair, and measured the height of the ceiling. ' She mimics the actions made by the old 
woman leading to her suicide. However, just as she is balancing on the chair, 
'The door creaked and opened slowly. The big, hulking woman, with the vague red face 
and blear stare, and the rabbit-skin muff, bobbing on her huge crinolined skirts, shambled 
slowly into the room. It was the Sora Lena. ' [p. 188] 
The reappearance of Sora Lena is less surprising for the fact of her being dead than because Madame 
Kransinska is confronting her double: Madame Krasinska's identity has become so inseparable from the 
Sora Lena's that it is startling to see her reappear in a separate physical state. 73 However, Madame 
Krasinska's fate does not finally duplicate Sora Lena's, the difference being that Madame Krasinska's 
suicide attempt fails: she enacts only a 'partial return' to the old woman's tragedy. 74 Whether due to 
the inferior strength of her Russian gaiter, divine intervention or her own will to live, she is discovered 
lying unconscious on the bare floorboards of the room, waking to thank God for his mercy. However 
exchangeable the identities, at the moment of death, Madame Kransinska is returned to her proper form, 
to her own mortality: she cannot, finally, take someone else's life - or death - as her own. 
in unpublished notes written in her seventies, Vernon Lee describes 
, that queer instinct, one might say mimetic, of einfuhlen the other person's reaction, of 
foretelling his words and gestures; a sometimes (in myself e. g. ) to the extent of a 
paralysing transformation into that other one. This amounts to a kind of duplicity, 
becomes at times the source of cowardice and deceit as much as of prudence, justice, 
tolerance and indulgence., 75 
Vernon Lee mistrusts the identification with the other person: it either slides into paralysis, Madame 
Krasinska's tortuous metamorphosis, or rests this side of mimicry in a duplicit mirroring. Proposing 
this mimetic instinct as 'the essential underlying social reaction', Vernon Lee is structuring her model 
of the psyche within the paradigm of mimesis-suggestion, disinheriting Myers' legacy of buried selves 
and William James' intimations of the transpersonal: 'for that moment and to that extent, we are those 
people'. 76 'We are those people' echoes Madame Krasinska's cry 'I am she', yet with the novelist's 
license to escape the pathology implicit in multiple identities. Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen has proposed a 
model of the unconscious based on mimetic identification, where self coalesces with other, with which 
he replaces the late-nineteenth century representation of unconscious states in terms of a 'hidden' or 
6subliminal self,. 77 Founded upon the extraordinary suggestibility of the subject in response to others, 
73 See Karl Miller, Doubles: Studies in Literary History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). 
74 We will see Richard Semon's theory of memory as 'partial return', introduced by Vernon Lee in her 
, Introduction' to Richard Semon, Alnemic Psychology (trans. Bella Duffy, London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1923). 
75 Note dated Oct 16,1933, 'Lore of the Ego', Vernon Lee Papers. 
76 Vernon Lee, The Handling of Words and other studies in literary psychology, p. 23. 
77 it is time to give up all this imagery of subjects embedded in each other, once and for all. If the concept of 
an unconscious is to be retained, it needs to be definitively liberated from the phantom of the other subject 
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his model proposes that this suggestibility approximates closely in definition to sympathy which is a 
mimic relation to the feelings of others, and to empathy which he terms 'physiological sympathy'. 
78 
In her essay, 'On Literary Construction', first published in 1895, adapting Kant's terminology, Vernon 
Lee distinguishes between two categories of novelist: the 'analytic' and the 'synthetic'. 79 The 'analytic' 
are described as constructing their characters from composite observations, building them up from the 
outside and this can be read as anticipating Virginia Woolf s critique of the Edwardian novelists in 'Mr 
Bennet and Mrs Brown' whose focus weighs overmuch upon 'the fabric of things': 'They were never 
interested in character in itself.. They were interested in something outside. '80 In contrast, the 
'synthetic' type, favoured by Lee, have the ability to 'feel inside' their characters: they are 'bom' from 
the novelist's feelings. It is an aesthetic founded upon what Vernon Lee describes as a mimetic tendency 
which is universal yet most pronounced in the novelist, and rudimentary to their success: 'We all 
possess, to a certain small degree, the very mysterious faculty of imitating, without any act of 
conscious analysis, the gestures, facial expression, and tone of voice of other people; nay, more, of 
other people in situations in which we have never seen them'. 
81 
Lee continues with a more graphic illustration of the process which occurs when 
'we have been tremendously impressed by something in another person - emotionally 
impressed, not intellectually, mind; and that the emotion, whether of delight or 
annoyance or amusement, which the person has caused in us, in some way grafts a 
portion of that person into our own life, into the emotions which constitute our life; and 
that thus our experience of the person, and our own increasing experience of ourselves, are 
united, and the person who is not ourselves cornes to live with the same reality, the same 
intimate warmth, that we do. '82 
The 'mysterious faculty of imitating' another is now represented as 'grafting': the insertion of a small 
piece of plant or animal into another individual so as to come into organic union. The mimetic 
paradigm becomes replaced by a model of empathy, or the writer's imaginative process, as invasion. 
Lee describes being 'haunted' by imaginary figures which people her world of inner experience. 83 
'Some day mental science may perhaps explain by the operation of stored-up impressions, 
of obscure hereditary potentialities, and all the mysteries of the subconsciousness, the 
and the other consciousness inherited from late-nineteenth-century psychology and psychiatry' (Mikkel 
Borch-Jacobsen, The Freudian Subject, trans. Catherine Porter, Stanford, C. A.: Stanford University Press, 1988, 
p. 41). 
78 Borch-Jacobscn determines the riddle of psychoanalysis to be the suggestibility of the hypnotised subject: 
'This enigma, it must be stressed, is both the enigma of the unconscious and that of a certain relationship to 
others, perhaps even that of the unconscious as a relationship to others' (The Emotional Tie: Psychoanalysis, 
Mimesis and Affect, Stanford, C. A.: Stanford University Press, 1993, p. 4 1, p. 267 n. 15). 
79 Lee, The Handling of Words, p. 29. 
80 Woolf, 'Mr Bennet and Mrs Brown'. read to the I leretics, Cambridge, on May 18,1924 in Collected Eisays i. 
ed. Leonard Woolf (Chatto & Windus, 1966-7), p. 332, p. 319, p. 327. 
81 Lee, 'On Literary Construction', The Handling of Words, p. 23. 
82 Ibid. p. 26. 
83 Vernon Lee, Ottilie, An Eighteenth Century Idyll (London: Fisher Unwin, 1883), p. 12. 
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extraordinary phenomenon of a creature being apparently invaded from within by the 
personality of another creature... to all intents and purposes imaginary., 84 
The ability to 'feel inside' the other, is here represented as a trespass 'from within', throwing into 
question the domestic origin of this seemingly foreign creature: and figuring the novelist as both agent 
and victim of the attack. 
A character named Baldwin dominates the dialogues in Vernon Lee's first two collections of essays, 
Baldwin (1886) and Althea (1894). Virginia Woolf's description of Vernon Lee as 'having completed 
her shape & was sun-dried and shell-like' finds a precedent in Baldwin who is described as '[a]n 
illusive, shimmering personality, seemingly full of contradictions, yet, at the same time, almost 
repulsively cut and dried'. 
85 Yet Vernon Lee's introduction of Baldwin, betraying reluctance in 
identifying his composite fictional and autobiographical origins, is by no means 'cut and dried': 
'My own relations towards him?... They are absolutely indefinable. I am the pupil of 
Baldwin, the thing made by him, or he is my master, yet made by me; choose and 
understand, for I cannot... And yet, Baldwin and I are distinct; he does not understand me 
quite; he stands outside me; he is not 1., 
86 
'[H]e is not 1', yet they form an inextricable relationship where categories of creator and created seem 
reversible: 'made by him... made by me'. Curiously, he is her master, she is in his thrall, offering him 
allegiance, yet 'he does not understand me quite'. He is perhaps of her making but does not 'fully 
comprehend' her, remaining outside. An earlier passage in the book addresses these ambiguous origins, 
referring to a mutual engendering of these imaginary friends at once self-created and the product of Lee's 
creativity: 
'the something to which we give the name of our friends is a creature somehow 
mysteriously bom of ourselves and of them; a creature which exists not really in the 
exterior and concrete world, but in our mind, or, if you prefer, in that particular 
borderland of fact and fancy. I do not care to commit myself to stating on which side, 
nearer or farther, of that strip of borderland, lies the exact dwelling place of the chief 
speaker in the following Dialogues., 
87 
Virginia Woolf s 'Unwritten Novel' published in 1920, describes the 'synthetic' process of feeling 
inside a character. Sitting opposite a middle-aged woman on a train journey a physiological mirroring 
of the woman's actions precedes an emotional connection: 
'While she spoke she fidgeted as though the skin on her back were as a plucked fowl's in 
a poulterer's shop-window... And then the spasm went through me; I crooked my arm 
and plucked at the middle of my back. My skin too, felt like the damp chicken's skin in 
84 Lee, The Handling of Words, p. 22. 
85 Vernon Lee, Baldwin: heing dialogues on views and aspirations (London: Fisher Unwin, 1886), p. 13. 
86 Ibid. p. 13, p. 14. 
87 Ibid. p. 3. 
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the poulterer's shop-window; one spot itched and irritated, felt clammy, felt raw. Could I 
reach iff 
Experiencing this woman's perceived discomforts as her own, with each of them rubbing at an unseen 
blemish on the window pane, precipitates an epiphany of understanding: 'She had communicated, 
shared her secret, passed her poison; she would speak no more. ... I read her message, deciphered her 
secret, reading it beneath her gaze. ' For the remaining journey, or text, the 'secrets' and imagined 
thoughts belonging to 'Minnie Marsh' (as she is named by our narrator) are shared as the writer 'feels 
herself' into 'poor' Minnie's bleakly drab life as a spinster. So immersed in Minnie's misfortunes is she 
that when the train stops and 'Minnie' is met at the platform by her son with whom she walks off 
conspiratorially arm in arm, the narrator is startled. Her empathic understanding has been entirely 
wrongfounded; her reading a misreading, the secrets never shared. 
'What do I stand on? What do I know? That's not Minnie. There never was Moggridge. 
Who am IT 
Yet despite the disorienting reality the concluding remarks to 'The Unwritten Novel' suggest that it is 
the novelist's license to blithely perform such imaginative misreadings, the character is their own 
creation, with no allegiance owed to the outside inspiring form. 
'If I fall on my knees, if I go through the ritual, the ancient antics, it's you, unknown 
figures, you I adore; if I open my arms; it's you I embrace, you I draw to me - adorable 
world! ' 
if empathy is self-referential, the outside world offers props in a ritual which facilitates the individual's 
inner drama. 88 Woolf's 'Unwritten Novel' unmasks the limitation of the empathic aesthetic and 
celebrates its relation to the world as inspiration. The title of this short piece of fiction as 'Unwritten 
Novel' both implies the artistic unreliability of such a method and suggests that our empathic relations 
to the world daily constitute unwritten novels: our experiencing of others is the stuff of fiction, rather 
than accurate identifications. 
Woolf s open embrace of the 'adorable' world conveys a warmth (compatible with Lipps' 'happy 
anthropomorphism') which lacks an equivalent in Vernon Lee's 'empathic aesthetic'. Indeed Gillian 
Beer finds it a 'rather odd fate' for Vernon Lee to be remembered in association with empathy. 89 A 
short story called 'Lady Tal', from Vernon Lee's first collection Vanitas, contains an unflattering 
character sketch of a novelist which was identified after publication as being a thinly-disguised portrait 
of Henry James. Offended by this ill-advised image of his brother, William James writes to Vernon Lee 
accusingly: 
'the using of a friend as so much raw material for "copy" implies on your part such a 
strangely objective way of taking human beings, and such a detachment from the 
88 'An Unwritten Novel', first pub. London Mercury (July 1920) repr. in Virginia Woolf, Complete Shorter 
Fiction, p. 153, p. 154, p. 164. 
89 Gillian Beer, 'The Dissidence of Vernon Lee: Satan the Waster and the Will to Believe' in Raitt and Tate 
(eds. ), Women's Fiction and the Great War, p. 107. 
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sympathetic consideration which usually governs human intercourse, that you will not be 
surprised to learn that seeing the book has quite quenched my desire to pay you another 
visit., 90 
Such an indictment holds a peculiar interest, levelled at a writer whose work constantly circles around 
the problematic 'way of taking human beings'. 
91 Vernon Lee's own shock and upset response to 
William James' letter - with what unintentional irony had the collection been subtitled 'Polite Stories'? 
- suggests that perhaps it is Lee's 'strangely objective way' and 
'detachment from sympathetic 
consideration' which enabled what is to an extent, a dispassionate study of human relationship. 
92 
'Looking for the colour red in our eye': the science of introspection 
Vernon Lee saved the 'Preface' and 'Epilogue' to an early unpublished story which she wrote between 
1883 and 1885 and destroyed a decade later. 
93 Of the torn-up story she had written: 
'It may be... that it is on my part all a misinterpretation, a gratuitous piece of fancy, a 
dream; for, after all, can we ever be certain that the things we seem to see, people of 
former days & of our own, other folk & ourselves, are not misinterpretations and dream? 
We see them in the light of our preconceived ideas, of our feeling & fancy, with the 
relations of shape and colour due to them; and who shall decide what would really remain 
for the crucible or the microscope if it were possible to get rid of this personal light, and 
to see the thing in itself, the never perceived, unreal reality? Perhaps nothing at all. '94 
The 'thing in itself is at the same time an 'unreal reality': an objective viewpoint is sought, yet held 
unattainable due to the impossibility of purging the object world of a 'personal 
light': 'if reduced to the 
absolute, if separated from the impression which it produces in our minds, how much might remain?, 
Vernon Lee's speculation here that objects exist only so long as we perceive them in a 'personal light', 
with 'perhaps nothing at all' remaining in the crucible of objectivity, will develop 
into a firmly held 
conviction in the 'subjective basis of aesthetics'. Under the undated heading, 'The subjective basis of 
aesthetics' Lee writes of her 'growing conviction that psychologically, the emotion of contemplation is 
more important than the object contemplated'. 
95 The 'personal light' will eventually become a glare 
which obviates the objects themselves: 'in fact that when we say 'it il' the real case is largely 
compounded of 'I am'. 
96 
90 Letter sent from Florence, March 11,1893, Vernon Lee Collection, Colby College. 'Lady Tal' was published 
in Lee, Vanitas: Polite Stories. 
91 'If one may speak of objective in regard to Empathyl' (Beauty and Ugliness, p. 360). 
92 In Lee's notes about the 'mimic relation' she claims that if Young she would devote herself to studying just 
such reactions ('Lore of the Ego', (1931-1934), Vernon Lee Papers). 
93 in a scribbled line on the surviving 'Preface' Lee notes that 'The Princess Penelope' was tom up 'as neither 
sufficiently true nor sufficiently artistic' ('Preface' to 'The Princess Penelope', n. d., Vernon Lee Papers). 
94 Preface to 'The Princess Penelope' (Vernon Lee Papers). 
95 'Sybilia9, nd. Vemon Lee Papers. 
96 introducing this note, Lee mentions that, unaccountably, she is reminded of the final lines of Wait 
Whitman's poem 'Of The Terrible Doubt of Appearances'. Whitman's poem conjures the 'terrible doubt of 
appearances, /Of the uncertainty after all, that we may be deluded' yet concludes that these fears are answered by 
the peace he experiences when he is with lovers or dear friends: 'Ile ahold of my hand has completely satisfied 
me' (Whitman, Leaves of Grass, 1885; repr. London: Dent, 1968, p. 103-4). Lee made an earlier reference to this 
poem in Vital Lies where she demonstrated how 'emotions can replace real beliefs' (Vital Lies: Studies of some 
'Our own potentialities... ' 48 
Her invoking of 'crucible' or 'microscope' in the preface saved between 1883-5 establishes reference to 
an exact science with which Lee remains reluctant to dispense, yet in later writings her desire is not to 
remove the 'personal light' of subjectivity but to analyse subjectivity itself. The wish to measure 'the 
Ego and its correlated otherness' or to dissect the psyche as if it possessed materiality will find its own 
imaginary object in Vernon Lee's fantasy of a Psychological version of the measuring instrument, or 
6microtome' used by biologists. First seen by Vernon Lee in the laboratory of the German zoologist 
Richard Semon, a microtome cuts an organism into infinitesimal slices: 'I remember Semon showing 
me, that last time of meeting before the war... a fish sliced microscopically and set between slides of 
glass so that you could see its minutest tissues in separate sections which put together presented the 
whole fish intact. ' Vernon Lee describes her own study of aesthetics as the employment of a 'psychic 
equivalent of such an instrument': her gallery diaries were 'my first rough and ready psychological 
slicer', in which she sliced works of art into how they made her feel; all subsequent analyses, 
questionnaires and autobiographical self-cnquiry continued this 'microtoming, slicing and isolating' the 
effect of objects upon their viewers or listeners, separating experience into its constituent parts: 
preferences, habits, instincts. 
97 Vernon Lee hopes that this, at present only a fantasy, instrument will 
one day reveal 'the organic motions constituting life' which underlie all thought and action. 
98 The 
anticipated discovery would confirm her increasing conviction that 'many - almost all - of our 
supposed beliefs are emotional conditions; indeed bodily conditions, urges, attitudes, movements, 
which some magically fine instrument might show and measure as our deepest organs are shown by the 
radiographer through the walls (les parois) of our body'. 
99 Lee's fantasy instrument would, like the 
radiograph, make the 'walls' of our body disappear: the invisible inner world would become visible, 
conjuring away the appearances we are accustomed to, and revealing the viscera within. 
William James represented the edges of the mind as virgin territory awaiting identity. This vision will 
be of key relevance in considering May Sinclair. In contrast Vernon Lee likens hers and Kit's approach 
to that of archaeologists, her metaphor acknowledging the history already enshrined within the 
individual: 
varieties of recent obscurantism, ii, London: Bodley Head, 1912). The resonance of the poem has shifted, from 
emphasis upon the jeopardising of belief by emotion, to the comforting physical reality of the 'held hand'. 
97 As part of Lee's ongoing enquiry into how aesthetic preference was constituted, in 1902 she began her 
town aesthetical biography': one hundred and six pages conscientiously examining her own likes and 
dislikes. The first part attempts to account for the development of formative preferences and to distinguish 
between the innate, arising from an 'individual deep down organisation', and the acquired, due to her 'habit' 
of being influenced by others. A second part enumerates the idiosyncracies of her physical pleasures and 
discomforts: her preference for cold baths, bracing climates, roughness to the touch, dryness, the power of 
breaking clean, vitality, restrained grief, decorum; her dislike of lush, luxuriant, yielding textures, words 
which suggest the flesh, excess, rapture, malformation of the nostrils. Lee's 'aesthetic autobiography' records 
an aesthetic response to the world which seeks no further hermeneutic beyond the phenomenological 
('Aesthetics, my Confession', holograph manuscript, Vernon Lee Papers). Such eclectic and exhaustive listing 
was inspired by Lee's reading of Henry Rutgers Marshall, Pleasure and Aesthetics: an essay concerning the 
psychology of pain and pleasure, with special reference to aesthetics (London: Macmillan, 1894; reviewed 
by William James in Nation 59,1894). 
98 'The psychological microtome' Jan 28,1932, rewritten and improved March 15,1934, in 'Psychology 
(essays)', Vernon Lee Papers. Lee's 'Psychology (essays)' are in varying stages of completion, often still in 
note form. 
99 'The psychological radiograph', Aug 29,1933, in 'Psychology (essays)', Vernon Lee Papers. 
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'In a certain obscure region of the soul, we two have noticed, odd, enigmatic, half-hidden 
vestiges, which might be (and might also not be! ) walls, terraces, and roadways, we have 
filled our pockets with shards of pottery and tesserae of mosaic; we have made rough 
sketches of what looked like masonry unless it was rock, and noted down peasant's tales 
of buried treasure. '100 
Lee's excavations suggest a wealth of material to be uncovered in the 'obscure region of the soul' yet 
the archaeologist is hesitant to identify the trace, let alone diagnose the original; her purpose is to 
observe and handle, to experience rather than label: methods suiting Virginia Woolf's injunction to the 
modem novelist of 1924 to '[flolerate the spasmodic, obscure, the fragmentary, the failure'. 
101 Lee 
herself draws parallels between the challenge of aesthetic introspection and the creative process, 
comparing her task to that of poets who are 'privileged to utter more than they can always quite explain, 
bringing up from the mind's unplumbed depths tokens of the nature of the world we carry within 
us,. 102 The 'world we carry within us' is an image to which Vernon Lee will return, suggestive of the 
self-enclosed solipsism to which self-investigation may lead and flagging the modernist vacillation in 
assigning to that world variously chaos or cosmos. 
In The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism, T. S. Eliot includes an aside in which he cautions 
against any such exploratory enterprise: 
'Whether the self-consciousness involved in aesthetics and in psychology does not risk 
violating the frontier of consciousness, is a question which I need not raise here., 
103 
Psychological aesthetics precisely trespasses upon the frontiers of consciousness which Eliot seeks to 
preserve: 'such researches are perilous if not guided by sound theology'. 
104 The self-consciousness 
encouraged in aesthetics and psychology which Eliot was wary of is evident in Vernon Lee's 
questioning in her 1897 essay: how is it that 'the subjective inside us can turn into the objective 
outside? '105 According to Vernon Lee we habitually extemalise what has its source inside our bodies, 
ascribing to the object what is a subjective phenomena: the linguistic habit, for example, of saying 'the 
object 'is round' in place of 'I feel roundness'. 
106 Our aesthetic perceptions 'are translated into qualities 
attributed to the visible objects, qualities thought of as existing outside ourselves, and for which we 
have as little the habit of looking inside our bodies as we have the habit of looking for the colour red in 
our eye, the middle la of the violin in our ear, or the smell of a flower in our nose'. 107 Insisting on 
directing the gaze not on the object but inside ourselves, Lee concedes to readers newly acquainted with 
100 Lee and Anstruther-Thomson, Beauty and Ugliness, p. viii - ix. 
101 Woolf, 'Mr Bennet and Mrs Brown', [lecture to the 'lleretics', Cambridge, May 18,1924], repr. Collected 
Essays, i, ed. Leonard Woolf (London: Chatto & Windus, 1966-69) p. 337. 
102 Lee, 'Introduction', Art and Afan, p. 75. 
103 T. S. Eliot, The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism, (1933) in Selected Prose of T. S. Eliol, ed. Frank 
Kermode, p-92- 
104 Ibid. 
105 Lee and Anstruther-Thomson, 'Beauty and Ugliness 11', Contemporary Review, 72 (Oct. 1897), p. 687. 
106 'Beauty and Ugliness 1'. Contemporary Review, 72 (Oct. 1897), p. 546. 
107 Lee, 'The Central Problem in Aesthetics' (first published in German as 'Weiteres Ober Einfahling' in 
Zeitschrift fur Aesthelik, 19 10), in Lee and Anstruther-Thomson, Beauty and Ugliness, (1912), p. 137. 
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the subject, that the demonstration of how 'we make form exist in ourselves' may at first sight appear 
$grotesque'. 108 In William James' metaphoric representation of Myers's gothic psychology (discussed) 
extravagant and wild forms disrupt the formerly classical landscape of the mind. Here, Lee's 'grotesque' 
demonstration disturbs distinctions between subject and object or what is 'inside our bodies' and 
toutside ourselves'. A note from Anstruther-Thomson's gallery diaries exclaims: 'Have we swallowed 
the vase! or is it, on the contrary, the vase that has swallowed us! I do not know, but anyhow we are 
seeing it with a delightful feeling of completely possessing it! '109 Such cannibalisation of form 
challenges the modernist aesthetic principles: Peter Nicholls describes the 'triumph of form over 
'bodily' content' as comprising 'one major strand of modernism'. I 10 
Vernon Lee's minute analysis of the individual's experience of an aesthetic object bears witness to a 
direct and palpable engagement with the relation between form and body: her key question: 'How do I 
behave in the presence of a given work of artT indicates the method of 'aesthetic introspection' which 
took as its premise that perception of form was constituted by actual physical adjustments. 
III In 
answer to this question, Kit would describe the effect of particular shapes and colours upon her, while 
Vernon Lee recorded her statements, observing the physical changes in respiration, circulation, and 
muscular strains which accompanied contemplation of an object. The extent to which these bodily 
sensations are pleasurable or not determine our aesthetic judgement of the object, thus to monitor 
details of physical sensations was to approach the question of aesthetic preference. 
112 An entry in their 
6gallery diaries' describing the effect of a Greek 'jar' demonstrates Lee's early methods of aesthetic 
introspection: 
'Here is ajar... To begin with, the feet press on the ground while the eyes fix the base of 
the jar. Then one accompanies the lift up so to speak, of the body of the jar by a lift up of 
one's own body; and one accompanies by a slight sense of downward pressure of the head 
the downward pressure of the widened rim on the jar's top. Meanwhile the jar's equal 
sides bring both lungs into equal play; the curve outwards of the jar's two sides is 
simultaneously followed by an inspiration as the eyes move up to the jar's widest point. 
108 'Beauty and Ugliness 11', p. 686. 
109 Anstruther-Thomson, Art and Man, p. 15 1. 
I 10 Peter Nicholls, Modernisms, p. 4. 
III Lee and Anstruther-Thomson, Beauty and Ugliness, p. 241-2. 
112 The proposition that criteria of beauty depended upon the 'aesthetic' emotions which accompanied 
perception of form derived from the 'physiological' branch of psychology which connected all states of 
feeling to a biological condition. Grant Allen's Physiological Aesthetics - listed among Vernon Lee's reading - 
aimed to rid the study of aesthetics from 'transcendental rhetoric' and to establish a purely physical basis for 
the psychical phenomenon of aesthetic feelings. Defining aesthetic feelings as phenomena of pleasure and 
pain intrinsically linked to bodily feelings, Allen also maintains an evolutionary agenda: the 'aesthetically 
beautiful is that which affords the Maximum of Stimulation with the Minimum of Fatigue or Waste' 
(Physiological Aesthetics: a psychological analysis of aesthetics, London: Henry S. King, 1887, p. 39). Late 
nineteenth-century approaches to the psychology of emotion took two forms: the 'intellectualist' claimed that 
states of feeling were a function of knowledge, and were considered secondary states; conversely the 
physiological' approach claimed that states of feeling were primitive and autonomous, with their 'origin in 
the needs and instincts of the organic life' (Thdodore Ribot, The Psychology of the Emotions, London: Walter 
Scott, 1897, p. vi). Ribot - described by Lee as 'my master on psychology' - counts himself nominally among 
the second camp (Music and Its Lovers, London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1932, p. 180). 
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Then expiration begins, and the lungs seem slowly to collapse as the curve inward is 
followed by the eyes, till, the narrow part of the neck being reached, the ocular following 
of the widened out top provokes a short inspiration. Moreover, the shape of the jar 
provokes movements of balance, the left curve a shifting on to the left foot, and vice 
versa. A complete and equally distributed set of bodily adjustments has accompanied the 
ocular sight of the jar. 'I 13 
In an obvious reference to the participating subject in aesthetic empathy, a passage set in 1914 from 
Virginia Woolf s novel The Years describes Martin Pargiter standing looking up at the dome of St 
Pauls: 
'All the weights in his body seemed to shift. He had a curious sense of something 
moving in his body in harmony with the building; it righted itself. it came to a full stop. 
it was exciting this change of proportion. 'I 14 
Woolf's selecting of such a vast and impressive 'object' suggests that focus on empathic process 
promotes a relation to the outside (of objects, structures, authority) where even the most monumental 
(and divinely inspired) structures are incorporated as internal bodily shifts. A few pages later, we catch 
Martin's passing thought: 'What would the world be, he said to himself.. without 11' in it?, 115 His 
question can be read as the consequence of the extreme subjectivist viewpoint to which the theory of 
aesthetic empathy tends: does the world exist without T? 
This foregrounding of the body was inspired by a recent theory of emotions, the 'revolutionary' 'Jarnes- 
Lange' theory which proposed that feelings of bodily changes constitute emotion, counter to the 
dominant view that emotions are produced by a prior mental activity. 116 As William James expressed 
it: 
'If weJancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstractfrom our consciousness of it 
all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no "mind. 
stuff" out of which the emotion can be constituted. 'l 17 
The 'bodily symptoms' in James' study of emotion were foremost those of muscular strain: Vernon Lee 
and Kit also included sensations of direction, adjustments in balance and sensations of altered 
respiration and circulation. These processes were described as 'internal and hidden', or occurring in the 
, dim places of our consciousness', particularly 'hidden' for Vernon Lee who later discloses her own 
unacquaintance with the movements to which Kit was highly sensitive. 118 'Beauty and Ugliness' was 
113 Lee and Anstruther-Thomson, Beauty and Ugliness, p. 119. 
114 Woolf, The Years, p. 216. 
115 Ibid. p. 230. 
116 The 'James-Lange' theory of emotions was so-called for being arrived at independently but almost 
concurrently by William James at Harvard ('What is an cmotion? ', Mind, 1884) and the Danish physician Carl 
Lange (On the Emotions, 1885). 
117 James, Principles of Psychology, ii, p. 451. 
118 Lee and Anstruther-Thomson, 'Beauty and Ugliness 11', p. 687, p. 688. 'A long course of special training 
had magnified not only [Kit's] powers of self-observation, but also most probably the normally minute, nay, 
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written before Vernon Lee encountered the work of Theodore Lipps, and Karl Groos, the German 
psychologists whose theories of empathy and inner mimicry had developed contemporaneously with her 
own. 119 After reading Lipps' 4sthelik and receiving his harsh review of her 1897 study, Lee 
reformulated her position, now judging the unmistakable physical sensations, in which Anstruther- 
Thomson excelled, as naive and insufficiently psychological indications of 'aesthetic empathy'. 
120 Lee 
suggests that her early endeavours foundered upon the idiosyncrasies of Kit's method of introspection 
and confesses never consciously experiencing such movements herself. she had assumed that they must 
be occurring subconsciously. The annotated 1912 version of the essay brackets Kit's contributions, 
peppering them with footnotes which disclaim the importance of bodily sensations and endorse Lipps' 
'justly severe' criticisms. Vernon Lee now substantially adopts Lipp's theory of empathy as a 'purely 
44mental" phenomena', although the body is never entirely evacuated from the argument. 
121 
Empathy and abstraction 
Given the nature of argument, once empathy entered modernist discourse an opposite term shortly 
companioned it. 
122 The German art historian Wilhelm Worringer's Abstraction and Empathy (1908) 
describes the 'polar antithesis' between empathy and abstraction, the two forms of aesthetic 
enjoyment. 123 His text defends abstraction as the most relevant aesthetic to the modem era in terms of 
the relation of distance it expresses between man and the world; empathy, correspondingly, is 
represented as an outmoded artistic response to the environment, betokening an intimate relation with 
the object world which, Worringer argues, is no longer appropriate for the alienated modem man. He 
does not critique the psychological method of aesthetics, which 'proceeds from the behaviour of the 
contemplating subject', but proposes an alternative psychic process, namely man's 'urge to abstraction' 
as the motivating influence behind modem art, rather than an 'urge to empathy'. 
124 Worringer reiterates 
Lipps' definition of empathy as 'objectified self-enjoyment': the object demands an activity in the 
so to speak, microscopic and imperceptible bodily sensations accompanying the action of eye and attention in 
the realisation of visible form' (Lee and Anstruther-Thomson, Beauty and Ugliness, p. 25-6). 
119 See Theodor Lipps, Raumaesthetik, 2 vols., (1893-7; Lee knew of Lipps work from 1899, see Beauty and 
Ugliness, p. 82) and Aesthelik (1906); Karl Groos, Einleitung in die Aesthetik (1892), and Der Aesthetische 
Gemiiss (1902). 'The modern term Einfahling was first used b, y Robert Vischer [Das optische Foringe/tilil, Ein 
Beitrag zur Asthetik, 1873]. flis suggestions were taken up and developed in Germany by Theodor Lipps, 
Johannes Volkelt and Karl Groos, in France by Victor Basch, in England by Vernon Lee' (Katherine Gilbert and 
Ilelmut Kuhn, A History of Esthetics (New York: Macmillan, 1939, p. 537): although Vernon Lee developed her 
ideas in Italy, not England, this is one of the few accounts which acknowledges Lee's work. 
120 Lipps critiques Lee's articles 'Beauty and Ugliness 1-11' in Archiv ftir systematicsche Philosophie, 6: 3 
(1900), p-385. 
121 Lee and Anstruther-Thomson, Beauty and Ugliness, p. 104. Ilowever, Lee does not entirely dismiss the 
kinaesthetic explanation - 'Inner Mimicry' - championed by Karl Groos according to which the contemplation 
of an object precipitates actual sensations of movement. Groos claimed that these sensations are only felt by a 
few privileged 'motor types'; Vernon Lee identified Kit Anstruther-Thomson as a highly-developed motor 
type. Thdodore Ribot added to the auditory, visual and motor types with his proposal of an 'affective' type - 
with which Lee identified herself - whose recollection of emotional impressions is particularly easy and 
complete. See Ribot, The Psychology of the Emotions (London: Walter Scott, 1897). 
122 Michael Levenson describes modernism as a movement which repeatedly expressed itself in terms of 
dualistic opposition and radical polarities (A Genealogy of Literary Modernism, p. ix). 
123 Wilhelm Worringcr, Abstraction and Empathy: a contribution to the psychology of style, trans. Michael 
Bullock (1908; London: RKP, 1953), p. 4, p. 23. 
124 Ibid. p. 4. 
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subject, and in so far as this activity, or sensation, is experienced as pleasurable, the object is perceived 
as beautiful. 125 Whereas empathy demands as a precondition 'a happy pantheistic relationship of 
confidence between man and the phenomena of the external world, the urge to abstraction is the 
outcome of a great inner unrest inspired in man by the phenomena of the outside world'. 
126 Modem 
man no longer seeks happiness in art by projecting self into the object of contemplation: while this 
object represents the external world, such projection would be a psychic launching into chaos, 
entanglement and obscurity, productive only of distress. The urge to abstraction seeks 'to wrest the 
object of the external world out of its natural context, out of the unending flux of being, to purify it of 
all its dependence upon life'. 
127 Abstraction is represented as a toughly virile aesthetic: 'wresting the 
object' from its context and purging it of 'dependence', abstraction creates an autonomous, self-enclosed 
artform. Yet at the same time the reassurances of geometric regularity witness a desire for security and a 
certainty in 'the thing in itself' which will transcend the world of objects. 
Abstraction and Empathy was hugely influential: the foreword to a later edition expresses Worringer's 
surprise at 'the immediacy with which its theories, which were concerned only with historical 
interpretation, were transposed so as to apply to contemporary movements in the artistic conflict'. 
128 
T. E. Hulme was quick to adopt Worringer's new polarities into the aesthetic discourse of modernism, 
abandoning his earlier enthusiasm for the Einfahling theories: his 1914 lecture to the Quest Society, 
'Modem Art and its Philosophy', explains the 'new movemenis in art' as evidencing the 'tendency to 
abstraction' which finds beauty in the inorganic and abstract. The geometric, or abstract creates a 'refuge 
from the flux and impermanence of outside nature' and is 'absolutely distinct from the messiness, the 
confusion, and the accidental details of existing things. ' It was an aesthetic approach which seemed to 
guarantee an 'absolutely enclosed material individuality', purging artist and spectator of their connection 
to I ife. 129 
Lee describes Worringer's 'interesting and readable little book' as having come into her hands just as 
Beauty and Ugliness was going into print. Regrettably, her response to Abstraction and Empathy is 
thus only briefly articulated in a footnote, yet it ably demolishes the relevance of such a pairing. 
According to Lee, Worringer's historical interpretation which explains 'all the history of art by their 
[i. e. abstraction and empathy] warfare and alliances, ' is misleading in arguing that modem aesthetics' 
theory of empathy only accounts for the appreciation of a certain style of art. Vernon Lee insists that all 
art is explicable by dynamic empathy: empathy is not a historical but psychological mode of response 
which is not intrinsic to naturalistic art but relevant equally to the appreciation of geometric form. 
125 Ibid. p. 5- 
126 Ibid. p. 15. 
127 Ibid. p. 17. 
128 Ibid. p. vii. Following Worringer's Abstraction and Empathy, Jung described his own typology in which 
empathy corresponds to extroversion, making its introverted opposite abstraction ('A Contribution to the 
study of Psychological Types', lecture delivered 1913, repr. in Jung, Psychological Types, trans. R. F. C. Ifull, 
1921; London: Routledge, 1971,499-509, p. 505). 
129 T. E. Hulme, 'Modem Art and its Philosopy', Speculations, p. 86, p. 87, p. 89. 
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Worringer 'confuses the various kinds of empathy, confining it to organic form, and explaining by a 
supposed horror of life those so-called geometrical forms whose peculiarities depend upon formal- 
dynamic empathy. From the aesthetic standpoint all aesthetic form is equally abstract, because the 
aesthetic standpoint is that of a play of abstract forces. '130 Vernon Lee insists that empathy is an 
intrinsic response to the object world not ousted by abstraction: its relevance reaches beyond the neat 
definition arrived at by Worringer, and Hulme in his footsteps, who associates it only with a 
naturalistic art fonn. 
Worringer's appeal to the modernist agenda was undoubtedly sharpened by his conceptualising of all 
kinds of art in tenns of a sought-for self-negation (in which significant respect he undoes his own 
opposition between the two terms). Worringer identifies this desire for self-alienation as 'the deepest 
and ultimate essence of all aesthetic experience', commenting with approval on the aptness of the 
colloquial expression 'losing oneself in contemplating a work of art. 
131 In abstraction the urge is to 
escape humanity and organic existence as a whole - 'life as such is felt to be a disturbance of aesthetic 
enjoyment'; in empathy the impulse is more specifically an alienation from one's individual being. 
Worringer translates from Lipps' Aesthetik: 'In empathy, therefore, I am not the real 1, but am inwardly 
liberated from the latter, i. e. I am liberated from everything which I am apart from contemplation of the 
form. I am only this ideal, this contemplating U 
132 Empathy enables an escape from the 'messiness' 
of subjectivity to the consolations of a fixed form; Worringer adds '[w]e feel, as it were, our 
individuality flow into fixed boundaries, in contrast to the boundless differentiation of the individual 
consciousness. In this self-objectivation lies a self-alienation. '133 The need for 'fixed boundaries' rests 
upon a representation of individual consciousness as boundless and unfixed. Provoked by a reading of 
William James' Principles of Psychology, Vernon Lee considers how 'we are ushered into life thinking 
ourselves conscious beings of a very definite pattern, ' only to find this belief misleading and be 
gundermined and made baggy by emotions that are not classified'. As the alternative to shunning the 
baggy formless self Vernon Lee strives to classify the disrupting emotions, to define the boundaries of 
individual consciousness in lieu of the formal bounds of the object. She expresses the hope that the new 
science of psychology will eventually comprehend the 'powers of nature (if you like, powers of chaos) 
within us'. 134 
In Lee's attention to the empathic process, contemplation of a work of art becomes more aptly a process 
of 'finding' than 'losing onesel r. Yet this is resolutely not a spiritual journey. Lee disparages Lipps' 
abstract descriptions of the ego's projections into the inanimate world in which, forbidding all mention 
130 Lee and Anstruther-Thomson, Beauty and Ugliness, p. 362n. 
131 Worringer, Abstraction and Empathy, p. 23. 
132 Ibid. p. 23 (q. v. Lipps, Aesthetik, p. 247). 
133 Ibid, p. 24. 
134 'Commonplace Book X', Vernon Lee Papers. 
'Our own potentialities... ' 55 
of the organic and bodily, empathy becomes 'an activity of the soup. 135 She takes exception to his 
conjuring an ego 'separate and almost material, leaving the realm of reality... to take up its abode in 
"the work of art", to participate in its life and to detach itself from its own, after the fashion of the 
Lenten retreat of a Catholic escaping from the world and purifying himself in the life of a convent? ' 
Conceding his metaphor as picturesque, she contends 'it would make us forget that the ego is not an 
entity apart, not a personage able to go in and out of a given place, but is a group of subjective 
phenomena, or rather a special kind of feeling intermittently present in consciousness. ' Determinedly 
literal in her conceptual understanding, Vernon Lee insists that the ego never leaves the body. She 
counters Lipps' assertion that 'Tbe ego lives in the thing contemplated' with 'Would it not be more in 
keeping with the facts to say that the contemplated object lives in the mind which contemplates iff In 
answer to Lipps' representation of empathy as a metaphysical projection of the ego into the non-ego, 
Lee relocates the site of encounter to within the body: the art form exists as an inner condition, it is 'the 
idea of it which we make for ourselves' which is of significance. This 'idea of it which we make for 
ourselves; an idea made up in part of our experiences of life and activity;... made up in part of the 
experience of movements of our own body' avoids the dichotomies of ego and non-ego, bringing the 
object within and substituting the fantasy that self can be lost in the outside world with the fantasy that 
self is always found-136 
'The pulsing of our own former experience': empathy and recollection 
After meeting with Karl Groos in 1901 Vernon Lee writes to Kit that 'He can produce in himself 
without the presence or recollection of any objective aesthetic circumstances, the subjective aesthetic 
state, merely by breathing in a given way, particularly by obtaining a sense in the nostrils, neck and a 
slight what he calls pathetic feeling in the chest,. 
137 The vanishing of the object from an experience of 
the 'aesthetic state' is a surprising denouement for a study founded in meticulously observing the effects 
of such an object. In notes headed 'the curious case of mysticism' made in 1896, Vernon Lee had drawn 
attention to the peculiarities of the mystic ecstasy in which intense emotion is felt without the presence 
of an object. 138 Although Karl Groos produced a subjective state without 'presence or recollection', Lee 
argues that mystic experience, along with all aesthetic states, is dependant upon recollection, but not of 
135 Lee, 'Introduction', Art and Man, p. 104; Beauty and Ugliness, p. 23. 'Does Einfilhling occur in cases where, 
apparently there is no organic resonance whatever? Can, that is to say, a visual objectification of a movement 
carry the feeling - in tone, as well as, and sometimes better than, a kinaesthetic or bodily resonance? ' (Jane E. 
Downey, 'Literary Self-Projection', Psychological Review, 19 (1912), 299-311, p. 31 1). 
136 Lee and Anstruther-Thomson, Beauty and Ugliness, p. 59. The terms 'ego' and 'non-ego' are employed in a 
sense current in the late nineteenth century: 'ego' is the conscious thinking subject opposed to a 'non-cgo' 
object; the 'projection' of the ego referred to by both Lipps and Lee is to be distinguished from the 
unconscious projective identifications familiar to psychoanalytic discourse. 
137 July 29th, 1901, Vernon Lee Papers. Lee concludes that 'we must find out what art does for others as well 
as for us' (ibid. ). Lee duly carried out this intention with a questionnaire submitted first to the 1901 Congrýs 
du Psychologie in Paris, and later distributed amongst her friends (Vernon Lee and Clementina Anstruther- 
Thomson, Le Role de Piliment moteur dans la perception isthetique visuelle. Mimoire et questionnaire, 
Imola, 1901). Music and its Lovers (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1932) was substantially based upon the 
results of a similar questionnaire examining individual response to music. 
138 Note headed Dec 13,1896, 'Commonplace Books XIII', Vernon Lee Papers. 
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an object: it is our capacity to remember and reproduce an 'emotional condition without necessarily 
remembering the object or circumstance giving rise to it'. 
Although Vernon Lee continued to observe 'objects', she emphasised the determining effect of the 
subject's past upon the present experience which shifted the significance of the object to that of a 
catalyst which re-activates the past (more akin to the evocative function of Proust's 'madeleine'). Based 
on the premise that '[a]ll visual perception is accompanied by interpretation of the seen shapes in terms 
of previous experience', the theory holds that we experience pleasure, which we call the perception of 
beauty, because a particular object provokes a revival of an experience of something formerly felt as 
pleasurable. 139 The present experience is 'residual of countless past experiences'. 140 Vernon Lee makes 
the connection explicit in the conclusion to Beauty and Ugliness, stating that 'fonnal-aesthetic empathy 
is of the nature of memory, of thought'. 141 Aesthetic preference is determined by the object's reviving 
our past experience rather than by our present experience of physical resonance with the object. Defining 
itself in terms of memory rather than relationship, Lee's empathic-aesthetic can be said to avoid the 
present encounter with the object. The individual is represented as being predominantly influenced by 
temporal connections with the past, to some extent immuring the experiencing self from its Cý 
neighbouring objects-142 
The shift from present encounter to a temporal recurrence as determining the appreciation of aesthetic 
objects extends also to a new understanding of the empathic relation to other people. According to this 
new emphasis: 
I[W]hat we call sympathy with others must be largely due to mnemic storage and 
evocation of our own affective experience. Sympathy is usually explained as arising from 
the recognition either of another person's facial expression and gesture, or of the import of 
his words and situation; but... I cannot see why such recognition should not, instead of 
causing an emotion, remain purely intellectual, unless it evoked a reviviscence of 
something we had ourselves experienced. '143 
Sympathy with others, or empathy, depends upon stimulating our own past rather than confirming an 
affective connection between self and others. Lee's exploration rests upon a solipsistic model of 
experience; where relations to others can only be 'purely intellectual', emotion is only ever self- 
referential. This interpretative slant extinguishes the immediacy of the present: beholden to his own 
past, the subject never surrenders to the emotional charge of the present collision between subject and 
object, seemingly marooned in an endless self-experiencing. 
139 Lee and Anstruther-Thomson, Beauty and Ugliness, p. 28. 
140 Ibid. p. 355. 
141 Ibid. 
142 In Lee's schema, the present relationship to the object is overwhelmed by the subject's past. We can 
compare object relations where present relations are a playing out of internalised past experience: despite the 
emphasis upon object, rather than aim, it can be argued that object relations theorises a solipsistic model of 
experience. 
143 Lee, 'Introduction' to Semon, Mnemic Psychology, p. 3 1. 
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Lee's emphasis on memory carries a new understanding of her 'empathic aesthetic' resolving previous 
ambiguities. In a dense passage from Music and its Lovers, Vernon Lee describes how our own past 
emotional experience accumulates into 
4something comparable with a subterranean reservoir' from which wells up 'a participation 
in joys and sorrows, sadnesses and elations which are not ours, and may not even now be 
present in others; which may be entirely imaginary... On such occasions it seems as if we 
had left our own self behind us; and so we have, because the self from which alone we 
can ever need such deliverance, is the self of our wants and cares, and that self exists only 
in the present, is of the present's very substance. Similarly, we may seem to be living in, 
or... living ourselves into, the life of other creatures. But; in reality, what we are living 
in, what has invaded and ousted our personality is our own residual and composite and 
averaged experience. ' 
Lee consistently undcrinines the significance of present relationship: we participate in other people's 
joys which - as Woolf's 'Unwritten Novel' demonstrates - are likely to be illusory. If this is 
experienced as a welcome 'deliverance' from self - the 'self-alienation' which Worringer characterised as 
a modernist urge - it can only be superficial since if the self is defined by past experience, it is a self 
from which we can never escape. Finally, we are neither 'living ourselves into' nor 'invaded' by another 
creature: there is only one player in this game, namely ourselves. It is our own 'past experience which 
has invaded and ousted our personality'. Lee concludes in a bleak indictment of human relationship: 
'The solemn and serene Past, not as it ever really was... has delivered us from the thin, 
stinging Present, and united us to our neighbours who are, in truth, our own 
potentialities regrouped in our mind; united us to mankind which is itself but an 
abstraction and would have no grip on us unless we had felt into that disembodied idea 
the pulsing of our own former experience. '144 
our relationships to other people are brought alive only by their rekindling the 'pulsing of our own 
former experience'. it follows that, contrary to the belief that we can experience others as ourselves, we 
are confined to always experiencing ourselves as others: 'our neighbours, are in truth, our own 
potentialities regrouped in our mind. ' 
Although this theoretical position was developed subsequently, Lee's stories written in the 1890s 
repeatedly describe intimacy across time, historical connections with the deceased, against a failure of 
those in the present. 'Amour Dure' (1890) tells the tragic story of Spiridion Trepka, a Polish historian, 
isolated in an Italian town, whose archival research and his acquaintance with her portrait, causes him to 
fall fatally in love with a woman who has been dead for hundreds of years, feeling himself to 
4understand her so much better than my facts warrant'. 145 In 'The Doll' (1899) the narrator describes 
how she comes to know the character and feelings of a woman who died years ago, through her chance 
144 Lee, Music and its Lovers, p. 190. 
145 Lee, 'Amour Dure', in Hauntings: Fantastic Tales (London: Ifeinemann, 1890), repr. in Lee, Supernatual 
Tales: excursions intofantasy (London: Peter Owen, 1955), p. 100. 
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encounter with a life-sized doll made in the image of this woman. This lifeless object yields a 
mysterious form of understanding to the narrator who describes how 'I somehow knew everything about 
her'. 146 The haunting in 'Oke of Okehurst' (1890), is of Alice Okehurst, obsessively preoccupied with 
the life of the woman who was her namesake several generations previously: living in the same house as 
her forebear, still furnished with the possessions: 'She seemed to know every word that Alice had 
spoken, every idea that had crossed her mind. '147 In these stories 'subjective' knowledge of a deceased 
person exceeds any limited factual acquaintance. It is mediated through an aesthetic artefact, variously 
portrait or doll: in the case of the doll, the narrator describes 'I bought a thing -I scarcely know 
whether to call it a thing'. 148 Yet it is significant that these objects all enable a historical, rather than 
present connection, the objects are aide-mdmoires to an experience beyond individual memory, they 
bespeak a temporal recurrence not a present relationship: the relationships are all with the deceased. 
in an unpublished autobiographical essay, 'Aesthetics, my confession', Lee makes the startling 
admission '[P]eople being dead, unless it disrupt a habit of contact, does not prevent my taking just the 
same pleasure I took during their life. '149 Louis Norbert, Lee's short novel, published in 1914, offers a 
curious verdict upon the intimacy of human relationships whereby it is more possible to know someone 
dead than alive. It contains letters between a young male archaeologist and the middle-aged Lady 
Venetia. These ensue after they meet briefly in Italy and discover a mutual curiosity in unearthing the 
facts behind the mysterious death of Louis Norbert, an orphan adopted by Lady Venetia's forebears in 
the seventeenth century. Research into a past romance informs their present relationship. When the 
archives of history are slow to yield information, the archaeologist advises: 
'Invent your Louis Norbert. Believe me, you have begun already, long, long ago, when 
you first saw his portrait in your childhood. Why not continue? After all, are not all the 
persons in whom we take the most vivid interest just to that extent, creations of our 
ownTI 50 
Lady Venetia's indignance at having her intuitions labelled inventions is vindicated by the denouement 
in which Louis Norbert, as Lady Venetia has already somehow known, is discovered to be the 
unacknowledged Prince Dauphin, in a fantasy which coincides the narratives of personal imagination 
and history. Less happily coincident is the archaeologist's romantic interest in Lady Venetia which 
develops during their letter writing relationship. When he meets her again in the flesh, and is again 
apprised of her matronly form, his passion immediately vanishes, having borne no relation to the 
existing Lady Venetia: according to his earlier advice, the 'persons in whom we take the most vivid 
interest' being 'creations of our own'. 
146 Lee, 'The Doll', (1899) repr. in For Maurice: Five Unlikely Stories (London: John Lane, 1927), p. 216. 
147 'Oke of Okehurst', first published as The Phantom Lover: A Fantastic Story (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 
1886), repr. in Lee, Ilauntings. - Fantastic Tales (London: Ileinemann, 1890), p. 152. 
148 Lee, 'The Doll', For Maurice, p. 209. 
149 Lee, 'Aesthetics, my confession' (1902), Vernon Lee Papers. 
150 Lee, Louis Norbert, p. 102. 
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The late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century memory theories from which Lee drew proposed 
that present experience was absorbed through the antennae of our senses, to be stored organically in the 
body and reproduced in the form of memory and heredity. 151 Although organic memory theory 
traditionally privileges heredity over the present and the inherited over the acquired, Lee's taking up of 
Theodore Ribot's theory of 'mdmoire affective' in Music and Its Lovers and Richard Semon's 'partial 
return' (she wrote a lengthy introduction to the English translation of Semon's Mnemic Psychology) 
display her interest in aspects of organic memory theory which honoured both a transfixion with the 
past and the transformative effect of the present. 152 Ribot's 'mdmoire affective' describes an emotional 
remembering in which former feelings are recreated but never duplicated: 'mdmoire affective' is a feeling 
all over again, a re-living (not dissimilar to Freud's 'working through'), not simply a re-calling. The 
past will always be slightly different when revived in the present: 'there is the prcsent-present and a 
present-past'. 153 Richard Semon, who introduced the word 'mneme' to define the biochemical process 
by which the body stores and reproduces the past, held that all stimulation leaves traces in the body 
which can be re invoked by the partial return of a similar situation to that which left the previous trace 
or 'engram'. 154 That a 'partial' return suffices, ensures that the past is not duplicated in the present: 
'[it] allows the transfusion of the past into the present, the capitalizing of what has been for the 
increased exploitation of what is and the production, the increment, of what has not yet been,. 15 5 The 
reviviscence of past sensations implies 'economy, vicariousness, and theirjoint result, the new'. 
156 
The dynamic relationship between past and present in Semon's theory is 'a competition between what 
has been and what is and continues; there is the victory of the present, which accepts from the past only 
as much as it can integrate with its substance and turn to its uses. '157 
In a 1906 discussion with the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, Freud dismissed Semon with the remark 
that 'Only he who has new things to say is entitled to coin new terms'. 
158 Semon certainly developed 
his laws of inherited memory along lines already established by the more renowned theorists Ribot, 
Hering, and Haeckel. 159 Yet in a sense, the use of new terms to say something old, characterises 
151 Laura Otis, Organic Memory, History and the Body in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), p. 3. 
152 Ibid. p. 39. Ribot described two kinds of memory: the intellectual memory which he designates 'false', and 
the 'emotional memory' or 'actual reproduction of a former state of feeling' (Ribot, 'The Memory of Feelings' 
Revue Philosophique, Oct. 1894, repr. in The Psychology of the Emotions, p. 164, p. 162). Whereas the former is 
a recollecting of intellectual states, the latter recollects feeling and recreates organic and physiological 
conditions: this kind of memory will 'vibrate through the whole body' (ibid. p. 163). 
153 Ibid. p. 162. See Lee, Music and its Lovers, p. 185, p. 188. 
154 Significantly, the 'engram' (Semon's term for the mnemic residue) is the result of an active response made 
by body or mind - contrasting with Freud's 'mystic writing pad' where the impressive medium is passive. 
155 Vernon Lee, 'Introduction' to Semon, Nfnemic Psychology, trans. Bella Duffy (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1923), p. 20. 
156 Ibid. p. 19. 
157 Ibid. p. 25. 
158 'Scientific Meeting on November 4,1906', in discussion of Richard Semon, Mneme as the Preserving 
Principle in the Changing Processes of Organic Life, recorded in Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic 
Society, 1 (1906-08), p. 50. 
159 Lee's admiration for Richard Semon (1859-1918), German biologist and zoologist is evident in her 
lengthy introduction to Mnemic Psychology (1923) - the English translation of Mneme (1904); see Lee, 
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Vernon Lee's interest in Semon's theory of memory which describes the way the past is always 
modified by its reproduction in the present: recollection permits both the conservation of the old, and 
creation of the new. The appeal of Serrion's theory to Vernon Lee suggests a point of convergence 
between her empathic aesthetic and the modernist attachment to the past. Eliot's famous voicing of his 
belief in 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' that 'the past should be altered by the present as much as 
the present is directed by the past' declares an allegiance to tradition which at the same time does not 
forsake a modem approach. 160 Eliot's description of Hulme as a 'classical revolutionary' conveys an 
aesthetic manifesto which looks to the past without being accused of being backward-looking. As 
Vernon Lee advises, 'the greatest innovator does not create out of nothing, but transmutes already 
existing forms into something possessing the familiarity of the old and the fascination of the new'. 161 
Since the past is stored in the body as memory and heredity, it follows that it is the reviviscence, not 
just of the individual's personal experience, but of the inherited residue of 'countless past experience' 
which determines present aesthetic preference. As a consequence, the individual responds favourably to 
forms which have long been familiar. According to Vernon Lee, tradition is esteemed an inherited 
arbiter of beauty, which, in terms of physiological psychology, means forms favourable to life. 
Classical proportions and dimensions have long been held agreeable for their harmonising relation with 
human dynamic modes of being; whereas art for art's sake creates 'aesthetic uncertainty' by breaking 
with the traditional forms to which man is accustomed. 
162 Tradition thus reveals 'an unconscious sway 
of preference', which apparently hearkens back to an ideal of an original harmonious relation between 
man and form. However, Lee is less interested in pursuing a definition of the original ideal than in 
observing the extent to which the present is suffused by the past. 
163 Furthermore, unlike Eliot in his 
concept of tradition, Lee - close to Proust - psychologises and internalises that relation. 
If, as Lee proposes, aesthetic preference depends upon its reviving our own past experience, the reader's 
response to literature must also rely on the 'realm of our recollections'. It only exists as it can reinforce, 
evoke or 'rearrange' images and feelings which are 'already within us'. Vernon Lee is specific as to how 
the written word re-awakens past experience: the memory, stored organically in the body, responds not 
to the rhythm of the outside world, but that of the inner one'; this 'inner' rhythm has its own peculiar 
logic which can be stimulated by the 'mysterious essence' of language. 164 These movements are 
expressed through the syntactical structure of the prose: the formal qualities of 'pace and weight, impact 
and rhythm', in comparison with which Lee considers the sound, the audible rhythms produced by 
alliteration, assonance and rhyme to be a superficial and inferior music. 'What I am speaking of... is 
'Spiritual Free Trade', [review of Eugenio Rignano, Essays in Scientific Synthesis], Nation (28 Sept. 1918), 
690-1, p. 690. 
160 T. S. Eliot, 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', Selected Prose, p. 39. 
161 Lee and Anstruther-Thornson, Beauty and Ugliness, p. 33. 
162 Ibid. p. 32. 
163 Ibid. p. 32. 
164 Lee, 'The Nature of the Writer', The Handling of Words, p. 13 1. 
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movement of a subtler and a wholly interior sort,. 165 The specific aesthetic quality of literature is due 
'to the complex patterns into which (quite apart from sound) the parts of speech, verbs and nouns and 
adjectives, actives and passives, variously combined tenses, can be woven even like lines and colours, 
producing patterns of action and reaction in our mind, our nerve tracks - who knows? in our muscles 
and heartbeats and breathing'. 166 Equivalent to the visual, or audible form, syntactical texture endows 
thought with form and structure, giving it body: it is composed into patterns made of us'. 167 The 
muscular medium of syntax, as Vernon Lee represents it ('thinking, to a thinker, is a form of fighting, 
of building') enables the written word to be experienced in terms of the formal-dynamic properties 
which define aesthetic empathy. 168 In language oddly similar to that of the 'Men of 1914', Vernon Lee 
prefers the use of language to be strenuous and flexed, using a high proportion of active verbs, judging 
a good writer by his unflagging activity, describing him as 'ploughing... with... strength and 
directness'. 169 
Vernon Lee's conception of empathy as evidencing 'the pulsing of our former experience' prioritised 
past over the present and also re-introduced the 'pulsing' of the body, marginalised by Lipps' 
commitment to abstract and purely psychological representations. It follows that if the past is stored in 
the organic material of the body, tradition is literally embodied. An 'empathic aesthetic' influenced by 
organic memory theory, allegiance is resolutely to something inside, indeed, to the insides themselves, 
the bodily viscera. Yet the embodied past is both inherited and acquired, thus the self carries allegiances 
to past experience which is both personal memory and heredity, or tradition, which both exceeds the 
limits of individual and is contained within. Since the embodied past surpasses the temporal limits of 
individuality in this respect the solipsism of the empathic-aesthetic is relieved by 'the modes of 
knowing incompatible with normal life' accessed by our bodily connection with the past. 170 
An essay written in 1897, 'In Praise of Old Houses' eulogises what Lee refers to as 'my foolish passion 
for the Past': it is not the historian's passion for events or details but a vague sense of 'the past which 
looms all round'. Lee describes intimations of past lives which overcome her in old houses and streets: 
'the sense of being companioned by the past, of being in a place warmed for our living by the lives of 
others. ' It is an experience which, as we will now see, corresponds to representations of the sense of 
oneness defined variously as a mystic, social or pathological experience by Evelyn Underhill, Jane 
Harrison, May Sinclair. Vernon Lee describes: 'I am in contact with a whole living, breathing thing... it 
possesses me completely, raising one into a sort of beatitude. This kind of rapture is not easy to 
describe. No rare feeling is.... This is something infinitely more potent and subtle'. Discontinuous with 
ordinary life, yet this 'kind of rapture' is not of transcendent origin: it 'has its origin far down in 
165 Ibid. p. 132. 
166 Lee, 'Aesthetics of the Novel', The Handling of Words, p. 69. 
167 Lee, 'The Nature of the Writer', The Handling of Words, p. 83. 
168 Ibid. p. 88. 
169 Ibid, p-80- 
170 Lee, Plal Lies: Studies of Some Varieties of Recent Obscuraniism, p. 93. 
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mysterious depths of our nature; and it arises overwhelmingly from many springs, filling us with the 
throb of vague passions welling from our most vital parts. '171 It is a flooding of the conscious self, 
not with Myers' subliminal consciousness, nor with William James' metaphysical 'more', but with 
4passions welling from our vital parts' uniting body and memory in a tangible relationship according to 
the laws of organic memory theory. The 'beatitude' is for Lee a moment of contact: 'I am in contact 
with a whole living, breathing thing, full of habits of life, of suppressed words; a sort of odd, 
mysterious, mythical but very real creature... This changes solitude in unknown places into the reverse. ' 
The past is anthropomorphosised, conceptually creating a 'living, breathing' companion (with its 
4suppressed words' suggestive of Freud's censor working to keep unwelcome words unspoken). Even 
more striking, and suggesting again the instability of the self/other binary, is the suggestion that 
solipsism in Lee's writing is transmuting itself into an almost transcendent, albeit acutely physical 
form of connectedness. But while it appears here as if something is opening up, with this rather 
extraordinary form of contact, what we will see in the following section is the reinstatement of barriers 
with the self closing back in upon itself. What I am going to describe in the next section could be Lee's 
resistance to her own insight here - one which Evelyn Underhill and May Sinclair will be seen to 
pursue further. 
Re-instating the body: 'the amoeba at our core' 
Vernon Lee most clearly articulates her argument against a metaphysical representation of self in a 
debate with William James in Vital Lies, over the question of mystical states of consciousness. In Vital 
Lies, Lee undermines James' reasoning in Varieties of Religious Experience which associates mystical 
experiences with the revelation of a transcendent truth and his belief that there is a category of 
inspirations which issue from what Vernon Lee refers to with irony as, the 'Well Head of Truth' or 
'Veracity personified'. 172 Lee concedes with James that mystical states of consciousness betoken an 
increase in felt energy, yet, as James himself then goes on to admit: 'the mystical feeling of 
enlargement, union, and emancipation has no specific intellectual contents of its own. '173 From where, 
if at all, asks Vernon Lee, does the so-called 'mystical truth' then derive? 
Vernon Lee's argument focuses upon James' own record of an experiment which he made with 'nitrous- 
oxide-gas-intoxication' in order to better understand the mystical experience: 
'Looking back on my own experiences, they all converge towards a kind of insight to 
which I cannot help ascribing some metaphysical 5ignificance. The keynote of it is 
invariably a reconciliation. it is as if the opposites of the world, whose contradictions and 
conflict make all our difficulties and troubles, were melted into unity... Drunkenness 
171 Lee, 'In Praise of Old liouses', Limbo and other essays (London: Grant Richards, 1897), p. 35. 
172 Lee, Vital Lies, p. 97. 
173 William James, Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 425; Lee, Ptal Lies, p. 106. 
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brings its votary from the chill periphery of things to their radiant core. It makes him for 
the moment one with truth. 'I 74 
Vernon Lee insists that the 'unity' experienced derives not from a merging of the self with some kind of 
metaphysical 'truth' but from the subject's own self-absorption. As Lee puts it, the effect of the drug, a 
form of anaesthetic, is to blot out pain while the 'universe goes on wagging just the same. 
175 'The 
thinker, the subject, is absorbed in his own feelings; the ihought-of, the non-ego, the object, has ceased 
to trouble because it has ceased to be present in consciousness. '176 According to Lee the revelation is 
ascribed to a less than radiant source: from the 'core, that is to say, from the drugged person's - how 
shall I call it? - inside'. 
177 Having located the origin of mystical feeling as 'inside', Lee sets about 
redefining the parameters of what James describes as the 'more' with which we feel connected in 
mystical experience: in other words, the 'sub-conscious continuation of our conscious life'. James' 
4more' gestures beyond the personal and physical towards the impersonal and metaphysical and it is 
with this extensive embrace of a world beyond self credited with mystical truth that Vernon Lee 
contends: she cites Janet on the error of endowing the subconscious with the profundities of 'un monde 
mysterieux'. 178 
Dispensing with soul in favour of body, Lee doggedly achieves the centripetal ends of her argument, 
reining in the bounds of mystical experience until it is unambiguously located within the physiological 
form. 
'Now if the Conscious is what is usually called the Mind; and if the sub-conscious is 
what we know or guess to exist below (or behind) the Mind, then the sub-conscious so 
far as it is not merely a vaguer, an unfocused part of consciousness, can only be what 
such Psychology as Professor James (with its elaborate brain and nerve anatomy, its 
cerebral localization, and its theory of the visceral and vaso-motor nature of emotion) 
teaches us to recognize below or behind mind, namely, the Body, or, more correctly, the 
bodily processes. '179 
According to this definition, the mystic experience is a flooding of consciousness with knowledge of 
the bodily self: what James refers to as an invasion of the sub-conscious is in Lee's terms equivalent to 
6auto-intoxication'. 
174 William James, The Will to Believe, and other essays in popular philosophy (New York: Longmans, 
1897). 
p. 294; q. v. Lee, Vital Lies, 117. 
175 Lee, Vital Lies, p. 12 1. 
176 Ibid. p. 121. 
177 Ibid. p. 122. 
178 Pierre Janet (Revue Philosophique, May 1910), q. v. Lee, Vital Lies, p. 125n. 
179 Vernon Lee's proposition is endorsed by the contemporary research findings of Candace Pert, 
neuroscientist: as a result of finding endomorphins present not just in the brain but throughout the entire 
body, Pert maintains that 'our body is really our subconscious mind' ('Molecules of Emotion: Martin Redfern 
Interviews Candace Pert', Network: Journal of the Scientific and Atedical Network 68, December 98, p. 9). See 
Candace Pert, Molecules of Emotion: why you feet the way you feel (1998). 
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'[B]y alcoholic, anaesthetic or "organic" poisoning of the organs which nonnally keep our 
microcosm connected with the macrocosm, the mind would be emptied of its normal 
supply of sensations and memories and left open to invasions of facts usually hidden or 
merged into vagueness. 'I 80 
Vernon Lee is describing a self-invasion: there is no outside agency. Returning to William James' text 
she pinpoints his admission that 'one of the peculiarities of invasions from the sub-conscious region 
[is] to take on objective appearances, and to suggest to the subject an external control. 'I 81 
Compromising his own claim for situating the source of mystical experience in outside truth, William 
James suggests that external authority is illusory. This suggestion, triumphantly seized by Vernon Lee 
as endorsing her own standpoint also inflects a different understanding upon the source of the 'external 
control' to which the individual submits in Eliot's 'classical' aesthetic. 182 
T. E. Hulme founds his distinction between the romantic and classical aesthetic upon an attitude towards 
the finite or infinite. Whereas the romantic believes the 'individual is an infinite reservoir', the classical 
man 'never forgets this finiteness, this limit of man... He may jump, but he always returns back; he 
never flies away into the circurnambient gas. '183 In staunchly refuting a belief in transcending our 
bodily sense of self, Vernon Lee is not a romantic; yet her aesthetic articulates itself against finiteness 
which she interprets as a mistaken belief in the limits of external objectivity. In her critique of William 
James' account of mysticism, Lee approves his reference to mystical states as producing similar effects 
to music and literature in inspiring an awareness of 'a life continuous with our own'. 
184 Indeed Lee 
defines as the very function of art that 'it satisfies our craving for continuing our own sense of living 
beyond the limits of our own life'. 185 The appeasement afforded by art arises 'from Man's 
imaginatively projecting life like his own beyond his own life's limits, and thereby attaining a wider, 
more vivid, and more harmonious sense of living than is habitually afforded by his practical dealings 
with reality'. 186 Yet whereas the mystic's experience testifies to an independently existing world of 
continuous and more perfect life, Art, 'to satisfy the heart's desire' according to Vernon Lee, 
deliberately creates such a world in response to its felt absence, Art 'makes, it, observe, not discovers it. 
And makes it because we want it., 
187 Vernon Lee discredits belief in metaphysical realities stressing 
the self-enclosed world in which the individual perforce creates what he needs in the absence of an 
external, outer reality. 'Art has never laid claim to any message save from the soul of man to the soul of 
180 Lee, Vital Lies, p. 123. 
181 William James, Varieties of Religious Fxperience, p. 512; Lee, Pital Lies, p. 124. 
182 Michael Eigen writes about the possibility of a self-other awareness, signalled in the work of Winnicott, 
where 'all is not self in disguise'; Eigen interprets the self's arrival at such an awareness as representing 
something approaching faith since it gestures beyond the self, transcending the introjcctivc-projective world 
of object-relating (Eigen, 'The Area of Faith in Winnicott, Lacan and Bion', Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 62, 
1981,413-33, p. 415). 
183 T. E. I fulme, Speculations, p. 116, p. 120. 
184 William James, Variety of Religious ExPerience, p. 383. 
185 Lee, f"ital Lies, p. 108. 
186 Ibid. p. 108. 
187 Ibid. p. 109. 
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man, the message that man's own powers have answered to man's own needs and wishes. 'I 88 Literature 
answers 'not to the necessities of outward things, but to the needs of the inner nature, the microcosm, 
the soul'. 189 '[I]n this aesthetic construction the soul can dwell awhile and renew itself in active 
peacefulness, safe from the irrelevanccs of an imperfect world; and living, during those few seconds 
which have the value of eternity, the life intense, unified, ordered and universal; the life imposed not 
from the chaos without, but from the cosmos within. '190 The soul finds refuge in the aesthetic 
construction, safe from the imperfect world, in an image comparable to Hulme's and Eliot's refuge, yet 
here the harmony of the construction finds its origin not in the inorganic, but in its resonance with the 
life, or cosmos within. 
Notes written towards the end of Vernon Lee's life express her wish that if she were young, or were to 
have another life, it would be devoted to the study of what she describes as the 'Psychology of the Inner 
Man'. These unpublished notes sketch ideas which remain undeveloped yet evidence Lee's untiring self- 
scrutiny. Although obviously not a response to Eliot and Murray, they identify the psychological 
underpinnings to their debate, suggesting a refiguring of the inner voice/outer authority dichotomy. Lee 
describes here how she has come to interpret motivation in terms of 'mere urge' rather than 'veritable 
Aim': even the most worthy goals are but 'casual symbols, symbols of the Ego swelling to fill the 
universe, symbols of - may I call it? protopathic God within the body's temple. ', 
91 It is an 
interpretation Lee acknowledges as 'the leaven perhaps of Freud', influenced by his theory of the 
instinctual drives which lessens the significance of the object and focuses upon the instinct driven 
subject. Vernon Lee identifies Freud's 'Triebe', or in her translation "'urge" of self-pushing [as) at the 
bottom of all fanaticism, religion or political. The Cause, the Idea, the Truth, the God for whom one 
would sacrifice somebody or something, is the divinity in one's own vitals & muscles, oneself. '192 
Counterposing Eliot's 'something outside to which the individual must surrender or sacrifice himselr 
and recalling Murray's prediction that 'the man who truly interrogates himself will ultimately hear the 
voice of God', Lee's self-enquiry does indeed access a form of divinity, yet it is resolutely a human 
god, quite literally embodied. Pursuing this idea, Lee describes how we habitually register the 'outside 
something', the objective half of the instinctive process' while 'the other half, the Trieb, the Urge is in 
the observed creature's innermost hidden processes'. She suggests that 'self-defensive evolution has 
concentrated our attention, our memory and our words on the outer world, the non-ego' while inner 
urges and feelings push us into action, and vanish leaving no clear memory until a similar outer 
combination occurs. We depend upon the outer world of objects to stimulate memory of 'the inside 
something'. 193 
188 Ibid. p. 109. 
189 Lee, 'The Nature of the Writer', The Handling of ; vOrds, p. 78. 
190 Ibid. p. 133. 
191 Lee, Note headed 'The Urge of the cgo', Dec 1932, in 'Psychology (essays)', Vernon Lee Papers. 
192 Lee, Note headed 'Nosce Teipsum', May 6,1930, Vernon Lee Papers. 
193 Lee, 'Lore of the Ego', Essays 1931-4, Vernon Lee Papers. 
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Vernon Lee's 'divinity within one's own vitals & muscles' challenges the Cartesian dualism which 
identifies the 'body with all our low not to say bad instincts, and spirit with all our better'. Body is 
conceived to be 'less complex than the soul, signifying everything which is a hindrance to virtue; any 
hypothesis which reinstates its integrity and eminence is viewed as a threat to the consolatory negation, 
the Soul. ' Spiritualists, and under this loose nomenclature she includes William James, look beyond 
the body to account for mental phenomenon, avoiding the body itself which has become a container of 
everything lowly and unspiritual. The body, she writes, has been held for centuries by religious and 
moral systems, as the 'opponent of the spirit', 'a hindrance to virtue', polluting, enslaving or 
hampering the expression of the spirit. 194 The body has been made a scapegoat in the scourge for moral 
purity; in Lee's words the body is a 'bugbear'. Vernon Lee describes how 'the body got into disrepute' 
by being so obvious and 'of very definite portions' so that it came to represent only what was itself 
material and definable, and a 'something not the body' was enlisted in support of everything other. Yet 
this 'something... could be described only as that which was not the body'. Intent upon restoring to the 
body 'its integrity and eminence', she disputes assumptions that 'there must be a body which receives a 
blow &a soul which remembers receiving it'. Instead, backed by the theories of Ribot and Semon, she 
reinstates memory as an organic property of the body, thus undermining the mind-body split. 
Vernon Lee was well-acquainted with Freud's theories, as evidenced by the marginalia in her editions of 
his works, yet his name is rarely invoked except in a disparaging aside. Lee's reluctance to adopt his 
emerging theories, and her preference for Adler's psychological model, seems most obviously in 
reaction to his emphasis upon sexuality and its repression as the determining dynamic of experience, for 
which he is cast as her 'bdte noire'. Damning together 'Lawrence and the Freudians' Lee explicitly 
rejects Freud's unconscious as 'that mysterious and rather unprofitable whirlpool', yet at the same time 
Lee already shares with psychoanalysis a belief that 'the bulk of our life is unconscious or 
semiconscious'. 
195 Engaging with psychoanalytic thinking without accepting Freud's 'discoveries', 
Vernon Lee proposes an 'urge' 'more primordial' than the sex instinct as a primary, motivating 
force. 196 In notebooks from 1932, Lee records what she describes as 'The Amoeba Conversation'. 197 
Inspired by her reading of The Science of Life written by II. G. Wells, his son and Julian Iluxley, 
Vernon Lee suggests that the ego shares similar properties to an amoeba, the simplest and amorphic life 
form: 'the amoeba at our core'. 198 The amoeba's engorgement of their surroundings as they spread 
themselves over their food, establishing a need for growth and survival, Vernon Lee sees transformed 
194 Lee, Note dated Nov 10, 'Commonplace Books Xll', Vernon Lee Papers. 
195 Lee, Note headed 'The psychological radiograph', Aug 29,1933 in 'Psychology (essays)', Vernon Lee 
Papers. Lee adds that these 'bodily conditions' would exceed those libidinal urges so absorbing to the 
attention of 'Lawrence and the Freudians' (ibid. ). 
196 Lee, 'Commonplace Book X% Vernon Lee Papers. 'While entirely disbelieving in the Freudian 
subconscious, I believe that consciousness is... intermittent - in fact seems a continuum merely because we do 
not perceive, or make allowance for its gaps' (Music and Its Lovers, p. 272). 
197 Lee later removed 'The Amoeba Conversation' from her manuscript collection of short, note-likc essays, 
'Lore of the Ego, (essays) 1931-4', Vernon Lee Papers. 
198 'Lore of the Ego', Dec 12,1933, Vernon Lee Papers; again, 'the ego is the amoeba' ('Notebooks', Feb 21. 
1932, Vernon Lee Papers). See II. G. Wells, Julian Huxley, G. P. Wells, The Science of Life. A summary of 
contemporary knowledge about life and its possibilities (London: Amalgamated Press, 1929-30). 
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into the human's 'lust of appropriation' which she identifies as 'one of the primordial needs' expressed 
as a demand 'for occupying space and (not having one's place taken)'. 199 Vernon Lee returns to this 
instinct for self-aggrandisement in an attempt elsewhere to explain the potency of 'The word mine. ' The 
amoebic analogy is employed to describe what Vernon Lee perceives as an underlying urge for self- 
importance and self-interest: an egoism which is proposed as a primordial urge to rival eros: 'my 
innermost intrinsic self and its motions of taking room, expanding like Jennings' Amoeba., 200 Yet it 
is more than analogy. The biological frame also refers to the prehistory of the individual suggesting that 
the amoebic ego is a legacy of the 'primordial inherited' of the race: 'Isn't the earliest embryonic stage 
of the homosapiens amoebic? I mean this not metaphorically but literally, biologically'; and again: 
'It seems to me, more & more, as if the human animal must be at bottom, what its 
ancestor - the rudimentary creature - amoeba or other - was in its day: I see the nucleus 
of us as a kind of sensitive bag of congregated cells... which is [impressed] upon by outer 
things, which dilates & contracts, sucks in & rejects, & thus renews itself & 
propagates., 201 
Borrowing a phrase from Felix Le Dantec, Vernon Lee refers unceremoniously to the self as 'our Sac de 
Cuir' or 'the visceral ego'. 202 We can also see a link here to Freud's image of the 'living vesicle' used 
to describe the ego's evolution. 203 
Vernon Lee's embrace of the 'amoeba at our core', acknowledged a fundamental egoism or 'lust of 
appropriation' as an inescapable human instinct. Lee's likening of the human psyche to an amoeba is 
further understood in reference to H. G. Wells' anthropomorphic portrayal of amoeba - 'nothing but a 
spot of jelly without enduring form' - in The Science of Life. 
204 Initially comparing the amoeba to a 
white blood cell comprising of masses of living protoplasm similarly without enduring form, Wells 
shifts the scale of comparison to suggest that, being a whole and independent organism, self-sufficient 
and able to live alone finding and securing its own nourishment, 'the amoeba is more like a whole 
199 Lee, 'Notebooks', Feb 21,1932, Vernon Lee Papers; 'Notebooks', July 1933, Vernon Lee Papers. Lee 
associates this idea with Adler's primordial inherited habits, 'the elementary stage of Adler's unconscious' 
('Commonplace Books', Vernon Lee Papers). 
200 Note dated October 1933, 'Lore of the Ego', Vernon Lee Papers. I lerbert Spencer Jennings (1868-1947), an 
American zoologist, argued in Contribution to the Study of the Lower Organisms (1904) that mind extends 
even to the most primitive organism: mechanistic explanations fail to account for their varied reactions (The 
Oxford Companion to the Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 403). 
201 'Theory of Consciousness and perception', 'Commonplace Books, New Series, X111', Vernon Lee Papers. 
Lee believes that the psychological study of habit 'might lead to something simpler, deeper than any Freudian 
or Jungian classification. Lead perhaps eventually to that root mystery of what I now think of as the 
primordial, the (I ask my own pardon for this jargon! ) amoebic reactions' (Note dated 26 July, 1932, 'Lore of 
the Ego', Vernon Lee Papers). 
202 Lee, 'Psychology (essays)', Aug 29,1933, Vernon Lee Papers; 'The Visceral Ego', Sept 5,1933, Vernon Lee 
Papers. Felix le Dantec, Professor at the University of Paris, was a leading authority on the mechanical theory 
of life: the body is a mechanism which functions in accordance with the laws of substance. See Felix Lc Dantec, 
The Nature and Origin of Life in the Light of New Knowledge, trans. Stoddard Dewey (n. p: 1907). 
203 Frcud, 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle' (1920), PFL 11, p. 298; again, 'Let us picture a living organism in 
its most simplified possible form as an undifferentiated vehicle of a substance that is susceptible to 
stimulation' (ibid. p. 297). Compare too Freud's statement that 'the ego is first and foremost a bodily ego' 
(The Ego and the Id, (1923), Standard Edition xix , 1-66, p. 26). 204 1 I. G. Wells, The Science q)f Life, p. 17 1. 
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human body than one of our constitute cells'. 205 Now fully anthropomorphic, the amoeba is analogous 
to 'a naked and solitary savage on a desert island, and a human tissue-cell to a trim, bowler-hatted clerk,, 
trotting with umbrella and attachd case to his appointed desk in the city,. 206 Whereas the clerk 
specialises in one task, efficient but limited, depending upon the other cells for satisfaction of all his 
needs; the savage is independent, unspecialized and free. 
Independent, unspecialized and free: this, surely, is how Vernon Lee chose to define herself. In her notes 
collected under the heading Mysetf(1917-18) which attempt to account for her own pacifism: 'How have 
I myself come by what I think about the war? and why in this respect do I stand aside from other folk? ' 
Lee reveals she has always lacked 'a sense of "WE"', having never had the experience of a large family, 
school class, profession, church or nation. This is a stance which can leave her prone to isolation, 
writing less robustly in a letter: 'I am an individual and an individual is a weak thing., 207 Yet Wells' 
representation of the amoeba resolves the paradox carried by Lee's work: the independence and self- 
completeness, or solitude, of the amoeba does not prohibit intimacy, moreover Well's description of the 
reproduction process of the amoeba is of an ideal union surpassing any human possibilities: 'the essence 
of the process is nearly always this: a complete mixing together of the substance of two originally 
separate individuals. They meet and come together in pairs, and they blend as completely as drops of 
water run together. They achieve an intimacy of union that we can never aspire to, becoming in a 
perfectly literal sense one flesh. And the resulting blend lives on as a single thing., 
208 
Conclusion 
In 'The Nature of the Writer' in The Handling of Words, Vernon Lee describes the novel as a 'various 
fluctuating, inscrutable form which owes its being to the Reader as much as to himself, and which is 
hidden from him by the impenetrable wall of flesh separating one soul from the other'. 209 The writer 
can never know what he has created, nor be in possession of his own work, yet there is an intimacy in 
this shared creative process. Anticipating one strand of structuralism, Vernon Lee is insistent that the 
literary text is not a closed system but comes into being only through its effect upon the reader: 'the 
Reader, without whose active response, whose output of experience, feeling and imagination, the living 
phenomenon, the only reality, of Literary Art, cannot take place., 
210 Accordingly the text is a 
collaboration: 'The Writer makes his book not merely out of his own mind's contents, but out of ours', 
205 Ibid. p. 172. 
206 Ibid. p. 173. 
207 Letter from Vernon Lee, dated August 12,1900, 'Vernon Lee Papers'. I feel it would be a great source of 
strength to meet anyone who felt like myself about impersonal matters; but I fancy I am too much of an alien, 
a cosmopolitan, an exception, for that to be possible. You see I am influenced by absolutely no tics, neither 
nation, nor blood, nor class, nor profession; I am just an individual; & an individual is a weak thingl (ibid. ). 
208 Ibid. p. 175. 
209 Lee, Handling of Words, P. 81. 
210 Ibid. pviii. Roland Barthes, 'Death of the Author', famously says that 'a text's unity lies not in its origin 
but in its destination' (Roland Barthcs, Image, Music, Text trans. Stephen Heath, London: Fontana, 1977, 
p. 148). 
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or, 'the Reader's mind is the Writer's palette'. 21 I Surrounding the images suggested by the writer 
'there gathers a halo of vague something else': this 'halo' is produced by the Reader's own experience 
which 'moving beneath the pressure of the words, brings into consciousness how many sights, how 
many feelings of which the author of that word can have no notion'. 212 In suggesting the 
intersubjective process by which literature and all art comes into being, Vernon Lee's 'halo of vague 
something else' is the reader's experience which contributes to and modifies the form of the novel 
constructed by the writer. Virginia Woolf s comment in 'Modem Fiction' that 'life is a luminous halo, 
a semi-transparent envelope surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the end' can also be 
read as pointing to the intersubjective nature of art and consciousness. Writing, like life, being a 
collaboration of which some part will always remain mysterious. Peter Nicholls' overly neat distinction 
between the 'men of 1914' and the 'other modemisms' describes 'Modem Fiction' as signifying a 
'temporary relaxing of those psychic defences which had seemed essential to one type of modernist 
aesthetic'. Yet whereas Woolf s writer is passively subject to a bombardment of perceptions, Lee's 'halo 
of vague something' acknowledges the activity of the reader whose participation in the aesthetic process 
is fundamental to its definition: the individual is never passively subject to but always actively the 
subject of an experience. 
Although it is arguable that Vernon Lee's 'empathic aesthetic' pushed subjectivism to its limits in an 
unabashed solipsism which, ironically, was only acceptable to herself, her voice was not unheard. In 
'The Narrow Bridge of Art', published in 1927, Woolf imagines a future writer of an as yet 'unnamed 
variety of the novel' who 
swill have extended the scope of his interest so as to dramatize some of those influences 
which play so large a part in life, yet have so far escaped the novelist - the power of 
music, the stimulus of sight, the effect on us of the shape of the trees or the play of 
colour, the emotions bred in us by words, the obscure terrors and hatreds which come so 
irrationally in certain places or from certain people, the delight of movement, the 
intoxication of wine. Every moment is the centre and meeting-place of an extraordinary 
number of perceptions which have not yet been expressed., 213 
The exploration of these perceptions was Vernon Lee's life study of the 'empathic aesthetic': her 
analyses of the individual's experience of music, in Music and Its Lovers, of visual and literary form, in 
Beauty and Ugliness and The Handling of Words, the power of place in her 'genii loci' essays and, not 
least, the relation to other people. It is tempting to read Woolf's 'unnamed variety of the novel' as 
acknowledging the significance of Vernon Lee's work while pressing for its representation in fictional 
form, a project Woolf herself undertook in her later novels. 
211 Lee, Handling of Words, p. 75. 
212 Ibid. p. 79. 
213 Woolf, 'The Narrow Bridge of Art' (1927), repr. Collected Essays, ed. Leonard Woolf, ii (Chatto & Windus, 
1966-7), p. 228. John Mepham selects this essay as more relevant to Woolfs aesthetic manifesto than both 
'Modern Novels' (1919), and 'Mr Bennet and Mrs Brown' (1924) (John Mepham, Virginia Woolf- a Literary 
Life, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991). 
TWO 
'Transcending by descent: 
Evelyn Underhill's way of mysticism 
'If we would cease, once for all, to regard visions and voices as objective, and be content 
to see them as symbolic expression... of a more mysterious contact. 'I 
'But we know so little of the noetic value of abnormal mental states of any kind that in 
my opinion we had better keep an open mind and collect facts sympathetically for a long 
time to come. We shall not understand these alterations in consciousness either in this 
generation or the next., 
2 
The feeling of modern mysticism 
In 'The Modern Mind' T. S. Eliot admits 'a relation (not necessarily noetic, perhaps merely 
psychological) between mysticism and some kinds of poetry' and then goes on, swiftly, to warn of the 
, danger' of such an association: 
'No-one can read Mr Yeat's Autobiographies and his earlier poetry without feeling that the 
author was trying to get as a poet some of the exaltation to be obtained, I believe, from 
haschish or nitrous oxide. He was very much fascinated by self-induced trance states, 
calculated symbolism, mediums, theosophy, crystal-gazing, folklore and hobgoblins., 
3 
Eliot cautions against the poet who seeks a vicarious 'exaltation' through his art - an altered state of 
consciousness which, equivalent to a narcotic or anaesthetic high, may not signify beyond the human 
domain. In other words, the exaltation is exclusively personal. What troubles Eliot here is the similarity 
of affect between mysticism and poetry, despite, as he would argue (although he deliberately refrains 
from doing so) their supposedly dissimilar provenance. Moreover, Eliot's emphasis upon the 'relation 
between mysticism and some kinds of poetry' as 'perhaps merely psychological' begs the question of the 
I Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism: A Study in the Nature and Development of Man's Spiritual Consciousness 
(1911; revised edition London: Methuen, 1930), p. 271. This passage was copied by T. S. Eliot into one his 
notebooks (see Lyndall Gordon, TS. Eliot: An Imperfect Life, p, 90). 
2 William James, 'A Suggestion About Mysticism', Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific 
Methods, 7 (1910) 85-92, p. 92. 
3 T. S. Eliot, 'The Modern Mind' in The Use of Poetry and The Use of Criticism: studies in the relation of 
criticism to poetry in England (London: Faber & Faber, 1933), p. 139. 
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6noetic' (or intellectual) relation which might keep them apart. Once he omits intellectual differences, the 
way is clear for psychological states, of widely varying origin, to pass for a spurious mysticism: Eliot's 
slide from mysticism to haschish to hobgoblins pursues a psychological equivalence which abandons a 
6noetic' relation entirely. 
In the previous chapter we saw Vernon Lee taking issue with William James' description of his nitrous 
oxide experience, to which he ascribes a 'genuine metaphysical revelation'. 4 Whereas Lee objects to a 
metaphysics which spurns the physical seat of experience, Eliot's concern is to preserve a religious 
dimension apart from the vicissitudes of psychic experience; despite these differences both challenge the 
categories subsumed by the prevailing definitions of mysticism. However idiosyncratic James' 
experiment may seem, it was in fact symptomatic of a widespread cultural curiosity in such exalted 
states of consciousness, whether drug, or self-induced-5 Their appeal is again apparent in a letter from 
Evelyn Underhill written in 1911 - the same year which saw publication of her best-selling volume 
Mysticism; in this letter she replies to her friend Mrs Meyrick Heath: 
'It is very interesting what you said about the "anaesthetic revelation". At one time of my 
life I used to have abrupt fainting fits, and in those I used to plunge into some wonderful 
peaceful, but quite undifferentiated plane of consciousness, in which everything was quite 
simple and comprehended. I always resented being restored to what is ordinarily called 
64consciousncss" intenscly., 6 
Underhill's letter witnesses the easy conflation between an 'undifferentiated plane of consciousness' and 
what might be termed a mystical experience: whatever their inspiration, the effect is 'wonderful, 
peaceful[ ... ] everything quite simple and comprehended'. 
Indeed Underhill goes on to describe her 
experience of feeling 'happily within a quiet peaceful Reality' as analogous to 'the "still desert" of the 
mystics - where there was no multiplicity and no need of explanations'. She admits this may not be a 
6very high way of apprehending reality, though no doubt it is a way'. Given that the pleasure of the 
experience so far exceeds 'what is ordinarily called "consciousness... it apparently matters little which 
4way' it is obtained (although this is not to say that a 'very high way' would not be preferable). For both 
Underhill and James, encouraged by their reading of Blood's 'The Anaesthetic revelation' (of which they 
both make mention), the parity of the feeling produced by the chemical anaesthetic with the feeling 
associated with religious mysticism is sufficient to interpret the anaesthetic experience as a mystical 
experience. In Varieties of Religious Experience James states his belief that 'nitrous oxide and ether[ ... ] 
stimulate the mystical consciousness to an extraordinary degree,. 
7 While the so-called 'mystical 
4 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Iluman Nature (1902; repr. 
Ilarmondsworth: Penguin, 1982), p. 387. 
5 Ibid. p. 389. 
6 The Letters of Evelyn Underhill, ed. Charles Williams (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1943), p. 122. 
7 William James, Varieties, p. 387. James credits Benjamin Paul Blood's series of pamphlets - 'The Anaesthetic 
Revelation and the Gist of Philosophy' and 'Tennyson's Trances and the Anaesthetic Revelation' - as 'of rare 
literary distinction' (ibid. p. 389n). Blood's work on the 'Anaesthetic Revelation' remained curiously 
significant to James: 'I am conscious of it having been one of the stepping stones of my thinking ever since' 
('A Pluralistic Mystic', Memories and Studies, New York: Longmans, Green & Co, 1911, p. 138). Underhill too 
acknowledges her reading of 'Blood's descriptions' (Letters, p. 122). 
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consciousness' raised many questions regarding its proper origins, mostly undisputed was, as James 
nicely puts it: 'The deliciousness of some of these states., 8 
Both Underhill's and James' readiness to ascribe a metaphysical significance to these states of 
consciousness, or in other words, to confuse or conflate heightened feeling with heightened meaning, is 
precisely the danger against which Eliot warns. Eliot's concern returns us to the troubled distinctions 
between inner and outer authority seen in the previous chapter to be crucial to a modernist aesthetics. It 
also raises the question of what is assumed to be beyond the psychological experience: is the 
transcendent invoked by proxy for what is a narcissistic, setting aloft of the self? Does a feeling of 
exaltation only ever refer back to the self and never beyond? Evelyn Underhill is not unaware of the 
danger signalled by Eliot: in her novel The Column of Dust she describes the incantation by which 'the 
student of magic really compels himself to exaltation, whilst he purports to be compelling the spirits of 
the air'. 9 Underhill is admitting the power of suggestion, another aspect of psychology which 
undermines the transcendent explanation given to mystical experience. In her published writings she is 
herself concerned to differentiate between real mysticism and 'the higher branches of intoxication'. I OAs 
we can see, Eliot's anxiety in safeguarding religious from other kinds of 'exaltation', whether aesthetic, 
or anaesthetic, is not unprovoked. His essay, from which I quote, was written in 1933, long in the wake 
of a pre-war enthusiasm for a religious mysticism which explicitly defined itself as an extraordinary and 
intense psychological experience, superior to that which, in Underhill's terms, 'is ordinarily called 
64consciousness. "' 
The understanding of mysticism as an exalted state of consciousness or feeling, which continues to be 
influential today can be read as the outcome of a specific interest in the personal and subjective. II The 
first decades of the twentieth century saw a 'rapid increase of interest in mysticism,. 12 Reviewing a list 
of books about mysticism for the Quarterly Review in 1914 Leslie Johnston ascribed the 'mystical 
revival' to a reaction against Victorian materialism provoking 'an almost morbid fascination for all the 
interior concerns of humanity' which he saw encouraged by the rise in psychological studies and the 
modem novel. 13 Religion, science and literature were each describing a centripetal force, which Rufus 
Jones in Studies in Mystical Religion described as a'profound tendency of the modem world'to shift the 
centre of meaning from 'authority' to 'experience', whether in the context of mysticism, individual 
psychology or the incipient dislocation of the omniscient narrator in favour of an interior narrative 
8 William James, Varieties, p. 412. 
9 Underhill, The Column of Dust (London: Methuen, 1909), p. 13. 
10 Underhill, Mysticism, p. 72. Underhill cites James' comment that 'the Drunken consciousness is a bit of the 
Mystic consciousness' (ibid. p. 72, n. 1). 
IIF. C. Ilappold defines mysticism as 'a form of experience and a type of consciousness' (Atysticism. - A Study 
and an Anthology, 1963; repr. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973, p. 38). 
12 Unsigned article attributed to Dean Inge, 'The Mystical Revival' Times Literary Supplement, 584 (March 20 
1913), 117-118, p. 117. 
13 Leslie Johnston, 'Modern Mysticism: Some Prophets and Poets', Quarterly Review, 220 (1914), 220-246, 
p. 22 1. 
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voice. 14 This can be read in continuity with Michael Levenson's description of the late-nineteenth 
century response to the secularising of religious values: he suggests dogma was replaced by 
consciousness as the locus of meaning and immediate perception as the source of certainty. Yet -I would 
suggest - the mystical revival was as much a hurnanising of religious values as a sanctifying of the 
human. 
Evelyn Underhill (1875-1941) played a prominent role in promoting this early twentieth century 
mystical revival which privileged states of consciousness as constituting religious experience. 
Underhill's reputation survives today among the Anglican community for her later publications on prayer 
and spiritual life and her role as spokesperson for the spiritual life - she was the first woman to be 
elected as an outside lecturer at Oxford, and the first laywoman to lead retreats within the Church of 
England. 15 Yet this embrace of an orthodox Christianity was preceded by an earlier more individualistic 
religious orientation which she retrospectively refers to as 'an irresponsible sort of theism'. 
16 Evelyn 
Underhill became widely known due to the immense popularity of her major work Mysticism: a study in 
the nature and development of man's spiritual consciousness (1911), an inclusive study of the subject 
drawing on the writings of the great Christian mystics. 
17 As the full title might suggest, a definitive 
characteristic of Underhill's mysticism is that it entails 'a definite Psychological Experience'. 
18 In her 
emphasis upon the psychological, emotional content took priority over the intellectual or noetic: she 
describes one of the great achievements of modem psychology as 'the vindication of the importance of 
feeling in our life, and in particular its primacy over reason'. 
19 In his dating of early modernist literary 
doctrine, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Levenson notes a 'persistent ambiguity' in the 
intermittent appeal to ideas of psychology and individual consciousness which are voiced in doctrines 
which advocate the autonomy of form. 
20 Just as it appears difficult to banish the psychic from 
discussions of the meanings of a modernist aesthetic so is it similarly enmeshed in definitions of 
religious mysticism in the early twentieth century. A key strand within modernism, the 'mystical 
revival' at once belongs to and resists the psychological component of that aesthetic: it defines itself as 
psychological while at the same time insisting that it goes beyond such a definition. Underhill's letter 
14 Rufus Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion (London: Macmillan, 1909), p. xv. 
15 See Charles Armstrong, Evelyn Underhill (1875-1941): an Introduction to her Life and Writings (London 
& Oxford: Mowbrays, 1975); Dana Greene, Evelyn Underhill: Arlist of the Infinite Life. (London: Darton, 
Longman & Todd, 1991), p. 94; Dana Greene (ed. ), Evelyn Underhill. - the Modern Guide to theAncient Questjor 
the 11oly (New York: State University of New York Press, 1988). T. S Eliot wrote of Underhill: 'She concerned 
herself as much with the practice as with the theory of the devotional life - her studies of the great mystics had 
the inspiration not primarily of the scholar or the champion of forgotten genius, but of a consciousness of the 
grievous need of the contemplative element in the modern world' (pencil draft of a letter written by T. S. Eliot to 
supplement Underhill's obituary notice; Helen Gardner, The Composition of the Four Quartets, London: Faber 
& Faber, 1978, p-69). 
16 Underhill, Letters, p. 125. 
17 Mysticism: A Study in the Nature and Development of Alan's Spiritual Consciousness (London: 1911). See 
also Underhill: 'A Note on Mysticism' Quest I (July 19 10); 'Another Note on Mysticism' Quest 2 (Nov 19 10). 
The Mystic Way: a Psychological Study in Christian Origins (London: Dent, 1913); Practical Mysticism: A 
Little Book for Normal People (London: Dent, 1914). 
18 Underhill, Mysticism, p. 90. 
19 Ibid. p. 47. 
20 Michael Levenson, A Genealogy of Modernism: A Study of English Literary Doctrine 1908-1922, (1984; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 135. 
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discussing the anaesthetic revelation both reveals her delight in extraordinary states of consciousness and 
her belief in their reference to a transcendent reality. This creates a tension or ambiguity which we see 
demonstrated by Underhill's work. In the last chapter Vernon Lee's empathic aesthetic tipped into a 
realm of connectedness which, in insisting on its bodily nature, she resolutely refused to assign to a 
transcendent sphere. In this chapter we will see how Underhill's engagement with mysticism betokens an 
ambivalent relation to psychology and lends a different inflection to the question of ego boundaries, a 
psychological subtext so central to the modernist aesthetic. 
William Inge, Dean of St Paul's Cathedral wrote a lead article for the TLS in 1913 entitled 'The 
Mystical Revival' which sets out his reservations about the modem type of mysticism. Inge makes a 
claim that 'Mysticism in its essence is absolutely autonomous. It needs no institutions, no dogmas, no 
historical traditions'. Mysticism is traditionally represented as having an 'essence', an ineffable content 
to place it beyond analysis, and beyond history. Even so it cannot escape contextual istion. Indeed the 
representation of an 'autonomous' mysticism parallels the strikingly similar claims being made, 
contemporaneously, for the autonomy of pure form in modernist aesthetic doctrine. 
21 And, just as the 
desire for formal abstraction was countered by an opposing emphasis upon the subjective experience of 
the artist, so we see a related conflict in religious thinking of this period. Dean Inge himself goes on to 
lament mysticism's most recent history in which its 'essence' has played so inessential a part. 
22 
'The relation of mystical experience to ultimate truth, though for the mystic himself this is 
the crucial and only important question, has been almost entirely neglected by recent 
critics. This is a peculiarity of the modem movement. In the times of other mystical 
revivals, such as the third, thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the scientific treatment of 
the subject took the form of metaphysical speculation [ ... ] not with a quasi-medical study 
of aberrant mental phenomena, but with a supreme effort to solve the great enigma of 
existence., 23 
Mysticism in its 4essence' - 'the relation of mystical experience to ultimate truth' - is an abstraction 
beyond even metaphysical reach (where Inge, and Eliot would like it to remain), but in its emphasis 
upon experience rather than doctrine it is brought within the scope of empirical psychology. Mysticism 
then becomes personal. More recently Grace Jantzen in Power, Gender and Christian Mysticism 
announces that 'the idea of "mysticism" has been subjectivised beyond recognition. 
24 According to 
Jantzen: 
, it is only latterly that the term "mystical" began to be applicable to "experience" at all: in 
earlier times, one might speak of a "mystical interpretation" or of the "mystical body of 
Christ" but not of "mystical experience". Similarly "the mystics" were not those who had 
21 Ibid. p. 133. 
22 W. R. Inge - known as the 'gloomy dean' for his scourge of modem society - was Professor at Cambridge 
(1907-1911) and Dean of St Paul's Cathedral (1911-1934) (see John Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious 
Thought, 1963, repr. London: SCM Press, 1993, p. 148). 
23 Dean Inge, 'The Mystical Revival', TLS, 584, (March 20,1913), p. 1 17. 
24 Grace Jantzen, Power, Gender and Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
p. 317. 
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particular states of consciousness, but those who were able to elucidate the spiritual 
interpretation of a passage of scripture, say., 25 
What was an epistemological and ontological inquiry becomes predominantly empirical. An 
intellectual ised discourse using the convention of 'negative imagery' to communicate a paradoxical idea 
of God beyond human conception now incorporates modem anxieties. Whereas recent accounts of 
mysticism define it against its earlier forms, it is also worth remarking its emergence in opposition to 
what Inge identifies as an 'exaggerated institutionalism' which characterises the prominent 'superficial 
current' within the Christian church and suggests again the similar set of resonances between religious 
thinking and modernist aesthetic debate. Mysticism is the 
4strong undercurrent flowing towards the opposite conception of religion - that of a direct 
intercourse between God and the individual soul, and of a faith which rests, not on 
authority, or tradition, but on an innate claim and longing of the soul, progressively 
satisfied by spiritual experience., 26 
According to Ernest Jones' biography, Freud was to regret having 'ignored the rarer and more profound 
type of religious emotion as experienced by mystics and saints'; certainly this oversight failed to 
acknowledge the significance of mysticism in the pre-war years as a fashionable expression of religious 
belief. 27 A middle-aged woman in Evelyn Underhill's novel The Column of Dust (1909) declares that 
'[a]ll young people like to call themselves mystics nowadays'. 
28 Typically represented as unreachable, 
mysticism is now contagious. Yet the 'mystical revival' inspired far more books about mysticism than 
by mystics themselves: the 'essence' becoming further diffused. There was a mass of literature written 
about the lives of mystics, which provided study of a glamorous range of states of consciousness found 
elsewhere only among the mentally ill -a comparison which provided much scope for commcnt. Emma 
Hermann remarked: 'Never was there such a stinging curiosity abroad regarding the most private 
sanctitics of the spiritual life., 
29 In these accounts the source of the mystical experience was the subject 
of much conflicting debate. The moments of exaltation suggested a view of the world searching towards 
a definition of the boundaries and contents proper to the self, thus it was very much implicated in the 
emerging discussions regarding the subliminal or unconscious self. A great array of testimony from the 
flourishing psychology of religion alleged that mysticism was an abnormal condition and diagnosed 
these undifferentiated states of consciousness as a case of pathology rather than divine presence. 30 The 
mystic was said to exhibit a form of psychical dissociation, using Pierre Janet's term to describe 'a 
splitting off of certain sensations from the rest of the person's consciousness' which are then cast into the 
25 Ibid. p. 332. See also Denys Turner, The darkness of God, negativity in Christian mysticism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
26 Dean Inge, 'The Mystical Revival', p. 117. 
27 Ernest Jones, Sigmund Freud: life and work, iii (London: I logarth, 1953-7), p. 386. 
28 Underhill, The Column of Dust, p. 87. 'There is in progress a return towards the sources of spiritual life, a 
tendency to study inner experience' (Meyrick Booth, 'Rudolf Eucken and the Mystics', Quest 4, April 1913, 
p. 430). 
29 Emma I lermann, The Meaning and Value of Mysticism (London: J. Clark, 1915), p. vii. 
30 on the psychology of religion see Rufus Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion (London: Macmillan, 1909); 
E. Starbuck, The Psychology of Religion (London: Walter Scott, 1899). 
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subconscious due to an 'unstable nervous organisation'. 31 Dissociation or else again self-suggestion 
were held to account for such a catalogue of phenomena as Dean Inge lists: 'alternate ecstasies and 
miseries, the hallucinations and catelepsies, and the unpleasant sublimated eroticism of the emotionalists 
who have brought discredit upon the name [of mysticism]'. Its worst detractors condemned the mystic's 
moment of exaltation as 'a cardinal mark of degeneration'. 32 Whereas mysticism had been irreducible to 
science when addressing the 'great enigma of existence', as we see, 'aberrant mental phenomena' are more 
readily diagnosed: a peculiarity of the modem movement being that the psychology which defines 
mysticism also threatens to undo it. 
Unsurprisingly, the word 'mysticism' itself became problematic: Underhill names it: 'one of the most 
abused words in the English languacye., 
33 We get a sense of mysticism's imprecise field of reference C, 
from a reviewer of Underhill's first novel who is undecided 'whether the author of this book is a 
theosophist, spiritualist or Roman Catholic, a hybrid combination of all three, or, as is probable, simply 
a purveyor of the queer ideas which are classed under the wide embracing noun mysticism,. 
34 Looking 
again at Dean Inge's article, which is also a review of Underhill's Mystic Way, (1913), we see him 
disapprove the anti-intellectualism vaunted by modem mysticism which finds encouragement in 
Bergson's irrationalist philosophy which, in its turn, Inge associates with a contemporary visual 
aesthetic: 'Bergson appears to many of his admirers as an artist of the Impressionist school, a champion 
of blurred outlines and colours which all run into one another., 
35 Bergson - as touchstone or scapegoat 
- links the undifferentiated states of consciousness 
found in mysticism and the 'blurred outlines' of 
modem painting. Modern mysticism becomes associated with a modernist aesthetic which in 
championing blurred outlines over autonomous essence implicates itself in the familiar structuring 
oppositions of modernist debate. This connection between mysticism and a modernist representation in 
art we will see developed in Underhill's own writing. 
As Underhill testifies in Mysticism published in 1911, vitalism is 'everywhere in the air. 36 Indeed 
Bergson's popularity reached its zenith in London that same year, due to a series of lectures he gave 
entitled 'On the Nature of the Soul' which Underhill enthusiastically attended: in this we see her direct 
link to a figure often deemed crucial to an understýnding of modemism. 37 Underhill found much 
31 William James, Principles of Psychology, ii, p. 456n, p. 270. 
32 Holbrook Jackson, The 1890's (1913; repr. London: Century Hutchinson, 1988), p. 19; Max Nordau 
Degeneration (London: William Ifeinemann, 1895), p. 22. 
33 Underhill, Mysticism, p. x. In the first issue of The Quest: A Quarterly Review, G. R. S. Mead, the editor, reveals 
that the journal would have been called "The Mystical Research Society' but 'mystical' requires further 
definition, even for those who are genuine lovers of mysticism in its best sense, while in modern times the 
name has so fallen from its high estate that it has become a veritable stumbling block for most people' ('On the 
Nature of the Quest' The Quest, 1, July 1910, p. 30). 
34 interior, Chicago, November 17,1904. See George Albert Coe, 'The Sources of the Mystical Revelation' 
Ilibbert Journal (Jan 1908). 
35 Inge, 'The Mystical Rcvival', p. 117. 
36 Underhill, Mysticism, p. 31. 
37 For Bergson's influence on modernism: see Maud Ellmann, The Poetics of Impersonality: T. S. Eliot and 
Ezra Pound (Harvester: Brighton, 1987). 
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encouragement in Bergson's endorsing of experience over intellect as a way of apprehending reality. 
Reality, for Bergson, is a continuous indivisible flux, the unceasingly dynamic quality of which is lost 
in its representation by the mind as a static succession of images; in short, reality is far better 
experienced than thought about. As Bergson most aptly puts it for the mystic, 'the letter kills the spirit'- 
Underhill writes again to her friend Mrs Meyrick Heath in a letter which reminds us of her anaesthetic 
revelation and the misplaced exaltations warned against by Eliot: 
'I'm still drunk with Bergson, who sharpened one's mind and swept one off one's feet 
both at once. Those lectures have been a real, great experience: direct contact with the 
personality of a profound intuitive thinker of the first rank!, 38 
Underhill's wholehearted espousal of Bergsonism is evident in her description of a 'real, great 
experience' and 'direct contact' which privilege experience over intellect and suggest an equivalence to 
the overwhelming mystical experience itself. 'swept [ ... 1. off one's feet'. Even the claim that the lectures 
4sharpened her mind' keeps her in dialogue with Bergson: he images the mind as a sword, where 
conscious mental activity corresponds only to its point. 
39 Considering Bergson's depreciation of the 
intellect, it is hardly surprising to see an emphasis in contemporary responses to his work represented as 
experience. T. E. Hulme recalls 'the sudden expansion' he felt after reading Bergson. 40 William James 
notes: 
'For me, a magician. Whereas, when I open most philosophical books I get nothing but a 
sort of marking time, champing of the jaws, pawing the ground, and resettling into the 
same attitude like a weary horse in his stall [ ... ] here on every page new horizons open. It 
is like the breath of morning and the song of birds. '41 
James' opening of 'new horizons', and Hulme's 'sudden expansion' echo Bergson's description of the 
direct experience of reality as a 'dilation of consciousness: our psychic life 'normally screwed down by 
action, expands with the unscrewing of the vice in which it has allowed itself to be squeezed, and always 
whole and undivided spreads itself over a wider and wider surface'. 
42 Such 'dilation of consciousness' 
which Bergson associates with the vision of great artists Underhill proposes is also the prerogative of 
mystics. According to Underhill the 'dilation' is due to a 'change of attitude, a change of relation 
between the world and the self'. 43 For Bergson the direct experience of reality is accessed by intuition, 
as against intellect. Intuition for Bergson is itself a rather nebulous category which is akin to kind of 
38 Letter to Mrs Meyrick Heath (mistakenly dated 1913 - the lectures took place 1911) in Underhill, Letters, 
p. 146. 
39 'Professor Bergson on the Soul'. The Times, 30 October, 1911 in Henri Bergson, Afflanges (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1972), p. 955-6. 
40 T. E. Ilufmc, 'Notes on Bergson 1', The New Age, 9 (1911), p. 587. 
41 William James, Works: Manuscripts, Essays and Notes (Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass, 1988), 
p. 216. 
42 Underhill, 'Bergson and the Mystics', English Review, 10 (Feb. 1912), 511-22; Living Age, 272 (16 
Mar. 1912), 668-75; repr. in Dana Greene (cd. ), Evelyn Underhill: modern guide to the ancient quest for the 
holy (New York: State University of N. Y. Press, 1988), p. 51-2. 
43 Ibid. p-51. 
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instinctual sympathy: a sympathy which in taking us into the inwardness of life, also brings about an 
expansion of consciousness: 
'We call intuition here the sympathy by which one is transported into the interior of an 
object in order to coincide with what there is unique and consequently inexpressible in it. 
Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation which reduces the object to elements already 
known, that is, common to that object and others. Analyzing then consists in expressing a 
thing in terms of what is not it., 44 
Bergson's definition of intuition and analysis arc, by turn, remarkably close to, and a comment upon, 
Vernon Lee's ideal of empathy and its failure. Although Vernon Lee damned Bergson along with the 
French 'obscurantists' for making a virtue out of deliberate mystification we see more of an affinity with 
Bergson's intuition in Lee's desire to know the object than, at times, in Underhill's mysticism where the 
interest in expanded states of consciousness as an apprehension of transcendent reality subsumes the 
object. As Underhill's biographer Christopher Armstrong notes: 'for Evelyn mystical experience seems 
inseparable from some kind of enhancement of consciousness, some expansion of perceptual and indeed 
aesthetic horizons,. 45 This 'change of relation between world and self' is an expansion and exaltation of 
consciousness which, as I suggest in reference to Underhill's fiction, in fixing its sights so wide 
overlooks the unique particularities of a human reality. 
oceanic consciousness 
Underhill's representation of mystical experience as an expansion of the boundaries of consciousness 
inherits its terms not only from Bergson, but also from William James' belief in the edges of the human 
mind as touching a wider, spiritual realm of existence. This 'underlying unknown limitless 
consciousness which is continuous with ourselves' James describes as a 'MORE of the same quality' and 
in his Ingersoll Lecture of 1897 an infinite 'mother-sea' of consciousness. 46 We find Evelyn Underhill 
describing the sought after moment when 'that Ocean would receive you; and there you would find, 
overwhelming and transfusing you, the unfathomable Substance of all life and joy,. 47 Bearing in mind 
that such an exalted feeling associated with mysticism was quite conventionally represented as a 
maritime encounter, its seems appropriate to turn to Freud's passage on the 'oceanic' from Civillsalion 
and its Discontenis which offers his own gloss on the 'blurred outlines, the shifting and permeable ego 
boundaries of self and other, associated in turn with mysticism and a modernist aesthetic. As I suggested 
in the Introduction, modernist literary criticism in its emphasis upon the stream-of-consciousness has 
overlooked the thematic importance of the 'oceanic'. 
44 Bergson, 'Introduction to Metaphysics', ('Introduction A la Mdtaphysique', Revue de Mitaphysique et de 
Morale 29,1903,1-36) repr. Bergson, The Creative Mind, trans. Mabelle L. Andison, (1946; Totowa, N. J.; 
Littlefield, Adams, 1965), 159-200, p. 161-2. 
45 Armstrong, Evelyn Underhill, p. 81. 
46 William James, 'Iluman immortality; Two supposed objections to the doctrine' in Works: Essays in 
Religion and Morality (Cambridge, Mass.: I larvard University Press, 1982), pp. 75-102, p. 94; 'the mother-sea 
and fountain-head of all religions lie in the mystical experiences of the individual, taking the word mystical in 
a very wide sense' (Letter to Henry Rankin, June 16,1901, Leiters of William James, ii, ed. his son Henry 
James, London: Longmans, Green, 1920, p.! 49). 
47 Underhill, Practical Mysticism, p. 103. 
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When Freud first invokes the term it is to describe the experience which his friend Romain Rolland 
characterises as the originary instance of religious sentiment: 'It is a feeling which he would like to call a 
sensation of "eternity", a feeling as of something limitless, unbounded - as it were, "oceanic,,., 
48 It 
signals an experience of numinousness in which the distinctions between self and other cease while 
individual consciousness is temporarily flooded with 'oceanic' feeling. The sensation may be of eternity, 
but the oceanic feeling itself is characterised by transience - comparable to Woolf's 'moments of 
illumination, visions of joy' associated with the modernist epiphany - it is like a wave which 
overwhelms the psyche, leaving nostalgia in its wake. 49 Rolland prefaces his biography La vie de 
Ramakrishna (1929) with a passage from the writing of Ramakrishna which more fully describes the 
cxperience: 
'I saw an ocean[ ... ] boundless, dazzling. In whatever direction I looked great luminous 
waves were rising. They bore down upon me with a loud roar, as if to swallow me up. In 
an instant they were upon me, they broke over me, they engulfed me. I was suffocated. I 
lost all natural consciousness and I fell [ ... I Round me rolled an ocean of ineffable joy. 
And in the depths of my being I was conscious of the presence of the Divine Mother., 50 
Unlike the Bengali mystic, Freud notably resists being swept away in his diagnosis of the 'ocean of 
ineffable joy' which would conflate dissolution of ego boundaries with religious feeling and materrial 
presence: he is resolutely circumspect in his response to this 'feeling of an indissoluble bond, of being 
one with the external world as a whole". Counting psychoanalysis as 'first' to map the extensions of the 
psychic domain beyond consciousness, Freud readily acknowledges the illusory nature of the ego's 
seeming autonomy : 'the ego is continued inwards, without any sharp delimitation, into an unconscious 
mental entity which we designate as the id and for which it serves as a kind of facade'. 
51 Yet this 
shading 'inwards' of the ego into the id is not mirrored in a corresponding dilation outwards: excepting 
the pathological mistaking of boundaries, Freud considers a further extension of the ego as far less 
conceivable. He maintains that 'towards the outside, at any rate, the ego seems to maintain clear and 
sharp lines of demarcation,. 
52 Freud's preserving of an intra-psychic topography which is 'clear and 
sharp' in its distinction against the 'outside' characterises - and, according to Leo Bersani, constitutes 
the limits of - psychoanalytic thinking which is hyperbolically aware of the world as different from 
48 Freud is quoting from Rolland's letter; Sigmund Freud, 'Civilisation and its Discontents', Penguin Freud 
Library 12, (1930; repr. llarmondsworth; Penguin, 1991), p. 251. 
49 Virginia Woolf, 'Time Passes', (first draft written 1926, published 'Le Temps Passd', trans. Charles Mauron, 
Commerce, Jan. 1927) first published in English in Twentieth Century Literature, 29 (Fall 1983), p. 284: this 
is an earlier draft of 'Time Passes', forming the middle section of Woolf's novel To the Lighthouse (1927; 
London: Granada, 1981). 
50 J. Moussaieff Masson, The Oceanic Feeling: The Origins of Religious Sentiment in Ancient India, 
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980), p. 35. Masson suggests that Rolland's use of 'occanic feeling' derived ultimately 
from Sanskrit sources describing mystic experiences in terms of the ocean. Rolland would have been 
acquainted with these through research for his biography of Ramakrishna, the Bengali saint (Rolland, Essal 
sur la mystique et Vaction de l7nde vivante: La Vie de Ramakrishna, Paris, 1930; trans. E. F. Malcolm Smith, 
Prophets of the New India: The Life of Ramakrishna, London: Cassell, 1930). 
51 Freud adds that 'this was a discovery first made by psychoanalytic research' (Freud, 'Civilisation and its 
Discontents', p. 253). 
52 Ibid. p. 253. 
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self. 53 A coalescence between ego and world would present an anathema to the psychoanalytic view 
which cherishes such distinctions (as enabling fantasy). When Freud candidly admits that 'it is very 
difficult for me to work with these almost intangible quantities' it is uncertain whether he is designating 
the unsuitability of the oceanic state of consciousness for analysis or confessing his own resistance to 
doing the work. Surely psychoanalysis is predicated upon such 'almost intangible quantities'? 54 
Having informed the reader that he is himself unacquainted with such a feeling, Freud proceeds to 
interpret oceanic feeling as a regressive experience, giving it in his words 'a psychoanalytic - that is, a 
genetic - explanation': an aside which sequesters psychoanalysis away from the metaphysical and 
towards a science of known origins. 55 According to Freud's 'psychoanalytic' explanation, 'oceanic 
feeling' describes the return of an earlier developmental phase of ego-feeling, recalling the 'mother sea' of 
pre-oedipal experience. 
56 Thus the 'feeling of oneness with the universe' is a survival of 'a much more 
inclusive - indeed, an all-embracing - feeling which corresponded to a more intimate bond between the 
ego and the world about it'. This 'intimate bond' is best represented by the infant's early experiences of 
mothering where boundaries of self are inapplicable to a union which suffuses intimacy and infinity. Yet, 
as we have seen, Ramakrishna's account suggests this 'all-embracing feeling' can also terrify: the waves 
'bore down upon me with a loud roar, as if to swallow me up'. 
Freud keeps oceanic feeling at bay, so to speak, by marginalising the significance of the pre-oedipal in 
his model of the development of self, and by excluding its relevance to his narrative of the origins of 
religious sentiment. It is not however, that parenthood is incongruous to a sense of the divine - instead 
of a 'Divine Mother' narrative supremacy is given to the paternal role. What is 'incontrovertible' and 
most powerfully operative in Freud's developmental model is a child's need for the father's protection, 
which supersedes the relationship with the mother. 
57 By prioritising desire for the rule of the father as 
the source of religious feeling further discussion of the kind of religious sentiment implied by the 
6oceanic feeling' is usurped by emphasis upon rule-bound institutional ised religion. 58 Written in 1930, 
53 'in Conversation with Jacqueline Rose' at the ICA, April 1999. See Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit, 
Caravaggio's Secrets (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Prce, 1998); 'Interview' with Leo Bersani, October 82 (Fall, 
1997). 
54 Freud, p-252, p. 260. 
55 Ibid. p. 252. Note that William James (disingenuously, if we recall his nitrous oxide experience) claims 'my 
own constitution shuts me out from their enjoyment entirely, (James, Varieties, p. 379). 
56 Freud was content to leave the child's early prc-linguistic relatonship with the mother 'wrapped in 
obscurity' (Freud, 'Civilisation and its Discontents'. p. 260). The dual longings for oneness and separateness 
can be compared to Freud's conflicting drives, cros and thanatos - the one an instinct for life and the other 
pulling the individual towards a state of conservation, passivity and inertia -a longing for immersion in the 
oceanic mother-sea could then be read as somehow compatible with the death drive. 
57 See Julia Kristeva, In the Beginning Was Love: psychoanalysis andfaith, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1987) for associations of mysticism with primary identification to a loving, 
protective agency (the serniotic), and the suggestion that idcalisation of the matcrnal relationship may bind us 
to her. 
58 Freud's elision of 'oceanic feeling' with the realm of the mothers has not been unrcmarkcd particularly in 
context of his failure to work with IID. Both Dianne Chisholm, ILD. 's Freudian Poetics, psychoanalysis In 
translation (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1992) Madclon Sprengncthcr, The Spectral Mother: 
Freud, Feminism, and Psychoanalysis (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1990) discuss Freud's 
Civilisation and Its Discontents but omit mention of the oceanic. The association of mysticism with the pre- 
oedipal, pre-linguistic realm of undifferentiated union with the mother has elicited a feminist claiming of 
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Freud's privileging of a patriarchal model of religious sentiment fails to account for the widespread 
mystical revival in the early twentieth century which, as we have seen, defined religion as experience 
rather than obedience. 
Foregrounding religion as the observance of laws, Freud's attitude 'towards the outside' can be said to 
reinstate theoretical boundaries which were necessarily less 'clear and sharp' according to a mysticism 
which founded itself upon the oceanic experience - the 'blurred outlines' associated with Bergson. The 
, feeling of oneness with the universe' pivotal to mysticism is an experience of union with a divine 
reality marking the apotheosis of the mystical quest. Yet the oceanic embrace - whether or not maternal 
- is not just benign. Arthur Waite - scholar and student of mysticism with a significant influence upon 
Underhill - described these 'moments, brief periods' attained: 
'when the love becomes so transcendent that the knower and the known, subject and 
object, are wrapped up together in an indescribable unity barriers are burned away and 
all the barbed wires of intellectualism are melted., 
59 
The fusing of identities in an ecstatic embrace, intensified because fleeting, also carries a suggestion of 
aggression - the demolition of 'barriers' and 'barbed wire'; as Bersani has argued oceanic feeling is 
associated in Freud's analysis with the satisfied realisation of the aggressive - narcissistic - instinct to 
erase difference between self and world. 
60 In considering the implications of 'oceanic feeling' it is 
significant then that boundaries are two-sided. Their dissolution can indicate liberation from the confines 
of individual experience, that is to say, an experience where self can be forgotten; on the other hand it 
can premise an infinity of selfhood or, as Freud describes, it a 'limitless narcissism,. 
61 If 'oceanic 
feeling' can signify both immersion and transcendence, it indicates mysticism's ability to point to a way 
both in and out of the self. Compare the exalted experience of which a paradigmatic moment is described 
by Ouspensky, a GurdJieff devotee of suitably non-orthodox mystic credentials: 
'And in that instant I became all. The waves - they were myself. the far violet mountains, 
the wind, the clouds hurrying from the north, the great steamship, heeling and rushing 
irresistibly forward - all were myselq ... ] It was an instant of unusual freedom, joy and 
expansion., 62 
mystical experiences as a specifically feminine religious state of experience. Mystics share the inevitable 
linguistic difficulties of representing a state which is beyond language, associated with the scmiotic, or 
tcriture feminine, which in mysticism leads to the convention of negative imagery. 
59 Arthur Waite, The Way of Divine Union: being a doctrine of experience in the life of sanctity, considered on 
the faith of its testimonies and interpreted after a new manner (London: William Ridcr, 1915). p. 318. 
60 Leo Bersani's reading of Freud elicits a comparison between oceanic feeling and his description of the 
aggressive instinct: 'against the view that the oceanic feeling is "the true source of religious sentiments", 
Freud had argued that it is probably rather "a first attempt at a religious consolation", a delusionary cure for 
human suffering. Now, however, Freud is suggesting that we suffer because civilisation insists that we curb 
-the extraordinarily high degree of narcissistic enjoyment" which accompanies satisfied aggressiveness (that 
is, the successful breaking down of the world's resistances to , or more 
fundamentally, differcriccs from, the 
ego). The oceanic feeling is the cure which religion proposes for the suffering caused by the curbing of the 
oceanic feeling [ ... 
]. More exactly, the proposed cure for the illness is a mystified sublimation of the cause of 
the illness. The oceanic feeling is a benign reformulation of "the blind fury of destruct i vcncss"' (Bersani, The 
Freudian Body: Psychoanalysis and Art, New York: Columbia, 1982, p. 19-20). 
61 Freud, 'Civilisation and its Discontents', p. 260. 
62 P. D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum: the third canon of thought (1908; repr. London, RKP, 1970). p. 276-7. 
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The 'instant' in which 'I became all' conflates transcendence and its opposite of 'limitless narcissism'. 
Christopher Armstrong suggests in his biography that Evelyn Underhill's own relation to her mystical 
experiences was uncomfortably poised between just such contradictions: he describes the alternatives she 
presents for herself between 'pure spirit - pure egotism'. 
63 Noting her 'general tendency to self- 
preoccupation' Armstrong risks imputing Underhill with a narcissistic relation to mysticism which 
Charles Williams' in his introduction to her Letters more studiously avoids: he defends Underhill's tone 
4of interior interpretation' which 'she did not altogether mean even then'. 64 A passage from Mysticism 
conveys the 'pure spirit' side of the dialectic: 
'Mysticism... implies, indeed, the abolition of individuality; of that hard separateness, 
that 'I, Me, Mine' which makes of man a finite, isolated thing. It is essentially a 
movement of the heart, seeking to transcend the limitations of the individual standpoint 
and surrender itself to ultimate Reality; for no personal gain, to satisfy no transcendental 
curiosity, to obtain no other-worldly joys, but purely from an instinct of love. 165 
As if working against the power of 'the word "mine"' which we saw Vernon Lee insist upon, mysticism 
is idealised as ennabling an 'abolition of individuality' and elimination of the motive of 'personal gain'. 
As we shall see, Underhill's own text problematises this too easy refutation of self, which is markedly 
resonant of similar disavowals in the literature of modernism. In Mysticism Underhill holds on to 
transcendence and self-loss as theoretically essential to the mystical paradigm while at the same time 
proposing that spiritual experience is an end in itself. she claims 'the only final thing is personal 
experience'. 66 Underhill's preoccupation with mysticism (which can itself be read as a preoccupation 
with self) demonstrates on the one hand a desire to be rid of self and on the other, as we will see, an 
inability to explain it away. 67 In this, Underhill's concern with a move beyond the realm of the self 
which remains intractably part of the self bears similarities with the tensions we have seen in the 
writings of Vernon Lee. 
The conceptual paradox by which a transcendent God is understood from within human experience is at 
the heart of an immanentist belief which increasingly defined the tendency of a pre-war Christianity. 
68 
immanentism shows the influence of modem philosophy upon religious thinking in this period, seen 
most obviously in the Modernist Movement within the Roman Catholic church - distinct from literary 
63 Armstrong, Evelyn Underhill, p. 215. 
64 Charles Williams, 'Introduction', The Lettlers of Evelyn Underhill, p. 18; 'the single final egotism - the 
psychic (the word is hers) awareness of the self - was a trouble to her as to all sincere and generous souls' (ibid. 
p. 35). 
65 Underhill, Mysticism, p. 71. 
66 This is a dilemma which still besets 'transpersonal psychology': Ken Wilber's cartographies of 
consciousness attempt to map the transpersonal. See Ken Wilber, No Boundary: Eastern and Western 
Approaches to Personal Growth (1979; repr. Boston & London: Shambala, 1985) p. 47. 
67 Richard Noll points out that the promise of an experience of a God within - and the narcissist potential of 
this position - was a key aspect to Jung's psychotherapy: 'To bear a God within one's self significs just as 
much as to be God one's scir (Jung, The Psychology of the Unconscious, paras 150-151; see Noll, The Jung 
Cult, London: Fontana, 1996, p. 363). 
68 See Clement Webb, A Study of Religious Thought in Englandfrom 1850 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933). 
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modernism. Picking up on Bergson's emphasis upon spirituality within his anti-rational philosophy, the 
Modernists reacted to what they held to be an over-intellectualised theology and proposed a theory of 
knowledge or faith as immanent in experience rather than doctrinally deduced. Faith, like experience, 
involves the activity of the whole being. Defined by Alec Vidler in 1934: 
'Faith[ ... ] does not consist 
in accepting with our intellect dogmas which are revealed to us 
from entirely beyond our experience and, as it were, imposed on us from outside. We 
approach and realize the supernatural from within. [ ... ] The method of immanence, as it 
was called, i. e. the analysis of our inmost life, is thus shown to lead to a doctrine of 
transcendence: it shows that the natural postulates the supematural., 69 
The kinship with Bergson and with Underhill's mysticism is obvious, as is the correspondance with 
Eliot's and Murray's debate over inner and outer allegiances, demonstrating the continuities between 
philosophical, religious and literary thought of the modernist period. Yet the Modernists, and again 
Underhill's mysticism, by retaining a transcendent category despite a subjectivist emphasis can be said 
to hold within them the contradictions which polarise the other discourses into realist/idealist or 
classical/romantic positions. Previous to her writings on mysticism Underhill considered herself a 
Modernist on many points and intended to convert to Catholicism -a plan she abandoned when her 
allegiance to the church was compromised by the papal decree issued in 1907 condemning the 
Modernists. 70 Modernist thought could not be asssimilated by the Catholic orthodoxy. 
During this early period, Underhill pursued further unorthodox paths towards the attaining of those states 
of exaltation which constituted experience of a transcendent reality. Most significant in this search was 
her association with Arthur Waite whom she describes as 'our most learned and important writer' on the 
subjects of occult and mystic science. 71 Waite's scholarship, even within esoteric subjects, was wide- 
ranging (he dedicates his journal The Unknown World to 'the occult sciences, magic, mystical 
philosophy, alchemy, hermetic archaeology, and the hidden problems of science, literature, speculation 
and history'); yet amongst such eclecticism his focus of study was defined as transcendental philosophy, 
teaching a 'method of transcending the phenomenal world, and attaining to the reality behind the 
phenomena'. 
72 He identifies his readership as one in search of a positive knowledge concerning 'the 
world beyond'. 
73 Underhill's early writings were much informed by Waite's scholarship: not only did 
69 Alec Vidler, The Modernist Movement in the Roman Church (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 
pp. 186-7. See R. C. Grogin 'The Catholic Revival' in The Bergsonian Controversy in France 1900-1914 
(Calgary, Canada: University of Calgary Press, 1988). 
70 Maurice Blondel, Edouard Le Roy and Lucien Laberthonniere articulated the movement in France; the 
leading Modernist in Britain was George Tyrell, an Anglican who became a Jesuit priest in 1891 but was 
virtually excommunicated in 1907. Evelyn Underhill was a great admirer of Tyrell. 
71 Armstrong suggests that '[tjhe central and transcendent significance of the fact of mystical experience as, in 
varying degrees, consummating that instinctive tendency and craving of human spirits to unite with the 
divine Reality, Evelyn almost certainly learned from Waite' (Armstrong, p. 40); Dana Greene concurs that 'the 
influence on [Underhill by Waite] was probably substantial' (Greene, Evelyn Underhill: 4rUst of the In Inite 
Life, p. 17). 
72 Waite, The Unknown World, I (Aug 15 1894); Arthur Waite, The Occult Sciences (London: Kcgan Paul, 
Trench & Trfibncr, 189 1), p. 1. 
73 Waite, The Occult Sciences, p. 213- Underhill joined The Independent and Rectified Rite -a branch of the 
occult brotherhood of The Golden Dawn - in 1904; see Francis King, Ritual Alagic in England: 1887 to the 
present day (London: New English Library, 1972) p. 89; Armstrong. Evelyn Underhill, p. 36. On the Golden 
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he found the branch of The Golden Dawn which shejoined (her occult name was 'Soror Quarens Lucem' 
meaning sister seeking enlightenment), but Underhill's first published fiction was in The Horlicks 
Magazine under his editorship. These five short stories were followed by three novels, The Grey World 
(1904) The Lost Word (1907), and The Column of Dust(1909) after which Underhill ceased writing 
fiction. In these novels, which draw upon the rituals of freemasonry and magic, we witness Underhill's 
interest in seeking a positive knowledge, that is experience, of 'the world beyond', regardless of the 
4way'. 74 While Underhill did not retain her affiliations with the occult brotherhood she did remain for 
some years engaged in the quest for accessing a higher, or exalted state of consciousness. Practical 
Mysticism recommends methods of meditation, visualisation and exercise of the will which are central to 
occult practice. 
A poem of Underhill's (from Theophanies 1916) represents her quest for a realm beyond the human 
experience as a galactic journeying through the solar system and 'beyond the edge of space': 
'I have not stayed my quest for any star 
Nor found in any sun the light I need: 
Authentic converse with the unconfined 
This might alone suffice mine avid mind' 
Failing to achieve 'authentic converse'- or 'cosmic' consciousness -she returns, cautioned by the stars: 
'Thou dost but tread the orbit of thy brain 
In thine ecstatic flight 
That would achieve his dread excess of bright. 
Not so 
The limited the Limitless may know., 75. 
The desire to 'know' the limitless, along with the need for 'authentic converse' is a desire not just for the 
experience, but at the same time for a guarantee of its exalted, or transcendent meaning. Without this 
assurance an 'ecstatic flight' about the cosmos might be diminished to an experience confined to the 
$orbit of thy brain', in other word, the limits of the psychological. The poem communicates the 
bewilderments of an empirical mysticism which echoes elsewhere in the collection. 'Beyond the Garden' 
figures the 'garden' of individual experience as 
'a cagc without a door, 
That shuts me from a better dream,. 76 
The inner experience is no longer an effective way to reach the transcendent: 
'Rich are my borders, yet beyond 
Dawn see Ellic Howe, The Magicians of the Golden Dawn, 1887-1923 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1972). 
74 Speaking at Manchester College, Oxford, as part of an inaugural course of a lectureship in religion, Evelyn 
Underhill urged 'that great business of human transcendence, which is man's function within the universal 
plan' (Underhill, The Life of the Spirit and the Life of Today, London: Methuen, 1922, p. 79. 
75 Underhill, Theophanies (London: J. M. Dent, 1916), p. 20, p. 21. The Canadian psychologist R. M. Bucke's 
study (referenced in Mysticism) names the 'limitless' experience as 'cosmic Consciousness' (Bucke, Cosmic 
Consciousness: a study in the evolution of the human mind, Philadelphia: Innes & Son, 1901, p. 55). 
76 Underhill, Theophanies, p. 64. 
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I know a ficrcer lifc must bc: 
I have a deep and secret pond, 
But far away I scent the sea. ' 
In her literary-philosophical excursus, Love's Knowledge, Martha Nussbaum counters a transcendence 
which pursues the desire for an 'other' life with transcendence 'of an internal and human sort'. She 
conceives of the latter process 'as a transcending by descent, delving more deeply into oneself and one's 
humanity'; this paradoxical transcending by descent strives against the limits that constrain human life 
without expecting a different sort of life altogether. 
77 In promoting this human sort of transcendence she 
asks us 'to reject as incoherent [ ... ] the aspiration to leave behind altogether the constitutive conditions 
of our humanity'. Quite differently to Underhill's linking of the mystic and the artist, Nussbaum 
connects Marcel Proust and Henry James with her idea of internal transcendence: in their case, 'the 
artist's fine-tuned attention and responsiveness to human life is paradigmatic of a kind of precision of 
feeling and thought that a human being can cultivate. Neither has the slightest interest in religious or 
otherworldly or even contemplative transcendence; both aim at transcendence nonetheless. '78 This has 
links with what Levenson describes as 'a "psychologistic" theory of literary meaning, associated with 
Henry James, which insists on the primacy of consciousness' and results in 'the enshrining of 
consciousness as the repository of meaning and value'. 
79 
Turning back to Underhill we see that she never relinquishes desire for a 'different sort of life altogether': 
cultivation of the inner way and desire for something beyond the human are uneasily reconciled. 
80 Yet if 
mysticism repudiates the ordinary world along with the ego on what basis can it be said to engage? We 
see the question of whether mysticism is a retreat from, or engagement with the world passing into the 
most recent discussions of the topic: Monica Furlong in the TLS defends the mystics' longing for 
, immediate consciousness' as a yearning to 'stand outside of the self that is also a transcending of the 
self' and which, in gaining a new perspective, need not be antithetical to justice and social concem. 81 
This position is not easily sustained with reference to Underhill: in her early work at least we see a 
disparaging of the ordinary, and an idealising of the beyond, displaying the spiritual elitism with which 
mysticism is characteristically charged. Her early mysticism may have been practical in method but not 
in application: a feature of it being an unconcern with improving anything in the visible universe'. 82 In 
77 Martha Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), p-379- 
78 Ibid. p. 379. 'I believe it is no accident at all that both I lenry James and Proust compare excellent literary 
works to angels that soar above the dullness and obtuseness of the everyday, offering their readers a glimpse 
of a more compassionate, subtler, more responsive, more richly human world. That is a view about 
transcendence' (ibid. ). 
79 Levenson, A Genealogy of Modernism, pp. 21-22. 
80 Underhill, The Mystic Way, pA 
81 Monica Furlong, 'What the Beguincs Began' [review of Grace Jantzen, Power, Gender and Christian 
Mysticism], TLS, (22 March 1996), p. 10. 
82 Underhill, Mysticism, p. 81. 
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anticipation of the call for an increased activism Underhill answers the reader of Practical Mysticism 
(published in the first year of the war) who asks 'What is the use of all this? ': 
'what is being offered to you is not merely a choice amongst new states of consciousness, 
new emotional experiences[ ... ] but above all else, a larger and intenser life It shall be 
both violently practical and affirmative. '83 
The reader's 'violently practical' duty is to convey an enhanced understanding of Reality and as 
Underhill goes on to say 'it will matter little where and how this career is actualized - whether in 
convent or factory, study or battlefield, multitude or solitude, sickness or strength'. 84 As I have already 
suggested, Underhill's vision of the transcendent can obviate a precision of feeling and thought in the 
human world. Thus, although Nussbaum lends to it an entirely different, even opposite emphasis, the 
epithet of 'transcending by descent' is an appropriate description of Underhill's way of mysticism which 
is, at moments, paralysed by its paradoxical constitution. 
Pure spirit/pure ego 
As I will argue in the rest of this chapter, Evelyn Underhill's work shows an uneasy relation to 'psyche' 
as the mystical component of her writing tries to cut itself off from the psychic dimension which it takes 
off from and on which it also relies. Mysticism is not a self-explanatory or self-contained mode of being 
and it constantly reveals undercurrents which return it to body, ego and self. The definition of the 
oceanic clearly troubles the question of transcendence which is at the heart of Underhill's mysticism. if 
the world is not clearly divided into the psychic and the physical - instead 'colours[ ... ] all run into one 
another' - what does it mean to speak of the psychological? In his essay on Beckett, Adomo questions 
what we mean when we refer to Proust as a psychological writer: 'If Proust is a psychologist, then he is 
one in a completely new sense of the word: he is a psychologist in that he immerses everything real, 
including sense perception, in a psychic fluid. '85 Once the world has been drenched, so to speak, in 
oceanic consciousness what constitutes the psychological? Or, to put it differently, what remains of the 
transcendent once a spiritual experience has been psychologised? 
We begin to see the anxieties inherent in Underhill's mysticism. In a bid to preserve the transcendent 
sanction of a mystical experience she asks 'what do we really mean by mysticism?, only to problematise 
her own answer: 
'The difficulty lies in determining the point at which supersensual experience ceases to be 
merely a practical and interesting extension of sensual experience - an enlarging so to 
speak of the boundaries of existence - and passes over into that boundless life where 
Subject and Object, desirous and desired, are one. ' 86 
83 Underhill, Practical Alysticism, p. 102. 
84 Ibid. p. 98, p103. 
85 Ernst Robert Curtius, Franzosischer Geist im neuen Europa (1925) in Theodor Adorno, 'Trying to 
Understand Endgame, Notes to Literature, ii, ed. Rolf Tiedermann, trans. Shierry Weber Nicolson (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 254. 
86 Underhill, Mysticism, pp. 72-73. 
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Underhill seeks a point at which psyche transcends psychology and the extended boundaries of 
consciousness become 'boundless'. Such a point is necessary if mysticism is to remain mystical. Yet 
Underhill goes on to acknowledge that there is no such 'point': 'there is no sharp line, but rather an 
infinite series of gradations which separee the two states. ' Confounded by the ever evanescing 'point' of 
her own argument she resorts to a metaphorical comfort, suggesting 'we must look carefully at all the 
pilgrims on the road; discover[ ... ] the maps which they use, the luggage which they take. '87 Yet this 
advice offers no consolation: Underhill has already clearly stated that the mystic experience is, quite 
precisely unmappable: similar to Bergson's philosophy, 'it has no edges [ ... ] It is a vision, not a 
map., 88 The question'what dowereallymean by mysticismT remains rhetorical. 
89 
That Underhill experienced such implications as profoundly unsettling are evident from a note in which 
she records: 
'A terrible, overwhelming suspicion that after all my whole 'spiritual experience' may be 
only subjective[ ... I There 
is no real test: I may have deceived myself right through, 
always studying these things, self-suggestion would be horribly easy. '90 
In this personal admission we see the radical instability of Underhill's position where her psychological 
approach threatens to undermine the very mysticism which it helps to define. If 'the only final thing is 
personal experience': her hold upon transcendent meaning is as precarious as subjectivity itself which can 
at once veer between limitless narcissism and existential nothingness, recalling the 'oceanic' defined as 
an overwhelming of the subject and by the subject. An empirical mysticism witnesses self-identity 
expand and contract as if under the 'vice' of Bergson's metaphor. Underhill's 'terrible, overwhelming 
suspicion' is not exactly that her spiritual experience may be subjective - for she has always described it 
as such - but that the subjective experience, the 
feeling of communion, however intense, may refer only 
to itself. The states of consciousness which were a mark of mystical experience now offer no 'real test', 
only an empirical record which provides no sanctification of meaning beyond the personal. Again 
Underhill asks; 'How am I to know for certain that this is not just some psychic mechanism? '. 
91 The 
&self-suggestion' to which she refers would further enclose the self within its own cage, with the 
87 Ibid. p. 73 
88 Ibid. p. 33. 
89 This concern appears differently in psychoanalysis subsequent to Freud. In her notes on '111sychoanalysis 
and Mysticism', Marion Milner describes mystical thinking as the 'other' kind of thinking that is due to 'its 
capacity for letting go the clinging to the distinction between subject and object'. Milner suggests that in 
relegating this thinking as specifically religious, we alienate it 'from what should be a complementary 
interplay with the ways of thinking based on the rules of formal logic. ' In other words, Milner approaches the 
problem from the opposite direction to Underhill, so to speak, proposing that we abandon the notion of a 
point' or dividing line at which ordinary consciousness becomes divine, and rethink our category of the 
ordinary (Milner, 'Some notes on psychoanalysis and mysticism' (1973) in The Suppressed Madness of Sane 
Afen: 44 years of exploring psychoanalysis, London: Tavistock, 1987, p. 26 1). 
90 Underhill's 'Report' to von IlOgel, June 1923, in Armstrong, Evelyn Underhill, p. 219. See Margaret 
Cropper's different transcription of Underhill's 'Report': 'A terrible overwhelming suspicion that after all my 
whole 'invisible experience' may only be subjective' (Evelyn Underhill, London; Longmans Green, 1958, 
p. 107); in an earlier document 'My Rule', (1921). which responds to a letter from her spiritual master von 
flogel, Underhill notes that 'Invisible religion shall be the touchstone for all external practices' (Cropper, 
p. 83). See Friedrich von I 10gcl, The Mystical Element in Religion ((London: J. M. DcnL 1908). 
91 Margaret Cropper, Evelyn Underhill (London; Longmans Green, 1958). p. 108. 
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implication that all experience is self-referential and consequently self-deceptive if seeking after God. As 
with Vernon Lee we see a reversion to the self when what is sought is an intense experience of the other, 
in Lee's case of another person or object and in this instance with a transcendent essence. Both reach a 
point at which such a connection is conceived of as impossible. The extremism of this position for 
Underhill is felt in a private note which confides: 'There are times when I wish I'd never heard of 
psychology-'92 As we see, faith can be as much undermined as reinforced by experience: 'states of 
consciousness' finally lacking the conviction which only a 'responsible' theism can provide. 
in 1921 Underhill gave a series of lectures on psychology at Upton College, Oxford which Armstrong 
describes as representing a 'high point in her long-standing preoccupation - by now in fact very close to 
an obsession- with psychology and the powers of suggestion'. 93 These lectures stress the importance of 
belonging to a church and pursuing a spiritual life within the safe harbour of an institutional ised 
religion. The turning point in Underhill's spiritual 'way' was a move away from attributing over-much 
significance to mystical states of consciousness: in this she was assisted by the spiritual guidance of 
Baron von Hagel to whom she turned in 1921. Friedrich von Hugel was a leading Roman Catholic 
thinker who, like Inge, was sympathethic to mysticism but frowned upon the emotional subjectivism, 
encouraged by immanentism, which lost touch with the importance of a transcendent God. 
94 Von Ilagel 
strongly disapproved Underhill's emphasis upon exalted states of consciousness, and encouraged her to 
reorientate her life of the spirit within the religious institution of the church, to devote herself to practical 
charity and a living out of the daily Christian virtues in 'what is ordinarily called "consciousness"' - to 
which she had confessed being reluctantly restored after her anaesthetic experience. Witness I lugel's letter 
to Undcrhill: 
11 do not like this craving for absolute certainty that this or that experience of yours is 
what it seems to yourself. And I am assuredly not going to declare that I am absolutely 
certain of the final & evidential worth of any of these experiences. These experiences of 
yours are not articles of faith, are they? [ ... ]Do not make [your search for direct personal 
experiences] an end when they exist only to be a means., 95 
The extent pf Underhill's shift in the direction recommended by von Ilugel is reflected in a letter written 
in 1932 which refers to 'ecstatic phenomena; Underhill now says that these extraordinary states of 
consciousness concern her little, 'because I think them a by-product and not the essence'. 96 
In Underhill's novel The Column of Dus: a middle-aged woman, adorned with beads and scarabs, gives 
lectures to her friends on the rites of the Egyptian Underworld and the joyous emancipation of the soul 
in death. During one of these talks her elderly husband dies in the adjoining kitchen, his death 
92 Armstrong, Evelyn Underhill, p. 226. 
93 Ibid. See Evelyn Underhill, The Life of the Spirit and the Life of Today: Upton Lectures, 1922 (London: 
Methuen, 1922). 
94 John Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought (London: SCM Press, 1963), pp. 150-1. 
95 Margaret Cropper, Evelyn Underhill, pp. 111-2. 
96 Letter to E. I. Watkin, 7 Feb, 1932, Underhill, Letters, p. 199. 
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confronting her with the inadequacy of creeds to provide solace in the face of grief. we see her 'neat 
universe, abruptly ruined'. 97 Underhill is pointing out the hypocrisies subsumed under the aegis of a 
doctrine alienated from human experience. Mrs Reed is unable to sustain her belief when life disproves 
the theory. On the other hand, as we have seen in the case of Underhill's own dilemma, over-privileging 
of experience can lead to no creed at all. 
(Colours which) all run into one another? 
(I) Poet, artist, baby 
Although Underhill's 1930's preface to Mysticism rebuked her own psychological emphasis an 
ambivalent relation towards psychology is already evident in the 1911 edition. As I described in the first 
section of this chapter, Underhill eventually retreats from the implications of an empirical psychology for 
mysticism. In this section we see Underhill voicing a different critique of psychology as an interpretive 
science which wrongly conflates the terms subliminal and the sublime. On the one hand we see 
Underhill trying to make clear some of the blurred outlines associated with mysticism, on the other hand 
we see a struggle in her fiction as it tries to make or maintain distinctions between the two terms. 
As we have seen, Underhill compares the mystic experience to a state of consciousness familiar to artists. 
'The Mystic as Creative Artist'(1913) cites from Bergson that it is the artists, and (she adds) mystics, 
prerogative to 'enter into immediate communion with things'. 
98 In this capacity, Underhill also makes a 
link with babies, prefiguring Freud's association of the oceanic with the pre-oedipal. In a review of 
Rabindranath Tagore's poetry Underhill elaborates upon her figure of the divine baby: 
'The baby, like the poetý sees things in their native purity [ ... 
]a fairy universe of limitless 
possibilities. His relation with that world is, in little, the untarnished human relation, and 
can interpret to us something of the meaning of our own mysterious contacts with things: 
for the flame of separation has not yet fenced him off from communing with the wind and 
the flowers, the unbroken continuity which we must strive to realize through long efforts 
and purifications exists in its perfection in him. 
99 
We see another instance in which a line can be drawn almost directly between these aesthetic concerns of 
modernism and more recent psychoanalytic debate: beyond Freud, Underhill's description of the child's 
'communing' with the world evokes Winnicott's category of a 'transitional space' between the absolute 
subjectivity of the infant and the recognition of 'not-me' objects. In this realm of play, or transitional 
phenomena, the child experiences, in Underhill's words, an 'unbroken continuity' with the world 
provided by 'the illusion that what the infant creates really exists'. 100 As Winnicott puts it, we 'never 
97 Underhill, The Column of Dust, p. 189. 
98 Underhill, 'The Mystic as Creative Artist'. Quest, 4 (April 1913), 629-652, p. 63 1. 
99 Underhill, 'The Circle and the Centre' [Review of Rabindranath Tagore, The Realkation of Lye, and 
Crescent Xfoon: Child Poems], Nation, 12 (13 Dec 1913), 499-500, p. 500. 
100 D. W. Winnicott, 'Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena', (1951), in Playing and Reality, 
(ilarmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), p. 16. 
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challenge the baby to elicit an answer to the question: did you create that or did you find it? 'l 01 This 
illusion sustained by play is also linked with creativity, and 'retained in the intense experiencing of 
religion'. 102 To this extent then the baby is connected with both artist, and mystic, a divine trinity to 
which Underhill grants special access to the transcendent: a character from her first novel exclaims 'I can 
be a saint or a baby or an artist, just as I wish. Yes, a baby! Haven't you ever noticed that there's a sort 
of divine babyishness about people who are really at peace. '103 
Yet Underhill's fiction tells a strikingly different story both of artists and babies: The Column of Dust 
represents the child Vera as 'squalid' and 'grubby' and refers to a baby as 'a condensed statement of 
human unpleasantness'l 04 while 'Death of a Saint' and 'The Mountain Image' question the nature of the 
artist's creative passsion. We see revealed the underface of Underhill's own idealisations, which recalls 
Freud's categories of child, primitive and woman to whom he famously ascribed a privileged relation to 
narcissism and the unconscious. Does art really fit into the same category as, or does it access other 
states than the transcendent? Looking first at these two short stories, published in 1904 we see a more 
problematic relationship between art and the holy. 'Death of a Saint', suggests that art enables the holy 
through the release of the unholy while 'The Mountain Image' reveals the self-destructive potential of 
art. 105 
'Death of a Saint' is a title which describes the death of Father John and imputes the demise also of his 
reputation as a saint. A much venerated priest, when Father John is dying he insists on spending the last 
remaining hours of life in his locked prayer cell. When he fails to emerge, his two noviciates force open 
the door to find themselves, quite unexpectedly, not in an ascetic's place of worship but in an artist's 
studio. The shock of discovery is heightened by the nature of Father John's paintings: 
'This was the workshop of a great painter; but his subjects were the grotesque, morbid, 
unspeakable secrets of the world. Papers were pinned to the wall, or lay in heaps upon the 
floor; and on each was the impression of something evil and alive -a matter of a few 
strokes, mostly, but in some cases finished with a care that approached the act of creation. 
The things were male-female-no sex- always human, but always bestial too., 106 
101 Winnicott, 'The Use of an Object and Rclating through Identifications' (1968), in Playing and Reality, 
(Ilarmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), p. 104. Michael Eigen describes a way of experiencing - which he names the 
area of faith - irreducible to mother or father (Eigen. 'The Area of Faith in Winnicott, Lacan and Bion', 
International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 62,1981,413-33). 
102 See Julia Kristcva, In the Beginning was Love: Psychoanalysis and Faith, trans. Arthur Goldhammcr (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1987), pp. 24-25. 
103 Underhill, The Grey World (London: Heineman, 1904), p. 304; differently, Lyndall Gordon selects 
'pilgrim, lover, ascetic' as representing Underhill's classic identities (Gordon, T. S. Eliot: An Imperfect Life, 
P. 90). 
104 Underhill, The Column of Dust, p. 78. 
105 From 1903-5 Arthur Waite was the editor of the Ilorlicks Company monthly house papcr, The Ilorlicks 
, &faga: ine and 
Home Journal for Australia, India and the Colonies. 
106 Underhill, 'The Death of a Saint', Ilorlicks Afaga: ine, 2 (1904), 173-177, p. 176. 
'Transcending By Descenf 91 
In stark contrast to the austerity of his adjacent bedroom, the pictures reveal the 'grotesque, morbid, 
unspeakable secrets' which have been kept behind locked doors, inadmissible to the religious life, and, it 
is implied, to the conscious psyche. 
'Above on the easel, a picture faced them with an air that was almost defiant. It was the 
most horrible of all the pictures in that horrible little room, and seemed to gather up into 
itself the unnameable evil which the walls distilled. Painted with a technical perfection 
which they were not able to appreciate, it pulsated with life, laughed cynically at its own 
monstrous suggestion; passion had created it, and it lived. In it were personified all the 
dark, obscene secrets of our common nature. 'I 07 
We will see the 'unnameable evil' of the picture reappear in a comparably 'monstrous' vision in a short 
story of May Sinclair's in the following chapter. In this instance, we are told that the 'evil' is 
unequivocally created by 'passion': the picture 'pulsating with life' mocks the dead form of the priest 
lying in a heap before the canvas. The passion lives, where the piety had died with the man. Underhill, 
in her 1921 Upton lecture on psychology elaborates upon a popular metaphorical analogy between the 
psyche and a partially lit room: here the painter's workshop becomes a 'horrible little room' due to its 
'dark, obscene' contents, associating the artist with a gratification of the instincts from which the 
religious man is customarily set apart. There are obvious analogies with Oscar Wilde's Dorian Grey, yet 
crucially for Underhill, what is at stake is not the underside of the libertine but of the saint: the ethical 
contradiction goes further. 
Father John's students are initially appalled to see the reputation of their spiritual teacher desecrated by 
the artistic expression of his own carnality yet their dissimilar responses differently interpret the 
relationship between art and the transcendent. Cuthbert concludes that: 
'Our saint was only an artist after all! ' 
'But Alban did not answer. He remembered with tears that Father John had always come 
from that room purged from the stain of earth and radiant with thanksgiving; with a heart, 
now stilled for ever, which had longed to help and comfort all the world. It seemed 
possible that, had he been less of an artist, he might not have been quite so much of a 
saint. '108 
Alban wonders whether it was the occluded expression of his passion which enabled Father John to live 
so piously outside the studio. We are warned in the opening paragraph that Father John's 'keen dark 
eyes' were 'signs of a fretting sword within'. 
109 Whether his art meets the demands of sublimation or 
suggests an unconscious agenda, we see psychological considerations are brokering ideas of the self 
which are not usually contained by religious identities. 
107 Ibid. p. 176. 
108 Ibid. p. 177. 
1()9 Ibid. p. 173. 
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The 'dark, obscene secrets of our common nature' which are revealed on the canvas resurface in 'The 
Mountain Image', a story in which 'strange monsters' also stir within the artist -to again problematise 
the relationship between an artist and his religious devotion. A sculptor who despairs of ever proving 
himself a great artist resolves to carve a massive Madonna in the rock above his village. However, once 
on the mountain he feels himself 'struggling against another force, not holy, but the dominant and 
resident powers of that place'. 
1 10 This other unholy force, the elemental powers of nature conflicts with 
his religious intention. The rock seems to resist his attempt to give it form: the Madonna he begins to 
carve appears lifeless, and at night, asleep under the cliff-face he dreams the 'strange, wild face' of a 
woman, the spirit of the mountain. This female figure becomes increasingly seductive in her attempts to 
sabotage the carving of the Madonna: 
, tempting him, reaching out to him. It had power - an evil power. Against it his coldly 
perfect Madonna was helpless and inert. In its eyes shone the fire which bums in the heart 
of the mountain; that mountain whose virgin sanctuary he had thus invaded, violated to 
satisfy the arrogant claims of his art. Now, the spirit of the mountain turned on him. He 
lay in the grip of magical and inhuman passions; unimaginable presences stood by his 
side. He felt strange monsters stir within himself as he gazed in his dream at that dreadful 
and wonderful face. 'I II 
Finally he gives up the effigy of the Madonna (and the 'arrogant claims of his art') and attempts to carve 
the dream face into the rock. This image is tantalisingly lifelike and at night she materialises into a 
living woman, the 'mistress of the rock' whom he pursues: 
'The dark spirit within him said: 'There is joy, there is the satisfaction of all longing; 
there is the lost secret of life! 'I 12 
Yet in succumbing to the joy she promises he is led over the edge of the dark cliff and falls to his death 
at the feet of the vast lifeless Madonna. Underhill indicates the ambivalent nature of the passion which 
seeks to realise a transcendental dream; the urge to create becomes a craving which is self-destructive, 
rather than having any relationship with the divine. This suggests that art connects with the 'dark spirit' 
more powerfully than with the holy, the human rather than the transcendent. 
(ii) Mystic, artist, psychologist 
'The Mystic as Creative Artist' was written in response to Bergson's London lectures) 13 In it she 
discusses the superior faculty shared by artist and mystic by which a 'hard-won innocence of eye must 
replace our common careless way of seeing things,. 
] 14 To represent this change in vision Bergson uses 
the image of a veil: 'Between nature and ourselves - more, between ourselves and our own consciousness 
- hangs a veil: dense and opaque 
for normal men, but thin, almost transparent for the artist and 
110 Underhill, 'The Mountain Image', Horlicks Magazine, 2 (1904), 375-380, p. 378. 
III Ibid. p. 379. 
112 Ibid. p. 380. 
113 1 lenri Bergson, La Perception A Changement: conferences failes b l'Universitj d'Oxford (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1911). 
114 Underhill, 'Bergson and the Mystics' (1912) repr. Dana Greene (ed. ), Evelyn UnderhilL the modern guide 
to the ancient questjor the holy, p-55. 
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poet. 'I 15 The figure of the veil also passed into literature of modernism: we find Woolf's claim that 
after reading great writers 'one sees more intensely afterwards; the world seems bared of its covering and 
given an intenser life'. 116 This figure was also familiar to the doctrines of Kandinsky and Mondrian, 
developed on the continent, where abstract art was 
6associated by many of its early practitioners and advocates with a kind of 'seeing 
through'; with the idea that the artist is one who penetrates the veil of material existence in 
order to reveal an essential and underlying spiritual reality., 117 
Yet if, according to Bergson, the veil is said to hang between 'ourselves and our own consciousness', 
what is revealed to the privileged artist, or mystic is perhaps a self-revelation. 
Underhill compares the mystic's attempts to give artistic form to the ineffable with 'the dominant art 
movement of the present day, trying to communicate it obliquely by a representation of the subjective 
feeling-state induced in the mystic's own consciousness'. 118 No doubt referring to the Post- 
impressionism exhibitions of 1910-1914, Underhill proposes that the 'subjective feeling-state' indicates, 
however 'obliquely', the ineffable, transcendent experience. 119 Again the conflation between aesthetic 
and mystical feeling reminds us of the danger warned by Eliot of associating the two experiences, yet 
here the danger is of a different hue. In language which repeats Fry's own from the Post-Imprcssionism 
catalogue Underhill tells us that, comparable to the 'best creations of other artists', the images seen by 
the mystic 'loom up [ ... ] from 
his deeper mind bringing with them an intense conviction of reality,. 120 
Set this against T. S. Eliot's insistence, again in 'The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism' that 'an 
efflux of poetry' is no guarantee of the sublime: 
'To me it seems that at these moments [ ... ] what happens is something negative: that is to 
say, not 'inspiration' as we commonly think of it, but the breaking down of strong 
habitual barriers - which tend to re-form very quickly[ ... ] [The resulting] incantation, an 
outburst of words which we hardly recognize as our own [ ... ], is a very different thing 
from mystical illumination. '121 
Eliot characterises this 'outburst' as a temporary and regrettable release of habitually repressed, and for 
that reason unfamiliar, emotion looming up from the 'deeper mind'. Written in 1932 it testifies to the 
increasing appropriation by modem psychology of what might previously have been more safely 
115 Cited by Underhill, 'The Mystic as Creative Artist', Quest, 4 (April 1913), p. 63 1. 
116 Virginia Woolf, A Room of One's Own, pp. 104-105. 
117 Charles Harrison, 'Abstraction' in Charles Harrison, Francis Frascina, Gill Perry, Primitivism, Cubism, 
Abstraction: The Early Twentieth Century, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 198. See 
Wassily Kandinsky, Concerning the Spiritual in Art (1912, trans. 1914; New York: Dover, 1977). 
118 Underhill, 'The Mystic as Creative Artist', Quest, 4 (April 1913), p. 637. 
119 Roger Fry's two 'Post- Impression i st' Exhibitions of 1910 and 1912, and Rutter's 'Post-impressionists 
and Futurists' in 1913. 
120 Underhill, 'Mystic as Creative Artist', p. 645. The artist attcmpts to express 'certain spiritual experiences 
[ ... ] to arouse the conviction of a new and 
definite reality' (Roger Fry, t7sion and Design, 1920; repr. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1981, p. 166-167). 
121 T. S. Eliot, 'The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism' in Selected Prose of T. SEliot, p. 89-90. 
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designated as mystical. Underhill was, inevitably, caught up in - her writings inflected by - these 
concems. 
The heroine of Underhill's Column of Dust is advised: 'one should keep an open mind towards the 
unseen. In the light of modem thought, we are learning to understand these subjects more and more. ' 
Constance's reply to this is that 'Modem thought makes no difference [ ... ]The thing is there, and always 
has been. At the most, we have only given it new names, and invented a new explanation. '122 Underhill 
makes a similar comment in her lectures of 1921 when she protests that 'no generation has ever been so 
much at the mercy of labels as our own'. By her account psychological labels usurp the ecclesiastical: 
diagnosis of an uprush of primitive instinct (combining the language of Myers and Freud) replaces what 
was formerly understood as the doctrine of original sin; psychoanalysts substitute for priests and 
autosuggestion revokes prayer. Yet in these lectures Underhill is determined to interpret the spiritual life 
in 'the language of the present day'. 123 which is, irrefutably, the language of 'this modem, growing, 
changing psychology'. 124 As we see, its changing nature problematises her task. 
A decade earlier, when Underhill's Mysticism was first published 'modem psychology' had its context in 
the subliminal psychology of Frederic Myers. Using Myers' model, at this date Underhill understands 
4 subconsciousness' to comprise man's 'most animal instincts, his least explicable powers, his most 
spiritual intuitions' side by side: 
125 However, this co-existence of 'animal' instincts and 'spiritual' 
aspirations in the subliminal regions of consciousness presented a 'new problem for theology'. 126 
Christian doctrine preached the supremacy of the conscious mind as a vehicle with which to express 
God's will, thus it was discomforted by what it saw as a sanctification of the subliminal by 
psychology's location of divinity in these subconscious regions. The naming of the subliminal as the 
'seat or locus of all divine indwelling' provoked a discussion in The Hibbert Journal entitled 'Theology 
and the Subconscious' to which Underhill contributed, intending to tackle 'the dangers and absurdities 
which lurk in the fashionable theories concerning the "subliminal self". 
127 While admitting that 'the 
hiddenness' may also include latent spiritual faculties, she argues that this does not sanctify their abode 
but provides justification for an ascetic life which will call them into consciousness and keep 'man's 
half-savage instincts and vices' deliberately 'below the threshold") 28 Underhill stresses the importance 
of contemplation as the way to entice the 'divine nucleus' out of 'the hiddenness' and into 
consciousness. 
'the mystical saints - were far from confusing their divine or transcendental powers, their 
link with God, with the totality of the subconscious mind. Their powers of self-criticism 
122 Ibid. p. 73 
123 Underhill, The life of the spirit and the life of today, p. 59. 
124 Ibid. p. 60 
125 Ibid. p. 60. 
126 C. F. D'Arcy, 'Theology and the Subconscious' flibbert Journal 9 (Jan 1911) 233-246, p. 233. See William 
Sanday, Christologies Ancient and Modern (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1910) which provoked the debate. 
127 Underhill, 'Theology and the Subconscious', llibbert Journal, 9 (April 1911), 644-6, p. 644. 
128 Ibid. 
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were singularly delicate; and in using them they seem to have displayed a more scientific 
spirit of discrimination than the new psychologists. '129 
Here, we see Underhill going against 'Death of a Saint': in trying to separate subconscious as lower and 
mysticism as higher in a way that the story problematises. 
In the first edition of Mysticism in 1911 Underhill described how subliminal psychology, 
'in its pious and apologetic moods, [ ... ] has told us ad nauseam that 'god speaks to man 
in the subconsciousness, ' and has succeeded in making the subliminal self into the 
Mesopotamia of Liberal Christianity. The result is that popular psychology tends more 
and more to personify and exalt the "subconscious. "' 
130 
In castigating a trend to exalt an unconscious divinity Underhill obviously does not have psychoanalysis 
in mind. If we look to the selective changes Underhill made to these lines in the 1930 edition, we 
witness the passing from Freud to Myers as psychological paradigm. Underhill now differently censures 
the theorists of the 'unconscious': 
'In his destructive moods the psychologist has little apparent difficulty in reducing the 
chief phenomena of religious and mystical experience to activities of the 'unconscious, ' 
seeking an oblique satisfaction of repressed desires. 'l 
31 
The mood attributed to the psychologists has shifted from 'pious and apologetic' to 'destructive' as the 
dynamic processes of psychoanalysis - 'projection, repression, and sublimation' - are now introduced 
into what was before a descriptive terrain 'of paths and levels, uprushes, margins and fields'. 
132 
Furthermore in this new version, Underhill sees the psychologists as shifting so that the unconscious is 
no longer a place but a process: the 'spiritual' and 'animal' which had existed side by side are now 
sactivities', or more accurately, only one activity since the spiritual - diagnosed as 'oblique satisfaction' 
of repressed desire - is but the expression of the savage. If we recall Underhill's description of the mystic 
who, in a similar manner to the 'dominant art movement', communicates his spiritual experience 
'obliquely' via subjective feeling we see strikingly how psychology for her now differently encroaches 
upon the mystical, and modernist aesthetic. In 1930 Underhill finds psychologists negligent of 'that 
deep pool, that heart of personality,. 
133 Where previously the subliminal, transcendent, location of the 
sublime proved problematic, Underhill now rebukes psychology for writing out the 'bottom of the soul'. 
We see Underhill insisting on the non-equation of the subconscious with the transcendent but at the 
same time wanting to retain an idea of a deep pool, a bottom, a depth with its own autonomy which is 
associated with mystical experience. The transcendent may not be a region, but 'we can hardly do 
without some spatial symbols'. 
134 
129 Ibid. p. 645. 
130 Underhill, Mysticism, (1911), p. 63. 
131 Underhill, Mysticism, (1930), p. 52. 
132 Underhill, Mysticism, (1911), p. 63; Underhill, Mysticism, (1930), p. 53. 
133 Underhill, Mysticism, (1930), p. 53. 
134 Underhill, 'Theology and the Subconscious', p. 645. 
7ranscending By Descent 96 
The Dweller in the Innermost 
Ile most extraordinary, and bewildering of her novels The Column of Dust is about a woman who, as a 
result of experimenting with occult spells becomes dominated by a strange and 'persistent Presence'. 
This figure who sits inside her and comments on the strangeness of the mortal world she names the 
'Watcher', or 'the dweller of the innermost'. 135 This psychic possession links back to Vernon Lee's 
Madame Krasinska, and will be developed along different lines in May Sinclair's Flaw in the Crystal. 
However, any 'psychological' reading of this text must be prefaced by the striking disclaimer made by 
Underhill and intended, I suggest, to pre-empt just such an interpretation. Two years after the novel was 
published Underhill protests against the abuses of concrete imagery: 
'[The subconscious] has been too easily personified in the popular imagination. Identified 
with the "Watcher on the Threshold", the "Dweller in the Innermost", and other such 
figures of speech used by mystically minded and "suggestive" writers, it is now regarded 
as a sort of imprisoned angel, gazing out on to eternity and possessed of supernormal 
powers. '136 
We can infer that Underhill, identifying herself with the 'mystical ly-m inded, ' is disturbed to see the 
device which she used in her novel now associated 'in the popular imagination' with a personification of 
the subliminal-137 Underhill forewarns us against mistaking the voice of herown Watcheror Dweller for 
that of the subliminal. 
138 Such an interpretation is evidently unwelcome yet, as we will see, like the 
psychic Dweller who is conjured by magic, it is not exactly uninvited. At the same time, the novel 
speaks of experiences which surpass any psychological understanding. 
The opening chapter prefacing Constance's strange inner occupancy is set beyond the human world, 
beyond time and space. Existing in this 'eternity' is a 'something' whose insatiable curiosity attracts 
him to the 'disagreeable and meaningless maze of noise, chaos, corruption', which we find to be the 
earth. 139. The Thing hears 'the thud and surge of life which echoed through [the earth], and gazing into 
its heart, saw the countless souls that clustered upon its surface, each locked inexorably within the 
transparent walls of the flesh'. 
140 Underhill is presenting a view through the veil in the other direction 
so to speak, where the tidal rhythms of human life are meaningless, their subtle movements of 
expansion and contraction' recalling Vernon Lee's analogy between human life and the primitive 
135 Underhill, The Column of Dust, p. 246. 
136 Evelyn Underhill, 'Theology and the Subconscious', p. 644; Underhill rcfcrs to the 'silent watcher - 
Dweller in the Innermost' in Mysticism, (1930), p. 55. 
137 'The subliminal may put us in communication not only with beings that are like or infcrior to ourselves, 
but with superior existences' (Emile Boutroux, The Beyond that is Within, trans. Jonathon Nield, London: 
Duckworth, 1912, p26). 
138 For earlier asociations with the 'Dweller in the Innermost': the prc-Raphaelitc George Frederic Watts' 
painting 'The Soul's Prism' was renamed 'The Dweller in the Innermost' for his retrospective exhibition in 
1896 and was described enigmatically as 'Conscience, winged, dusk-faced and pensive' ('The Age of Rosctti, 
Burne-Jones and Watts: Symbolism in Britain 1860-1910', exhibition at the Tate Gallery. 1997). On the 
'Dweller in the Innermost' as an occult term - equivalent to Jung's shadow but rcfcrring to a greater 
evolutionary experience - see Dion Fortune, Applied Magic (London: Aquarian Press, 1962), p. 82. 
139 Underhill, The Column of Dust, p. 4. 
140 Ibid. p. 4. 
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movements of the amoeba. A rare articulation of Underhill's own aesthetic underscores what can seem an 
overly schematic use of the fictional form to communicate ideas: 'The true business of the novelist is to 
show eternal things in and through temporal things. This, and only this, gives permanent value to his 
work. '] 41 Yet as The Column ofDust makes clear from the 'standpoint of eternity' the temporal appears 
an 'absurd paradox': this perspective diminishing the significance of the psychological. The reader is 
asked to engage in a human world the meaninglessness of which is pregivcn. Yet this is not an 
existential predicament against which to construct meaning: when asked whether Column ofDust was an 
allegory Underhill responded emphatically: 'No! It's not an allegory, never thought of such a thing. It's 
my idea of a realistic novel! '142 Underhill's idea of a realistic novel begs an unusual kind of realism: 
Underhill describes of Constance 'All that she called reality had been shattered and only consciousness 
remained as a certain fact. ' Underhill's aesthetic intends a seemingly paradoxical undertaking which pits 
against realism - and then not wholly against it -a transcendent project which is in turn quasi- 
psychological. This gives a very different underpinning to the 'subjectivism' Levenson makes 
characteristic of modernism. 143 
The second chapter of The Column ofDust shifts us from the abstract and eternal to the contingencies of 
the human in a scene set at night in the backroorn of a bookstore where 'A woman stood within the 
patch of light, and also within a small circle which she had traced with charcoal upon the imperfectly 
scrubbed floor'. 144 Compared to the 'spaceless' world we have just left, the concentric circles define her 
as enclosed within the limits of a human perception, within a mortal world. She is conducting a magical 
ceremony accompanied by mirrored candle light, occult symbols drawn on cardboard and her magician's 
wand, a forked hazel twig. The magical experiment is described with a combination of irony and 
solemnity appropriate for her ambivalence, yet when Constance recites the 'Words of Power' the potency 
of the ritual becomes apparent; 'Their curious rhythms rose, as it were, to waves - inexorable waves of 
sound - which battered the cliff of uncreated things'. 145 Constance's invocation is designed to conjure a 
spirit; what appears in the half-lit room is a 'little column of dust [ ... ]a grey, faint, cobwebby thing' 
which cries out in an inarticulate cry, that came in a rising cadence of anguish and dread'. 146 The 
'inarticulate cry' marks the inauspicious birth into the human world of the 'something - or spirit' whose 
desire for knowledge combined with Constance's invocation has precipitated his unplanned arrival. 
141 Underhill, 'The Cant of Unconventionality -A Rejoinder to Lady Robert Cecil by Evelyn Underhill' 
National Review, 299 (Jan 1908), 751-60. 
142 Unpublished letter to Margaret Robinson in Armstrong, Evelyn Underhill, p. 85. 
143 The New York Times nominated Underhill's first novel as one of 'Two Books of the Past Season which 
seem to point the way to the Twentieth-century Novel' (11.1. Brock, The New York Times, Mar 11,1905, section 
2, p. 150, Kings College Archives); the second title was May Sinclair's The Divine Fire (London, Constable, 
1904). 
144 Underhill, Column of Dust, p. 8 
145 Ibid. p. 13 
146 Ibid. p. 18 
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Although 'the something' has been usefully categorised as a mouthpiece for a Plotinian worldview, this 
identification is not explicit within the text. 147 Constance herself is confounded by her 'vision of the 
writhing, twisting, misty, yet living, thing which rose, one knew not how, and vanished, one knew not 
where'. 148 She is reluctant to recognise it as the effect of her conjuring, which would verify a terrifying 
occult reality. At the same time the psychic implications also threaten: we are reminded how the student 
of magic 'compels himself to exaltation'. 
149 yet Constance is assuaged by her knowledge of the new 
psychology: 
'[sIcience came to the assistance of its child, and helped her to put a proper interpretation 
on an adventure which refused to square itself with any known theory of the unseen, but 
ranged itself easily amongst the accredited varieties of optical and auditory 
hallucination. '150 
By presenting psychology as reductive, Underhill charts the advent of a clinical vocabulary which 
psychologises the supernatural and harbours the unknown within extended boundaries of the natural 
world: the 'proper interpretation' returns the inexplicable to the individual psyche. This representation of 
psychology, which we will see bears similarities to the occult perspective of Dion Fortune, indicates an 
ambivalent response to the insurgence of a new discourse and puts in dialogue two competing concepts 
of the psychological: both as scientific reduction and as something which passes beyond the limits of the 
known. Her representation of the psychology of the subliminal self is of an applied science with a new 
language rather than new ideas: 
&much that is obviously absurd when ascribed to the agency of unseen forces, becomes 
acceptable to the educated mind if interpreted in terms of psychology. [ ... ] this science had 
taught Constance that the release of her subliminal powers was all that was necessary if she 
wished to perceive the unknown but strictly natural world beyond the threshold as an 
interesting extension of the known. If you see in your incantation a method of shifting the 
field of consciousness, and call your magic wand an autoscope, these things no longer 
seem silly, but take their place as part of the cosmic plan. A careful study of the works of 
Professor James had further convinced her that some forms of credulity are still compatible 
with self-respect. '151 
This irony regarding the modish introduction of psychology into the study of the unknown is sustained 
at later opportunities in the novel. The psychological component of transcendence in Underhill's writing 
is precisely not this interpretative psychology. 
147 Armstrong, Evelyn Underhill, p. 74. 
148 Underhill, Column of Dust, p. 22 
149 Ibid. p13. 
150 Ibid. p. 22 
151 Ibid. p. 21 
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We are told that Constance's 'solitary and uncongenial life' had inspired a longing, 'to open a new door, 
to satisfy latent but passionate curiosities, add new territory to her domain'. 152 Constance returns to her 
dingy flat, dreading 'a t6te-A-tete with her own imagination in the "four walls" of her room'. 153 The 
metaphors of doors and homes encourage an interpretation of Constance's return home as a return to her 
inner world as much as to an external domestic reality. 154 The desire to add new territory to her domain 
conflates the psychic with the economic since her living quarters are small, and high up 'for cheapness' 
sake'. Entering the flat she confronts its drabness, and the untidy mess left by her young daughter Vera. 
Constance 'went to the window; looking out from her empty, bright, and hideous room, which 
distressed her, into the dim and attractive night'. 155 In Underhill's Upton lectures of 1921, she figures 
the psyche as a room with a window out of which we look onto the world: 
4most of us behave like the owners of a well-fumished room, who ignore every aspect of it 
except the window looking out upon the street. This we keep polished, and drape with the 
best curtains that we can afford. But the room upon which we sedulously turn our backs 
contains all that we have inherited, accumulated. '156 
The position by the window would seem to represent the conscious self, while the room behind is 
unconscious. Constance's flat is uninviting, and harbours in its darkest room the secret of her 
illegitimate daughter Vera. Despite Underhill's disavowal, the text is far from unamenable to such a 
psychological interpretation. Underhill's lecture more precisely locates the unconscious in the 'darkest 
comers' of the metaphorical room of the self. The column of dust has followed Constance home to 
reappear, hovering by the fireplace, in the comer of the room. Constance is initially 'determined to ward 
off this horrible companionship, which pressed towards her with a certain wistfulness, like some 
desperate and desolate creature exiled in a foreign town [ ... 1. Then the little grey thing wavered and 
leaned towards her. '157 The diminutive form seems to be preying on the maternal embrace, with a 
yearning for contact. Constance shrieks, waking up her young daughter Vera - Constance's flesh and 
blood progeny who we will discover is as repellent to her senses as this newcomer. After a temporary 
interlude Constance returns again to the room - the four walls of which we recall would leave her alone 
with her imagination - to find the comer empty. 
'Then she perceived that there was a figure sitting by the fireplace. It was, perhaps, less a 
figure than a form: an impressionist sketch of humanity, without detail and without sex. ' 
152 Ibid. p. 24. Underhill argued in 'A Defence of Magic' that magic is a 'living and serious philosophy' 
(Fortnightly Review, Nov 1907, p. 754. 
153 Underhill, Column of Dust, p. 24. 
154 Underhill's second novel is structured upon the principles of Freemasonry which make literal the 
frequently used analogy: 'our art of building Temples in the heart arose by direct and historical derivation 
from the art of their material building' (Arthur Waite, A New Enclopedia of Freemasonry, London: William 
Rider, 1921 p. 78). 
155 Underhill, Column of Dust, p. 24. 
156 Underhill, The Life of the Spirit and the Life of Today, p. 89. Underhill continues 'only by the window is a 
little patch of light. Beyond this there is a fringe of vague, fluctuating, sometimes prismatic radiance: an 
intermediate region, where the images and things which most interest us have their place, just within range, on 
the fringe of the field of consciousness. In the darkest corners the machinery that we do not understand, those 
possessions of which we are least proud, and those pictures we hate to look at, are hidden away' (ibid. ). 
157 Underhill, Column of Dust, p. 27. 
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Horrified, she hides against the closed door, but hears 'within her mind' the sad and wailing voice. The 
distinctions between within and without become unhelpful as Underhill inscribes an experience which 
challenge the sureness of boundaries between the known and the unknown. Whether a ghostly 
manifestation of spirit, or an attempt to animate a philosophical stance or a psychic state, it is 
uncontainable by familiar demarcations. 158 Raising her head, Constance 'saw two brilliant, wild, and 
hungry eyes, which gazed into hers from the recesses of some alien life that had caught them in its 
folds'. This disconcerting image of disembodied eyes nestled in 'folds' of an 'other' life prefaces the 
final confrontation. Compare the experience recorded by Henry Senior, the father to Alice, William and 
Henry James, of 'perfectly insane and fetid terror[ ... ] some damned shape squatting invisible to me 
within the precincts of the room and raying out from his fetid personality influences fatal to life'. 
159 
Finally addressing 'the thing', Constance accepts its existence, asking 'what are YouT and then, 
immediately, implicating herself in its existence: 'What have I doneT It replies: 'I think that you have 
got to see me as a shape, as something which has a limiting edge, because otherwise you will not let me 
enter your experience. 'I 
60 Assimilation of something into our experience is predicated upon its having a 
, limiting edge', recalling the 'clear and sharp lines of demarcation' required by Freud between self and 
world. More specifically to this chapter, and Underhill, is the related question of what gets assimilated 
into an institutionalised religion, or psychology, and the 'oceanic' which gets left out. The 'thing' takes 
occupancy within Constance without her consent, and she slowly becomes conscious of an inner 
violation: 
'It was gradually bome in on her that her senses were no longer quite her own; there was a 
Thing which used them, and she participated in that use, but could not control it. She 
leaned, as it were, over the shoulder of a new inhabitant, and peeped out of the window 
with him. '161 
This alien nesting within Constance's 'experience', however much intended to facilitate the exposition of 
a specific doctrine of reality, also represents inner experience as a conflicting dialogue between more than 
one voice, reflecting contemporary psychological interest in cases of multiple personalities made famous 
by the psychologists Prince, and Flournoy; it also points to the figure of the double prevalent in late 
nineteenth century fiction, particularly evocative of Stevenson's Jekyll and Hyde. Although Underhill 
resists this interpretation, the device she uses falls straight into the hands of the 'reductive' psychologists 
she spurns. We are told of Constance that 'seeking a greater freedom, she had been caught in a peculiarly 
exasperating slavery'. 
] 62 1 suggest that this could also be read as a comment upon Underhill's relation 
to psychology. Here, as we will again see in May Sinclair, the limits of the writer's own theoretical 
158 Ibid. p. 26. 
159 tlenry senior's Literary remains' in F0 Matthiesen, The James Family, (New York: Alfred. A. Knopf, 
1947), p. 161. 
160 Underhill, Column of Dust, p. 30. 
161 Ibid. p. 38. 
162 Ibid. p. 60. 
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demarcations, as much as her own fictional embodiment of other psychic or mystical states, takes on a 
monstrous, terrifying shape. 
As we have seen, William James proposes a 'more' - 'the subconscious continuation of our conscious 
life' - with which we feel ourselves connected in religious experience. He goes on to say: JI]t is one of 
the peculiarities of invasions from the subconscious region to take on objective appearances, and to 
suggest to the Subject an external control. '163 This is strikingly resonant of Underhill's representation 
of the Watcher whom Constance cannot 'control' and whose agency is experienced as other than her own. 
Tausk's 1919 paper 'The Origin of the "Influencing Machine" in Schizophrenia' formulates the 'loss of 
ego boundaries' as defining the psychotic state in which one's own psychic process are misattributed to 
the world. Tausk asks 'What causes the formation of the ego and, as a reaction to the outer world, the 
ego boundaries, and what arouses the realization of individuality, of self, as a distinct psychical 
unit? '164 Consistent with the classical psychoanalytic viewpoint Tausk's analysis is exclusively 
intrapsychic, tracing the machine and its influences to internal conflicts within the patient's own mind. 
Tausk is analysing psychotic breakdown but his question can be seen as partly pre-empted by writings 
such as this by Underhill. The 'slavery' is depicted in detail: 
'There were no more visual hallucinations, no apparent interferences with the laws of 
external life; only the constant presence of an alien point of view, and of a Self, a Thing, 
an actual if intangible personality, that put the machinery of her brain to its own 
purposes.. This personality infected her, .. Thus, very often she 
hardly knew whether the 
thoughts she had and the words he said were symbols of the Watcher's ideas or of her own 
[ ... ] Always acutely aware of 
the besieger at her gates, unfriendly, egotistical, rather 
contemptuous. Life, for him, was an odd an interesting exhibition, and she the show- 
woman. 'I 65 
If the Watcher is an imprisoned angel - according to popular personifications of the subliminal - then 
Underhill is representing the subliminal as an egotistical angel without a heart. William James was alert 
to the way in which the subliminal self insinuated itself into narrative form and was less benevolent 
towards its manifestations: 'But what a ghastly and grotesque sort of appendage to one's personality is 
this from any point of view: the humbugging and masquerading extra marginal self,. 
166 
163 William James, The tarieties of Religious Experience, p. 513. Writing on the supernormal faculties 
displayed by mediums William James commented: 'My own dramatic sense tends instinctively to picture the 
situation as an interaction between slumbering 
faculties in the automatist's mind and a cosmic environment of 
other consciousness of some sort which 
is able to work upon them. If there were in the universe a lot of diffuse 
soul-stuff unable of itself to get 
into consistent personal form, or to take permanent possession of an 
organism, yet always craving to do so, 
it might get its head in the air, parasitically so to speak, by profiting by 
weak spots in the armour of human minds, and slipping 
in and stirring up there the sleeping tendency to 
personate' (William James, 'The Confidences of a "Psychical Researcher"', The American Magazine, Oct. 1909; 
repr. William James on Psychical Research, ed. 
Gardner Murphy, p. 323). This is strikingly close to the parasitic 
occupation of Constance. 
164 Victor Tausk, 'The Origin of "The Influencing Machine" in Schizophrenia', in A Psycho-Analytic Reader, 
ed. Robert Fliess, (London: flogarth, 1950), pp. 31-64, p. 47. 
165 Underhill, Column of Dust p. 61-3. 
166 William James, 'Review of 'A further record of observations of certain phenomena of trance' by 
R. Ilodgson', Psychological Review, v (1898), p. 423. 
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But eventually another possibility emerges as the terms of his occupancy are redefined, without the 
aggression: 
'Because she had made a little place for the Watcher, had accepted his presence, even took 
a certain pride in her guardianship, Constance now found herself subjected to a steady 
invasion, as one after another the chambers of her mind opened their doors to him. His 
vision was merged with hers in all save immediately human matters. Thus she was finally 
made aware of a new aspect of the universe. '] 67 
The steady invasion is no longer the siege of an enemy but of a lover: the 'slavery' has been transformed 
into an offer of freedom. What was figured as a rape of the mind, becomes a seduction. It is remembered 
that Constance was lonely, now she has companionship, however parasitic. With her new borrowed 
perspective, Constance sees things differently and is less enthralled by the material world. 
168 Indeed, the 
Watcher teaches her, despite his egotism, the vision of the mystic: Constance acquires 'the innocence of 
eye which we snatch so easily from our children, to give back so tardily and incompletely to our artists, 
poets, and saints'. 
168 
Increasingly, a conflict emerges between the quest for spiritual beauty and transcendence pointed out by 
the Watcher, or an acceptance of the responsibilities, and limitations of Constance's ordinary life. The 
, obstinate dweller of the innermost' insists that Constance's parenting of Vera tie her to a life of squalor, 
ugliness, and poverty; only without Vera can she be free to follow 'beauty, happiness and life'. 
169 We 
are told from the first that Vera is 'not an attractive child' but, we must not forget, Vera is illegitimate 
and this marks her apart in the logic of the novel: she is literally the embodiment of her mother's 
sexuality, immoral since outside marriage. 
170 She does not represent the pure child but the carrial 
instincts and these are what have to be renounced. Unable to tolerate Vera's presence the Watcher forces a 
choice between Constance's life and her child's. 
'There could be, it was clear, no amicable termination to this contest: no final living side 
by side, all three of them - she, Vera, and the subjugated lodger within. 'I 
71 
If the lodger stays his hatred of Vera's 'intrusive personality' would 'push her remorselessly from 
iife'. 172 Rather than refuting the lodger's 'contest', she acts within its terms to suggest that he is less 
than subjugated'. We are told that Constance chooses through love (the human quality which the lodger 
cannot comprehend) to sacrifice her own life for that of her daughter. Only through her death will she 
expel the inner inhabitant: thus she dies to save her child in what reads as a schematic gothic conclusion. 
Constance's self-sacrifice is an enactment of the mothering role taken to an extreme, her mother's 
strength winning 'a more splendid victory" in abandoning her daughter, paradoxically to save her. She 
sacrifices her life but if, according to the eternal perspective human life is an absurd paradox, we can infer 
167 Underhill, Column of Dust p. 75. 
168 Ibid. p. 35. 
169 Ibid. p. 290. 
170 Ibid, p28. 
171 Ibid. p. 289. 
172 Ibid. p. 290. 
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that the 'splendid victory' is also for herself. Earlier in the novel, the Watcher has suggested that to 
'disentangle yourself from the dream' would hasten spiritual peace. 173. Recalling James' reference to a 
gothic world of mind heralded by the new psychology, the conclusion becomes unsettling. Although 
represented as a victory, do we witness a psychic murder, suicide, or madness - an extremism which 
cannot integrate body and soul?: 
'Constance pleads, "Do not kill me! Do not force on me this action! I do not want to go! " 
He answered "I will not wait, for I see the future. I see that since you will not yield, it is 
best that you should die. If you live, there cannot be a happy outcome: only eternal effort 
and wasted sacrifice. "' 174 
If we read the Watcher, against Underhill's inclination, as, in part, a personification of Constance's 
subliminal self, the conflict becomes Constance's own: the strength of spiritual desire which must be 
forsaken is set against her own ambivalence towards her child; anti-maternal feelings which are indeed 
murderous feelings. Countering Underhill's idealisation of baby and mystic, the novel suggests 
irreconcilable claims between mothering, spirituality, and aesthetic beauty. Despite the oceanic's 
associations, the mother and the mystic appear absolutely irreconcilable. Was Underhill suggesting that 
mothering was incompatible with a spiritual life - she did not have any children herself (nor indeed did 
any of the women in this thesis). After The Column of Dust, which was the last of her three novels, 
Underhill entirely gave up writing fiction. It is more often assumed that 'as her ideas matured and certain 
hypotheses became certitudes, when conviction gave authority to her writing, she dispensed with the 
form of the novel'. 175 Alternatively we can argue that the fiction showed up the difficulties of 
sustaining 'certitudes' and 'conviction', revealing an incompatibility between artist, or writer, and 
mystic. 
The blood-dimmed tide 
At the end of 'Tradition and The Individual Talent' T. S. Eliot concludes 'This essay proposes to halt at 
the frontier of metaphysics or mysticism, and confine itself to such practical conclusions as can be 
applied by the responsible person interested in poetry'. 
176 Likewise in conclusion to his final essay in 
Vision and Design Roger Fry stresses the centrality of 'certain spiritual experiences' to the development 
of the 'new' visual aesthetic, but is unable to get beyond a 'vague adumbration', reproducing the 'blurred 
outlines' of which Dean Inge accuses Bergson: 
'One can only say that those who experience [the value of aesthetic emotion] feel it to have 
a peculiar quality of 'reality' which makes it a matter of infinite importance in their lives. 
Any attempt I might make to explain this would probably land me in the depths of 
mysticism. On the edge of that gulf I stop. 
d 77 
173 Ibid. p65. 
174 Ibid. p. 291. 
175 Sister Mary Xavier Kirby, 'The Writings of Evelyn Underhill: A Critical Analysis' (unpublished Phd 
dissertation, University of Pennsylvannia, 1965), p. 112. 
176 T. S. Eliot, Selected Prose, p. 30. 
177 Fry, 'Retrospect', Vision and Design (1920; repr. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 21 1. 
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Fry stalls at the brink placing the 'matter of infinite importance' beyond debate and allowing mysticism 
to retain its mystique. Adding Bergson's 'I stop at the threshold of the mystery' we notice that 
representation of modem mysticism characteristically brings its writers to a standstill. 178 Always 
inexpressible, in its increasing appropriation by modern psychology mysticism is further 
unapproachable. In Column of Dust Constance 'peeped for a moment through a forbidden door in the 
ramparts, and obtained from this glimpse a permanent memory of great precipices all about her dwelling- 
place, of the black gulf and soundless moat below. Conversely, it could be argued, Underhill attempts 
to lead her reader further into this 'black gulf'. In doing so she is caught between situating the mystical 
experience as beyond analysis (which understands the object 'in terms of what is not it') or suggesting 
that our experience (Bergson's intuition) constitutes the gulf. To rescue mysticism from this gulf is 
perhaps to find that it is 'merely psychological' and to fail to discover both its noetic and transcendent 
content. More recently Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness categorises a 'pure consciousness event' or 
TCE' which can never be fully explainect. 
179 However we interpret mystical experience, it is certain that 
while mysticism is represented as ineffable the impossibility of speaking for itself ensures that it never 
ceases being spoken about. 
In The Mystic Fable, Michel de Certeau describes authors of mystical texts as 
4statues erected to mark the boundaries of an 'elsewhere' that is not remote, a place they 
both produce and guard. They form with their bodies and their texts, a frontier that divides 
space and transforms their reader into an inhabitant of the country, or the suburbs far from 
nowhere where they house the essential. 'I 
80 
De Certeau concisely figures the way that the representation of mystical experience as incommunicable 
and unspeakable to those not privileged to share the experience, at once constitutes mysticism as 
$elsewhere' than the everyday. Any articulation of the mystical experience, however ineffable, at once 
maps it, yet maps it as inaccessible and in so doing produces a 'frontier that divides space' and positions 
the reader 'far from nowhere' since the unmappable mystic experience is at once the 'essential' 
location. 181 Evelyn Underhill was not herself a mystic: as a 'reader' of mystical texts she is identified 
with 'the suburbs far from nowhere' against which she speaks, disparaging the ordinary. 182 In 
178 Bergson, 'Le reve', Bulletin de lInstitut general psychologique, 1: 3 (190 1), pp. 97-102; rcpr. in The World 
of Dreams, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958). p. 57. 
179 Robert K. C. Forman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness (Suny Press, 1999); Michael A. Sell, Mystical 
Languages of Unsaying (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Diane Jonte-Pace argues that 'absence, 
formulated as non-being in the discourse of religion, and formulated as difference or female lack in the 
discourse of gender, [ ... 
I underlies the homology of women and religion' (Jonte-Pace, 'Situating Kristcva 
Differently: Psychoanalytic readings of Women and Religion in Body/Text' in Julia Krisleva: Religion, 
Women and Psychoanalysis, ed. David Crownfield, New York: State University of New York Press, 1992, pp. I- 
22, p. 2). 
180 Michel de Certeau, The Mystic Fable: the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, trans. Michael Smith 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 3. 
181 The ineffability of mysticism keeps it as other than commonplace: a kind of religious monopoly which we 
saw Marion Milner trying to undo. 
182 Some disagree: Anne Bancroft regrets Underhill's inclusion in Twentieth-Century Mystics and Sages - 
curiously, Dion Fortune (see chapter 4) is included (Bancroft, ed., Twentieth-Century Mystics and Sages, 
1976, repr. London: Arkana, 1989) p. ix; see also Delroy Oberg, 'The Making of a Mystic: "Was Evelyn One? "', 
in Evelyn Underhill 1875-1941: Two Addresses given at the commemoration of the 501h anniversary of her 
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Underhill's poem, 'Thought's a Strange Land' the speaker is romanticised as a gypsy who pities 'honest 
farmers' in their 'square, fenced fields' and mocks the suburban garden which appeals to 'others'. In 
contrast 'I'm the one' who seeks a more profound experience: 
'Far off, a long day's journey, there's a marsh that stretches to the sea. ' 
A salted wind, sharp taste of the hidden wave: 
There on the fringes of thought when the night is falling 
I'll wait the invading tide. 'l 83 
As Charles Williams avows Underhill was 'never an eccentric' - her wide social circle included Eliot, 
Tagore, Williams, May Sinclair; her waiting stance on the fringes of the ocean sets herself apart in her 
spiritual aspirations. 184 But by the time which the poem was published, in 1916, it might be said that a 
more violent tide was already invading. 
The general trend towards immanentism in religious belief in England was arrested by the fact of the 
First World War, the trauma of the war years being irreconcilable with an optimistic belief in man's 
inner spiritual nature, so that once again spiritual revelation was looked for from without and a 
transcendent theology reinstated. In her preface to the 1930 edition of Mysticism Underhill describes the 
changes of emphasis she would make if she were to rewrite it, primarily in making its focus the 'Creator' 
as against the 'Created' and to foreground 'grace' or givcnness as the predominant factor in man's 
spiritual development. 
185 In other words she would refigure the mystic process as contingent upon a 
transcendent God, rather than as a psychological or evolutionary process of development. Underhill adds 
that she would incorporate mysticism within 'history, dogma and institutions' so as to collapse the false 
distinctions set up between religions of authority and experience, Church and mystic. 186 In sum she 
would diminish the significance of the immanent spirit in place of a transcendent God. Writing this in 
1930, the same year as Freud's Civilisation and its Discontents, we see a similar emphasis as that of 
Freud's upon religion as institutionalised which marginalises the 'boundless' oceanic feeling. By 1932 
when Eliot's essay was written warning of the dangers of an introspective psychologised mysticism 
Underhill had herself revoked the individualism of her former position and was a well-respected member 
of the Anglican community, leading retreats which Eliot himself attended. 
Virginia Woolf's lyric middle section of To The Lighthouse (1927) connects a decade which includes the 
war years and post-war years, a historical span, or passing of time which can be told by the narrative's 
several turns to the shifting relevance of the mystic: 
death at the society of the Sacred Advent, Brisbane, June 1991, 
Chelmsford Diocesan House of Retreat, Pleshey. 
183 Underhill, Theophanies, p. 97. 
184 Williams, 'Introduction', The Letters of Evelyn Underhill, p. 41, 
Valerie Pitt, 'The Cloud of Unknowing', Prism, 3 (1959), 7-12. 
185 Underhill, 'Preface to the Twelfth Edition' (1930), Mysticism, pviii. 
186 Ibid. p. ix. 
p. 27, Plcshcy Rctreat House Library, 
A critique of Underhill's clitism, see 
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'Meanwhile the mystic, the visionary, walked the beach, stirred a puddle, looked at a 
stone, and asked themselves "What am IT' "What is this? " and suddenly an answer was 
vouchsafed them (what it was they could not say): so that they were wann in the frost and 
had comfort in the desert. '187 
Appropriately figured as walking by the sea, reminding us of Underhill's mystic at the fringes of thought 
and the oceanic consciousness, the mystic and visionary (or from an earlier version of Time Passes, 'The 
inspired, the lofty minded') receive an answer to which they alone are privy and which provides 
reassurance from existential uncertaint-es. 188 Yet as to the answer 'what it was they could not say' 
perhaps even to themselves. Present in these lines is an incipient critique of the exalted mystical 
experience, or what Underhill, in mysticism's defence called the 'solitary ineffable encounter'. 189 The 
mystic stirring a puddle and receiving unspeakable answers to the questions which they ask of 
'themselves' are set apart, on the beach, as both enlightened and deceived, seers and dupes. Notice also 
how 'Meanwhile' indicates a parallel plot, at the fringes of the ocean, marking their non-engagement 
with the world. Implied is a critique of the culture of the mystic, or visionaries who position 
themselves, in de Certeau's words 'elsewhere' down on the beach, waiting for the tide and being 
vouchsafed ineffable visions. 
The mystic reappears following a report of news from the front. It is now war-time and we look again to 
the beach to see the harmonious vision disturbed. 'Meanwhile' is replaced with 'At that season' to 
suggest a coincidence of realities: 
, there was a purplish stain upon the bland surface of the sea as if something had boiled and 
bled, invisibly beneath. This intrusion into a scene calculated to stir the most sublime 
reflections and lead to the most comfortable conclusions stayed their pacing. It was 
difficult blandly to overlook them, to abolish their significance in the landscape; to 
continue, as one walked by the sea, to marvel how beauty outside mirrored beauty 
within[ ... ] to pace the beach was impossible; contemplation was unendurable; the mirror 
was broken. 'I 90 
Unambiguously Woolf insists upon the wartime impossibility of mysticism. The horror of war's 
ominous stain upon the mystical vision is unavoidable: a monstrous bleeding in the sea ('as if 
something had boiled and bled') which recalls Yeats' blood-dimmed tide in the apocalyptic 'Second 
Coming'. In this disturbing image the bleeding stains the surface of the water, shattering the vision of 
the mystic, for whom, Woolf is suggesting, the sea, or we could say oceanic, has functioned as a giant 
looking-glass for his own narcissism. 
187 Woolf, To The Lighthouse, (1927; Lor)don: Granada, 1981). See Tracy Hargreaves, 'The Grotesque and the 
Great War', in Suzanne Raitt and Trudi Tate (eds. ), Women's Fiction and the Great War, p. 132-50. 
188 Woolf, 'Time Passes', (first draft written 1926, published 'Le Temps Passd', trans. Charles Mauron, 
Commerce, Jan 1927) first published in English in Twentieth Century Literature, 29 (Fall 1983). pp. 284-5. 
189 Underhill, 'Mystic as Creative Artist', p. 629. 
190 Woolf, To the Lighthouse, p. 124-5. 
THREE 
'The beauty of restraint': 
May Sinclair's 'Flaw in the Crystal' and the aesthetic of sublimation 
, [impossible] to resist the extraordinary stimulus to range hither and thither in search of 
some absolute good, some crystal of intensity, remote from the known pleasures and 
familiar virtues, something alien to the processes of domestic life, single, hard, bright, 
like a diamond in the sand, which would render the possessor secure. ' 
Virginia Woolfl 
"'Does crystal then break - when it is crystal? I thought its beauty was its hardness. " 
[ ... ] "Its 
beauty is its being crystal. But its hardness is certainly its safety. It doesn't 
break, " he went on, "like vile glass. It splits - if there is a split. " 
[ ... ] "Thank goodness 
then that if there be a crack we know it! But if we may perish by 
cracks in things that we don't know --- !" And she smiled with the sadness of it. "We can 
never then give each other anything. "' 
Henry JameS2 
'The water-filled pitcher is placed upon water, it has water within and without. 
it should not be given a name, lest it callforth the error of dualism. ' 
Kabid 
The imagist 'Poet in the bath tub' 
In her search for mystical experience Evelyn Underhill (in the previous chapter) describes the confines of 
individual selfbood as 'A cage without a door/That shuts me from a better dream'. Dora Marsden, 
writing a year previously in 1915, is emphatic that the ego is itself infinite and inescapable: if it is a 
cage it is one which imprisons the entire universe: 
'The Ego includes both Body and the World... Space is not therefore to be regarded as the 
containing vessel in which lies the World. The 'containing vessel' if such a phrase is to be 
I Virginia Woolf, To the Lighthouse, (1927; London: Granada, 1981), p. 123. 
2 flenry James, The Golden Bowl, (1904; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) pp. 87-90. 
3 Kabir, Poem 'XLVI', One Hundred Poems Of Kabir, trans. Rabindranath Tagore, assisted by Evelyn Underhill 
(1914; Madras: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 52-3. 
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used at all is the 'I' itself which contains Space, Time, Matter, Motion, - all that is within 
the World and all that is said to be 'outside' it., 4 
If the ego is both the starting and finishing point of awareness, the subject can only ever be accurately 
described as T, contextualising all of our experience. It is apt that such a totalising vision of the I as 
4containing vessel' should preface an issue of The Egoist: an Individualist Review. Re-named at the 
suggestion of Ezra Pound in 1914 the journal had been founded by Dora Marsden in 1911 as The 
Freewoman; the new title replaces the journal's increasingly nominal feminism more properly to describe 
its support of the philosophical doctrine of radical individualism, or egoism, then in vogue owing to its 
glorification by Max Stime r in the recently republished The Ego and his Own. 5 The change of title 
brought a change in the editorial - Richard Aldington, Ezra Pound and later TS Eliot - yet the lead 
article continued to be penned by Marsden, whose intricate existential explorations seek to establish, 
according to the tenets of egoism, that we have proof only of our own existence, and nothing beyond. To 
ask "Is there... an independently existing world? " is a tautology according to Dora Marsden since, 
"'Is there" psychologically means "Am I", "Do I... feel". How can it be asked "Do I feel a 
World (of feelings) apart from feeling? " It is absurd., 6 
Challenging the very grammar which plots a stable world about us, Marsden pursues the psychological 
hermeneutic to an end whereby we have guarantee of nothing except ourselves: Marsden proclaims 'The 
World 'is' that which is sensed: by being sensed it is created., 7 
Remaining loyal to the original policy of The Freewoman to ignore 'existing tabus in the realm of 
morality and religion', the bold logic of Marsden's egoism launches itself against the ethics of a 
Christian tradition where to be preoccupied with self is to be wrongfully self-indulgent: self-regard is 
identified as a source of suffering which alienates self from others. 1ndeed the Gospels preach self. 
renunciation as the condition of spiritual salvation: 'Whoever will come after me, let him deny himself, 
and take up his cross, and follow me., 
8 In Technologies ofthe Self, Foucault traces the influence of such 
a legacy upon the tendency of Western secular attitudes to judge concern with oneself as incompatible 
with being a moral subject. According to Foucault, 'our morality, a morality of ascetism, insists that the 
self is that which one can reject. '9 Against this position, which Foucault names the prerogative of the 
Christian tradition, Dora Marsden is proposing that the self is rejected only at the cost of the whole 
world. In a cultural context in which disavowal of self is the ethical ideal, Marsden's egoist is antisocial 
4 Dora Marsden, 'Truth and Reality', Egoist, 2 (May 1915), p. 69. 
5 Stimer, The Ego and his Own (1844, trans. 1907); on the Stimer revival see Michael Levenson, A Genealogy 
of modernism, pp. 63-68. 
6 Dora Marsden, 'Truth and Reality', Egoist, 2 (May 1915), p. 69. 
7 There are obvious links here to similar questions asked by Vernon Lee; and, again, Woolf's question in The 
Years 'What would the world be, he said to himself, without I in it? '(1937; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992), p. 230. 
8 English Version (London: Samuel Bagster & Son, 1912), Mark 8,34. 'For whoever will save his life shall 
lose it; but whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the gospel's, the same shall save it. For what shall it 
profit man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul? ' (ibid. Mark 8,35-7). 
9 Michel Foucault, Technologies of the Self- A Seminar with Michel Foucault, ed. Luther 11. Martin, Iluck 
Gutman and Patrick Hutton (London: Tavistock Publications, 1988), p. 22. 
'The Beauty Of Restraint' 109 
and immoral in his monopoly of the world: a 'World' which, she insists, rests upon 'the Power of the 
, 1,. 10 
In this chapter I will be suggesting that the antinomies of egoism and ascetism (and the corresponding 
virtue of altruism) upon which morality was traditionally structured were dislocated by the influence of a 
modem psychology in the early twentieth century. A spokesman for the changing climate, Bertrand 
Russell advocates 'Morality.. should not be based upon self-sacrifice, but upon correct psychology. 'I 
I 
According to Russell the correct psychology, taking into account the individual's natural inclination to 
satisfy his own desires, would advise a 'practical morality' which is a rational pursuit of happiness rather 
than a counsel to be virtuous: however much altruism has been recommended, in practice the virtues of 
religion have appealed to the 'prudent egotist,. 
12 Russell adds: 'The study of psychology, and more 
particularly of psychoanalysis, has tom aside the cloaks that our egoism wears, and has shown that when 
we think we are being unselfish this is hardly ever in fact the case. '13 Whether modem psychology's 
uncovering of unconscious desire speaks of an inescapable egoism or leads to mistrust of altruism, the 
unsettling of distinctions between the two held particular import for writers defining a modem aesthetic 
during the First World War which itself was brutally exposing unsuspected 'dark depths' to human 
nature. 14 
Punctuated by Dora Marsden's comments, in this chapter I shall consider how May Sinclair's work, in 
its support of the imagist aesthetic and philosophical idealism, (and sometimes in dialogue with Evelyn 
Underhill) attempts to withstand the troubling of these distinctions through an engagement with the 
redeeming psychoanalytic concept of sublimation. However sustained 
by the oscillating logic of her 
critical writings, Sinclair's fiction, as I will go on to show, reveals the 
impossibilities of this project. 
The focus of literary critics/cultural historians tends to be on the 'contents' which psychoanalytic theory 
introduced to the unconscious mind; my concern is less with Freud's intra-psychic mapping than how 
the increased cultural prominence of psychology vexed age-old questions concerning the topography of 
an inter-psychic relationship between individual and world, self and other upon which so many aesthetic, 
ethical and philosophical positions of this period were founded. These questions persist to this day. As 
the contemporary psychologist Daniel Stem puts it: 'The self and its boundaries are at the heart of 
philosophical speculation on human nature, and the sense of self and its counterpart, the sense of other, 
are universal phenomena that profoundly influence all our social experiences. 
0 5 Much of the writing in 
this chapter was published either during or close to the period of the First World War. Read in context of 
a war which demanded that individuals be subsumed in nationhood, these sometimes quite abstract 
10 Dora Marsden, 'Truth and Reality', p. 68. 
II Bertrand Russell, 'Introduction' to Selected Papers of Bertrand Russell, (New York: Random I louse, 1927), 
P. Xvii. 
12 Russell, 'The Prospects of Industrial Civilization', ibid. p. 265. 
13 Ibid. p. 266. 
14 ibid. p. xi. 
15 Daniel Stern, The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis and Developmental 
psychology (London: Kamac, 1998), p. 5. 
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concerns about individuality and altruism become more sharply focused. Referring to Aldington's poetry 
written during the war, May Sinclair shows admiration for 'intransigeant individuality': 'To have 
achieved, in the teeth of such overwhelming disaster, work of such beauty, of such finish, of such 
firmness and of such intransigeant individuality, is to have kept his soul., 16 
if forbiddingly verbose, Dora Marsden's articles address these issues at the heart of philosophic enquiry. 
It is striking that such a painstakingly egoistic view of the world should preface a journal known 
primarily as a platform for the early modernists' aesthetic creed: indeed, the previously cited article (at 
the beginning of the chapter) introduces the 'Special Imagist Number' of The Egoist. 17 Both the 
prolixity of Marsden's prose and her commitment to the 'subjective' position of the solipsist comprise 
an unlikely introduction to Imagism: an aesthetic constituted upon the deliberate rejection of these two 
traits. Although in practice all kinds of verse was bracketed under Imagism, its originary theoretical 
precepts, as formulated by Ezra Pound and F. S. Flint, urge a pithy use of words and 'Objectivity and 
again objectivity-'18 Pound outlines Imagism as: 'Objective - no slither; direct - no excessive use of 
adjectives, no metaphors that won't permit examination. It's straight talk, straight as the Greek! '19 In 
his insistence upon Imagism as 'straight talk' Pound no doubt intends to prevent the self-reflexive curve 
of sentimentality endemic in the verse of his Victorian forbears. Yet, beyond the articulation of its 
doctrine, Imagism's success in resisting the 'slither' back towards oneself becomes more problematic: as 
is suggested by Ford Madox Ford's rejection of certain Imagist poets (Aldington, Lowell and Fletcher) 
as too preoccupied with themselves and their emotions to be called Imagists., 
20 
it is Pound's insistence upon 'direct treatment of the thing', requiring the poet to render an exact Image 
of the object of his experience, which produces what Michael Levenson describes as a 'scientific 
subjectivity': the image is at once uniquely personal yet never personalised. This enravelling of both 
absolute subjectivity and objectivity is unpicked by Levenson in his study of the intellectual 
development of early modernist literary doctrine: Imagism represents the culmination of an 
impressionism which describes the world from an individual consciousness such that the subjective 
impression exists to the exclusion of any other reality, while, at the same time, the Image is a deliberate 
abstraction from self, seeking an impersonal rather than egoist aesthetic. As I will argue, the aesthetic 
positions carry psychological, philosophical and ethical implications: compare Schiller's description of a 
similar paradigm in contemporary philosophy where '[The] New Realist gets so absorbed in his object 
that he entirely neglects his subject, and so is not on his guard against his own subjectivity': his account 
of the object becomes his own private experience of it. 
21 
16 May Sinclair, 'Introduction' to Jean de Bossch&e, The Closed Door, (London: J. Lane, 1917), p. 28. 
17 Dora Marsden, 'Truth and Reality', The Egoist, 2 (1 May, 1915), p. 68. 
18 Letter to flarriet Monroe, January 1915, The Letters of Ezra Poun& 1907-1941 ed. D. D. Paige (New York 
I larcourt Brace & Co, 1950), p. 49. 
19 Letter to I larriet Monroe, October 1912, The Letters of Ezra Pound, p. 11. 
20 Ford Madox Ford (Outlook, 10 July, 1915), cited Peter Jones, 'Introduction' to Imagist Poetry 
(Ifarmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), p. 35. 
21 F. Schiller, Humanism: Philosophical Essays, (Macmillan: London, 1903), p. 254. 
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This structure of instability underpinning the relationship between subjectivism and objectivism, as 
between any opposites, is familiar to post-structuralist literary theory; the submerged polarity will 
always reemerge. However, the Imagist ideal pauses between the two poles, obliterating both in an 
encounter between poet and thing which renders the notion of 'containing vessel' superfluous. When 
Pound describes his poetry as an attempt 'to record the precise instant when a thing outward and 
objective transforms itself, or darts into a thing inward and subjective, ' he is seeking to represent the 
precise instant when neither subject nor object is subsumed by the other 'containing vessel., 22 Pound's 
much cited definition, where the Image 'presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of 
time', seems to borrow the photographic snapshot which is faithful to the momentary encounter between 
subject and world; it is the imprint of an 'instant of time' which forcgrounds neither subject nor 
object. 23 The 'direct treatment of the thing' causes differences between self and object to vanish as each 
becomes, momentarily, indistinguishable from the other. 24 As I have shown, the moment of fusion 
between self and object, or oceanic consciousness, is taken up by Evelyn Underhill in her writing about 
mysticism. It is a commonplace that the mystical moment is lost in its representation: the attempt to 
define the relationship between subject and object during this 'instant' itself produces false distinctions 
since the experience is one of indivisibility. May Sinclair was a friend of Evelyn Underhill, the subject 
of chapter two, whose book Myslicism (1907) reportedly 'did more to popularise the subject than any 
other single work'. 
25 Acutely aware of the problem she cites from a translation of the Indian poet Kabir 
to offer a timely (and timeless) caution: 
'The water-f illed pitcher is placed upon water, it has water within and without. 
It should not be given a name, lest it callforth the error of dualism. ' 
26 
Alive to the 'error of dualism' Sinclair embraces Imagism as an aesthetic which proposes to present 
experience without naming it, yet she admits the gap between 'strict Imagist formula' and practice: 'Amy 
Lowell tries for the direct presentation of the Bath. But she cannot get rid of the poet in the bath-tub., 27 
Following publication of a second anthology of Imagist verse, the 'Special Number' of the Egoist is 
dedicated to reviewing the principles and demonstrating the practice of the Imagist poets. 28 However, 
the incestuous reviewing of Imagist poets by fellow Imagists (notably Richard Aldington, John Gould 
Fletcher and F. S. Flint) portrays the movement as itself self-referential, and lacking in objectivity. 
Harold Monro, the editor of Poetry Review, rounds on the Imagist for '[having] not at any time taken 
22 Ezra Pound, 'Vorticism', Fortnightly Review, 96 (Sept. 1914), 461-71, p. 467. 
23 Sinclair will add to this: 'Poetry is the rhythmic expression of an intense personal emotion produced by 
direct contact with reality' ('The Poems of F. S. Flint', English Review, 32,1921,6-18, p. 13). 
24 For the metaphor of 'hardness' invoked in reaction to the late Romantic poetry of subjective moods, see 
Erik Svarny, "The Men of 1914": T. S. Eliot and Early Modernism (Milton Keynes: Open University Press 
1988), p. 33-35. 
25 Leslie Johnston 'Modem Mysticism: Some Prophets and Poets', Quarterly Review, 220 (1914), 220-246, 
p. 223. 
26 Kabir, Poem 'XLVI', One Hundred Poems Of Kabir, trans. Rabindranath Tagore, assisted by Evelyn 
Underhill (1914; Madras: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 52-3; q. v. in May Sinclair, A Defence of Idealism: Some 
Questions and Conclusions (London and New York: Macmillan, 1922), p. 318. 
27 Sinclair, 'Two Notes: 1. On II. D. 11. On Imagism', Egoist, 2 (1 Jun 1915), p. 89. 
28 Some Imagist Poets (London: Constable, 1915). 
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much trouble to make themselves clear', imputing a lack of concern for their readership. Offering the 
most critical perspective in this issue, he also accuses Imagism of an objective detachment, an 
unwarranted priviliging of the intellect. Unimpressed by verse symptomatic of a 'drastic self-detachment' 
which lacks engagement - with the poet's feelings and the world - Monroe challenges the modem 
school's retreat into a cerebral minimalism. It seems that objectivity incurs an alienation both from self 
and other which can be read as being as exclusive as solipsism. He suggests that, having spurned all 
sentiment as clichd, 'the passing event and its effect on their minds is everything to them ... The method 
of the Imagists is to model little detached patterns of words. ' Targeted for its employment of such a 
method is HD's poem 'The Oread' which he quotes in its entirety: 
'Whirl up, sea - 
Whirl your pointed pines 
On our rocks, 
Hurl your green over us, 
Cover us with your pools of fir. 
That is all. It can be said in the one minute before lunch... Such reticence denotes either 
poverty of imagination or needlessly excessive restraint., 
29 
In his demand for less self-reserve from poet and poem Monro's accusation of 'restraint' is a term which 
would be picked up in Imagism's defence, suggestive of its ethical and psychological 
underpinnings. Indeed the following month's edition of The Egoist carried a prompt response: May 
Sinclair, in 'Two Notes: I On H. D. 11 On Imagism, ' expressly commends the 'beauty of restraint' 
evident in the work of the Imagist poets, asking: 
'why, in Heavens name, should there be passion in [poetry]? Haven't we had enough of 
passion and of the sentiment that passed for passion all through the nineteenth century? ... 
isn't it almost time to remind us that there is a beauty of restraint and stillness and 
flawless clarity?, 30 
The 'beauty of restraint' and 'flawless clarity' are aesthetic qualities which will reappear in Sinclair's 
work to speak of an ethical and religious ideal, variously defined against what Suzanne Raitt notes as 
Sinclairs' 'uncertainty about the value of passion in itself. '31 We will then see how these terms, 
specifically via the image of the flawed crystal, transmute themselves into, and transform themselves in, 
her fiction. 
This was the first of May Sinclair's enthusiastic reviews of poetry by ILD, F. S. Flint, Ezra Pound and 
T. S. Eliot which witness her involvement in the contemporary critical reception of key modemist texts. 
As a novelist with an already well-established reputation, her connections to this circle of young writers 
highlight the modem currency of her own aesthetic. Sinclair was a friend both to the doctrines and poets 
29 1 larold Monro, 'Some Imagists Discussed', Egoist, 2 (1 May 1915), p. 78, p. 79. 
30 Sinclair, 'Two Notes', p. 88. 
31 'Sinclair's confusion about the significance, even the definition of passion in poetry is an indirect 
comment on her uncertainty about the value of passion in itself" (Suzanne Raitt, Alay Sinclair: A Modern 
victorian, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000, p. 198). 
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of imagism: in 1911 Pound writes to May Sinclair expressing 'sincere interest' in her work and 
requesting that she invite 'Hilda Doolittle' to tea; a decade later, Sinclair is still an evangelist, avowing, 
on her return from the United States: 'I did what I could to spread the Gospel of H. D. and Richard 
Aldington-, 32 Although Sinclair's personal acquaintance with these writers undoubtedly influenced her 
appreciation of their work, I suggest that aspects of Imagism resonated with convictions of Sinclair's 
own, developed previously in the realms of philosophical and metaphysical thought. Sinclair's marked 
defence of the 'beauty of restraint', can be read as crucial to May Sinclair's embrace of the Imagist 
aesthetic which as I will argue, finds its precedent in her own work. 
in common with any self-description, defining what it is not - usually a predecessor in the case of a 
snew' aesthetic - is vital to constituting what it is. Imagism was emphatically 'not Symbolism. It has 
nothing to do with image-making. It abhors Imagery ... The Image is not a substitute; it does not stand 
for anything but itself. '33 The uniqueness of the Image - Imagism waves 'goodbye to fancies and 
conceits' - is contrasted with the formulaic symbol which readily yields to approximate meanings. 
Sinclair disparages the 'dilettante manner of the true symboliste' and Pound speaks against association, 
'dealt in' by the (dirty-handed) symbolists: 'I should like [Imagisme] to stand for hard light, clear 
edges', proposing the Image should stand alone and resist the contagion of 'association'. 
34 May 
Sinclair's approbatory use of the terms 'hardness' and 'clarity' is equally striking in her reviews where 
she introduces the image of crystal to define the sought after poetic ideal. HD, '[t]he perfect imagist, ' 
writes poetry which is 'so radiant, so crystalline'; there are no 'blurred edges', (recalling the sharp 
photographic image), only hard outlines and transparency. 
35 I argue that for Sinclair the representation of 
Imagist poetry as 'crystalline' spirals into associations of her own so that the 'hard light, clear edges' of 
the Imagist aesthetic itself begin to function symbolically. Now championing the crystal values of 
hardness and clarity in the name of the Imagist aesthetic Sinclair made use of these terms and her image 
of the crystal elsewhere than in her reviews of Imagism: the qualities of the crystal are already resonant in 
Sinclair's novella 'The Flaw in the Crystal' written in 1912, where its associations are less aesthetic than 
with a moral and spiritual ideal. The crystal, invoked as a symbol of moral purity, altruism, ethical 
goodness and spiritual transcendence, now reappears in her critical writings in service of the ideals of 
Imagism. 
Before writing about Imagism, Sinclair had published a review in 1913 of the Indian poet Rabindra Nath 
Tagore's Gitaniali where she is superlative in her praise: 
&a supreme transparence and simplicity is what you will find in every line of Rabindra 
Nath Tagore. It is the simplicity, the transparence of dew and crystal and still water. As a 
32 Letter to Richard Aldington, August 30,1921, Box 53A, May Sinclair Papers, Rare Book and Manuscript 
Library, University of Pennsylvania. 
33 Sinclair, 'Two Notes', p. 88. 
34 Sinclair, 'Introduction' to Jean de Bossch&e, The Closed Door, p. 1 1; Ezra Pound, Fortnightly Review (Sep. 
1914), p. 463-4; I Aug 1914, The Letters of E. -ra Pound: 1907-1941, p. 38; Peter Jones, 'Introduction' to 
Imagist Poetry, p. 22- 
35 Sinclair, 'The Poems of II. D. ', Dial, 72 (Feb. 1922), 203-207, p. 207, p. 203. 
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mystic he is bound to be a symbolist. But his phrase, his rhythm, is infallibly the most 
perfect, the most crystalline medium of his symbol, his symbol the most crystalline and 
perfect medium of his thought. The result is an incomparable unity of rhythm and 
language, of language and idea., 36 
Significantly for Sinclair the crystal ideal is at its most perfect in the poetry of a mystic. Already 
excusing his symbolism, the crystal speaks of an aesthetic unity of word and rhythm, language and 
thought crystallising the mystic's belief, shared by Sinclair as I will go on to show, in the unity of 
reality as spirit. 
37 Avoiding the metaphysical interest, Ezra Pound would later praise the 'precise and 
objective language' - Imagist qualities - of Tagore's Gitanjali. 
38 
A collection of verse by the French poet and artist Jean de Bossch&e (well-known to the Imagists 
through his association with Pound) is again introduced by May Sinclair with a litany of praise for its 
crystal qualities: 'Sharpness, precision, purity, the cold clearness of crystal, the hardness of crystal, 
hardness attained by concentration, by sheer pressure of spiritual intensity. ' A potent image in her 
writing, the crystal functions as a concise symbol illuminating her own aesthetic, ethical and 
metaphysical ideal. She continues: 'They say [de Bossch&e's poetry] is obscure. It is the obscurity of 
crystal that shows dark when it is laid on darkness. Hold it to the light and you will see that it is all 
transparency. '39 We are reminded that at the same time as having intrinsic properties of hardness and 
precision, crystal is an object which shifts in appearance according to the context in which it is placed, 
becoming indistinguishable from its setting without losing its 'hardness'. 40 The crystal then represents 
the perfect Image both in its precision (compare the Image which is unyielding to approximate 
interpretations) and its transparency (presenting subject and object as indivisible). Yet I suggest that 
these qualities speak not only of an aesthetic but also connote a moral ideal: the 'hardness' is also a 
'purity', a moral intactness which is uncompromised, while the 'clearness' and 'transparency' of the 
crystal betokens an openness to the other: an altruism in which, so to speak, my brother is experienced 
as myself. 
41 Ironically, what I hope to make increasingly 'clear' in this chapter is that the crystal itself 
embodies properties which are at times contradictory and paradoxical. 
36 'The "Gitanjah": or Song-Offerings of Rabindra Nath Tagore', North American Review, 197 (May 1913), 
659-76, p. 662. The Brahman wisdom 'that art thou' is described by the philosopher S. Alexander as being close 
to the sense of identity of God and man in Absolute Idealism: 'the current notion represented by T. II. Grccn in 
this country of a divine mind which makes human minds organic to itself and works through them [ ... I is not 
far removed from this older philosophy' (Alexander, Space, Time & Deity: The Gifford Lectures at Glasgow 
1916-1918, London; Macmillan, 1920, p. 385). 
37 Sinclair's belief that reality is spirit is, according to a reviewer of Defence of Idealism, the belief that 'it is 
one and it is psychical, appearing in and informing all things' (Robieson, International Journal of Ethics 28, 
1917-18,563-567, p. 564). 
38 Ezra Pound, 'List of Books: comment by Ezra Pound', Little Review, 4 (1917 Aug), p. 9. 
39 Sinclair, 'Introduction' to Jean dc Bossch&e, The Closed Door, p. 6. The Closed Door was approvingly 
reviewed by T. S. Eliot: '[De BosscUre] 
is directly in front of his object. [ ... ] The effect is an intense 
frigidity 
which I find altogether admirable' ('Reflections on 
Contemporary Poetry', Egoist, Oct 1917, p. 133). 
40 May Sinclair admits to finding certain passages of II. D. 's "Demeter" obscure on her first reading: 'I even 
sent to the London Library for Miss Jane Harrison's Themis and Prolegomena to Greek Religion, in the hope 
that scholarship would throw some light'; however, 'the obscurity was mine' ('The Poems of I I. D.: Review of 
I lymen', Dial, 72, Feb 1922, p. 205; this passage was deleted from the expanded version 'The Poems of I I. D. ' in 
Fortnightly Review 12 1, March 1927,329-340). 
41 Sinclair, 'The Poems of F. S. Flint', Engli3h Review (Jan 1921), p. 7. 
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In its attempt to seize a momentary indivisibility between subject and object the Image may remind us 
of the indeterminate mergings of self and other which are predictably gendered as the literary property of 
women modernists excluded by the rubric of 'Men of 1914'. It is noteable in this respect that Sinclair's 
commitment to 'hardness' is as unforbearing as any of these 'Men': she finds one of HD's poems marred 
by a certain diffuseness' and cannot conceive of de BosscUre 'melting, slackening, unbending and 
growing gradually facile and diffuse'. 
42 The crystalline poem achieves its object through precision not 
diffusion: reviewing T. S. Eliot's 'Prufrock', May Sinclair approves: 'Reality, stripped naked of all 
rhetoric, of all ornament, of all confusing and obscuring association, is what he is after., 
43 However I 
intend to suggest - and in this I am stepping Sinclair out of line with the 'Men's' conscious principles 
at least - that these same crystal qualities which describe the direct encounter of the poet with the object 
world also describe a spiritual encounter charged with a contingent eroticism. If Sinclair proposes a 
'restrained' beauty somehow purified of passion, the Imagist solution is nevertheless represented in 
language describing a sensual immediacy: 
'What the Imagists are out for is direct naked contact with reality. You must get closer and 
closer. Imagery must go. Symbolism must go. There must be nothing between you and 
your object... The fusion is complete', 
and 
, you will get Imagist poems which are as near as possible to the naked presentation of a 
thing, with nothing, not so much as a temperament or a mood, between you and it. '44 
Pound's more clinical emphasis upon 'direct treatment of the object', becomes in Sinclair's language a 
'naked' embrace: 'It is all a question of closeness, more or less closeness., 
45 The preoccupation with 
crystal clarity and altruism paradoxically speaks of a sensuality which it purports to be rid of. 
As I will suggest, the aesthetic, ethical and spiritual 'crystalline' ideals sustained in May Sinclair's 
philosophical and critical writings are disturbed, or flawed by her own fiction as it reveals undercurrents 
which her allegiances to Imagism, idealism and the psychoanalytic concept of sublimation, were 
designed to avert. Discussing the title poem to F. S. Flint's collection 'Otherworld' Sinclair describes 'In 
this world all human contacts are flawless'. Yet, as she has already identified 'this world' is the dream of 
. an lotherworld': a 'universe where the poet's dream is a reality'. 
46 Sinclair's fiction explores the 
impossibility of sustaining 'flawless' human contact in the material world outside the dream, while also 
arguing for the reality of an 'otherworld' of thought - not unlike dream - which would enable such an 
ideal. The flaw refers to the visible 'split' in the crystal, which in Henry James' novel The Golden Bowl 
is as characteristic of crystal as its 'hardness' (see introductory citation). In showing, the flaw is a 
blemish which compromises the crystal's transparency - which I have suggested is associated with 
42 'The Poems of "I I. D. "'(Ionger version), Fortnightly Review, 121 (March 1927); repr. in Scott (cd. ), Gender of 
, Vlodernism, 453-67, p. 465; 
Sinclair, 'Introduction' to The Closed Door, p. 27. 
43 Sinclair, "Prufrock: And Other Observations" A Criticism', Little Review, 4 (Dec 1917), 8-14, p. 12. 
44 Sinclair, 'Two Notes', p. 88. 
45 Ibid. p. 89. 
46 Sinclair, 'The Poems of F. S. Flint', p. 14, p. 15. 
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altruism. In Sinclair's writing, most explicitly in 'The Flaw in the Crystal', I argue that the 'flaw' is a 
reminder of the body and of physical opacity: significantly, 'flaw' is also defined as 'an outburst of 
passion,. 
47 The flaw runs through the crystal and the image resonates throughout Sinclair's work; the 
crystal represents clarity and aesthetic unity in the project of writing, but the flaw represents the desire 
which imperils this project. 
In May Sinclair. A Modern Victorian, Suzanne Rain suggests Imagism offered May Sinclair an aesthetic 
correlative to psychoanalysis - as she welcomed modemity in the psychological sphere, so she adopted a 
favourably corresponding modem aesthetic. Yet as Raitt observes of the 'spareness' of the Image: 
'Nothing could be further from the Jungian symbol with its infinitely creative connections to both the 
individual and the collective unconscious., 48 I will be suggesting that the Image appealed precisely in 
defining itself against a symbol: purged clean of associations the Image offers an alternative to the 
symbols introduced by psychoanalysis which, as I go on to say, were always a betrayal of unconscious 
desire. Sinclair's interest in the emerging new science of psychoanalysis was less in what it had to say 
about contents of the unconscious mind than in the dynamic possibilities of transforming these contents 
through the process of sublimation: the diversion of the sexual instinct towards non-sexual aims such as 
artistic creation and intellectual inquiry. Sublimation offers a psychological resolution to the (aesthetic) 
dichotomies of restraint and passion occupying May Sinclair, making explicit the connection between 
restraint, passion and art. If sublimation can be described as the 'purification' of the libido, transferring it 
to higher, more culturally valued activities then the object of sublimation can be said to re-evoke the 
crystal ideal. May Sinclair thus found in Imagism an aesthetic which as I shall go on to show, 
dovetailed with her own allegiance to the philosophy of Absolute Idealism and at the same time 
answered to the psychological model of sublimation. I suggest that the doctrine of Imagism confirms 
May Sinclair's own intellectual and aesthetic preferences for crystal qualities on two counts: emphasis 
upon the clear Image as an immediate and direct presentation of reality vanishes the distance between 
subject and object and thus endorses the belief of idealists with its conviction 'You cannot distinguish 
between the thing and its image'. 49 At the same time, the hard outlines of an Image, aiming for 
detachment from the passions swamping Victorian poets, speak of an ideally sublimated aesthetic. May 
Sinclair brings Imagism into dialogue with a metaphysical and psychological world view which lends to 
it unexpected intellectual underpinnings. I shall look first at the complexities involved in mediating 
between subject and object in her writings about idealism, sublimation, and mysticism (the 
philosophical, psychological, spiritual and ethical dimensions of her aesthetic) before moving on to read 
Sinclair's own fiction for its indications of an indeterminacy which seriously disturbs the distinctions 
she is trying to sustain. 
47 Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary (Edinburgh: Chambers, 1981), p. 497. 
48 Raitt, May Sinclair. A Modern Victorian, p. 183, p. 207. 
49 Sinclair, 'Two Notes', p. 88. 
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Furthermore, both 'crystal' and 'flaw' can be read as images with specific associations for a woman 
writing in the early twentieth century, with a legacy of Victorian values -a predicament to which Raitt's 
concisely titled biography of May Sinclair refers: A Modern Victorian. Virginia Woolf in Three Guineas 
specifically associates the desire to be 'clear as crystal' with the ideal of the Victorian woman: she cites 
Josephine Butler as an exemplary figure from the nineteenth-century, who praised her women helpers, 
saying: 
'The utter absence in them of any desire for recognition, of any vestige of egotism in any 
form, is worthy of remark. In the purity of their motives they shine out 'clear as crystal'. " 
That, then, was one of the qualities that the Victorian woman praised and practised'. 50 
Earlier, in A Room of One's Own, Woolf acknowledges how hard it must have been for a woman writer 
to hold fast to her own female values, in the face of the prevailing patriarchy. She refers to a 'flaw' in the 
centre of women's novels: 'It was the flaw in the centre that had rotted them. She had altered her values 
in deference to the opinion of others., 51 However, in May Sinclair's philosophical thought we see her 
holding firm to her own beliefs, even when they go against the modem trend. 
'Drawing the line between consciousness and the objects of consciousness' 
Sympathetic to the contemporary modernist aesthetic in literary culture and engaging with the shifting 
psychological worldview, May Sinclair appears disinclined to accept the new philosophical attitude of 
mind. When the dominance of Absolute Idealism as a philosophy in England at the turn of the century 
was threatened by newer doctrines, May Sinclair remained stalwart in its support and defence. Her 
Defence of Idealism takes on, one by one, Samuel Butler's pan-psychism, pragmatism, humanism, 
vitalism, psychology, metaphysics, new realism and new mysticism. 
52 Yet it was the so-called 
, formidable advance of new realism' which was most challenging, articulated chiefly by G. E. Moore and 
Bertrand Russell and fashionably associated with the Bloomsbury literary scene. 
53 Briefly, in holding 
the view that a real world exists independently of our cognition of it, the new realist movement were 
rejecting the idealists' belief that the world is in some sense mind-dependent. 
54 To recall Dora 
Marsden's image from the introduction to this chapter, disagreement over the nature of the 'containing 
vessel' outlines the essential difference between idealists and realists. Is consciousness enveloped, as 
another object, by the 'real' world of space and time, or is the world of mind, whether of individual or 
Absolute consciousness, the only containing context within which these objects have existence? The 
50 Josephine Butler, Personal Reminiscences of a Great Crusade, (1896) cited in Woolf, Three Guineas 
(1938; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), p. 185 n. 34. Crystal reappears within Three Guineas in Woolf's 
reference to the modernist Mary Butts' autobiography of her childhood, The Crystal Cabinet: My Childhood 
at Salterns, (1937), ibid. p. 172 n. 20. 
51 Woolf, Room of One's Own, p7l. 
52 Sinclair's Defence of Idealism was well-received: although M. Robieson considered Sinclair 'anything but a 
professional philosopher', Defence was 'a serious philosophical work', 'most interesting and even [ ... 
I 
important' (International Journal of Ethics, 28,1917-18, pp. 563-567; T. S. Eliot describes Defence as 'one of 
the most interesting books of philosophy that have appeared for several years' (New Statesman, 22 Sept 1917. 
p. 596). 
53 Robieson, p. 563. 
54 See John MacQuarrie, 'The New Realism' in Twentieth Century Religious Thought (London: SCM, 1993), 
p. p. 228-235. 
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idealist maintains that objects exist only as 'ideas' within the embrace of consciousness and are created 
so to speak by this consciousness: in the 'world of mind' there is then no division between the knower 
and the known since consciousness of the object is the object. Compare May Sinclair's statement about 
imagist doctrine that 'in no case is the Image a symbol of reality (the object): it is reality (the object) 
itself. You cannot distinguish between the thing and its image., 55 It is this assumption, based on the 
premise that 'object and subject are necessarily connected' which is challenged in G. E. Moore's polemic 
essay, 'The Refutation of Idealism' where he disputes, what is for him, the idealist fallacy: 'No object, 
no mind... no mind, no object., 56 The 'new realists' rationalism replaces the phenomenalist basis of 
idealism (stressing the perceiver's central role in determining meaning) to argue according to the laws of 
natural science that an external reality exists independently of, and prior to, the perceiving subject. The 
relationship between object and subject then speaks of contiguities rather than connections such that, for 
example, my consciousness and a table are discrete co-ordinates within the 'containing vessel' of time 
and space. 57 As Sinclair puts it 
'Here, they say, on the one hand, is consciousness and there, outside it and utterly 
independent of it, is the object of consciousness... It is a haphazard encounter, left 
unexplained., 58 
Sinclair is uncomfortable with the extent to which realism refers all experience, not only of material 
objects, but of emotional states, to the external world. At its most extreme, she argues, it would 
wrongfully appropriate even love which, in her depiction, is quintessential ly 'immaterial': 
'Even in [passion's] most immaterial manifestations, in its purity, its devotion, its 
abnegation, its transcendence of its own delight, its utter selflessness, love, on any strict 
realistic theory falls to the world outside consciousness... Once you have begun drawing 
the line between consciousness and the objects of consciousness I do not see where you are 
to stop. So that the margin of consciousness and of the self is the narrowest 
conceivable., 59 
As I shall go on to discuss, the 'immaterial' manifestation of passion plays a central role in Sinclair's 
'The Gift' and 'The Flaw in the Crystal': two short stories which unravel a love apparently bom of an 
, immaterial' tie. A disavowal of the 'material' to insist upon the 'immateriality', or incorporeal nature of 
experience underpins Sinclair's critical, philosophical writing and fiction to enable a belief in a 
disembodied and selfless love. Sinclair suggests in the above passage that to begin 'drawing the line' 
55 Sinclair, 'Two Notes', p. 88. 
56 G. E. Moore, 'The Refutation of Idealism', Alind ns I (1903), 433-53; rcpr. G. E. Moore: Selected Writings, ed. 
Thomas Baldwin (London: Routlcdge, 1993), p32. S. Alexander, Space, Time and Deity: The Gifford Lectures at 
Glasgow 1916-1918, p. 5. 
57 A relationship defined as 'comprcsence' by Alexander, or 'the angel's view' (Space, Time and Deity, p. 19). 
See also Alexander, Essays in Critical Realism (1920). 
58 Sinclair, 'Primary and Secondary Consciousness', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, ns 23 (1923). 
111-20, p. 1 13. The encounter is less vicarious, according to the realists: 'Knowledge is a form of union of Self 
and not-Self; like all union, it is impaired by dominion, and therefore by an attempt to force the universe into 
conformity with what we find in ourselves' (Bertrand Russell, qv Arthur McDowall, Realism: A Study in Life 
and Thought, London: Constable, 1918, p. 265). 
59 Sinclair, The New Idealism, (London and New York: Macmillan, 1922), p. 34. 
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between consciousness and its objects, self and other, or indeed the material and immaterial, would be to 
never end. Her own philosophical debate with realism questions the positionings of such lines, which 
differently delineate the 'edges of the mind', or the distinctions between psychic and external reality. If 
the realist perspective is taken to its limits 'Consciousness, then, is contentless': containing nothing, it 
becomes a 'blank transparency,. 60 The reference to 'transparency' is intriguingly evocative of Sinclair's 
previously cited descriptions of the crystal's transparency which were associated with the indivisibility of 
subject and object in the Image. Again, the crystal values are applied when Sinclair commends the 
realists for the 'hard clearness' of their precision and formal logic. 
61 It seems that the crystal values of 
'hard clearness' are capable of switiching sides of the philosophical/aesthetic debate. Here they partake of 
the very qualities (of 'drawing the line') against which the crystal is defined. If drawing lines enacts the 
errors of dualism, which Sinclair hopes to avoid, it seems that it also preserves individuality. Sinclair's 
reference to love (cited above) serves at the same time as a reminder that lines can be drawn on the further 
side of the self. Sinclair's evocation of love in its 'purity, its devotion, its abnegation, its transcendence 
of its own delight, its utter selflessess' suggests the relegation of experience beyond the psychic world of 
the individual, to its containment by a greater consciousness. May Sinclair's sustained defence against 
realism seeks also to diminish the pull of an external reality upon desire since, as she insists: 'What 
really matters is a state of mind, the interest or the ecstasy with which we close with life. It can't be 
explained., 
62 
May Sinclair develops her dialogue with realism in her second volume of philosophy, The New Idealism 
in which she proposes that idealists and realists are referring to two different types of consciousness. 
'Primary' consciousness, which is the domain of the idealists, denotes direct and immediate perception: 
'all knowledge, of whatever kind, on which consciousness is not doubling back'; 'Secondary' 
consciousness, on the other hand, represents the doubling back, the ensuing self-conscious activities of 
mind which intervene upon the primary perception: it is 'awareness of awareness. It includes all 
reflection, judgement, inference, inductive and deductive reasoning.. It is the play of thought round and 
about its object., 
63. Sinclair had already applied similar distinctions to aesthetic differences in narrative 
style in the modem novel: in her review of Dorothy Richardson's Pilgrimage she contrasts 'the objective 
method... of aftcr-thought, of spectacular reflection' with the immediacy of Richardson's narrative 
technique where she is said to 'seize reality alive' in presenting: 
'first hand, intimate and intense reality of the happening... in Miriam's mind... The 
intense rapidity of the seizure defies you to distinguish between what is objective and what 
is subjective either in the reality presented or the art that presents., 64 
60 Ibid. p. 35, p. 36. 
61 Ibid. p35. 
62 Sinclair, 'The Novels of Dorothy Richardson', Egoist 5 (April 1918), p. 57-9, p. 59. 
63 Sinclair, 'Primary and Secondary Consciousness', p. 112, p. 113. 
64 Sinclair, 'The Novels of Dorothy Richardson', p. 59. 
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Although the Georgian novelists could also be appropriated as 'new realists', when interviewed about the 
'Future of the Novel' in 1921 (the year before New Idealism was published) Sinclair defines 'modem' 
writing as working within the parameters of the idealist's Primary consciousness: 
'The modem novelist should not dissect; he should not probe; he should not write about 
the emotions and the thoughts of his characters. The words he uses must be the thoughts - 
be the emotions., 65 
The importance of 'Primary' and 'Secondary' consciousness is clarified in a paper which Sinclair gave to 
the Aristotelian Society in 1923. Importantly, 'Secondary consciousness is always distinguishable from 
its object and Primary consciousness is not., 
66 By Sinclair's definition, primary consciousness is 
always beyond realist logic: 'Primary consciousness presents its object, its content in an indivisible 
unity with itself. No analysis can distinguish one from the other., 
67 While conceding some ground to 
the realist, Sinclair's manoeuvre serves to reinforce the idealist argument. By way of example, she 
conjures moments of complete absorption in a compelling idea, a beautiful object or, in the following 
instance, a violent sensation: 
'When you see a flash of lightening, or hear the firing of two batteries, or feel the stab of 
toothache, how clearly do you distinguish between consciousness and its object?.. Where 
in the overpowering moment, is your distinction between consciousness, and the flash, the 
shell fire, or the pain?, 68 
The 'razor blade of analytic thought' cannot insist upon the object's independent reality from 
consciousness since 'pure primary consciousness' has already 'swallowed it,. 
69 It is subsequently 
primary consciousness itself, with subject and object indivisibly united, which becomes the discernible 
object for the realists. May Sinclair's argument preserves the essential belief of absolute idealism as 
intact and unreachable - by 'swallowing' it whole - while at the same time containing, and in effect 
blunting, the incisive 'blade' of realism. 
Alert to her own beguiling logic, at this point in the paper May Sinclair has her imaginary 'realist' 
smash his fist on the table with exasperation and insist that the 'green table cover' is actually 'there' and 
not in consciousness. But inevitably, according to Sinclair, he is already 'too late': for in making a 
judgement he has forsaken primary consciousness and moved into the reflective mode of secondary 
consciousness, the realm where the object is already distinguishable from the mind. Yet if Sinclair's 
argument is seemingly water-tight in theory, towards the end of her paper May Sinclair confesses to 
feeling the strain of its all-inclusive logic. She admits: (thinking about the writing of the paper): 'This 
65 'The Future of the NoveL Famous Au. hors and Their Methods: A Series of Interviews with Renowned 
Authors' repr. Scott (ed. ), The Gender of Modernism, p. 478. For the Georgian novelists as new realists see 
Arthur McDowall, Realism: A Study in Life and Thought, p. 189, p. 200. 
66 Sinclair, 'Primary and Secondary Consciousness', p. 113. 
67 Ibid. p. 114. 
68 Ibid. p. 115. 
69 Ibid. p. 116. 
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question of thinking is extremely complicated... It is very difficult to catch primary thinking in its 
purity, or having caught it, to keep it pure., 
70 A concern with catching, and preserving, the now 
evanescent purity of her own ideal invokes comparison with the purity of the Image, and of the crystal, 
at stake in her critical and fictional writing. Although the theory tells us that secondary consciousness is 
always already 'too late', now, as Sinclair considers the writing process itself, secondary consciousness 
is experienced as stepping in too soon with its judgements, reasonings and reflections which sever the 
mind at any moment from its objects. 
Perhaps hard to sustain at times, Sinclair's belief in the world of mind as contextualising, or containing, 
all experience can seem to lend itself to a similar egoism as that preached by Dora Marsden: 'by being 
sensed the world is created'. 
71 However, May Sinclair's world of mind does not stop at individual 
consciousness: although the experience of mind is central, hers is not a subjective idealism - which she 
dismisses as 'that easy prey of realists, the lunatic theory of Myself Alone' - but a philosophical belief 
which approaches a theological position in believing that ultimately reality is spiritual. 
72 The 
assumption of the absolute idealist is, according to the philosopher Alexander, that: 
&since whatever is, is experienced, and since some things are which are not experienced by 
the individual, these must at least form part of some experience. Or again that, since an 
object necessarily implies a subject, and since the whole world must be an object, we must 
conceive it to belong to some subject or subjects, in the same sense in which whatever is 
the object of our experience belongs to us. Or again, that, since thought enters into the 
essence of all reality, we must conceive behind it, in it, or as its essence, a spirit akin to 
ours., 73 
Crucially therefore this is not the unmitigated solipsism of the subjective idealist, nor an egoism which 
believes in the absolute power of 1. The Absolute Idealist believes that the finite consciousness of the 
individual is subsumed in 'some ultimate consciousness' 'as parts within the whole'. 
74 Adherents of 
Absolute idealism aspire to an ever-increasing identification with this Absolute - Mind, Spirit or Reality 
- avoiding solipsism through 
devotion to a spiritual ideal. To become the pure perceiver, unalloyed by 
the intervening reflections of secondary consciousness, is to become closer to this absolute consciousness 
or Absolute Reality or Universal Mind. May Sinclair's Absolute Idealism maintains reference to a 
mystical, spiritual, transcendent idea which may appear foreign to Imagism yet as I will argue, for May 
Sinclair, the crystal image, like the pure perceiver, also brings the individual closer to this spiritual 
Reality. It belongs therefore on both sides of the philosophical divide between idealism and realism 
70 Ibid. p. 117. 
71 Realism is a 'philosophy of self-effacement rather than of self-asse. -tion' (McDowall, Realism: A Study in 
Life and Thought, p. 264). 
72 Sinclair, The New Idealism, p. 253. 
73 Alexander, Space, Time and Deity, p. 27. 
74 Sinclair, The New Idealism, p. 253, p. 265. 
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since, in one influential argument, the transcendent did not pertain to 'Absolute Idealism', but to a 
4realist' encounter with space and time. 75 
Sinclair's own defence of idealism is itelf progressively more hospitable to the 'realist' side of the 
divide. Just as her early interest in Hegel had focused upon spirit, the philosophy of TH Green, and 
absolute idealism similarly pointed to a transcendent dimension to human experience which lifted the 
individual beyond what was conceived of as the 'bare monotony of Space-Time'. 76 Yet in The New 
Idealism, influenced by her reading of Alexander's Space, Time, Deity, Sinclair modifies the idealist 
position to take 'space and time seriously', no longer conceiving the spatio-temporal world to be an 
appearance of a Reality which is believed to be timeless. 77 The developments in new realism offered by 
Alexander and Whitehead, successors to Moore and Russell, were conducive to May Sinclair's taking 
time seriously in finding a way to re-introduce spirit into the finities of time and space, thus effecting, to 
an extent, a rapprochement between absolute idealism and realism. 78 Whereas G. E. Moore and Bertrand 
Russell - in denying the existence of spirit - widened the divide between philosophy and theology - 
Alexander and Whitehead's philosophy more accurately described as realist metaphysics, brings god into 
time as the highest goal within the evolutionary process, making a natural God, finite and evolving, a 
God who is on his way, not yet complete, emphasising process and becoming (influenced by Henri 
Bergson and William James). 79 Sinclair remained a staunch defender of idealism, but in doing so 
shifted the terms which she was defending, substantially taking on board Alexander's idea of deity as her 
own, declaring in conclusion to New Idealism: 'there will be a divine unending process, the advance of 
God's immanent life to higher and higher forms, in which the perfection of his transcendent Godhead is 
manifested in Time. Transcendent Godhead is what immanent God will be., 
80,81 
To what extent is belief in a transcendent Reality anathema to the Imagist aesthetic? Suzanne Raitt 
names mysticism 'one of modernism's dominant - and in literary circles most neglected - 
75 F. S. Schiller argues otherwise: solipsism 'best be defined as the doctrine that all existsencc is experience, 
and that there is only one experient. The Solipsist thinks that he is the one. The absolute idealist is a solipsist 
becaue he believes the Absolute is the sole cxperient and he is the incarnate Absolute' (Schiller, Humanism: 
Philosophical Essays, Macmillan, London, 1903, p. 252). 
76 Sinclair, The New Idealism, p. 304; Dorothea Beale, principal of Cheltenham Ladies College in 1886 
reassured her former pupil that 'it is not human to be content to be caged in by this little world of time and 
space (Elizabeth Raikes, Dorothea Beale of Cheltenham, London: Constable, 1908, p. 389), 
77 Sinclair, The New Idealism, p. 14. 
78 In other words, 'a transformation of some main doctrines of absolute idealism on to a realistic basis' 
(Whitehead, Process and Reality, pviii, in Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought, p. 259). 
79 See Macclarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought, pp. 260-268. 
80 Alexander finds the terms have 'such shifting senses' he would like to be rid of them altogether 
(S. Alexander. Space, Time and Deity, p. 7). See Wyndham Lewis, 'The Fusion of Idealism and Realism' in Time 
and Western Man, pp. 244-257. According to Wyndham Lewis the terms realist and idealist express the 
contemporary phase of the great traditional antithesis otherwise labelled nominalism and realism, or 
rationalism and empiricism; however, they are terms which have less and less meaning as 'a certain brand of 
cleverly adulterated idealism [draws] ever nearer to a highly-mentalized type of 'realism' and realists and 
idealists 'merge in the common worship of Time and Change', in other words, the idols of Bergson (ibid. 
p. 477). 
81 Sinclair, The New Idealism, p. 309. 'God is immanent in respect of his body, but transcendent in respect of 
his deity' (Alexander, Space, Time and Deity, p. 396). 
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movements'. 82 Indeed when Pound insists 'the natural object is always the adequate symbol', Levenson 
argues that 
'[the] pursuit of transcendence is... summarily abandoned. Pound is proposing a strict 
confinement of art to the physically and psychologically given; there is no superior realm 
to which this is inferior... This shift represents a naturalizing of the poetic sign; the sign 
still points, but to this world rather than to any other., 83 
As I argue, however, art's confinement to 'this world' does not preclude May Sinclair's discovering of 
absolute consciousness, or experiencing of 'Reality' in the 'given'. Her introduction for de Bossch&e 
affirms that the everyday objects in his verse, the bread and fruit themselves 'are divine', his figures 'are 
not symbolic of a higher and diviner life than ours; they are symbolic of the divine beauty and the divine 
sorrow of life itself'. 
84 In 'Two Notes' Sinclair had made a comparison between Victorian and Imagist 
poets as between Protestants and Catholics, one using the bread and wine symbolically and the other 
believing in trans-substantiation: 'For them the bread and wine are the body and the blood. '85 In her 
review of de Bosschere, published two years later in 1917, she now rejects the association with 
Christianity entirely, naming his method: 
'the opposite of Catholic, the opposite of Romantic, the opposite of the symbolism of 
Stephan Mallarme. It is much more akin to the symbolism of Greek religion with its 
adoration of the magic sacra than to the Christian religion with its unholy repudiation of 
the earth. ' 86 
May Sinclair's suspicion of Christianity rested in its 'unholy repudiation of the earth', or error of 
dualism. The Eastern approach - exemplified by Tagore's 'simplicity, his restraint, his austerity' - is 
welcomed by Sinclair as an alternative to the emotionalism she associates with the Christian mystics. 
These 'repulsive qualities' are provoked by the 'obstinate dualism' which keeps God apart from man. 87 
The passionate outpourings are 'in proportion to their ascetism, to the violence of their rupture with the 
divine visible world., 
88 The 'morality of ascetism' identified by Foucault with a Christian theology, 
paradoxically serves in this argument, only to confirm the attachment rather than aid renunciation. 
Although critical of the Christian mystics' emotional outpourings (well-documented by Evelyn 
Underhill) as speaking of their own imperfectly sublimated desire, May Sinclair appeals to abiding 
moments of 'certainty' which give evidence of the Absolute. The moments are of heightened, immediate 
experience, a 'shock of contact with reality': 
82 Raitt, May Sinclair, A Modern Victorian, p. 233. 
83 Pound, 'A Retrospect', Literary Essays, P. 5; Levenson, A Genealogy of Modernism, p. I 10. 
84 Sinclair, 'Introduction' to A Closed Door, p. 11. 
85 Sinclair, 'Two Notes', p. 89. 
86 May Sinclair's familiarity with early Greek religion owed much to her reading of Jane Ilarrison: Defence of 
Idealism cites both Harrison's Prolegomena to Greek Religion and ThemiS. 
87 Sinclair, Defence, p. 303; 'The "Gitanjali": or Song-offerings of Rabindra Nath Tagore', North American 
Review, 197 (May 1913), p. 662. 
88 Ibid. p. 667. 
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6moments when eternal Beauty is seized travelling through time; moments when things 
that we have seen all our lives without truly seeing them, the flowers in the garden, the 
trees in the field, the hawthorn on the hillside, change to us in an instant of time, and 
show the secret and imperishable life they harbour. '89 
These moments in which spirit is 'seized' in an instant of time through directly experiencing 'things' 
around us, recall the 'instant of time' which captures the Image in its own epiphany. These moments are 
most associated by Sinclair with the usual list of poets, painters and musicians, yet she is hesitant to 
include lovers since, she says, 'sexual passion is the source of our most profound illusion'. She also 
adds a category of the man who 'faces death' - of which the 'world has been full' since August 1914. In 
a discomforting idealisation of the soldier's fate, which highlights the wartime consolation of a belief in 
a more perfect Reality, she describes 'how pure, how absolute is their surrender. 90 
Ethics absolute and not absolute 
This stress on the spiritual or transcendent realm brought with it an ethical dimension which will be 
crucial to a reading of Sinclair's fiction. As I have already suggested, there is a tension between 
Sinclair's vision of the ego as being self-contained, self-concerned, or being open, surrendering itself to 
others. 
Given her early disenchantment with a Christian theology which seemed to hold a 'spiritual lifc' apart 
from the human experience and which rejected her own experiences of 'God' as unorthodox, Sinclair 
found reassurance in the religious bent taken by the idealist philosophy of T. H. Green. tier earliest 
philosophical writing 'The Ethical and Religious Import of Idealism, ' traces Green's metaphysical 
argument which argues that Spirit is not the 'crowning category' but is presupposed in all others (instead 
of following Hegel's system in which Spirit is realised in the individual only as an endpoint in the 
development of a vast impersonal Thought). 91 According to Green, personal self-realization was 
implicitly part of the universal process of spiritual evolution through which humanity was increasingly 
realising its divine 'self'. The worlds of human and divine experience are reconciled to Sinclair's 
satisfaction since identification with God is 'an ever-present fact' to be realised through increased 
knowledge: indeed thinking itself becomes a spiritual activity since the work of the mind brings the 
individual into closer union with Absolute Mind. 92 Yet given that, according to idealist principles, 
, mind' constitutes, or creates experience, it follows that the individual incurs a responsibility for the 
nature of her own thoughts. At the heart of Green's doctrine is the belief that, having disavowed an 
influencing external world, we are self-detennining beings: an opportunity is only 'tempting' to us when 
we pronounce it as such, nor can we any longer be excused as slaves to our passions. 93 Crucially, 
89 Sinclair, A Defence of Idealism, p. 302, p. 379. 
90 Ibid. p. 302. Sinclair describes the poet Jean de BosschUe as 'a master of sublimations. lie has the 
mystic vision' ('Introduction' to de BosschUe, A Closed Door, p. 3) 
91 Sinclair, 'Ethical and Religious Import of Idealism' New World, 2 (Dec 1893), 694-708, p. 694. 
92 Ibid. p. 705. 
93 T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, ed. A. C. Bradley (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899), p. 98. 
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Green's emphasis upon spiritual self-determination, necessitates a heightened moral vigilance in the 
individual subject. In 'The Flaw in the Crystal' which I go on to discuss, Agatha's thoughts are as 
reproachable as deed: 
, it mattered nothing that... she had sinned only in her thought; for Agatha, who knew, that 
was enough; more than enough; it counted more... For thought went wider and deeper than 
any deed., 94 
Arising out of a subjectivist philosophy the insistence upon ethical responsibility requires that the 
individual surmount the experiences which the same philosophy argues are the unavoidable ground of his 
being. As I will go on to suggest a belief in self-determination invests May Sinclair's emphasis upon the 
efficacy of the human will which is central both to her interest in the concept of sublimation, and her 
praise for 'the beauty of restraint'. The idea that 'thought [goes] wider and deeper than any deed' suggests 
the potency with which thinking is imbued in Sinclair's 'world of mind', a potency which exceeds that 
of physical acts - its effect going 'wider and deeper', the ethical consequences of which are developed in 
'The Flaw in the Crystal'. 
Taking his cue from a Christian and Greek morality, combining teleological purpose with social duty, 
Green is in no doubt that 'fellow-men' are always to be put before oneself. Self-realisation, or more 
accurately the realisation of self in the Absolute, is accomplished through self-sacrifice. As Sinclair 
explains, the logic of this unambiguous altruism arises from the individual's unity with an 'eternal 
subject' which brings with it an identification with the whole of humanity so that 'They are more than 
his brothers or his fellows - they are HE'. 
95 This union of the individual and the universal, named by 
Sinclair the 'deep mystery of our personality' is the subject of the chapter on Jane Harrison. 96 Whereas 
for Harrison the experience of 'brotherhood' or the social, is a sacred end in itself, for Sinclair the 
spiritual explanation is eclipsed by a moral duty which, ironically, is a means to a personal end: 'only in 
following selfless and universal ends can [man] realize his own. Not in a rhetorical figure, but in a 
profound truth, he that loses his life shall find it., 
97 Sinclair's argument acknowledges the paradox 
implicit in a dual demand for self-renunciation and self-realisation, yet she argues that altruism must 
, absorb' egoism: in the language of Hegel's dialectic, the difference of egoism is resolved into a higher 
unity of experience. As we will see, Sinclair's later adoption of 'sublimation' grafts itself onto a similar 
structural hierachy of moral experience. 
The perennial Christian wisdom, 'if I lose myself I find myself' resurfaces in the literature of the modem 
psychology which Sinclair reviewed: Jung recommends in 'New Paths' that 'Only through the mystery 
of self-sacrifice can a man find himself anew, ' prescribing the abandonment of cherished illusion in order 
94 Sinclair, 'The Flaw in the Crystal', English Review, 'I I (Sept 1912), 189-228, p. 225, p. 226. 
95 Sinclair, 'Ethical and Religious Import of Idealism', p. 702. 
96 Ibid. p. 706. 
97 Ibid. '[For The Absolute Idealists] the finding of one's life through the losing of it was the grand 
principle wherein alone was to be found the clue to the universal process of Spirit manifested alike in nature 
and in the mind of man' (Webb, Religious Thought in England since 1850, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933, 
p. 141-3). 
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to arrive at something 'deeper, fairer and more embracing' within. 98 Yet Green's earlier insistence upon 
self-sacrifice is specifically a denial of the pursuit of 'selfish' pleasures: he describes 'the conscientious 
man sacrificing personal pleasure in satisfaction of the claims of human brotherhood. 99 Altruism, or 
identification with others, demands a self-restraint which will then bring the reward of enhanced self- 
realisation. In this early work May Sinclair declares, accordingly, that: 'Every mean thought, every 
selfish passion is an actual limitation of [man's]personality ... through more perfect self-sacrifice, man 
will enlarge the bounds of his personality. ' 
100 Yet these contradictory demands of egoism and altruism 
resurface in Sinclair's fiction in less consoling form. Although there is a clear moral distinction here 
between the egoism of selfish passion and altruism of self-sacrifice, we will see the opposite formulation 
is also implicit in May Sinclair's fiction: self-sacrifice is a 'limitation' of personality (egoist) and 
passion 'enlarges the bounds' beyond the self (altruistic). As we will see, Sinclair's 'uncertainty about 
the value of passion, ' noted by Suzanne Raitt, disrupts a straightforward relation between the virtue of 
altruism and the 'beauty of restraint'. 
Self-renunciation shows itself to be a crucial aspect of Sinclair's espousal of Green's philosophy, 
stressing the ethical responsibilities of purity and restraint associated with a 'self-determining' being. Yet 
self-sacrifice, whatever its spiritual gains, must surely incur a loss. Dora Marsden, to return to her 
briefly, made just this point in her article aff irming 'The Power of the Will' where she lessens the rigour 
of her argument to concede that: 
'Self-determination, in short, is a decidedly limiting and cramping business, and in 
mortgaging our futures to it... we feel, no doubt, most delicately sorry for all our many 
once-possible but now snuffed-out selves'. 10 1 
I suggest that these 'once-possible' selves, seemingly 'snuffed out' by the logic and ethics of Sinclair's 
philosophical argument survive to populate her fiction. 
A lecture by the philosopher Henry Sidgwick, with which Sinclair would undoubtedly have been 
familiar, argues that T. H. Green's bid for self-realisation through self-sacrifice is not paradoxically 
enlightening but downright contradictory. Sidgwick thinks that Green's ethics call upon man to sacrifice 
not his 'True Good' but only the 'selfish passions' and instincts which he associates with an 'animal 
soul' and does not in the first place identify with himself. 102 In this light, Green's self-sacrifice would 
require the individual to forsake only those aspects of himself which he is already disinclined to own: I 
suggest that Green's 'self-sacrifice', which is a renunciation of the 'animal' bears resemblance to the 
98 Jung, 'New Paths in Psychology', first published in Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology (London 
1916), rev. 'The Psychology of the Unconscious Processes' in Collected Papers, (2nd edition, 1917); repr. 
Appendix 1, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology, trans. R. F. C. Hull (1953; London: Routledgc, 1990), p. 265. 
We have seen Frederic Myers' comparable belief in the Introduction. 
99 T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 330. 'The good citizen has no leisure to think of developing his own 
faculties of enjoyment' (ibid. ). 
100 Sinclair, 'Ethical and Religious Import of Idealism', pp. 704-705. 
10 1 Dora Marsden, 'The Power of the Will', Egoist, 5: 2 (Feb. 1918) 17-23, p. 23. 
102 Henry Sidgwick, Lectures on the Ethics of T. H. Green, Herbert Spencer and J. Alartineau (London: 
Macmillan, 1902), pxiii. 
'The Beauty Of Restraid 127 
psychoanalytic theory of sublimation held to 'transform' a libido commonly labelled 'the beast in the 
jungle'. As I go on to discuss May Sinclair was most receptive to the idea of sublimation, which I 
suggest would also present itself as a resolution of the second difficulty in Green's doctrine identified by 
Sidgwick: the problem of creativity. According to Green, 'true virtue' aims for the 'highest possible 
realisation of man's faculties' which includes artistic creativity and the pursuit of knowledge: 'the will 
for true good... is the will to know what is true, to make what is beautiful'. 103 Yet it is also 'to resist 
the allurements of pleasure... in the interest of some form of human society'. 
104 Sidgwick finds Green's 
anti-hedonism misguided, arguing that the ideal of self-denial in the interest of others inhibits 
development of the very faculties which would enhance self-realisation. Given Sidgwick's argument, the 
appeal of sublimation is obvious in resolving the problem of art by identifying the pursuit of aesthetic, 
cultural and intellectual achievements as the very process by which 'selfish' passions are, willingly and 
virtuously renounced: uniting, at least in theory, the antinomies of self-restraint and self-expression. 
Among Sinclair's papers there is an ink drawing by Jean de Bosschere which catches her as she writes 
The Defence of Idealism to which 'The Way of Sublimation' was to have been a sequel. She is dressed 
in black, an insect-like creature, with small dark wings attached to her body, standing stooped over a 
small writing desk, pen in one hand while the other stretches forward to cup the chin of a sphinx figure 
into whose gaze she stares earnestly. Long pins attach pages of her book to the sphinx's body. While 
immersed in this scholarly activity, rising up from the skirts of her dress, like a phantom, is a figure of a 
woman with large extended ochre butterfly wings, a crown on her head and holding in one hand a circle 
of thorns and in the other a heart pierced with arrows. 
105 This double image suggests May Sinclair 
achieving her own sublimation as she writes, offering up her martyred heart as she transcends her own 
bodily form. 
'The Way of Sublimation' 
it is perhaps fitting that in May Sinclair's prolific writing career 'The Way of Sublimation' was the one 
major text which remained incomplete: one hundred pages of unpublished typescript end abruptly, 
denying the reader the satisfaction of a conclusion in a mirroring of the failure of the theory of 
sublimation itself to provide May Sinclair with the resolution she sought. 
106 Appropriately Hegelian, 
May Sinclair assumes that psychoanalysis should contain within it a corresponding synthesis, thus 
providing a panacea for the disturbances it provokes: her regard for psychotherapy is contingent upon 
such a promise. In her narrative of the development of psychotherapy, Freud is responsible for the 
analysis, the minute examination and taking apart of the psyche, Adler identifies the psyche as seeking 
103 T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 307, pp. 311-2. 
104 T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, q. v. Sidgwick, Lectures on the Ethics, p. 69. 
105 Sinclair, 'The Way of Sublimation', unpublished typescript, p. 20, May Sinclair Papers. 'Drawing of May 
Sinclair by Jean de Bossch&e', May Sinclair Papers. Jean de BosscRre illustrated Sinclair's Uncanny Stories 
(London: Hutchinson, 1923). 
106 Edited extracts from 'The Way of Sublimation' repr. Sinclair, 'Two Clinical Lectures on Symbolism and 
Sublimation' I Medical Press and Circular (9 Aug, 1916), 118-122; 11 (16 Aug 1916), 142-5. 
I 
rThe Beauty Of Restrainf 128 
an 'end'; Jung refines the teleological goal, and compasses the means to achieve it. Although an 
understanding of Freud's psychoanalysis (from Three Essays on Sexuality and Interpretation of Dreams) 
informs the work and Sinclair is at pains to identify Adler as an important predecessor, 'The Way of 
Sublimation' was substantially in response to Jung's newly published Psychology of the Unconscious, 
and Collected Essays on Analytical Psychology. 
107 
No doubt echoing her own reading experience: 
'there are points at which even the unprejudiced student of this literature recoils and asks 
himself. Is it worth while going through so much to gain so little? He is, or was interested 
in psychotherapy; he understands perfectly that psychoanalysis is only a means to an 
ultimate psycho-synthesis, and he is lured by the vision of that "Sublimation" which is 
held out before him at the end. fie likes the sound of it. So he says, "Psychoanalysis is all 
very well; but when, oh when are we coming to the Synthesis? "' 108 
Sinclair alights upon the idea of sublimation with enthusiasm: it offers a 'solution' to the alternative 
fates of 'license or repression' outlined for the libido and enables her to adopt the 'new psychology' 
without having to accept that we can do nothing with the inherited furniture of the mind', our unwanted 
psychic heritage. Sinclair chastises the student who mistakenly despairs of a synthesis, criticising his 
impatience, not the hunger for synthesis: 
4as if the indestructible libido must either ramp outrageously in the open or burrow 
beneath us and undermine our sanity; as if Sublimation, the solution that [the psycho- 
analysts] do offer, were not staring us in face. 'I 09 
Reluctant to dwell in a divided and unresolved state, Sinclair insists that libido can be made acceptable 
and that the disruption of psychoanalysis' emphasis upon unconscious desire can be pushed outside the 
self. Sublimation puts desire out into the conscious world of cultural activity and beyond the boundaries 
of the self 
The psychoanalytic theory of sublimation proposed a psychological process by which the psychical 
energies associated with sexual desire could be 'transformed' to achieve alternative satisfaction in a 
cultural, intellectual or religious sphere. A term borrowed from chemistry where it describes 'the act of 
refining and purifying or freeing from baser qualities, ' it satisfies at once the philosophical idealist (who 
asks 'Where is the goal of human striving? ') and the moralist, reading the process as a freeing of the 
libido from base sexuality and its consecration to higher ends. I 10 The idea of sublimation, interpreted 
by Sinclair as 'the striving of the Libido towards manifestation in higher and higher forms, ' potentially 
describes the whole evolutionary process towards increased self-consciousness which is at the heart of her 
philosophical understanding: 'The whole evolution of man as a moral and social being has been a lifting 
107 Jung's Psychology of the Unconscious is 'a great and terrible book' (Sinclair, 'The Way of Sublimation', 
, May Sinclair Papers', p. 21). 
108 Ibid. p. 21. 
109 Ibid. p. 120. 
110 Ibid. p. 22. 
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of the libido out of the Unconscious into the Conscious and its direction by intelligence. 'I II At these 
points in her discussion, the description of sublimation itself reaches increasingly greater heights as she 
depicts a universal process of moral righteousness in which psychoanalysis enacts on a microcosmic 
scale the cosmic process. In this Sinclair is encouraged by what she interprets as Jung's 'ideal of social 
communion and high moral endeavour'. 
1 12 As we can see, from a passage in 'New Paths', which he 
later heavily revised, Jung proposes that psychoanalysis can indeed bring us closer to our fellow men: 
'Psychoanalysis has been accused of liberating man's (fortunately) repressed animal 
instincts and thus causing incalculable harm. This childish apprehension shows how little 
trust we place in the efficacy of our moral principles. .. It is true that analysis liberates the 
animal instincts, though not, as many would have it, with a view to giving them 
unbridled power, but rather to put them to higher uses, so far as this is possible for the 
individual concerned and so far as he requires such "sublimation"... If people can be 
educated to see the lowly side of their own natures, it may be hoped that they will also 
learn to understand and to love their fellow men better... 
This funnelling of the individual conflict into the general moral problem puts 
psychoanalysis far outside the confines of a merely medical therapy. It gives the patient a 
working philosophy of life. ' 113 
Not dissimilar to T. H. Green's idealism, the 'philosophy' of psychoanalysis concerns itself with the 
regulation of sexual morality and the individual's betterment through an increased identification with 
humanity, yet differs in finding the unity not - in this stage at least of Jung's development - through a 
common divinity but by virtue of their shared 'animal instincts'. Sexuality and morality were 
inextricably implicated in the early psychoanalytic theories, and not exclusively in Freud's work. 
Sinclair's 'The Way of Sublimation' initially avows that Libido is not just sexual instinct: 'I use this 
word (so repulsive to the idealist) in Jung's sense of Creative Energy, in which it is equivalent to the 
Will to Live of Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, the 'need' or 'want' of Samuel Butler, the Life-Force, 
or elan vital of Bergson'. 
114 Yet, further on in the text Sinclair increasingly names 'Sexual Libido or 
Desire' and identifies 'primordial sexual desire' as responsible for 'the whole amount of the tremendous 
driving power stored up in the Unconscious'. 
115 Furthermore, although this is rarely commented upon, 
looking to the early Jung which Sinclair herself read, we discover less his &sense of Creative Energy' 
than a predominantly sexualised libido. In passages deleted from subsequent revisions Jung reiterates the 
'erotic' and 'sexual' nature of unconscious conflict which he describes as of 'universal prevalence' and 
admits to 'something of a sexual problem today': a pent-up energy restricted by present-day sexual 
moral ity. 116 
III Ibid. p. 25. 
112 Ibid. p. 101. 
113 Jung, 'New Paths in Psychology', Two Essays On Analytical Psychology, p. 267. 
114 Sinclair, 'The Way of Sublimation', p. 23. 
115 Ibid. p. 25. 
116 Jung, 'New Paths in Psychology', p. 257, p. 259, p. 265. 
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Although she was dismayed by its so-called 'contents', 117 May Sinclair was not unduly dismayed by 
the emerging theory of the psychoanalytic unconscious which gave reassuring confirmation (important to 
an idealist) of a unified psyche, even if opinions differed as the nature of the ultimate unity. Second only 
to the significance of sublimation was the explanation offered by psychoanalysis of how, through the use 
of symbols, unconscious psychic states are in communication with the conscious mind. Following her 
reading of Jung, Sinclair describes how the symbol functions as a bridge, forming an 'indissoluble link 
between primitive emotion and developed concept,. l 18 These symbols with their 'source and hiding 
place' in the 'Unconscious' pass into our awareness mainly via our dreams. Yet all such symbols, 
6persistent and recurrent, ' represent 'man's primitive and incomplete effort at Sublimation': what they are 
communicating to the conscious mind is the still active presence of the libido. 119 However cannily 
disguised, all symbols, insists Sinclair taking her lead from the acknowledged experts, are 
unambiguously libidinous: 'sexual Libido or Desire... chooses its own symbols, saturate[s] them with 
its emotion and fixes them'. 
120 Symbols offer camouflage yet if all symbols, according to May 
Sinclair's reading of psychoanalysis, are a disguise of the libido, it can equally be said that all symbols 
betray that which they intend to hide. 
May Sinclair's exaction in defining the Image as apart from symbolism can be reread in the context of 
her understanding of the psychoanalytic symbol. Imagism, she insists, 'is not Symbolism,. 121 
'Imagism is, in fact, a return to reality, to direct vision. It is good-bye to the mere symbol. ' 122 In the 
visual arts too, 'Modem art has been getting rid of its symbols as fast as it can. It has been impatient for 
direct contact with the real'. 123 Whereas symbolism is murkily associated with the libido, the 
transparency of the Image resists analysis, promising a clarity of presentation without disguise, or 
betrayal: 'Presentation not Representation is the watchword of the school. '124 However, this direct 
presentation itself, as I argue, cannot free itself ultimately from the libido and becomes eroticised as a 
close encounter, a naked contact. 
125 Significantly, Sinclair adds in parenthesis: '(We are not saying that 
Sex is an unimportant or unholy or unspiritual thing. Far otherwise. ')126 While on the one hand 
Sinclair read psychoanalysis as offering a synthesis to the philosophical and psychic antinomies which I 
have described, on the other hand the libido was unmistakably the strongest current of the theory and one 
which would always threaten any synthesis that psychoanalysis itself proposed. The drawing of Sinclair 
4sublimating' as she writes, depicts a process which in practice is always liable to overthrow itself. The 
117 The contents of the unconscious 'may be repellent to [a woman's] religious, moral and aesthetic sense' 
(Sinclair, 4The Way of Sublimation' p. 5). 
118 Ibid. p. 32. 
119 Ibid. p. 5. 
120 Ibid. p. 8- 
121 Sinclair, 'Two Notes', p. 88. 
122 Sinclair, 'The Poems of F. S. Flint'. p. 7. 
123 Sinclair, 'The Way of Sublimation', p. 96. 
124 Sinclair, 'Two Notes', p. 88. 
125 'As if, in terror of its own nakedness, [the libido] sought a dress'; metaphysical dreams offer the Libido 
4his happiest hunting ground' (Sinclair, 'The Way of Sublimation', p. 31, p. 13). 
126 Ibid. p. 132. 
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threat, she warns, lies in the creative imagination of the artist which works with 'an immense trail' of 
unsublimated material from the unconscious: 'An enormous amount of the best poetry is erotic. And if 
you throw in the beautiful formless phantasy which is the raw material of poetry and is turned out in 
enormous quantities by people who are not and never will be artists, but are poets and seers for certain 
brief moments of their adolescence, the proportion becomes simply overwhelming. '127 
Artistic achievements, then, are no guarantee of sublimation since the conscious 'end' is as erotically 
laden as the unconscious origin. When May Sinclair examines each of the pathways by which the libido 
can transform itself. Art, Science, Religion and 'Concrete Activity', she finds that each fails in some 
way to offer a satisfactory and total sublimation, finally admitting that the synthesis 'does not seem to 
hold together very well'. 128 Focusing on mysticism as the fashionably popular religion, she claims that 
the Christian mystics evidently failed to sublimate their libidos: the emotionalism of their mystical 
experiences witness no more than a resurfacing of their repressed desires. 
129 They speak 'of sensuous, 
almost of sensual, emotion, so voluptuous that it must be confessed it ]ends itself to the 
misinterpretation of the profane. '130 While mistrusting the mystic for seeking God in 'the darkest and 
most secret recesses of his own soul', art too, as we have seen, 'bears the hidden peril of unsublimated 
libido. 131 Yet art is not entirely dismissed: Sinclair singles out the 'redemptive' function of catharsis, 
best demonstrated by the Greek tragedian in which the 'passions' lose their 'deadliest power' when they 
are subjected to 'a clearjet of laughter, or [soused] in a cold bath of intellect'. 
'[The Greek tragedian] knew the swamping and obliterating effect of "unsublimated" 
passions, and he abstained from letting them loose in his drama ... Hence the strength and 
beauty and the unassailable purity of the Greek tragic drama. '132 
The 'unassailable purity' is the effect of restraint -'abstained from letting [passions] loose' - suggesting 
that in this instance, sublimation is a restraint, not transformation of libido. 
it becomes increasingly apparent in 'The Way of Sublimation' that although sublimation could be 
represented as a tidy solution, the intra-psychic dynamic was not a neat exchange: 'in man we have a 
creature in whom the libido is actually in conflict with itself and with its own sublimation. ' It is 
interesting how the 'conflict' becomes a property of the libido rather than of man: the concept of the 
libido provides a psychic object with which to identify everything which (as Sidgwick suggested about 
Green) the individual would not wish to identify with himself. No longer a naturally evolving process, 
Sinclair now describes a struggle with a recalcitrant beast: the 'sinful secret libido' must be 'dragged out 
of its hiding place in the Unconscious into full consciousness and thus made clean'. 133 At the same 
127 Ibid. p. 101. 
128 Ibid. p. 134. 
129 Sinclair, Defence of Idealism, p. 303. 
130 'The "Gitanjah": or Song-Offerings of Rabindra Nath Tagore', North American Review, 197 (May 1913), 
p. 666. 
131 Sinclair, 'The Way', p. I 10. 
132 Ibid. p. 91. 
133 Ibid. p. 27. 
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time as an anthropomorphised libido conveniently procures sexuality as its own, the idea of libido 
complicates questions of self-identity since if the individual is not identified with libido at its lower end 
in the den of the unconscious, how can he own its higher cultural manifestations? Is it implied that the 
quality of the libido (like the crystal) will shift depending on whether you hold it to the light or against 
darkness: when May Sinclair speaks of sublimation seeking 'redemption of the soul from the tyranny of 
the flesh, ' the libido is both the soul which needs redeeming and the flesh which tyrannises. 134 The 
libido is described as being tugged upwards towards the light of consciousness by the activity of 
sublimation and backwards into unconscious darkness by the mechanism of repression, in a 
dramatisation of a process which perhaps speaks more simply of a woman in conflict with herself. As 
Judith Butler remarks, in Freud's psychic topography, he makes no mention of an external law which 
operates upon the libido: both repression and sublimation are mechanisms which are themselves a 
'libidinal activity': 'the renunciation takes place through the very desire that is renounced, which is to 
say, the desire is never renounced, but becomes preserved and reasserted in the very structure of 
renunciation'. 
135 Sinclair's discussion of sublimation can be read as a frustrated search to escape the 
implications of this dialectic. 
if the libido is indestructible, as psychoanalysis argues, how can it be transformable? Surprisingly Jung 
and to an even greater extent Freud were circumspect in describing the process of sublimation which they 
both admitted to be crucial to the civilisation of society and the individual, omitting to say how much 
of the process was conscious and rational and how much involuntary. In Three Essays on Sexuality, 
where the first mention of sublimation occurs, Freud describes the mental forces impeding the flow of 
the sexual instinct as 'dams', of 'disgust, feelings of shame and the claims of aesthetic and moral ideals'; 
sublimation is the mechanism which builds these constructions 'so important for the growth of a 
civilised and normal individual'. 
136 Rather than representing sublimation as the engineering of 
constructive obstacles May Sinclair suggests (following Jung) that the process is a transferral of the flow 
of instinct to higher ends: it is a 'conscious direction of the libido into higher channels'. 
137 Yet how is 
unconscious libido related to the conscious will of the psyche? Early on in the text Sinclair has 
commented that 'a man's will is greater than his just,. 
138 When Sinclair acknowledges gratitude towards 
psychoanalysis for developing a 'conception of desire and Will' beyond its previously limited theoretical 
terrain are desire and Will equivalent or opposed? Sinclair admits that in the interest of clarity she has 
restricted herself to using the term libido when she would have liked to switch between 'primal need, 
want, Will-to-live, desire, wish, liking, affection, interest, love and will'. 
139 Will, lust, desire, love: 
Sinclair argues for the unity of a psyche seemingly rift with divisions. 
134 Ibid. p. 27, p. 35. 
135 Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), p. 56. 
136 Sigmund Freud, Three Essays on Sexuality, (1905), Penguin Freud Library, 7, p. 93-4. 
137 Sinclair, 'The Way of Sublimation', p. 6 
138 Ibid. p. 41. 
139 Ibid. p. 136. 
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The second edition of Jung's Collected Papers, published in 1917, includes a heavily revised version of 
the 1916 essay 'New Paths', entitled 'Psychology of the Unconscious Processes, ' which now reviews the 
extent to which he believes libido can be consciously directed: 
'Hitherto the supposition prevailed, that this newly acquired energy was at the patient's 
conscious disposal, that he might apply it in any way he liked. In so far as it was thought 
that the energy was nothing but the sexual impulse, people spoke of a sublimated 
application of the same, under the presumption that the patient could, without further ado, 
transfer what was thought of as sexual energy into a "sublimation"; that is, into a non- 
sexual form of use. It might, for instance, be transferred to the cultivation of an art, or to 
some other good or useful activity. '] 
40 
Jung goes on to suggest that this energy is not available to conscious control, moreover, too 'rigid' and 
'conscious' use of the will can be injurious in denying the 'accidentalness' which is the nature of this 
unconscious energy. The 'present fearful catastrophic world-war' offers disturbing proof to Jung that the 9: 1 
, irrationality of destiny ordained otherwise than the rationality of the well-meaning thinker'. 141 In 
Jung's priviliging of an ordained irrationality we can see the seeds of his later theory of synchronicity 
which finds meaning in 'accidentalness'. The war is the barbaric culmination of a civilisation excessively 
structured upon reason which now shows itself blown apart by the energies it intended to compass. 
Similarly, sublimation in the individual which aims at an expedient disposal of sexual energy will 
always be undermined by the very irrational and incontrollable nature of what it aims to control. Jung 
opposes conscious will to power with a seemingly stronger and somehow more natural force of 
unconscious, irrational destiny. Psychic energy, acccording to Jung, insists upon having its own 
condition fulfilled. 
'What is called "will" in the individual is called "imperialism" in nations; for all will is 
demonstration of power over fate ... 
just as the idea of a world civilisation received a fearful 
correction at the hands of war, so the individual must often learn in his life that so-called 
'disposable' energies are not his to dispose... It is unhappily the case that no man can 
direct the so-called disposable ene; gy at will., 142 
The spectre of war is a sanguine check upon the illusion of control both for the nation and the individual 
and raises the question whether civilisation is built upon a vast system of sublimations or repressions, 
As the line between the two became less obvious ('The Way of Sublimation' was to have followed 
Defence of idealism which was published in 1917), this may also have contributed to Sinclair 
forestalling her own views on sublimation. 
Perhaps responding to the critics of 'imperialist' will, May Sinclair makes the further distinction that 
, only the creative, the enlightened and progressive will is holy'. In creating a third category, I suggest 
140 Jung, 'Psychology of the Unconscious Processes', Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology, 2nd 
edition, 1917, p. 397. 
141 Ibid. p. 399. 
142 Jung, 'On the Psychology of the Unconscious', Two Essays, para. 74, p. 50; para. 94, p. 62. 
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she is trying to break free of the psychoanalytic terms within which she is articulating her argument. We 
can understand this aspect of her thought more clearly if we consider how May Sinclair's keenest 
engagement both with philosophical idealism and psychoanalysis is with the theoretical promise, in each 
discourse, of liberation from self and the body, whether through belief in the Absolute, or sublimation as 
a way of both resolving and transcending mortal passions. 143 Her fiction, as I will argue, more 
troublingly traverses this theoretical territory, and in so doing problematises the ease of such a 
distinction between material and immaterial realms of experience. Judith Butler, in The Psychic Life of 
Power, dissects the logic with which Hegel and Freud attempt to exceed the bounds of their own 
theoretical argument. She skilfully demonstrates how argument which relies upon dialectical reversal is 
enmeshed within its own polarised terms so that, for instance, both the Hegelian body, and Freudian id 
instincts are forever implicated in their opposite term despite the theoretical procedures of suppression. 
Butler argues that Hegel's philosophy conceives of the transition to spirit as a move to a realm beyond 
that ruled by the dialectical reversals of his own logic. His dialectic proceeeds by an interplay of 
opposites in which each term always inheres in the other: accordingly an act of self-sacrifice would 
invoke its own opposite and thus be always as egoistic as it was altruistic. Where Hegel conceives of the 
move to Spirit, the pinnacle of his triple dialectic, as a movement to a world beyond these mutual 
implications, and similarly sublimation proposes achievements which 'exceed the dialectical reversal by 
which they are generated, ' Butler argues that there is no third term: self-sacrifice can then never refer 
beyond the self, nor can body ever be renounced. 144 Suppression of bodily experience, or self-feeling 
consequently becomes an impossibility and 'leads to its opposite -a self-congratulatory or self- 
aggrandizing assertion of desire, will, the body' and 'the ethical regulation of bodily impulses becomes 
the focus and aim of impulse itself'. 145 To reflect upon May Sinclair, her search to exceed the 4error of 
dualism' can be read as an attempt to escape the terms of her own experience within which she is 
impossibly implicated; the 'beauty of restraint' speaks of an aesthetic, and ethical assertion of will over 
bodily impulse. 
if we return now to Dora Marsden, we can see how these ideas are present in her exegesis of the 
philosophy of egoism (now named 'lingual psychology'). Having established its foundation in the 
&power of the I' a later article in the columns of The Egoist elaborates the individual's relationship to the 
world in terms of 'The Power of the Will' in which the ability to be objective becomes a form of 
execution of a sublimated will. Marsden distinguishes between human and 'subhuman' or 'will-less' 
experience according to 'the power to apprehend items of experience as clear-cut units'. By virtue of this 
sense of 'saliency, ' experience 'stands cut in striking and isolated units' and enables human beings to 
apprehend an objective world which is 'clear-cut' and apart from self. 146 In contrast, 'subhuman' 
experience is described as 'destitute of objectivity': the subject is inextricably and, in Marsden's 
143 Sinclair reminds her readers of Ilegel's emphasis on Spirit, which she sees neglected by many of his 
followers in deference to Thought (Defence of Idealism, p. 32 1). 
144 Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power, p. 58. 
145 Ibid. p. 57-8. 
146 Dora Marsden, 'The Power of the Will', Egoist, 5 (Feb 1918), p. 19. 
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judgement, quite pitifully bound by uncontrolled, instinctive reactions to the world, so that he becomes 
&overly implicated' therein. 147 There are inevitable parallels to be drawn between these 'striking isolated 
units' and the intentions of the Imagists, captured by Monro's description of their method to 'model 
little detached patterns of words'. 148 It being a mark of the rational human, Marsden judges that the 
greater man's ability to objectivise experience the better: 'The man of genius... is what he is precisely in 
virtue of an intense power of 'taking hold' of phenomena... The power to objectivise his experience is 
possessed in such an outstanding degree that there results a force and clarity in respect of it - 149 This 
power to objectivise is proportionate to the force with which it is controlled: 
'The greater the degree, the greater the saliency and also the restraint. It seems, indeed, that 
the reverse side to the saliency of human experience is restraint, and these two are the 
characteristics which united together yield objectivity... Ability to restrain force is quite 
regularly the accompaniment and consequence of the ability to exercise it. '150 
Restraint implicates itself in force, for without it there would be no need for restraint: 'united together 
[they] yield objectivity' which is the exercise of the sublimated will. The 'beauty of restraint' is an 
aesthetic of sublimation which appeals both as moral requirement and aesthetic ideal in Sinclair's 
writing. Now we can see that May Sinclair's fictional and non-f ictional writings reveal the psychological 
arguments underpinning these key strands and definitions of the modernist aesthetic. 
6MY world... without beginning and without end' 
The trials and precariousness of sublimation are not, however, the only thing troubling Sinclair's attempt 
to secure a path towards restraint. Inherent in Sinclair's commitment to the Absolute - which we already 
saw unsettling the philosophical distinction between 'idealism' and 'realism' - is an interest in the 
metaphysical union which brings a dissolution of the ego. For Sinclair this interest extends to a 
preoccupation with liminal psychic states which also challenge the boundaries of individuality. These 
psychic states and phenomena, while linking subjects apparently seamlessly and potentially, therefore, 
altruistically, can be seen to open up a faultline in the individual psyche which a number of Sinclair's 
fictional writings examine, yet as I will suggest, they fail to redeem. 
Having dismissed 'The Mystic Way [as] the surest way backwards and in, ' Sinclair develops her 
argument in 'Way of Sublimation' to suggest, towards tile text's premature conclusion, that she has been 
unduly harsh in her condemnation. Indeed, the intended title 'Way of Sublimation' marks an obvious 
parallel to the 'Mystic Way' described by Evelyn Underhill as 'the psychological process by which the 
[mystic] personality is able to set up direct relations with the Absolute'. 151 If sublimation is proposed 
as the &psychological process' which ennables such a relation with 'the Absolute, ' Sinclair is marking 
147 Ibid. p. 21 
148 Harold Monroe, 'Some Imagists Discussed', Egoist, 2 (May 1915), p. 78. 
149 Marsden, 'The Power of the Will', p. 22. 
150 Ibid. p. 21. 
151 Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism, (1911; rev. London: Methuen, 1930), p. 167. 
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both her commitment to mysticism and a conviction in the implacable ties between the transcendent and 
the libido, the erotic and the holy. In fact mysticism and libido are intwined in her work, so as to 
sometimes appear interchangeable: in Defence of Idealism, Sinclair confesses 'Mysticism is as 
indestructible as the human libido'. 152 Yet Sinclair does suggest that the most effective form of 
sublimation is provided by metaphysical argument, and it is in terms of its sophistication of thought by 
which she judges the sublimative promise of a religious solution: whereas 'the Christian idea of God 
was never wholly sublimated by thought', the 15th century Indian poet Kabir speaks a 'mysticism which 
has passed through the last fires of thought. It is utterly sublimated. '153 
Furthermore 'the idea of the Absolute... is a very late and highly 'sublimated' idea'. 154 Indeed the path 
of eastern mysticism appealed to Sinclair for the harmony of its beliefs with the tenets of absolute 
idealism: in both, the identity between human and divine worlds promise an idea of union in which 
difference, or duality is absorbed, or lost: in Kabir's words, 'He makes the inner and the outer worlds to 
be indivisibly one'. 155 Both doctrines assure not only a sublimation of the libido, but an annihilation 
of individuality itself -'the utter exinction of the individual as such' - which, in the case of Buddhism, 
is attained 'by simply ceasing to desire'. 
156 yet, it could be said that Sinclair's writing demonstrates 
the complexities of 'ceasing to desire. A passage from her novel The Three Sisters describes an 
embattled process: 
I [Gwendolyn] found that there was nothing like Thought to keep you from thinking. She 
took to metaphysics as you take to dram-drinking. She must have strong, heavy stuff that 
drugged her brain. And when she found that she could trust her intellect she set it 
deliberately to fight her passion. 'I 57 
Eastern mystics, too, recommend ascetism: The Buddhist Suttas advise the subjugation of certain 
'Asavas' which May Sinclair translates in a footnote as meaning 'life-streams'. The primary Asavas or 
Ilifestreams' to be overcome are those of lust and life, or put differently sensuality and individuality. 158 
inevitably, there is more than one 'Way' to the Absolute and it is a difference of approach which, I 
suggest, importantly divides Sinclair and Underhill. Their differences are made explicit in an 
unpublished letter of 1913 in which Evelyn Underhill defends Christian mysticism from Sinclair's 
152 Sinclair, Defence of Idealism, p. 289, p. 283. 
153 Ibid. p. 306. 
154 Ibid. p. 277. 
155 Kabir, Poem 'IX', One Hundred Poems Of Kabir, p. 26. 'Nothing that [Sinclair] has written is more 
interesting than the contrasts she draws between eastern and western mysticism' ('Review' of May Sinclair, 
Defence of Idealism by M. W. Robieson, International Journal of Ethics 28 (1917-18), 563-567, p. 566). 
156 Sinclair, Defence of Idealism, p. 316, p. 369. Sinclair became familiar with an Eastern mysticism from 
translations of the Upanishads and Vedas, Buddhist Suttas, and from the poetry of Rabindra Nath Tagore - the 
'great mystic poet of Bengal' - and his translations of the fifteenth-century Indian poet Kabir - the 'greatest of 
them all' (ibid. p-661). 
157 Sinclair, Three Sisters (1914; London: Virago, 1982), p. 352. 
158 Sinclair, Defence of Idealism, p. 396 n. 62. It is advised in the Buddhist Suttas that the 'Asavas' - 
interpreted as sensuality, individuality and ignorance - shoud be abandoned by insight, subjugation, right 
use, endurance, avoidance, removal and cultivation: methods which work to 'destroy that Craving Thirst' 
(Buddhist Suttas, trans. from Pali, by T. W. Rhys Davids (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 188 1), p. 307. 
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accusation of 'selfish satisfaction' and imputes Sinclair's 'dear Brahmins and Buddhists' with harbouring 
its own egoism. Thinking, as far as Sinclair is concerned is both a sublimatory process and a spiritual 
activity which ultimately arrives at an utter extinction of the individual, and his passions, in the 
'Absolute': the realising of the Hindu wisdom 'that art thou'. Yet it is interesting to consider Sinclair's 
position according to the principles of the Christian Western mysticism which was being put forward by 
Underhill at the same time. According to Underhill, the metaphysics of the eastern doctrines reduce God 
to an intellectualized abstraction; Underhill's idea of the mystic's union with God is of one brought 
about 'by love, not by knowledge'. 
159 She describes the soul's union as a 'love union, a mutual 
inhabitation, ' between man and God 'distinct, yet ever united'. But it is the Christian mystic's 
representations of this love union which Sinclair labels 'entirely self-centred', displaying arrogance in 
having won 'God's love' for themselves. 160 For Underhill, on the other hand the idea of 'total 
obliteration' is distastefully egoistic: it is 'a self-mergence which leaves no place for personality, ' 
personality being intrinsic to a Christian belief inspired by Christ's own return to earth motivated by 
love for his fellow-men. 161 Underhill sees the Christian attitude as founded upon a 'warmly vital and 
more truly mystic, outgoing and fruitful, world-renewing attitude of Love'. 162 In other words the 
Christian ideal, by virtue of preserving personality, enables altruism. 
To quote the letter at length: 
tannihilation is one thing, [but] the perfect self-surrender of love, which leaves personality 
intact & yet makes that personality... [a] divine instrument, seems to me quite another 
thing -a rich, fruitful, life-spending thing: &I cannot agree that the Hindu ideal is that. if 
the Hindu does find the Divine as you say, so fully immanent - in the Here & Now, why 
does he devote his energies to getting away from the Here-&-Now instead of bringing out 
of the hiddenness, & actualising its potential reality? What ever he may say on this subject 
in his more lucid moments, his general system seems to me only comprehensible as a 
4way of escape'. Its true he has not got that horrible dualism, a godless world set over 
against its Creator... but his objective is a full stop, & the christian objective is just the 
opposite - 'It shall be our last perfection to become the cause of other things. ' No doubt 
the Hindu can make a splendid case for himself metaphysically - but surely not vitally? 
The Man method of describing Union may be paradoxical & open to attack - yet I'm 
convinced its nearer reality than any description, however logical, which involves total 
obliteration of the subject-object relation, or the achievement of a point at which, as one 
159 Evelyn Underhill, 'Introduction' to One Hundred Poems Of Kabir, trans. Rabindranath Tagore, (1915; 
Madras: Macmillan, 1985), p. 16. 
160 Sinclair, Defence of Idealism, p. 288. 
161 Underhill, 'Introduction', One Hundred Poems Of Kabir, p. 11. 
162 Evelyn Underhill, The Mystic Way: a psychological study in Christian origins (London: Dent, 1913), 
p. 2 1; q. v. Sinclair, Defence, p. 394, n. 54. 
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Hindu philosopher explained to me with much pride 'the word love becomes 
meaningless'. 163 
Importantly, the terms of their difference is specifically over the definition of 'union' which, is at the 
heart of the mystical experience, or moment. Whereas, as we have seen, Sinclair describes a union in 
which self and divine are identical, 'total obliteration of the subject-object relaiton', Underhill maintains 
that the individual remains 'distinct, yet ever united'. While this may seem a technicality of interest only 
to the theologian, it is striking to note how the emphatically held metaphysical positions of these two 
women so clearly address issues of egoism and altruism and thinking about limits of selfhood which we 
find at the heart of aesthetic questions of modernism. In the case of Sinclair, as we will now see, her 
metaphysics leads to, or contains within it, a preoccupation with liminal psychic states and phenomena 
which offer an even more forceful and disturbing challenge to her belief in sublimation. 
When One Hundred Poems of Kabir were translated by Tagore in 1915, Sinclair found conf innation of 
the 'utterly' sublimated world she sought; in this world: 'discussions as to individuality lost, or 
individuality preserved have little meaning'. 164 Having retracted a prior statement she made about 
whether in fact individuality is preserved in the union with the Absolute, Sinclair goes on to add a 'third 
alternative' belief which she assigns to 'poets, who are the seers of Reality': this third alternative is 'that 
[the selQ may have identity and lose it, and recover it and lose it again'. 
165 Defence of Idealism is a 
search for the conditions of individuality. Having come up against the limitations of memory, self- 
feeling and will to sufficiently define a sense of self, in the final chapter, entitled 'New Mysticism, May 
Sinclair arrives at a doctrine of personal identity which embraces a unity of consciousness greater than 
the individual ego. She concludes that 'the self is something over and above its own experience, its own 
memories, and its own organism'. 
166 
'Selfhood is not necessarily individuality. If our selves existed before birth, they would 
seem to have existed as members of a group-self, or as mysterious partakers in the 
experiences of millions of individuals; anyhow in a manner utterly incompatible with 
individuality as we understood it here and now. 'I 67 
Selfliood extends beyond the limits of individuality: 
I in our experience here and now, though our selthood would seem to remain inviolable, 
our individuality holds its own precariously, at times, and with difficulty against the 
forces that tend to draw us back to our racial consciousness again. The facts of multiple 
163 See Evelyn Underhill, 'Kabir, The Weaver Mystic, ' Contemporary Review, (Feb. 1914), 193-200. 
164 Sinclair, Defence, p. 319. Ironically, Evelyn Underhill's 'Introduction' to Kabir is equally enthusiastic but 
finds in his verse a confirmation of the love, not thought, which she believes to motivate religious mysticism. 
Moreover, Underhill considers Kabir to avoid the 'soul-destroying conclusions' of the very monism - that is 
'the identity of substance between God and the soul' - for which we see Sinclair honour him (Underhill, 
'Introduction', One Hundred Poems Of Kabir, trans. Rabindranath Tagore, assisted by Evelyn Underhill, 1915; 
repr. Madras: Macmillan, 1985, p. 11). 
165 Sinclair, Defence, p. 316. 
166 Ibid. p. 356. 
167 Ibid. p. 375. 
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personality, telepathy and suggestion, the higher as well as the lower forms of dream- 
consciousness, indicates that our psychic life is not a water-tight compartment, but has 
porous walls, and is continually threatened with leakage and the flooding in of many 
streams. '168 
Reviewing 'The Poetry of F. S. Flint' for The English Review May Sinclair defines the contemporary 
aesthetic as at its most modem when most nearly representing the conscious psyche: 'it is in rendering 
psychological states, in presenting unaltered and unabridged the truth of ordinary reality, that the modem 
poet most shows his modernity; in sticking, that is to say, close to consciousness. ' Omitted from the 
published version, the holograph copy of Sinclair's essay goes on to add: 'The consciousness may be far 
from ordinary'. 169 This deletion suggests an editing out of May Sinclair's own interest in those states 
of consciousness which were 'far from ordinary' and in so doing indicates a tension between her two 
relations to the new psychology. While on the one hand the modernist aesthetic, as Sinclair herself had 
been the first to describe in Richardson's prose, presents 'unabridged' the writer's 'stream of 
consciousness'; on the other hand Sinclair found seductive confirmation of her (metaphysical) belief that 
the self is something 'over and above' itself through the study of psychological states beyond 'ordinary' 
consciousness evidenced by telepathy, spiritualism, mysticism, and dream-consciousness. 
Sinclair's belief in the evolving process of time bringing an ever-increasing consciousness of the world 
of mind beyond our individual mind underpinned her interest in psychic phenomena. Agreeing to 
introduce C. A. Dawson Scott's From Four Who Are Dead, (which transcribes exchanges with several 
spirits of the departed, including her husband, a great-uncle and a cousin) Sinclair suspends her 
judgement between the four explanations (for as many spirits) which she provides: 
'either (1) Mrs Dawson Scott really knew what it is not likely she should have known, or 
(2) that her subconscious tapped the mind of some other living person, or (3) that the 
subconscious produces this sort of thing spontaneously without a hint from consciousness, 
or (4) that we should accept the script as it is given, as coming supernormally from a 
world beyond death and as telling of that world: a world the planes of which intersect, 
mysteriously and invisibly, our own, a world where knowledge is being and to think is to 
create, a world that, infinitely more than our world, is 'a world of thought'. 170 
The alternative interpretations, reminiscent of Freud's description of the overdetermincd meanings 
produced by dreamwork, will be seen to repeat the multiple readings provoked by Sinclair's fiction 
which similarly questions psychic boundaries. Yet, while careful to avoid identifying her own position, 
the last explanation is highly resonant of Sinclair's belief articulated in her philosophical writing that 
168 Ibid. 
169 Sinclair, 'The Poems of F. S. Flint', English Review, 32 (Jan 1921), p. 16; 'The Poems of F. S. Flint', 
holograph copy, May Sinclair Papers. 
170 Sinclair, 'Introduction', C. A. Dawson Scott, From Four who are Dead: messages to CA. Dawson Scott 
(London: Arrowsmith, 1926), p. 7. Dawson Scott, founder of the P. E. N. club in 1921, mentions that she has been 
texperimenting - sitting - with Miss May Sinclair' whom she hopes will one day communicate these 
experiences to the world (ibid. p. 31). 
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'knowledge is being and to think is to create'. We see that an idealist belief in a 'world is mind' lends 
itself readily to an understanding of phenomena which transcend the material world; idealism is then not 
just an abstract theoretical position, its argument with realists is also an argument for a more open- 
minded belief in phenomena which do not conform to our expectations of the material world. 
May Sinclair's curiosity in what she termed the 'Borderland' was consistent with her belief in a world of 
mind, yet she was wary of professing too much interest in the phenomena associated with the occult. 
Sinclair admits in Defence to having already so much jeopardised her reputation with her belief in the 
Absolute that 'I simply cannot afford to be suspected of tenderness, or even toleration for the professors 
of the occult,. 171 Yet in the early twentieth century the overlap between 'occult' and the psychological 
were not terribly distinct. In the same year that Defence was published May Sinclair wrote a letter to the 
Society for Psychical Research of which she was a member, (from 1914) as indeed were Freud and 
William James, contributing to a debate about the evidence for spiritual survival beyond death. 
In this letter May Sinclair brings recent psychoanalytic theory to bear upon 'abnormal' psychic 
phenomena to suggest that unconscious desire to produce evidence of spirits may influence the 
production of the evidence itself. the so-called communications from the dead may in fact be voicing the 
desire of the living. Furthermore, unconscious desire would then be seen to operate beyond the domain 
of the individual psyche since the case under discussion involves startlingly accurate cross- 
correspondences in a series of automatic scripts produced by two experimenting mediums. May Sinclair 
suggests that these inexplicable coincidences do not necessarily indicate spirit intervention from the dead 
but may point instead to the influence of 'telepathy in the form of control from the fiving: impelled by 
a common desire for evidence, the 'subconscious minds' of the mediums might have collaborated to 
produce the elaborate dove-tailing in the scripts. The astonishing results may communicate only the 
original desire for evidence rather than the desired evidence itself. She is suggesting that the boundaries 
of individual consciousness are breached by desire. Until the limits of the 'collaborating powers of 
subconscious minds' are known, how can it be judged what might surpass them. 172 Sinclair boldly 
asserts: 'psychologically, desire, conscious or 'sub-conscious', if it be strong enough, is the most 
purposeful and designing thing in the universe. ' 
173 
Although symbol-formation in dreams communicated an unwelcome unconscious content, Sinclair held 
another relation to psychoanalysis which appreciated the study of dream consciousness for its indication 
of the 'extra-ordinary power of the psyche' beyond ordinary consciousness. Sinclair directs her readers to 
171 Sinclair, Defence of Idealism, p. 296. 
172 Sinclair, Letter 'To the Editor of the Journal of the SPR', JSPR, 18 (Feb-Mar 1918), p. 149. 
173 Sinclair, 'On Evidence of Survival' Letter 'To the Editor of the Journal of the SPR', JSPR, 18 (May-Jun 
1918), 67-8, p. 67. Sinclair's letter provoked respondents to question whether the psychical researcher could 
trust desire. Does it work with or against him, seeking spiritual comfort or the truth? Would 'unconsciously 
collaborating minds of psychical researchers [ ... I enter into psychic reciprocity to elicit a lie' (K. F. R., Letter 'To 
the Editor of the Journal of the SPR, PSPR, 18, Dec. -Jan. 1917-18, p. 127)? See 'Correspondance', JSPR, 18 
(July 1917), pp. 85-88; (Oct. -Nov. 1917), pp. 101-102; (Dec. -Jan. 1917-1918), pp. 126-127; (Feb. - Mar. 1918), 
pp. 147-149. 
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a chapter by F. S. Schiller entitled 'Dreams and Idealism' in which lie remarks that 'The study of dreams 
emancipates us from too absolute a subservience to the realities of waking life,. 174 The ending of 
Defence of Idealism presents a dream narrative in which the dreamer experiences herself simultaneously 
as three other people while also retaining her own individual identity. Sinclair presents the dream to 
demonstrate the way in which individual finite selves maintain their own separateness in fusion with the 
infinite self, or Absolute. But it is also a dream of an aesthetic, for the dream is 'the outline of a very 
ordinary novel or a play' and the dreamer is a writer who has created three characters who she experiences 
as if they are herself 
'While playing, with perfect difference, yet perfect unity, these three parts in the drama, the 
dreamer also stood apart and looked on, an unprejudiced and unmoved, yet interested 
spectator... From beginning to end, not only three distinct experiences, but three distinct 
selfhoods were preserved in one experience and one selfbood. '175 
The experience insists on the possibility of one self experiencing a plurality of selves without rupture to 
the unity of the one self- it is a plea for a narrative which represents states of consciousness from the 
inside, without loss to the aesthetic unity of the work: 'the great novelists - have always worked from 
the inside of their characters, and have always been one with them, but they have also always been the 
outside spectator. '176 Sinclair is suggesting that the creative act of writing observes the same irreverence 
as dreaming towards boundaries of consciousness which are normally held to delineate between 
individual selves: both dream reality, and fiction permit what might otherwise be pathologised. Sinclair 
claims not that a 'real' transfusion of consciousness and of selves took place but that it gave a 'sense of 
such transfusion, of what it wouldfeel like if the transfusion did take place'. Both writing and dream 
consciousness emulate the world of mind: 'that world where to think was to will, and to will was to 
create'. 177 
If our notion of individuality has limits, self and world are unfinished, still creative: 'I shall conceive 
my world as without beginning and without end. ' 
'For the universe as it stands is ethically and aesthetically incomplete... It appeals to us in 
an incalculable number of intensely exciting sentences, which it hurls at our heads and 
leaves provokingly unfinished. It has made us spectators of its stupendous drama, what is 
more, it has honoured us with free passes as critics of the performance; worse still, it 
involves us personally in important and dramatic situations, which it leaves 
undeveloped... It creates desires which certainly cannot be satisfied in one life-time, or in 
the conditions of the only life we know. There is some evidence that it has created, or is 
creating, powers in us whose exercise demands another and more extensive sphere. 'I 78 
174 F. S. Schiller, 'Dreams and Idealism' in Studies in Humanism, (London: Macmillan, 1907), p. 487. 
175 Sinclair, Defence of Idealism, p. 376 
176 'May Sinclair, 'The Future of the Novel: Famous Authors and Their Methods: A Series of Interviews with 
Renowned Authors', in Scott (ed. ), The Gender of Afodernism, p. 478. 
177 Sinclair, Defence of Idealism p. 220 
178 Ibid. pp. 366-7. 
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These references to unfinished sentences, performance, critics, and spectatorhood returns Sinclair's 
thinking about selfbood and consciousness to the question of aesthetic representation. They also 
demonstrate how the aesthetic is closely bound to questions of personal desire and ethical ideals as I 
have been tracing them in Sinclair's thought: as she puts it 'the desire to go on living... its motive may 
be, and often is the passion for metaphysical truth and for a righteousness not obtainable on earth. It may 
be, and often is, in the highest degree aesthetic. 'I 79 
A character from 'The Flaw in The Crystal' is described as having a mind 'at home with limits,. 180 
Sinclair's own reluctance to observe the confines of the discrete self can be placed in the context of a 
widespread interest in exploring 'far from ordinary' states of consciousness, through psychic powers, 
mystical experience or occult phenomena which prefaced any unsettling effect of psychoanalysis upon 
notions of a stable self. What I hope to show in the rest of this chapter is how a preoccupation with the 
stability of the self, familiar to readers and critics of modernism, is linked to the issue of objectivity and 
sublimation - their difficult and complex assimilation -just described. Sinclair's fiction can be said to 
be caught in tension between her two approaches to psychoanalysis: on one hand stres3ing the power of 
the conscious will to effect sublimation, and on the other the conviction that there is a world beyond 
ordinary consciousness, operating beyond our awareness, beyond the limits, and remit of - and crucially 
uncontrollable by -a single mind. The short stories, novella, and prose poem which I look at in this 
section -'The Gift', 'Written Between the Lines', 'The Flaw in the Crystal' and The Dark Night - show 
desire overriding sublimation and its associated ethics; and suggest that relatedness to others leads 
readily into a telepathic arena where the self, meant to be a basis for altruism, is no longer secure. These 
texts were published between 1908 and 1924, covering the period of the non-fictional writing I discussed 
in the first half of this chaper (with the exception of Sinclair's earlier 1893 essay on TH Green); it is 
striking that 'The Flaw in the Crystal' written in 1912, raises many of the issues which will be explored 
by her later involvement with Imagism and her work on sublimation. However, while all these concerns 
are contained within 'The Flaw', we will see that they do not add up in the same way to the argument 
which we have traced in Sinclair's philosophy. 
'The Gift' 
One of Sinclair's earliest short stories 'The Gift', published in 1908, provides an introduction to 
Sinclair's interest in less discrete selves, exchange between minds, and the intcrconnectedness of the self 
with others. Similar to 'The Flaw in th,. Crystal' as we will see, 'The Gift' describes a relationship 
between a woman and a man characterised by a 'unique and immaterial tie,. 181 Freda Farrar is a poet 
whose 'pitiful' attempts at poetry have flourished into an 'incomparable art' after her befriendment by 
179 Ibid. p. 366. 
180 Sinclair, 'The Flaw in the Crystal', p. 206. 
181 Sinclair, 'The Gift', Fortnightly Review, (Sep. 1908), 517-35, p. 522. 
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Wilton Caldecott. 182 When we first encounter Freda's gift it is as something unaffected by the usual 
exigencies of the body: 'Her illness, then, had not impaired her gift, her charming, inimitable gift., 183 
Whether her illness is somatic or psychological, it is implied that neither her mind nor her body touch 
the source of art; this could be salutary, considering the prevailing medical view of genius as a 
mechanism allied to degenerative insanity, which diagnosed creative inspiration as a nerve affliction. 184 
Descriptions of 'the gift' consistently imply that its source is not found in her mind but located 
strangely beyond what she calls her own: 
'It was the divine thing given to Freda, hers and yet not hers, so wonderful, compared 
with the small pale creature who manipulated it, that it could be discussed with perfect 
propriety apart from her. 'I 85 
As a 'divine' thing, it is set apart as something seemingly too 'wonderful' to issue from an unheavenly 
body - particularly so unrobust a 'creature' as Freda. 
The narrative implies that Freda's gift is inspired by love: Freda holds Wilton Caldecott, her gentleman 
visitor, responsible for its inception. They agree that before they met, before he found her shivering in 
her attic room, she hadn't even a 'spark' of genius: 
I It was... a thing that he had given her, that if he chose he could at any moment take away. 
What had come from her came only through him. She owned with a sort of exultation that 
there was nothing in the least creative in her. She had not one virile quality; only this 
receptivity of hers, infinitely plastic, infinitely tender. What lay in the lamplight under her 
caressing hand had been born of their friendship. It was their spiritual child. 'I 
86 
She disowns her part in the child's birth: it is an immaculate conception which enables her to cast herself 
in an entirely passive role. Freda promotes the idea of her gift as 'impersonal' since under cover of its 
impersonality - nothing to do with her - she can write love poetry without owning its implications. In 
this way creativity permits the expression of otherwise inopportune feelings. 
Sinclair shows the paradoxical predicament of a creative woman in a cultural context which associates 
creativity with virility. Yet it can also be argued that sexualising the language of genius ennables 
sexuality to be spoken of via such language. Upholding conventionally gendered roles, Freda displaces 
her creativity/sexuality on to a man and claims utter passivity for herself. 
182 Sinclair, 'The Gift', p. 517. Freda's name and temperament are reminiscent of Fleda Vetch in Ilenry James, 
The Spoils of Poynton (London: Heinemann, 1897). 
183 Sinclair, 'The Gift', p. 516. 
184 See Eugene Taylor, William James on Exceptional Menial states: The 1896 Lowell Lectures (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1983), Lecture viii p. 151; 'there is a strong tendency among these 
pathological writers [Moreau, Nisbet, Lonbrosol to represent the line of mental health as a very narrow crack, 
which one must tread with bated breath, bet"cen foul fiends on the one side and gulfs of despair on the other' 
(ibid. p. 163). See F. W. H. Myers, 'The Subliminal Consciousness: the mechanism of genius', PSPR, 8 (1892), 
333-61. 
185 Sinclair, 'The Gift', p. 521. 
186 Ibid. p. 526. 
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'It wasn't in me. When it came, it seemed to come from somewhere outside. Somebody 
must have put it into me. I believe such a thing is possible - And there wasn't anybody, 
you know, but you. ' 
The essence of a gift is that it is given freely, yet Freda seeks to attach it to a prior owner. While this 
shows Freda as liberally embracing the idea that thought can be transpersonal she also trivialises her own 
creativity, in effect giving it away. Disowning her own art, is she also speaking of a reluctance to own 
her own expression of desire? Creativity works as a convenient disguise for her passion: as May Sinclair 
remarks in 'The Way of Sublimation', 'An enormous amount of the best poetry is erotic'. 187 
Unfortunately, Caldecott is unwilling to be implicated in a 'gift' which inspires passionate love poetry; 
after having 'suffered' once in a marriage to 'a pretty, underbred little governess' (the description of 
whom has a premonitory echo in Freda's own as 'a funny, little unflcdged bird'), he is a man with a 
'morbid horror' of marriage, terrified of women falling in love with him, and his being obliged to marry 
them. His oversensitivity to this possibility repeating itself renders him blind to Freda's determination 
to transcend the demands which her love would place upon him: she castigates her former rivals 'If 
they'd cared enough, they'd have got beyond that': that is to say, they would have got beyond their 
desire. 188 Having been informed of his apprehension she determines to exalt the gift in his presence, 
reinforcing his sense of collaboration in its effects in order to reassure him that she desires nothing 
beyond his part in her genius. 'Her passionate concentration on it would show that there was nothing 
behind, no vision of anything darker and deeper. '189 Inevitably Freda's plan succeeds only in 
convincing him of her devotion to him and precipitates his abandonment of her; he does not respond as 
she believes he will to her perception that: 'It is not me, but his part in me that he loves. If I am true to 
it, he will be true to me-'190 Freda's misjudgement is partly due to her denial of what is 'darker and 
deeper' in her desire: the 'something that had been living with her in secret for many days'. Are we to 
conclude that the love poetry is an incomplete sublimation? Although sublime in utterance its 
inspiration is mortal. Freda's creativity is then a surrogate expression of her love. The poetry is 
conceived as a surrogate love child. We also see Freda failing to heed her own insight that 'It's in the 
things he naturally supposes that a man goes so wrong'. 191 Sinclair in 'A Defence of Men' (1912) draws 
up a stark distinction between the sexes which makes spirituality the prerogative of women, while men 
are at the mercy of their bodies. 
192 Freda protests: 'Couldn't he see that she had set her house of life 
above all thatT, yet as the reader we are shown that the distinctions are less simply gendcred: was 
Caldecott really mistaken in what he 'naturally' supposed about Freda's devotion? 193 
187 Sinclair, 'The Way of Sublimation', p. 101. 
188 Sinclair, 'The Gift', p. 524. 
189 Ibid. p. 530. 
190 Ibid. p. 527. 
19, Ibid. p. 524. 
192 'Spirituality, so difficult for (man) to come by, has been positively thrust upon woman. Born of her 
sacrifical destiny, it has been expected of her, guarded by all the sanctions of her life' (Sinclair, 'A Defence of 
Men', English Review, 11, July 1912, pp. 556-66, p. 560). 
193 Sinclair, 'The Gift' p. 531. 
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Caldecott fails Freda by refusing to comprehend that she is capable of a spiritual love, without material 
ties; yet what are we to make of the subsequent disappearance of her gift? After Caldecott's resolute 
horror of marriage is disclosed to Freda, she returns to her room to find, despite her repeated aff irmation 
of their 'spiritual' friendship and denial of any material hopes of possessing him in wedlock, that 
'Something had gone from it, something that had been living with her in secret for many days, that 
could not live with her now'. 
194 Her love for Caldecott has been disabused of the possibility of its 
fulfilment. At the end of the 'The Gift' we hear that Freda has died, starved to death from no lack of 
material comforts but from 'want of something'. Another interpretation of the gift is put forward in the 
closing pages from her aunt who says of Freda: 
'She didn't know it herself. She used to say it wasn't in her. It was the most mysterious 
thing I ever saw. It came from somewhere deep down in her, a part of her that had only 
one chance to show itself.. There was something in Freda infinitely greater, infinitely 
more beautiful, than her gift. It showed itself only once in her life. When it couldn't show 
itself any more the gift left her... We can't account for it. ' 195 
'The Gift' interrogates the boundaries of self at stake in the project of writing, in terms of what lies 
below (i. e. the subconscious of early depth-psychology), beyond (in terms of a transcendent 
consciousness), and between selves (manifest in phenomena such as thought transference and telepathy). 
The representation of Freda's gift raises a number of questions characteristic of the way the 'other states' 
of consciousness were being mapped in this period. Does the gift come from 'deep down', a part of the 
subconscious which the psychologists were trying to define? Is it transpersonal, proliferating between 
selves and open to suggestion? Is it a morbid consequence of her weak health manifest in her pale 
birdlike frame? Or is it a symptom, in Freud's use of the word, of her imperfectly sublimated desire? 
Alternatively, is the 'something ... infinitely greater, 
infinitely more beautiful' her sense of the 
transcendent universe which is given mystical expression in her writing, described as 'the divinest, 
simplest prose... its frail, half-elemental, half-spiritual form'. 
196 We are left with the problem of how to 
account for a dispossessed gift of writing belonging to no-one but which you can die of losing. 
in 'Between the Lines', published in 1911, Colonel Lumby, a resolute batchelor and the secretary to a 
hospital for nervous disease, becomes ill due to the powers of suggestion, in an ironic reversal of the 
usual use of suggestion in healing: 'He had gone into the Braid Hospital bursting with health and look 
at him now!, 
197 The hospital matron, of whom we are already suspicious, convinces him of his 
neurasthenia and induces him to take a rest-cure, during which time she persuades him of their 
engagement. He manages to escape with the help of his friend Simpson, the narrator of this collection of 
194 Ibid. p. 526. 
195 Ibid. p. 534. 
196 Ibid. p. 518. 
197 Sinclair, 'Between the Lines', in Tales told by Simpson, Harper's Magazine, 124 (Dec 1911), 28-4 1; repr. 
May Sinclair, Tales Told By Simpson (London: I lutchinson, 1930), p. 114. The discovery of hypnotism is 
ascribed to James Braid, the namesake of the Braid Hospital. 
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tales (figured upon a Jamesian narrator), who proposes that the only way out of the undesired marriage is 
to write the matron a letter explaining that he is in love with another woman. 
The key episode in the story is that Colonel Lumby, who is defined from the start by his total lack of 
imagination, and incapacity for invention, becomes 'inspired, kindled, inflamed with an idea' and writes 
such a convincing letter that it 'rings too true' making Simpson intrigued as to its origin. Lumby's lack 
of imagination forbids the likelihood of auto-suggestion and implies that the suggestion has come from 
without: 
'Coming from him there was something unnatural about it, something I couldn't quite 
account for. It may have been that at the Braid Hospital he had been worked into a state in 
which he was peculiarly open to suggestion, and that, just as he had produced his 
neurasthenia at a hint from Miss Manisty, so at a hint from me he had produced that 
astounding Tale of his. I'm inclined to think, myself, that the whole thing was written in 
him somewhere and could have been read by those queer people who do read things, you 
know - between the lines of consciousness, I mean; that it was a sort of uprush from the 
submerged depths of Fitz's personality; and it could only have appeared under the 
excitement, the disintegration, if you like, of a supreme terror; that, in the grip of his 
mortal danger, he gave out something that was not his and yet was in him - perhaps as an 
ancestral passion, an ancestral memory. '198 
This multiple explanation of the creative outpouring as 'unnatural', due to suggestion, an unconscious 
content, a subliminal uprush, or ancestral memory supposes mental communication both between selves 
and across time. The something 'not his' and yet 'in him' echoes the ambiguous category of Freda's gift, 
yet here, the ancestral memory is given particular credence since we are told that letters from his maternal 
grandmother reveal, from reading between the lines, that she 'died of an attachment -a previous and 
unhappy one'. 
199 
In both stories writing figures as the manifestation of an unknown source. In 'Between the Lines, the 
source itself is represented as a narrative 'written in him somewhere' which can only be read between the 
lines of consciousness: a form of non-writing which is communicated between rather than through 
words. Yet Lumby's creative outpouring belatedly connects him with his sexuality: having spent a life 
of celibacy, he is now 'alive as he had never yet been to the magic and the loveliness of women, to the 
passion and the wonder of living'. 
200 Although he rejects the matron's advances, whose influence is 
described as 'a primeval, savage, animal thing', it seems that his libido has been awakened by her 
suggestion that he has been living an 'unwholesome, unnatural existence'. 201 Writing, or creativity is 
seen to produce rather than transform sexual energy. In 'The Way of Sublimation', Sinclair describes 
198 Ibid. p. 122, p. 124. 
199 Ibid. p. 124. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Ibid. p. 106. 
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repression as a terrifying prospect since it precipitates a reversion to the primitive and infantile. It is a 
turning back towards ancestral paths, primitive habits and instincts leaving the individual 'bound hand 
and foot in the prison of the past, his own and his ancestors'. 202 Sublimation for May Sinclair 
represents the possibility of escaping from such an inheritance, yet 'Between the Lines' suggests that 
writing may arouse these depths, rather than escape them. 
The Flaw in the Crystal 
(i) A clear and restrained vision: mind contained and uncontained 
As we already see, the distinctions which Sinclair's philosophical and critical writings attempt to 
establish are progressively undermined, or put into question, by her fiction which in so doing reveals 
some of the most disturbing undercurrents of the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious - the very 
undercurrents which May Sinclair's engagement with the concept of sublimation was designed to avert. 
Sinclair's 'The Flaw in the Crystal' suggests the irreducibility of desire, while The Dark Night is a 
narrative of renunciation which powerfully speaks of the 'other' course of sexual fulfilment. Although the 
narrative of 'The Flaw' contains many of the concerns which we have traced in Sinclair's philosophical 
argument for idealism, namely restraint, sublimation, telepathy, ethics and transcendence, in the text we 
see fragments of these arguments appear and then become absorbed in something which exceeds them. 
This is manifested above all in what can be described as the 'absolute horror' at the end of the story, 
where, as we will see, it is as if Sinclair writes something into her fiction which is, finally, 
uncontainable by her thought. This to an extent, accounts for the real assymetry which becomes apparent 
between her philosophy and fiction, which is not entirely exh 
. 
austed by the failure of sublimation which I 
describe in the text. 
'The Flaw in the Crystal' by May Sinclair, published in 1912203 uses the language of psychoanalytic, 
supernatural, and mystical discourse, while being contained (or restrained? ) by none. Like 'The Gift' it is 
a story about a woman's gift - this time a gift of healing - which was read as challenging customary 
psychological and ethical boundaries. 
'While most people in Europe are more and more preoccupied with the supernatural, with 
the odd, with the inexplicable in life, there seems a conspiracy among the more cultured 
critics to treat any manifestation of interest in these subjects as a disgraceful lapse on the 
part of a novelist., 204 
202 Sinclair, 'The Way of Sublimation', p. 29. 
203 Sinclair, 'The Flaw in the Crystal', English Review 11 (1912; also published The Flaw in the Crystal, New 
York, Dutton, 1912). 
204 R. Ellis Roberts, 'Miss Sinclair among the Ghosts', Bookman, (October 1923), p. 32. 
'The Beauty Of Restraint' 148 
in response to the mostly negative reviews205 which met the American edition of the story, May 
Sinclair was asked by the editor of the New York Times Review ofBooks to 'write something round 'The 
Flaw in the Crystal". 206 May Sinclair admits that: 
'I was embarrassed to the point of declining the invitation. For how far round could I go 
with any modesty? But, as it happens it would be possible to go the whole way round 
without touching it more than is becoming; for the story has an interest apart from the use 
that I have made of it, a charm of its own, more fascinating than any form I could give 
it., 207 
To 'go the whole way round without touching it' is a particularly apt description for a story which 
describes the dangers of physical contact in favour of more transcendent communication. 
In her New York Times article Sinclair meets the question: 'How much of this is actual experience? ' with 
a candid admission 
, that in this story everything that appears "natural"... is invented, and the apparently 
44supematural" alone is true... That there are such happenings is becoming more and more a 
matter of experience. It is impossible to define them in any term that is not a statement of 
some question-begging theory. Whether they come under the head of psycho-therapeutics, 
Christian Science, the Higher Thought, or the New Mysticism, whether they can or can 
not be satisfactorily disposed of as cures by "suggestion" or "autosuggestion" they have 
this in common that they presuppose a pull upon some utterly secret and mysterious and 
immaterial power, some way of communication between persons below or above the level 
of their ordinary consciousness., 
208 
in the opening paragraphs of 'The Flaw in the Crystal' a triangular relationship is established between 
Agatha Verrall, Rodney Lanyon and his wife Bella. 209 Despite her focal position in the story Agatha 
occupies the unstable position of the third party, the extra-marital woman who threatens the status quo of 
conjugal couples and supports a failed relationship. Rodney makes weekend visits to Agatha in her small 
house in the country: their relationship is sacred but not sexual. They are held by an 'extraordinary, 
intangible, immaterial tie' which passes unnoticed by Bella who 'used to say that she had never seen 
anything in Agatha, which amounted, as [Rodney] once told her, to not seeing Agatha at all. Still less, 
205 "'Hopeless immorality", "neurotic femininity". "amazing twaddle", was about all our reviewers found to 
say' (Amy Wellington, 'An Artist of the Supernatural', Dial, 63,13 Sept. 1917,195-98, p. 196). 
206 'Concerning My Book: May Sinclair Tells Ilow Tales of Strange Influences came to her as the basis for a 
Story', New York Times Review of Books, (Nov. 3 1912). 
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid. A letter from the American Society for Psychical Research in New York asks for a scientific account of 
the experiences which led May Sinclair to write 'The Flaw in the Crystal': 'it is the cold naked facts we desire 
without colour of imagination or fear of ridicule' (Letter from James Hyslop, Nov 3 1912, May Sinclair papers, 
Box 56). 
209 The name Verrall suggests 'will see all' (verr- future stem of voire) and 'glass*(verre) the clarity of the 
crystal; Mrs Margaret Verrall (nde Merrifield; co-authored Mythology and Monuments of Ancient Athens, 1890, 
with Jane Harrison) was a medium whose experiences were frequently reported to the Society for Psychical 
Research. 
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could she have compassed any vision of the tie'. 210 Sinclair's stress on the preposition 'in' turns a 
commonplace expression into a qualifier: not seeing anything in Agatha carries the inverse proposal that 
there might be something to be seen outside her. Whether this is a comment on her extra-personal 
healing powers or that those things which Rodney sees in her must be the properties which he has put 
inside her (i. e. his projections), Bella is more canny than Rodney and Agatha give her credit; her 
'obtuseness' is a deliberate blind eye turned towards Agatha and Rodney which allows an adulterous 
relationship of her own to be pursued. Yet in a story which uses the symbolism of light and dark, 
insight and blindness for corresponding moral and mental states of purity and clarity, Bella's lack of 
vision imputes to her a murky sexual morality and dubious sanity. 
in comparison with Bella, Agatha, like an Imagist poem, is marked by clarity, cleanliness and 
corresponding spiritual purity: 'She had set herself apart; she had swept herself bare and scoured herself 
clean for him. Clean she had to be; clean from the desire that he should come; clean, above all, from the 
thought, the knowledge she now had, that she could make him come., 211 The interchangeable image of 
housework, or spiritual spring cleaning introduces a metonymic relationship between Agatha and her 
house which rival each other in Sinclair's description of their spotlessness. This compulsion for 
cleansing prefaces Freud's later theories on obsessional behaviour, identifying psychical conflict with 
compulsions towards undesirable acts and the corresponding struggles against them. We can then read 
Agatha's immaculacy as a symptom rather than a principle: cleaning to stay sane not sanitary, cleaning 
away the signs of the body. Note too how this emphasis on purity and clarity links to those aspects of 
imagism which Sinclair also promoted. In making Agatha its extreme in this sense, Sinclair might be 
partly diagnosing her own attachment to Imagism. At the same time this purity is also a form of passage 
beyond the boundaries of the self. 
In May Sinclair's introduction to de Bossch&e's The Closed Door, the overlap between man and house 
is explicit: a house 
'stands for the total of [man's] nearest loves and interests; it is invested with his soul as 
much as it invests; it is as much the expression as the shelter and hiding-place of his secret 
Ii fe... It is part of his personality., 212 
Agatha's clean, white house is situated in a narrow green valley in a solitary position: 
'Across the field her own house showed pure and dim against the darkening slope behind 
it, showed a washed and watered white in the liquid, lucid twilight. Her house was open 
always and on every side; it flung out its casement arms to the night and to the day. And 
now all the lamps were lit, every doorway was a golden shaft, every window a golden 
2 10 Sinclair, 'The Flaw in the Crystal', p. 189. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Sinclair, 'Introduction', The Closed Door, P. 2 1. 
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square; the whiteness of its walls quivered and the blurred edges flowed into the dark of 
the garden. It was the fragile shell of a sacred and a burning light., 
213 
The house introduces the structural opposites of interior and exterior, or body and soul (or mind) 
subsequently countered by the insistence of this house's openness. It is a metaphor paralleled by Henry 
James' description of his brother William's mind as being 'incapable of the shut door in any 
direction'. 214 Being open betokens a generosity of interest as well as the virtue of refusing to cloister 
secrets - like the 'crack' in the crystal a secret would always show. It dissolves the significance of a 
threshold, insisting on a continuity between states, on a refusal of the limits of solidity: 'blurred edges 
flowed out into the dark of the garden'. The golden interior is the shining soul 'sacred and burning' yet 
the shell is fragile, as if to explain that the golden light flows out of it because the vessel is too weak to 
hold it. If the implication is that Agatha does not observe the boundaries of her own inner self because of 
weakness, it would then be correspondingly strong and healthy to remain discrete within the firm walls 
of one's personality. Alternatively, Agatha's openness, even given its symptomatic underpinnings, is a 
gift. 
There is a tension here between the possibilities of merging and moving beyond boundaries seen as a 
positive expansion, and the contradictory dynamic of propriety and control, that is abiding within the 
law. Agatha draws attention to her unimpeachable conduct in using 'the power, the uncanny, 
unaccountable Gift, ' which as the model, moral citizen she works 'lawfully, sacredly, 
incorruptibility,. 215 The emphasis on her exemplary behaviour works not only to redeem her morally 
uncomfortable status as the triangular woman, but to introduce the possibilities of corruption and abuse 
on the other side of the law. The idea of abusing this power 
is 'horrible' to Agatha, it is 'the last 
indecency'. In other words she has not used it to fulfil her desire, to 'get at him to make him do things. 
This is what keeps her innocent and beyond reproach. 'It was the secret and essence of their remarkable 
relation that she had never tried to get at him; whereas Bella 
had, calamitously; and still more 
calamitously, because of the peculiar tragic that there was (there must have been) in her, Bella had 
succeeded. ' Bella had, in fact, succeeded in marrying Rodney, in fulfilment of her desire. It is notable in 
the above passage that the secret which Agatha marks as the defining characteristic of her relationship 
with Rodney is a secret of restraint: 'Restraint had been the essence and the secret of the charm she had, 
and it was also the secret and the essence of her gift. '216 Restraint hides its own darker secret, that of the 
desire which it represses. 
it is worth remarking that Agatha makes a distinction between her 'uncanny, unaccountable power' and 
the 'peculiar magic' in Bella. This is one of only two uses of the word 'magic' in 'The Flaw in the 
Crystal' and obviously holds particular associations which Agatha is keen to avoid in relation to herself. 
213 Sinclair, 'The Flaw in the Crystal', p. 200. 
214 flenry James, Autobiography, ed. Frederick W. Dupee (London: W. ff. Allen, 1956), p. 430. 
215 Sinclair, 'The Flaw in the Crystal', p. 190. 
216 Ibid. 
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The second refers to Milly, the other woman in the text; on both occasions the association marks their 
difference from Agatha. Evelyn Underhill defines the difference between magic and mysticism as a 
difference in motive: 'magic wants to get, mysticism wants to give'. 217 In A Defence of Idealism, 
Sinclair. replaces Underhill's distinction with her own, stressing that the difference is only in the object 
of desire: magic desires physical things, the mystic desires spiritual things. Reading this back into the 
story it is apparent that Agatha works to resist the pull of physical desire and to align herself with things 
spiritual, yet the secret of restraint reveals her secret of desire and introduces a more uncomfortable 
territory marked out by Sinclair in A Defence: 
'And between these two regions of desire and expectation, there is a dubious borderland: 
the region of the so-called supernatural powers, of which the mystic himself cannot say 
whether they are magical or spiritual: the power of healing, of vision, of clairvoyance and 
clairaudience, of control over matter., 218 
Unlike Bella whose 'peculiar magic' renders her comfortably domiciled in the realm of physical desire 
this dubious borderland is the metaphoric land occupied by Agatha. Agatha, as a character therefore 
embodies in her person the tensions at the heart of Si nclair's philosophical project: firstly between 
sublimation, or restraint, against desire; and secondly between clarity, and self-containedness against 
openness, lack of boundaries and a striving towards the absolute. Although she intends her gift to be 
used only for the most selfless and devout purposes, it is described at one point as: 'a charmed circle; or 
rather, as a sphere that held all the charmed circles that you draw round things to keep them safe, to keep 
them holy'. 219The function of a charmed circle is to take possession of a desired object and to close off 
outside threats and is an uneasy image to reconcile with a vision of purely spiritual aims. It is these 
ambiguities of the borderland in its embracing of the overlap between the physical and the spiritual 
which May Sinclair denotes in naming it: 'a region of the utmost uncertainty and danger., 
220 
it is Agatha's special 'Gift', the power of healing herself and Rodney, which induces her to 'cut herself 
completely off in the narrow valley in Sarratt End and 'give herself up to it, to him (to his pitiful case)': 
the substitution of 'it' for 'him' making obvious the substitution operating in the realm of desire. 
Devoting herself to the long distance healing of Rodney is the sacrament of her gift: Rodney, who had 
been tormented by nerves before she discovered her ability can be cured of his affliction from afar. The 
whole process is entirely incorporeal: fi-om the healing without touch, to the nervous location of the 
ailment and his recovery which can be read by the absence of lines on his face: it negates the physicality 
of the body, or what happens inside, in place of what takes place outside the body (or in the head). It is 
significant that when Agatha sees Rodney she is reassured by the absence of lines on his face: the marks 
on the body (marks of the body) which would require her perhaps to read between the lines and discover 
the source of his nerves in the mutual repression of their desire. Rodney, in mirrored action, searches 
217 Underhill, 'Another Note on Mysticism', Quest, 2 (Nov. 19 10), p. 137. 
218 Sinclair, Defence of Idealism, p. 282 
219 Sinclair, 'The Flaw in the Crystal', p. 195. 
220 Sinclair, Defence of Idealism, p. 283. 
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Agatha's face hoping not to find the 'unborn lurking spirit' of terror in the tragic lines. 221 This, in turn, 
is what he tries to keep out of her face. In keeping the physical signs at bay, their 'communion' brings to 
them both a sense of well-being, peace, and joy. Yet the reassurance brought by seeing is problematised 
by Agatha's capacity for seeing what is not there i. e. seeing beyond the visible. While keeping them safe 
the successful application of her gift opens up possibilities which threaten the very boundaries which 
give her protection: the assumption thac there is nothing between them - how can an immaterial tie 
produce tangible results? Her ability to produce physical and psychical effects in Rodney from a distance 
suggests that personal consciousness is not discrete but operates between subjects. However Agatha is 
driven by another dynamic: to keep thoughts in their proper place. When 'a thought rushed in on her 
straight from him' she is shocked at the content of the thought (that they do have something to hide). 
'And still his thought, his naked terrible thought, was there. It was looking at her straight out of his 
eyes., 222 If Agatha's special power gives her other people's thoughts, it also provides her with the 
means to dispose of them. In this way Agatha polices the borderland for unwelcome thoughts: 'She had 
only got to apply [the gift] to that thought of his, and the thought would not exist. '223 This control is 
an antidote to the degree of extra thought-material available to her. Without it could she survive? She 
would have no veil: we are reminded of George Eliot's narrator of The Lifted Veil whose ability to read 
other people's minds drives him mad and Virginia Woolf's 'screens... made out of our own 
integument'. 224 
Thus Agatha controls Rodney's thoughts as well as his nerves. She appropriates Rodney's nerves as her 
own responsibility, although they are not exclusively his to begin with: like so much in the story the 
boundaries of belonging are unclear - his nerves are 'wedded indissolubly' to Bella's, as if in reminder 
of the physical union of marriage from which Agatha is excluded. Consequently, 
in healing Rodney, she 
also heals Bella: the gift has yet to define its limits and for the moment 'she saw no end to the 
possibilities of the thing., 
225 Whether this is pathological or enlightened is one of the questions raised 
by the narrative. 
The safety and seclusion of the green valley is threatened when MillY and Harding Powell arrive. They 
have come because Harding Powell is mentally ill, and his wife Milly hopes that the change of scene 
will work as marvellously as 'it had answered with dear Agatha (not that Agatha ever was, or could be, 
where he was, poor darling)'. Harding is 'in the dreadful interior': 'it wasn't any longer, Milly Powell 
intimated, a question of borders and of thresholds. They had passed all that. lie had gone clean over; he 
221 'Sinclair, 'The Flaw in the Crystal', p. 192. 
222 'The idea that influences pass out of our eyes, affecting what we look at, is completely inadmissible from a 
conventional point of view but readily contradicted by the common experience of a sense of being stared at' 
('Experiments that could change the world', Network. the scientific and medical network newsletter, 54, 
Spring 1994). 
223 Sinclair, 'The Flaw in the Crystal', p. 193. 
224 The Diary of Virginia Wooýr iii, ed. Anne Olivier Bell (London: flogarth, 1980). p. 104; see prefatory 
quote for 'Introduction'. 
225 Sinclair, 'The Flaw in the Crystal', p. 192. 
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was in the dreadful interior; and she... had no longer any power to get him out., 
226 Agatha, however, 
does have the power and is absolutely qualified to help considering that the illness 'isn't anything 
bodily'. 227She begins to direct her healing power towards Harding, confident that this will not affect her 
commitment to Rodney since the power is 'immeasurable, inexhaustible'. 
228 After the first night of the 
working of the gift, Harding Powell is miraculously recovered: 'like magic' according to Milly's 
enlightened judgement, he has been able to sleep and in the morning stroll about outside the farmhouse 
where previously he was cowering inside, with the blinds drawn and the door locked, terrified of the 
Thing which pursued him. 
Encouraged by her exquisite power to heal, Agatha continues 'effortlessly' to keep Harding from 
madness without letting go of Rodney. She is reassured that in selflessly devoting so much of her power 
towards Harding she will maintain the faultless working of the gift: for the one condition it transpires is 
required by the gift is the purity of Agatha's mind: 'it had to be to ensure the blessed working of the 
gift; as again, it was by the blessed working of the gift that she had kept it so. She could only think of 
that, the secret, the gift, the inexpressible thing, as itself a flawless crystal'. 
229 The flawless crystal is 
both the gift and her mind, for later her mind is described as 'a crystal without a flaw in its clearness, its 
sincerity'. Agatha's flawlessness should be ensured by her 'passionless, impersonal' attitude towards 
Harding, however, the perfect equilibrium is gradually lost. At Milly's desperate entreaties Agatha 
dedicates increasingly more time to maintaining Harding's sanity, and consequently gives less and less 
to Rodney's cause. The operation of the gift becomes fraught with tension as Agatha's welcome of 
Harding into her 'fount of healing' becomes an overpowering embrace from which she cannot extricate 
herself. 
Almost half way through the story Agatha discloses to Milly the reason for Harding's recovery in order 
to stop Milly from worrying that his madness will resurface when they leave the tranquillity of Sarrat 
End. Declaring that she is responsible for Harding's unprecedented return to health, Agatha insists at the 
same time that 'I don't do anything. It isn't me... I can't explain it. I only know it isn't me., 
230 yet 
Agatha is described as entering 'more and more into possession' of the gift of healing which 'isn't me'. 
This denial of ownership over something which she experiences as coming from her but not of her, 
parallels Freda Farrar's ambiguous relationship to her gift. Both question the limits of ownership: an 
issue which is not theoretically transparent in these stories even with tangible objects, such as the body, 
and is further perplexed by the immaterial nature of possessions such as a gift of inspiration, or the 
ability to heal. 
226 Ibid. p-195- 
227 Ibid. p. 194. 
228 Ibid. p. 200. 
229 Ibid. p. 195. Spiritualist literature stresses the importance of 'purity' for mediums: 'all your spiritual 
associates express qualities of your own mind. If your motives are wholly selfish or impure, the law of 
like 
attracting like mentalities will hold good' (Harry Boddington, Trance States in Relation to 
Spirit Control, 
Psychic News Booklet 3, London: Psychic Press, 1933, p. 9). 
230 Sinclair, 'The Flaw in the Crystal', p. 204. 
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ii) Eros in the mind/ between minds 
As we will see, Agatha's gift of healing works from the mind. Yet, as we saw the spiritual become 
charged with a contingent sensuality in Sinclair's writing, so does the act of healing carry sexual 
analogies. The realm of mind, however incorporeal, is yet depicted in terms which, paradoxically, 
suggest a staunchly incarnate eroticism. 
231 The image suggested for Agatha's healing gift is 'a current of 
transcendent power' with which you made a 'connection' and then 'you simply turned it on'. This image 
is familiar to early theories of mental energy initially based on concepts of an unknown magnetic fluid, 
or current - Anton Mesmer's system of 'animal magnetism' - whose equilibrium and disturbances 
determined health or sickness. Agatha's healing technique draws primarily upon the popular mind-cure 
movement. 232 
in 'The Flaw in the Crystal' Agatha's curative powers are effective at a distance but unlike the early 
methods of animal magnetism, the person she is healing is not a conscious participant in the process: 
whether the operative imagination is then her own or whether we are to believe in the agency of 'the 
Power' is uncertain. When Agatha prepares herself to make a 'connection' with the 'Power', she: 
, turned the lights out in her room and undressed herself in the darkness. She laid herself 
on the bed with straight lax limbs, with arms held apart a little from her body, with 
eyelids shut lightly on her eyes; all fleshly contacts diminished. '233 
This ritual suggests a preparation for sacrifice; what occurs is a sensation-based experience, a rhythmic 
motion, which is both absorbed by and dissolves the body: 
'It was now as if her being drank at every pore the swimming darkness; as if the rhythm of 
her heart and of her breath had ceased in the pulse of its invasion. She sank in it and was 
covered with wave upon wave of darkness. she sank and was upheld; she dissolved and 
was gathered together again, a flawless crystal. She was herself the heart of the charmed 
circle, poised in the ultimate unspeakable stillness, beyond death, beyond birth, beyond 
the movements, the vehemences, the agitations of the world. ' 
Sinclair continues 
'She drew Harding Powell into it and held him there. 
... as 
if she drew him by intangible insensible threads; she touched, with no sense of peril, 
his innermost essence; the walls of flesh were down between them; she had got at him. 
She said to herself, "He will sleep now. He will sleep. lie will sleep. " And as she slid into 
her own sleep she held and drew him with her. 
231 May Sinclair was accused of 'hopeless immorality' for using the spiritual world to obliterate the physical, 
enabling her to portray a 'woman who comforts and cures other women's husbands' as saintly and self- 
complacent ('May Sinclair's Novel: a very strange mixture of the style of Henry James and the matter of Marie 
Corel I V. New York Times Review of Books, 8 September, 1912). 
232 'Animal magnetism' - developed in 1774 - was based upon the principle of 'a subtle physical fluid 
[which] fills the universe and forms a connecting medium between man, the earth, and the heavenly bodies, and 
also between man and man' (I lenri Ellenberger The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution 
of Dynamic Psychiatry, 1970; London: Fontana, 1994, p. 62). 
233 Sinclair, 'The Flaw in the Crystal', p. 200. 
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He would sleep; he would be alright as long as she slept. Her sleep, she had discovered, 
did more than carry on the amazing act of communion and redemption. It clinched it. It 
was the seal on the bond., 234 
The sexual analogies of this 'amazing act' are immediately apparent: it has been described as a 'repressed 
woman's wish-fulfilment dream or at least a rather spiritualised sexual fantasy'. 235 The 'wave upon 
wave of darkness', as Agatha surrenders to a rhythm more powerful than her own, invokes the breaking 
down of the boundaries between the ego and the world, which is at the heart of Sinclair's belief as an 
absolute idealist, and transports her beyond the phenomenal world into an 'ultimate, unspeakable 
stillness'. Yet the description suggests that this transcendent realm is less about spirit than an eroticised 
form of contact. The language of merging conceals the predatory aspect of the encounter. In its 
immaterial isation of the 'walls of flesh' which keep individuals apart, the gift enables healing to takes 
place, 'she had got at him'. The immaterial realm enables an intimacy of contact prohibited by the 
morality of the physical world; 'she touched, with no sense of peril, his innermost essence'. 
Paradoxically it is through this openness that real contact with another is possible, yet this 
connectedness which is an altruistic act compromises the intactness necessary to purity. We see here 
some of the founding oppositions of modernism with which I started becoming confused. Does restraint 
then defend against altruism or egoism? Evelyn Underhill signals such a dilemma when she writes that 
the 'individualist' will be prevented from attaining the satisfaction he seeks since it 'can only be 
obtained by the destruction of the barriers of personality... But the whole tendency of contemporary 
thought is to build up these barriers, and make of them an impregnable shield., 
236 As I have suggested 
Vernon Lee's study of aesthetic empathy can be read as an attempt which fails to counter such a modem 
, tendency'. 
Agatha's eroticised encounter is achieved at the cost of a self-splitting in which the body is renounced. In 
The Dark Night, a prose poem by Sinclair published in 1924, Elizabeth describes the necessity to 
'forget' her body in order to transcend it: 
11 have undone the clasp of clinging flesh, 
From the shining net of the senses I have broken loose, 
Soft is my breathing, 
Soft my heart's knocking; 
Without weight, thin as a ghost, 
Unseen, unfelt, forgotten, 
My body hangs, stretched out on the night. 
I empty myself 
234 Ibid. p. 201. 
235 Rcbeccah Kinnamon Neff, 'May Sinclair's Fiction of the Supernatural', unpublished Phd dissertation, 
Duke University 1974, p. 56. 
236 Underhill, 'Magic and Mysticism of Today', Hibbert Journal (1908), p. 380. 
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For the night to fill me, 
I open the doors of my house 
For the darkness to come in., 237 
Breaking loose from the net of the senses reminds us of Sinclair's desire to escape the constrictions of 
Time and Space - as Beale encourages, to 'lift the veil'. Yet the flesh clings and the net is shining: the 
alluring corporeal snare is also the material world which in Hindu philosophy is 'maya' or illusion. 
We can see strong links between this aspect of 'The Flaw' and contemporary discussion and practice of 
the mind-cure movement. In its most populist form, this 'New' or 'Higher Thought' comprised of 
optimistic affirmations, an acknowledged element of Agatha's technique. As she admits, 'persistent 
invincible affirmation was part of her method, her secret, " yet Agatha also calls them 'irritating 
affirmations' when not combined with the agency of the 'Power'. 
238 In Defence of Idealism, May 
Sinclair disapproves of Christian Science encouraging an undiscerning belief in the powers of healing. 
Yet this is almost a disclaimer, since she then acknowledges that there are 'some powers' and that faith 
can certainly move molecules 'otherwise physical healing by suggestion could not occur'. 
239 Indeed - 
however reductively - mind-cure derives its founding logic from the very beliefs held dear to May 
Sinclair: it was claimed, by its more serious adherents, to be a practical application of the doctrines of 
absolute idealism. Elizabeth Severin, an experienced practitioner, describes her synthesis of 
psychoanalysis, idealism, and eastern mysticism as 'Practical Idealism' or 'metaphysical healing'. (More 
generically, she also calls this admixture 'Psycho-therapy'). Reducing everything to an attitude of mind, 
and with the personal in league with the universal, the individual's power becomes limitless. As one 
handbook advises: 'Matter is only a shadow. Mind is all. Mind is God.., 240 To mitigate this 'sense of 
mastery over conditions' we find an accompanying emphasis upon altruism and moral responsibility 
within mind-cure doctrine. We recall Agatha's self-caution that 'thought went wider and deeper than any 
deed' - such an emphasis on mind, makes thinking at once powerful and safe, or as perilous as deeds. 
The distinguishing feature of the treatment, again according to Severin, is the use of 'Direct Suggestion': 
'indispensable as a means of reaching the subconsciousness, and through it is supplied that force of 
237 May Sinclair, The Dark Night (London: Jonathan Cape, 1924), p. 59. 
238 Elizabeth Severin, Psycho-therapy its doctrine andpractice, (1913; London: William Rider & Son, 1919), 
p. 144. Evelyn Underhill disapproved of belief in mind-cure as a poor substitute for mysticism: 'the cheap 
transcendentalism which is known as the "Higher Thought"[ ... ] disguised by a vocabulary borrowed, without 
acknowledgement, from mysticism, metaphysics, psychology, and the New Testament, [which] is now being 
offered to a community too self-indulgent for the discipline of religion, too materialistic for mysticism, too 
credulous to be satisfied with the wary certitudes of an agnostic philosophy' (Evelyn Stuart-Moore 
[Underhill], 'Magic and Mysticism of Today', Hibbert Journal, 1908, p. 381). Jackson Lears identifies the 
mind-cure movement as characteristic of a late Victorian yearning for oceanic dependence, passivity, and 
reassurance which he sees as: countering an opposing drive towards autonomous selfhood (see Jackson Lears, 
No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the transformation of American culture, New York: Pantheon, 198 1, 
p. 218-220). 
239 Sinclair, Defence of Idealism, p. 299. Elizabeth Severin describes a 'more subtle interchange of vibrations, 
where the actual quality of the healer's mindý which is in a state of poise and free from thought of disease, is 
transfused by some invisible psychic process into the very heart and soul of the patient' (Sevcrin, Psycho- 
therapy its doctrine andpractice, p. 98-9). 
240 L. P. Mercer, The New Birth with a chapter on Mind-Cure (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1887), p. 107. 
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will,. 241 She describes: 'this is neither Egotism nor a mere passive acquiescence in a force outside 
oneself, but is a personal and conscious co-ordination with the inscrutable action of the Cosmic 
Will.,, 242 
in her autobiographical novel Mary Olivier, May Sinclair describes such an identification of a personal 
with transcendent will in which a journey, similar to Agatha's, is undertaken by Mary Olivier to reach a 
selfless transcendent state with the object to divest herself of desire. On the first occasion she wills 
herself to give up her first opportunity to travel abroad in order to be at home to look after her sick 
brother; in the second instance she wills herself to stop wanting Richard, her lover, so she can take care 
of her elderly, but domineering mother. The ritual involves losing touch with immediate sensation: 
'Flat on your back with your eyes shut; not shut tight. You mustn't feel your eyelids. You 
mustn't feel any part of you at all. You think of nothing, absolutely nothing; not even 
think. You keep on not feeling, not thinking not seeing things till the blackness comes in 
waves, blacker and blacker... 
Let everything go except yourself.. But you felt your self going. 
Going and coming back; gathered together; incredibly free; disentangled from the net of 
nerves and veins. It didn't move any more with the movement of the net. It was clear and 
still in the blackness; intensely real. 
Then it willed. Your self willed. It was free to will. You knew that it had never been free 
before except once; it had never willed before except once. Willing was this. Waves and 
waves of will, coming on and on, making your will, driving it through empty time.... 
Where nothing happens except God's will. God's will in your will., 
243 
This supra-physical state is liberating: there is a transfusion and confusion of wills (whose will in 
whose? ) and a curious depersonalisation: 'It willed. Your self willed. ' Although the experience describes 
a self-abandonment, 'your self going, the self which wills remains powerful. As I go on to show in the 
chapter on Dion Fortune, will is central to the occult belief in the power we have to make things happen: 
Underhill too acknowledges 'In the will there resides... a force as powerful and as amenable as 
electric ity'. 
244 Crucially for May Sinclair, the body is figured as a 'net' to be escaped; made of living 
and breathing 'nerves and veins' ,a net which 
has movement, in sharp contrast to the 'clear and still' 
place which is the self s destination. Recall the Image which fixes a moment in stillness and Underhill's 
letter which accuses Sinclair's intellectual position of seeking a 'way of escape' by making a case for 
itself metaphysically but not 'vitally'. Are imagism, idealism and mysticism different routes of escape 
from the net of the body? 
241 Scverin, Psycho-therapy its doctrine and practice, p. 134, p. 78. 
242 Ibid. pp. 97-8. See William James: the 'mind's detachment from outer sensations' (Varieties of Religious 
F, xperience, p. 406); on the 'religion of healthy mindcdness' (ibid. p. I 11). and 'mental touch' (ibid. p 103). On 
mind-cure see Ross Posnock, The Trial of Curiosity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
243 Sinclair, Afary Olivier p. 351. 
244 Evelyn Underhill, 'Magic and Mysticism of Today'. p. 374. 
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As I have mentioned, in 'Flaw in the Crystal', desire is situated beyond the laws of marriage, and 
beyond Agatha's own self-identity. By placing Agatha outside a marriage relationship her desire is not 
sanctioned by society. Her 'Power' works then by eliminating desire in accordance with the laws of 
social conduct, and thus restoring harmony both individually and socially. The process of divesting 
herself of desire, of surrendering to the demands of the gift and choosing spiritual over physical 
satisfaction over, can be read as a 'willed' sublimation and is mirrored in the endings of Mary Olivier 
and The Dark Night. In all three texts there is a pivotal experience involving the relinquishing of desire 
with a consequent reward in a transcendent sphere of experience. Similarities have been identified 
between the process of creativity and healing: both involve a 'prelude ritual' followed by an altered state 
of consciousness, and an 'emotionally valent postlude'. 
245 It is notable that this can also be applied to 
sexual ecstasy thus making sublimation mimic its origins. 
if a moral society depends upon an ability to suppress sexuality, sublimation becomes the potential 
instrument of enfranchisement from desire offering fulfilment in a state beyond the self. In The Dark 
Night, when the poet Victor Rendall asks Elizabeth to love him outside of marriage she replies: 
'The law was made 
To bind father and mother together, 
To keep a safe roof and a warm hearth for the children; 
I who am strong 
Owe protection to the weak and to the children I have not borne; 
The law is sacred; 
it cannot be broken without sin., 
246 
Elizabeth views the social and ethical codes of conduct as sacred, not oppressive, yet her strength derives 
from her position of independence: outside of them, she is not subject to them. Yet The Dark Night also 
suggests that desire is unconfinable by marriage: it exceeds the laws which would keep it 'safe'. Victor is 
reluctant to marry Elizabeth, fearful of entrapment both by the sacred law and the 'beautiful cage' of 
Elizabeth's house (which as we have seen, by analogy, is also her self). He speaks of himself in a similar 
image to Sinclair's description of libido, as: 
'a beast untamed that must go alone, 
Full of fierce, solitary memories, savage ardours, and delights; 
Running free and alone in the wild, hidden places'. 247 
His desire is identified with wild, untamed instincts, while Elizabeth is represented as a paragon of 
restraint and virtue who finds solace in the beauty of her garden. Unable to be without her, Victor does 
return from his roaming to marry Elizabeth, only then to betray her trust when he himself falls prey to 
the compelling charms of their 'adopted' daughter Monica. 248 Desire is then seen to exceed the laws of 
245 John Curtis Gowan, 'Equivalences in Creativity, Ifealing and Illumination Experiences' in Stanley 
Krippner (ed. ), Psychoenergetic Systems; the interaction of consciousness, energy and matter (New York & 
London: Gordon & Breach, 1979), p. 123. 
246 Sinclair, The Dark Night, p. 54. 
247 Ibid. p. 54-5. 
248 Elizabeth becomes Monica's guardian when Monica's mother - Elizabeth's cousin - dies. 
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marriage and tabus of society. While Elizabeth is the model of crystal purity, The Dark Night carries the 
other equally extreme representation of woman as atavistic seductress for whom consummation of desire 
is as inevitable as time: 
'She is old, old, she has come down through many ages. 
She has mated with crying ghosts at the cross-roads of the forest[ 
She is waiting now, 
Spreading her net for the feet that shall come to her. '249 
Among May Sinclair's papers she kept an article which focuses upon the erotic component of mental 
states. James Kiernan, editor of the sexology section of The Urologic and Cutaneous Review, adopts the 
term 'lagny' to designate a mental state in which 'sexual excitement and satisfaction arise either from 
psychic influence alone or from psychic and sensory factors combined,. 250 In denoting a sexual 
experience without a physical act, 'lagny' describes a consummation in the realm of the senses which 
remains immaterial: appealing to Sinclair's interest in a world of mind. Kiernan's paper specifically 
explores 'ozolagny', 'sex excitement or satisfaction through odor' (which he sees evoked in Shelley, 
Keats, Herrick, Zola and Baudelaire) and, to support his argument he remarks the origin of perfume from 
flowers 'i. e. the sexual parts of the plants'. Much of Sinclair's prose poem is set amongst the flowering 
plants in Elizabeth's garden which is suffused with the smell of flowers, ground ivy and wild mint. In 
The Dark Night May Sinclair intones the 'sweet scent of the lilac', 'the sweet scent of her hair', Monica 
picks purple violets and holds their scent up to Victor's face, and 'his eyes followed the flower down 
into the sweetness of her breasts'. 251 Perhaps owing to the common metaphorical representation of 
psyche as confined by its housing, it is unsurprising to find that the heightened moments of mystical 
experience are frequently set in the seeker's garden: we see in Tagore, de Bosschere and Sinclair the poet 
finding that their divine visitor is already present among the flowers and the trees. 
One of May Sinclair's readers was concerned that owing to Sinclair's 
6real interest in Freud's Psycho-analysis, your new book [Mary Olivier] might be 
disproportionately sexual. How wrong I was in my misgivings. The book tends to the 
other extreme, & thereby, I think increases its beauty & greatness... the reserve and 
reticence is perfect in its wonderful 'good taste' -I have never come across such restraint 
before - not one kiss described. '252 
Perhaps 'not one kiss' need be described when the non-material world of the psyche and senses can be so 
potently eroticised. Moreover, when, in The Dark Night, 'one kiss' is described, we see it through 
Elizabeth's eyes as she discovers Victor and Monica entwined together in the secret chamber of a yew 
249 Sinclair, The Dark Night, p. 80-81. 
250 Jas Kiernan, 'Ozolagny', Urologic and Cutaneous Review, 7 (July 1922), 413-7, p. 413. 
251 Sinclair, The Dark Night, p. 83-85. 
252 Letter to May Sinclair, June 24 1919, May Sinclair Papers, Box 56. 
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tree which is in the heart of Elizabeth's own garden. The beauty of the garden is then both associated 
with spiritual and sensual passion. 
iii) Beyond self 
In 'The Flaw in the Crystal', Agatha experiences a momentary vision at the edge of the wood above her 
house during a period in the narrative when her healing gift is working perfectly. This experience is 
typical of the sudden and unexplained flashes of insight and rapture that characterise a mystical vision: 
'All the appearances of things, their colours, the movement and the stillness remained as if 
constant in their rhythm and their scale; but they were heightened, intensified; they were 
carried to a pitch that would have been vehement, vibrant, but that the stillness as well as 
the movement was intense. She was not dazzled by it or confused in any way. Her senses 
were exalted, adjusted to the pitch. 
She would have said now that the earth at their feet had become insubstantial, but that she 
knew, in her flash, that what she saw was the very substance of the visible world; live and 
subtle as flame; solid as crystal and as clean. It was the same world, flat field for flat field 
and hill for hill; but radiant, vibrant, and, as it were, infinitely transparent. Agatha in her 
moment saw that the whole world brimmed and shone and was alive with the joy that was 
its life, joy that flowed flood-high and yet was still. In every leaf, in every blade of grass, 
this life was manifest as a strange, a divine translucence., 253 
Although Agatha's vision presents characteristic opposites of 'movement' and 'stillness', 'substance' and 
'insubstantial', 'subtle' and 'solid' it is the stillness which is most striking. The intensity of perception, 
the exaltation of the senses, the realisation of a transcendent reality, and the transience of the whole 
experience are features common to the content of mystical experiences. Considering the friendship 
between Sinclair and Underhill despite the disagreement previously discussed (Underhill acknowledges 
Sinclair in the preface to Mysticism and Sinclair sends 'The Flaw' to Evelyn Underhill for her comment) 
there is nothing surprising in Agatha's vision echoing Underhill's description of the common mystical 
experience when: 
'the world has seemed charged with a new vitality... [and] in such moods of heightened 
consciousness each blade of grass seems fierce with meaning, and becomes a well of 
wondrous light., 254 
In Underhill's tenninology, the test of real transcendental activity is their 'life-enhancing quality. 'They 
infuse something new in the way of strength, knowledge, direction; and leave [the selfl - physical, 
mentally, or spiritually - better than they found it. ' Does Agatha's knowledge which comes to her 'in a 
flash' of the very substance of the visible world distinguish her 'moment' from 'those which are only 
due to imagination raised to the nth power, to intense reverie, or to psychic illness... at worst, they are 
the dreams - sometimes the diseased dreams - of an active rich, but imperfectly controlled subliminal 
253 Sinclair, 'The Flaw in the Crystal', p. 203. 
254 Underhill, Mysticism p. 22. 
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consciousness., 255 As well as evidencing incomplete sublimation, in Defence of Idealism Sinclair 
attributes such visions to the power of unconscious suggestion: 'It accounts for all the 'psychic 
phenomena' of Mysticism: the miracles, the vision, the ecstasies, the sense of Union. '256 Suggestion 
was commonly invoked as a catch-all explanation for the inexplicable: examined closely, it refers to a 
process which reveals less about origin than influence. As May Sinclair observes, suggestion 'does not 
account for itself. When we have said that suggestion gives rise to psychic events, we do not know why, 
or even how it does'so. We have said not said from what centres or on what levels it is working. '257 
Yet in her letter to the SPR, as we saw, she is most explicit, naming unconscious desire as the 'most 
purposeful and designing force in the universe. ' 
iv) Absolute horror 
Agatha Verrall from 'The Flaw in the Crystal' is not the only one of Sinclair's protagonists subject to 
(or the subject of) these out of the ordinary psychic states: both Gwendolyn in The Three Sisters and 
Mary Oliver in Sinclair's semi-autobiographical novel of that name share experiences of similar vibrant 
intensity. 258259 However Agatha is unique in being the only one of these women to later experience a 
mirror image of her vision, as evil in its conception as the first vision was beneficent. Quite unpredicted 
by her philosophy, what we now witness is a gothic underface of sublimation which drives these 
questions of location and limitation to an extreme. Embodied in this moment are, in a sense, her worse 
psychological fears and by being embodied they are symbolised. This gothic nightmare, far ftom the 
ideals of imagism, recalls William James' prediction of the gothic 'world of mind' which we saw in the 
introduction. 
'A hot wave swept over her brain, so strong that she staggered as it passed. It was 
followed by a strange sensation of physical sickness, that passed also. It was then as if 
what went through her had charged her nerves of sight to a pitch of insane and horrible 
sensibility. The green of the grass, and of the young com, the very colour of life, was 
violent and frightful. Not only was it abominable in itself, it was a thing to be shuddered 
at, because of some still more abominable significance it had. 
... it was horror and 
fear unspeakable. Horror and fear immanent in the life of things. She 
saw the world in a loathsome transparency; she saw it with the eye of a soul in which no 
sense of the divine had ever been, of a soul denied the supernatural. It had been Harding 
Powell's soul, and it had become hers. 
Furiously, implacably, he was getting at her. 
255 Ibid. p. 270. 
256 Sinclair, A Defence of Idealism, p. 300. 
257 Ibid. 
258 'There went through her a sudden deep excitement, a subtle and mysterious joy. This passion was as 
distant and as pure as ecstasy. It swept her, while the white glamour lasted, into the stillness where the 
flowering thorn trees stood' (Sinclair, The Three Sisters, p. 320-1). 
259 'She had a sense of happiness and peace suddenly there with her in the room. Not so much her own as the 
happiness and peace of an immense, invisible, intangible being of whose life she was thus aware' (Sinclair, 
, Vfary Olivier: A Life, p. 375). 
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Out of the wood and the hedges that bordered it there came sounds that were horrible, 
because she knew them to be inaudible to any ear less charged with insanity; small sounds 
of movement, of strange shiverings, swarmings, crepitations; sounds of incessant, 
infinitely subtle urging, of agony and recoil. Sounds they were of the invisible things 
unborn, driven towards birth; sounds of the worm unborn, of things that creep and writhe 
towards dissolution. She knew what she heard and saw. She heard the stirring of the 
corruption that Life was; the young blades of corn were frightful to her, for in them was 
the push, the passion of the evil which was Life; the trees as they stretched out their arms 
and threatened her were frightful with the terror which was Life. Down there, in that gross 
green hot-bed, the earth teemed with the abomination; and the river, livid, white, a 
monstrous thing, crawled, dragging with it the very slime., 260 
In curing Harding's madness we are told that the symptoms have been transferred to Agatha: his soul 
'had become hers'. The evil vision is ascribed to Harding, the dark shadow of the story, and Agatha, the 
flawless crystal, is saved from being tainted by her vision. Yet since the vision is the precise opposite of 
the former - 'infinitely transparent', now 'loathsome transparency' - they are inevitably implicated one 
with another. Underhill wrote praising 'The Flaw' for Sinclair's depiction of the devil'; and 
surprisingly, confessing to a similar vision of her own: 
4your most brilliant bit is that vision of the evil world. I wonder whether you have ever 
S=a that disagreeable piece of evidence of the existence of the devil. If not, it is an 
extraordinary piece of imaginative reconstruction. I saw it once for 24 hours (this piece of 
information is for you gl=! ) and it was awfully like that, allowing for difference of 
landscape. You reminded me of it again with horrid vividness! 1! '261 
Evelyn's letter is cited in Boll's biography of Sinclair yet he omits an earlier letter which curiously 
professes ignorance of such abomination. In this letter Underhill writes: 
'Its simply amazing about that evil vision of the world, & makes me quite afraid of you! 
I've never heard of anyone else having it in that violent form... I wonder whether the 
description in the Crystal will bring to light any other cases. The heavenly vision seems to 
be much commoner, doesn't it? '262 
it is striking that at first Underhill identifies Sinclair with the source of an 'evil' which is entirely 
foreign to her own experience (Jit] makes me quite afraid of you! ') only to later own such a fearful 
vision as her own. Underhill's belated confession betrays the oscillating and contradictory processes of 
projection and reluctant identification of 'horror', or in Agatha's case, 'desire' with oneself, and suggests 
the stigma attached to identifying oneself with the opposite face of spirituality, or the mystical moment 
characteristic of modernism. Towards the beginning of 'The Flaw' Agatha, as if some 'veil' has been 
260 Sinclair, 'The Flaw in the Crystal', p. 216. 
261 Letter from Evelyn Underhill to May Sinclair, Tuesday, 1911, May Sinclair Papers; cited in T Boll, Afiss 
jVfay Sinclair: Novelist (Cranburry, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1973), p. 92. 
262 Letter from Evelyn Underhill to May Sinclair, 1911, May Sinclair Papers. 
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brushed aside, sees 'something that up till her now her crystal vision had refused to see.. She discovered 
in [Rodney] a desire... that up till now he had concealed from her. It had left its hiding place; it rose on 
terrifying wings and fluttered before her, troubling her. She was reminded that, though there were no 
lurking possibilities in her, with him it might be different., 
263 
A Defence of Idealism describes the origins of modem mysticism in fertility magic of the past which 
celebrated 'the desire for fertility, the desire to live and make live'. 
264 If the mystic vision should be 
, life-enhancing', Agatha's counter-vision presents fertility as depravity, a horror of the unborn, a fear of 
birth and generation. This terror of the unborn recalls the episode when Rodney searched Agatha's face 
for signs of well-being, hoping not to find 'the unborn, lurking spirit' of terror which her face had the 
latent capacity for expressing. The unborn can be interpreted as her unborn desire, the sexual desire which 
she suppresses out of fear and decorum, and in denying it life is repudiating the living world of nature. 
The vision expresses fear and revulsion of the body: hers and other peoples, which she avoids in her 
insistence on all things spiritual and with which she is confronted here in all its inescapable awfulness. 
Even the description of the river reads more convincingly as a body 'livid, white, a monstrous thing, 
crawled, dragging with it the very slime'. 
265 
The psychic topography within which Sinclair's fiction articulates itself insists that what is expelled can 
never be fully obliterated but continues to threaten apparent unities and stabilities with disruption, or 
murkincss. 266,267 In Subjectivity, Identity and the Body Sidonic Smith, discussing banishment of the 
body to the margins, a neutralising through scif-censoring that functions to contain and control 
dangerous passions, uses an image strikingly resonant of Agatha: a 'body so restrained, so drained of its 
chaotic and grotesque potential, serves as a vessel for the soul'. 
268 Agatha describes 'her whole fragile 
being, as a vessel, a crystal vessel for the holy thing, and was careful lest a touch of the earth should jar 
and break her'. 
269 Agatha's body serves as an unearthly vessel for the sacrament of the gift - Rodney 
describes her hair, her mouth, her eyes, 'lifted; as if by - he could find no other word for the thing he 
meant but wings., 
270 Yet by hallowing herself as a crystal vessel, 'lifted' so high up, Agatha has, so to 
speak, further to fall: as her extreme self-censoring becomes unsustainable the story now follows her into 
collision with the earth. 
263 Sinclair, 'The Flaw in the Crystal', p. 195. 
264 Sinclair, A Defence of Idealism, p. 274. 
265 Sinclair, 'The Flaw in the Crystal', p. 216. 
266 'Neither wholly present, nor wholly absent, the body is confined, ignored, excribed from discourse, and 
yet remains at the edge of visibility, troubling the space from which it has been banished' (Francis Barker, The 
Tremulous Private Body; essays on subjectivity, London: Methuen, 1984, p. 63). This is similar to Kristeva's 
position on the abject: that part of the subject which it attempts to expel. 
267 The 'supplementary' body persists ineluctably: 'it is, as it were, the unspoken of a stable speaking 
position, an abyss at the very borders of the subject's identity, a hole into which the subject may fall' 
(Elizabeth Gross, 'The Body of Signification' in Fletcher, John and Benjamin, Andrew (eds. ), Abjection. 
Melancholia and Love: the work of Julia Kristeva, London: Routledge, 1990, p. 87). 
268 Sidonie Smith, Subjectivity, identity and the body. women's autobiographical practices in the twentieth 
century, Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1993, p. 6. 
269 Sinclair, 'The Flaw in the Crystal', p. 200. 
270 Ibid. p. 192. 
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There is a point about modernist representation and language, as most familiarily discussed, also to 
made here. Once again the issue of the moral boundaries resolves itself partly into an aesthetic question. 
The Thing dramatises the difficulties encountered in the narrative: 'in other words, if you could put it 
into words at all., 271 In Defence of Idealism May Sinclair draws attention to 'the limitations of 
language... when it comes to discussing whether things are inside or outside of consciousness; whether 
consciousness is a part or a whole; whether, if it runs, it runs parallel with psychical processes, or runs 
altogether in some other manner; whether, if it stands, it stands at the circumference or the centre; and 
whether consciousness stands or runs at all, it seems almost obvious that we are being made the victims 
of our own metaphors., 
272 In her own description of psychic dissociation she becomes entangled in 
images of 'territories and streams and bottoms and seas and thresholds'. 'If we once grasp the utter 
irrelevance of all this symbolic language as applying to consciousness and the relation of subject to 
object, half the difficulties in accepting some conscious principle as the ultimate reality will have 
disappeared., 273 No longer arguing about the naming and content of symbols, Sinclair is decrying the 
collapse of symbolisation altogether. It is as if the boundary between subject and object has not only 
dissolved philosophically but linguistically, and this dissolution and its psychic subtext have become 
internalised into the fiction. The dissolution between subject and object has, as it were, gone inside the 
work and reified itself as a monstrosity. What her story enacts is the toppling of the 'conscious 
principle', in other words, the unearthly vessel, by the inevitable touch of earth. 
Yet Agatha's horror is not over: immediately following her vision of evil, her fear reaches its apotheosis 
when she 'sees' Harding crouched in the bushes: 
&as she called his name he became insubstantial, and she saw a Thing, a nameless, 
unnameable, shapeless Thing, proceeding from him. A brown, blurred Thing, transparent 
as dusk is, that drifted on the air. It was tom and tormented, a fragment parted and flung 
off from some immense and as yet invisible cloud of horror. It drifted from her; it 
dissolved like smoke on the hillside; and the Thing that had born and begotten it pursued 
her. 
She bowed under it; and turned from the edge of the wood, the horrible place it had been 
bom in'. 274 
Harding Powell immaterialises as she calls his name: the act of naming is met with dissolution. The 
'Thing' is 'nameless, unnameable': indescribable and unspeakable. The Thing can be read via structural 
linguistics as what escapes categorisation each time language opens up the gap between the subject and 
its representation. In this instance, The Thing quite literally escapes, drifting away and dissolving, while 
at the same time remaining inescapable: the 'immense and invisible cloud of horror' of which it is a 
fragment, pursues her. 275 
271 Ibid. p. 200. 
272 Sinclair, A Defence of Idealism, p. 346. 
273 Ibid. p. 347. 
274 Sinclair 'The Flaw in the Crystal', p. 217. 
275 In Lacanian theory these losses are the unspeakable contents of the unconscious. 
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Agatha's failure to locate the source of the Thing on one hand revives questions of subjectivity and 
objectivity and their mediation dealt with in Sinclair's philosophical writing on idealism, and the other 
hand indicates an indeterminability which seriously disturbs the distinctions she is trying to sustain. 
Thus, the confusion over what is or is not visible, is matched by an indeterminacy of origin. The 
'Thing' proceeds 'from him' and drifts 'from her', as if both collaborate in its production. Furthermore, 
does 'the fragment parted' describe the 'Thing' itself, or does it refer to the creation of a new 'Thing', an 
offspring or part of the original Thing? Cohesive to either possibility, and reinforced by the evocation of 
both, is the conception of a successive crigendering of 'Things': of fragments tom from their place of 
origin. Following the horror of the unborn in the vision of evil this can be read as representing a 
counterpart horror of the birth process itself, of the begetting, and even the place of birth. The place of 
birth is where Agatha takes a habitual walk at night. Just as the mystical vision had its reverse, the 
emergence of the Thing was pre-figured by her consecration in the identical location of her gift . She is 
accustomed to 'calling her thoughts home to sleep' here, as if they are birds roosting in the woods. 276 
We remember the 'whirring of little wings in fright' when she first sees the 'Thing' and receive the 
inference that the 'Thing' is a disturbance of her thought: 'It looks as if thoughts flew about, and could 
be caught casually on the wing., 277 
If the world of material objects is an illusion (Hindu maya), transparency refers to an ability to see 
beyond the veil of things, not to be seduced by appearances. Murkiness is a claustrophobia which entraps 
the subject in this world and in the physical form. The brown, muddied Thing, coming from Harding 
cannot be seen through: it is associated with the 'turbid, brown shadows' in which he is sitting when 
Agatha first meets him. 278 It is the colour of madness and the libido. Yet when Evelyn Underhill 
reassures 'I don't think you need be the least afraid of any misunderstanding about the relation between 
A& Rodney. It is absolutely clear., 279 'Clear', ironically, remains ambiguous: as we recall what you 
see depends on what you hold the crystal against. 
Interviewed in the hope of appeasing the public's own horror at her story, Sinclair suggests that Agatha's 
invasion by Harding's madness is 'a fact': 
11 have questioned everyone of these people as to the possibility of the healer taking on (as 
Agatha Verrall took on) the malady he takes away, and almost every one of them has told 
me that, until the healer knows how to protect himself, this uncanny transference is a fact. 
The physician will explain it as an effect of auto-suggestion, the Christian Scientist will 
tell you gravely that if is the last stand that the Evil One, the Spirit of Error, makes 
against the Truth, which is shortly to annihilate him., 280 
276 Ibid. p. 215. 
277 Sinclair, A Defence of Idealism, p. 299. 
278 Sinclair, 'The Flaw', p. 197. 
279 Letter from Evelyn Underhill, 1911, May Sinclair Papers, Box 57. 
280 Sinclair, 'Concerning My Book: May Sinclair Tells How Tales of Strange Influences came to her as the 
basis for a Story', New York Times Review of Books, (Nov 3 1912). 
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One reading relegates the madness to an invasion from without, endorsing the unconscious telepathic 
transference of psychic states while the other garners the vision as Agatha's own: sabotaged by her own 
beast in the jungle. In Agatha's case 'the fact' of telepathy, or 'uncanny transference', can also be read as 
an attempt to disguise the source of the 'evil' in her own psyche, in which case telepathy covers Agatha's 
own psychic splitting and, for all her insistence upon clarity, prevents her from seeing the whole picture. 
Implicit within the earlier passage is the suggestion that the abomination is of Agatha's own making, 
and the experience is peculiar to her own fears. Her repressed desire and repressed fear of this desire irrupt 
into her waking consciousness from the dissociated part of consciousness whose contents Sinclair 
marked out in Defence of Idealism as an 'isolated and abandoned tract [which] is the home of all the 
obsessions, the fixed ideas, the morbid 'complexes' unearthed by psychoanalysts, the day-dreams and 
phantasies of neurotic and insane persons., 
281 
Most importantly, the indeterminacy of location manifested by telepathy disturbs the philosophical 
distinctions Sinclair has been trying to sustain. Agatha is certain that the cause of her vision is her 
invasion by Harding's madness. 'It was not her own madness that possessed her. It was, or rather it had 
been, Harding Powell's; she had taken it from him. That was what it meant - to take away madness. '282 
Who is trespassing upon who? 283 The curative intention of healing casts Agatha's as a benign 
intervention yet the language of 'getting at' someone to heal them is aggressive: 
4 In the process of getting at Harding to heal him she had had to destroy not only the 
barriers of flesh and blood, but those innermost walls of personality that divide and 
protect, mercifully, one spirit from another. With the first thinning of the walls Harding's 
insanity had leaked through to her, with the first breach it had broken in. It had been 
transferred to her complete with all its details, with its very gestures, in all the phases that 
it ran through'. 
Agatha's healing is an acknowledged act of violence, yet she is unprepared for retribution, for having 
another's madness 'put into you': 
, it seemed to her that to have a madness of your own would not be so very horrible. It 
would be, after all, your own. It could not possibly be one-half so horrible as this, to have 
somebody else's madness put into you., 
284 
Horrified to experience 'somebody else's madness' Agatha's preference for a far less horrible madness of 
4your own, ' can be read as repudiating the altruistic model which obliges an identification with all 
fellow-beings as oneself. If the crystal's transparency presents an ideal of altruism - moral purity and 
brotherhood - Agatha can be said to have encountered her own limits in refusing to identify Harding's 
281 Sinclair, Defence of Idealism, p. 289. 
282 Sinclair, 'The Flaw in the Crystal', p. 218. 
283 F. W. H. Myers described the common confusion between agent and percipient in cases of clairvoyant 
invasion (Gurney, Edward, Myers, Frederic, and Podmore, Frank, Phantasms of the Living, ii, London: TrObner, 
1886, p. 310). 
284 Sinclair, 'The Flaw in the Crystal', p. 218. 
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madness as her own. Inadvertently perhaps, Sinclair has proposed a vision of the supreme form of 
connectedness as a horror, or madness. 
in a predicament which is unspeakably horrible yet also indescribably intimate, Agatha resolves to stop 
healing Harding: the gift, which is her own power has become uncontrollable and she fears that she will 
4pass him on to Rodney Lanyon' like a sexually contagious disease. Although the operation of the gift is 
entirely extra-physical, it effects a more complete union than that achieved by any physical contact: they 
are 'undivided substance': a description which recalls that of Rodney's nerves 'wedded indissolubly' to 
Bella and suggests a similar partnership. We also remember Agatha's belief that 'thought went wider and 
deeper than any deed'. 285 Harding clings tenaciously yet finally on the third night, Agatha manages to 
cast him off. in 'recalling some forgotten, yet inalienable knowledge' she remembers the only terms with 
which the power can be appeased. In the region where we are told 'there is no more self' she is required 
to give up her desire for Rodney. 
286 The Power asks a sacrifice and Agatha concedes'. 
Agatha's sacrifice restores the faultless working of the healing gift: without it the gift might harm 
instead of help. Agatha insists that the purveyor of the gift must be 'crystal without a flaw'. She initially 
believes the fault to be in her fear, yet later realises through Milly's probing, that the flaw is in fact her 
desire. Interestingly, Milly, the unimaginative for whom 'Anything short of the tangible had never been 
enough' is endowed with knowing. 
'For now the whole marvellous thing was clear to [Agatha]. She knew the secret of the 
gift. She saw luminously, almost transparently, the way it worked. Milly had shown her. 
Milly knew; Milly had seen; she had put her finger on the flaw. '287 
Milly's seeing undermines the privilege given throughout the story to Agatha's powers of perception. 
Agatha has always appeared to 'know' yet only 'now' does the secret become apparent. 'It was the strain 
of mortality in her love for Rodney; the hidden thing, unforeseen and unacknowledged, working its work 
in the darkness. It had been there all the time undermining her secret, sacred places., 288 Agatha has not 
seen the tangible, the mortal; her vision has also been partial only looking beyond, not at, the body. 
This can be read back into her evaluation of transparency, as the ultimate quality of moral purity, to be 
see-through is not to have a body, to be bodiless. It is telling that Harding's wife Milly puts 'her finger 
on the flaw' as if touch discovers desire, where thought vanishes, or conceals, it. Desire undermines 
$secret, sacred places'; it demands another; it disrupts the discrete self. The 'strain of mortality' defines 
285 Ibid. p. 225, p. 226. 
286 Ibid. p. 219. 
287 Ibid. p. 225. The image of the flaw reappears in The Dark Night marking the infidelity of Elizabeth's lover: 
11 thought that his soul was a hard, clear crystal, 
Swinging its light through soft darkness, 
Flawless and stainless, 
Unbreakable crystal, 
[... ] The flaw runs through the crystal, 
The star has fallen from its sky, 
There is no faith, no truth in heaven 
Any more' (Sinclair, The Dark Night, p. 94-5). 
288 Sinclair, 'The Flaw in the Crystal', p. 225. 
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the human as against the eternal; it reads the human as a body moving between birth and death; 
something repugnant in what is earthly. Sexual desire can thus be read as a subversive dynamic 
jeopardising the altruistic motives of Agatha's healing gift. It is the problem, yet it is also the solution 
since only through openness is healing possible. In 'The Flaw', the egoism/altruism debate inflects upon 
notions of moral purity: intactness, essential to purity, is an uneasy companion to the demand of 
altruism. How to preserve intactness and be 'open' to others? 'The Flaw' identifies desire as the 
inevitable flaw running through the crystal: a desire which 'flaws' the purity of intactness. 
Itself rich in images of crystal, Henry James' Golden Bowl carries inevitable and significant associations 
to May Sinclair's 'The Flaw in the Crystal'. 289 Reading the novel as moral philosophy, Martha 
Nussbaum's essay 'Flawed Crystals' identifies the conflict arising from Maggie's desire to remain 
morally irreproachable, or intact. As in Agatha's case, moral perfection is consituted upon an altruistic 
ideal of not harming others: for both women this ideal would seemingly be threatened by expression of 
their sexuality. In Agatha's case suppression of sexuality respects the law of marriage, whereas for 
Maggie it would disrupt the moral duty she owes to her father. Like Agatha, Maggie is described as 'a 
pure and perfect crystal': yet Nussbaum suggests that Maggie's attachment to a moral simplicity masks 
an avoidance of her own adult sexuality and the complexities of her position and paradoxically 'generates 
an extraordinary blindness,. 
290 Yet, if innocence, or intactness, generates guilt and blindness, so too 
does the loss of it: the triumph of love requires an insensitivity to the claims of others. When Maggie 
finally gives up her purity of vision, her crystal hardness, her perfect rightness, she buries her eyes 
literally and metaphorically in her husband's body; as Nussbaum observes: 
'To see all, to be present to all, requires of the spectator a narrowness of love; to surrender 
to love requires an infidelity of the soul's eyes., 291 
Seeing all is the altruistic ideal, a vision which is obscured by the egoism of love. Agatha's surname 
'Verrall' (remembering the future tense of the French 'voire') can be read as marking her gift 'To see all,: 
yet as The Golden Bowl demonstrates -a novel which we know Sinclair to have admired - altruism is 
incompatible with the love which would enable it. Paradoxically the beauty of restraint necessitates a 
blindness which compromises the ideal of transparency. 
289 Sinclair was undoubtedly influenced by Henry James: one reviewer compared 'The Flaw in the Crystal' to 
Henry James' Turn of the Screw (Amy Wellington, 'Artist of the Supernormal', p. 197); Sinclair wrote to 
Charlotte Mew that Henry James 'had influenced = considerably' (Letter to Charlotte Mew, 22 April, 1915 in 
The Berg Collection of English and American Literature, The New York Public Library, q. v. Raitt, May Sinclair: 
Modern 1,7ctorian, p. 69 n. 87); Sinclair cites the forty-first chapter of Henry James' Golden Bowl as 
exemplifying the poetic possibilities of prose ('The Poetry of F. S. Flint', p. 12). 
290 'Flawed Crystals', Martha Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 132, p. 128 n5. 'The richness of the novel's moral vision lies in the way in 
which it both shows us the splendor of a rigourous moralism [ ... I and at the same time erodes our confidence 
in 
this ideal by displaying the guilt involved in such innocence' (ibid. p. 133). 
291 Ibid. p. 137. 
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'Blindness and unspeakable intimacy' 
Metaphors of light and dark, seeing and blindness are inextricably woven into the prose of 'The Flaw in 
the Crystal' - holding in tension the play between the cerebral and sensual, objectivity and subjectivity, 
restraint and passion. In The Dark Night Elizabeth says to Victor, the poet: 
-You look as if you saw something that isn't there. " 
"it is there, " he answered. 
And 1: "Yes, I've seen it. " 
"You would see it, " he said. 
"I knew that You would, 
There were your poems, 
But how did you know that I- T' 
"There were your eyes -p, 
292 
As a poet Victor has privileged insight, but Elizabeth's quality of seeing grants her similar access to a 
transcendent reality: writing (specifically poetry) and seeing are linked. In Sinclair's writing seeing refers 
to a form of knowing unrestricted by language which can see, or think, beyond words, beyond the 
physical. In Sinclair's depiction of the Absolute 'world of mind' she describes: 'there seeing is not 
seeing but perceiving, and this I take to mean a form of sight not less but more intense, more brilliantly 
and exquisitely revealing than our earthly sense., 
293 
In the 'Way of Sublimation' Sinclair refers to the libido as 'this Beast in the Jungle, this secret thing 
that hunts me and destroys me in the dark'(my italics) and describes how symbols make visible the 
libido to man: 'It is as if long ago man had said to himself. 'Let me only = what it is I have to 
combat., 
294 May Sinclair's appeal to the conscious mind with its associated clarity of thought which 
satisfies itself in logic of philosophical debate casts as its shadow the opposite, undesirable state of 
obscurity. Dora Marsden, as I have shown, suggests that exercise of the will maintains the distinction 
between human and subhuman forms of experience: 
, being carried away bodily by a gust of uncontrollable passion... [is] the nearest 
approximation which the human being can make to the 'blind' emotional condition of the 
subhuman... Though every fibre of the body has lent itself to the action's consummation, 
not once has it assumed objectivity'. 
292 Sinclair, The Dark Night, p. 24. 
293 Sinclair, 'Introduction' to C. A. Dawson Scott, From Four Who Are Dead, p. 7. 
294 Sinclair, 'The Way of Sublimation', p. 27, p. 28. See also: Sinclair cites Jung, Psychology of the 
Unconscious: the purpose of the Mysteries to 'transform the obscure compulsion of the libido' (ibid. p. 28); 
, the long miles of [Jung's] march are always upwards and towards the light' (ibid. p. 53); 'it will be a relief to 
many students of the Unconscious to see it in another aspect than that of "a wild beast crouched, waiting its 
hour to spring. - Some readers have gathered that view of it from the writings of the Viennese school' (Editor's 
preface to Jung, Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology); the belief underpinning mind-cure is - by 
thinking positively - to 'emphasise the bright side of life and minimise the dark' (Severin, Psychotherapy, 
P. 141). 
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She goes on to approve the common labelling of such an impulse as 'blind. 295 In Sinclair's The Dark 
Night blindness literally befalls the man who gives way to his sexual passion for his 'adopted' daughter 
marking an explicit connection between darkness and passion, light and restraint. 
In The English Review an ink drawn portrait of May Sinclair faces a page from D. H. Lawrence's short 
story 'The Blind Man'. 
296 The portrait is a cut-out photograph of May Sinclair's head which appears to 
have been glued to a pen and ink drawn body. As if mirroring Sinclair's priviliging of reason and mind, 
the head is disproportionately oversized with eyes fixed in a piercing gaze, while the body is diminished, 
shrinking towards the frailest of ankles with feet in small, pointed shoes. The lower half of her frame is 
insubstantial while the face is charged with import. Behind her is a shelf with a single candle burning, 
feather pen and ink and several bound volumes. Just as the head both belongs, and yet appears disjointed 
from the body, so, I suggest, Sinclair's writing in emphasising the power of the will, attempts to 
disavow the emotional condition of the 'body' with which it is, nevertheless, united. The objects behind 
her, the tools of the writer, or intellectual, are enclosed in a box-like shelf, which is coff in-shaped, as if 
to suggest an entombing of the intellectual life away from the vitality of the body. Taking the image 
further, this coff in-box of writer's implements presents itself as an x-ray of Sinclair's body - as if to 
suggest that writing, or sublimation, clears the body of viscera - it is now transparent as crystal. 
it can hardly be coincidental that the portrait is set among the pages of a story by Lawrence which exalts 
in the sensual darkness of a blind man's universe, and thus it is tempting to read it bluntly in response 
to May Sinclair's own negation of the 'blind emotional condition' and her insistence upon the virtues of 
clear-sightedness. Similar to 'The Flaw', 'The Blind Man' is set in an secluded farmhouse yet in 
Lawrence's story the isolation is only geographical: the last year, for the couple who have lived there 
since the husband returned home from the war, has been one 'of blindness and unspeakable intimacy': an 
intimacy which, in contrast to Agatha's 'immaterial tie' is now materialised in the pregnant body of the 
woman. 297 The man's loss of sight has brought the reward of a renewed connection with the physical 
world -I suggest that his blindness itself is represented as a gift where the sensitivity of touch replaces 
the subtleties of seeing. Where 'touch' disrupted the clarity of Agatha's vision, Lawrence glorifies the 
sensuality enabled by touch in a world uninterrupted by sight: 'So long as he kept this sheer immediacy 
of blood-contact with the substantial world he was happy, he wanted no intervention of visual 
consciousness., 
298 Whereas 'The Flaw in the Crystal' is about an unconsummated liason in which the 
potency of touch is a taboo to be transcended, Lawrence's story celebrates the 'blood-contact' which 
triumphs over the daylight cerebral world: 'The touch had an almost hypnotising effect on [his 
wifel. 1299 In an obvious contrast to the facing portrait of May Sinclair, the husband is described as a 
295 Marsden, 'The Power of the Will', Egoist, (Feb 1918), p. 21. 
296 Number 2 in a series of 'Distinguished Women' by Will Farrow, English Review, 31 (Jul-Dec 1920), p. 33. 
297 D. 11. Lawrence, 'The Blind Man', English Review, 31 (Jul-Dec 1920) 2241, p. 25. 
298 Ibid. p. 31. 
299 Ibid. 
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man 'with heavy limbs, powerful legs that seemed to know the earth'. 300 Yet if, as I have described, it 
was the 'flaw' in Agatha's gift which brought her into contact with the earth, it is curious to discover 
that Lawrence's protagonist, too, has a 'flaw': 'he was a man, dark and powerful and infuriated by his 
own weakness. By some fatal flaw, be could not be by himself, he had to depend on the support of 
another. And this very dependence enraged him., 301 Touch, in 'The Blind Man' is a condition of 
survival. In both stories the 'weakness' describes the individual's implication - whether through 
dependence or desire - in another. Is the 'flaw' in each case the impossibility of autonomy? Is what we 
see here the failure of both models - altruistic and solipsistic as each failing adequately to account for - 
or sublimate - the idea of unconscious desire which was being foregrounded by the psychoanalytic 
model? 
300 Ibid. p. 30. 
301 Ibid. p. 32. 
FOUR 
'To turn the mind loose within determined limits': 
the 'peculiar art' of Dion Fortune's occultism 
'We find that a great psychic wave swept over the world and man began to realize that he 
was Mind and as such was neither bound by time nor by space, but could send his 
thoughts in any given direction and could communicate without words with distant 
minds; and that mind could compel matter to obey it. 'I 
"it is difficult for the man who knows nothing of the occult to rcalise how great, how 
serious and how all-pervading are his own limitations. 12 
Stepping outside the narrow limits 
'He]... forgot what age and land he dwelt in. Whole blocks of conventional belief 
crumbled and fell away. Brick walls erected by routine to mark narrow paths of proper 
conduct... thawed and vanished. Through the ruins, scrambling at him from huge horizons 
never recognised before, came all manner of marvellous possibilities. The little 
confinement of modem thought appalled him suddenly., 3 
The above passage from a short story by Algernon Blackwood, envisages a utopia of 'marvellous 
possibilities' incident upon the disintegration of modem consciousness. The psychic and moral bounds 
of 'routine', 'proper conduct' and 'conventional belief are concretely represented as physical edifices: 
'brick walls' which both structure and stricture experience. Included in a collection of stories published 
in 1914, it could be read, in line with the Futurist's initial war enthusiasm, as heralding an intellectual 
anarchy to be precipitated by destruction of the establishment. On the other hand, given that the modem 
vista of thought was already being reshaped by the new models of subjectivity being articulated in the 
field of psychology, philosophy and aesthetics - recall for instance the 'new horizons' opened for 
William James by a reading of Bergson - Blackwood's reduction of these liberal insights to the 'little 
I Ingalese, Richard, The History and Power of Mind (London: Fowler, 1902), p. 17. 
2 Leadbeater, C. W., The Hidden Side of Things (Madras: Theosophical Publishing llouse, 1913), p. 5. 
3 Algernon Blackwood, 'The Regeneration of Lord Ernie', Incredible Adventures (London: Macmillan, 1914), 
p. 26-7. 
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confinement of modem thought' may seem intriguing. 4 What apocalyptic thinking could this imagined 
collapse liberate? Taking into account Blackwood's membership of the Golden Dawn - to which Evelyn 
Underhill briefly belonged - and his commitment to the study of ritual magic, it is occultism which 
emerges as the wider prospect to offer emancipation from 'modem thought': the 'huge horizons' and 
4marvellous possibilities' gesture towards the changes in consciousness purportedly made accessible 
through magical practice. It is perhaps not incidental then that William James should have praised 
Bergson as, 'for me, a magician., 5 
It was not uncommon for occult doctrine to be represented as offering deliverance from the confines of 
everyday consciousness. The Secrets of Doctor Taverner, a collection of short stories first published in 
1922 by another committed occultist, Dion Fortune, are set in a nursing-home where unusual cases of 
occult pathology are treated. The stories are narrated by Forbes, Dr Taverner's young medical assistant, 
whose naive scepticism develops into an increasing respect for the anomalies of occult practice. By the 
conclusion of the volume, Forbes' exposure to an enlarged realm of experience has undermined any 
former sense of proprieties, prompting him to question: 'Should I dare to step outside the narrow limits 
of human experience into the expanse of wider consciousness that was all about me? Should I open that 
door which never can be closed againT6 Once more, everyday human experience is characterised as 
4narrow', yet here the alternative is figured as being accessed through human will. Dramatising the 
moment as one of choice, the elected step will take the speaker beyond 'conventional belief' and into the 
margins, or edges, of consciousness and society. The choice involves a repudiation of the establishment 
- which, in its turn, labels occult 
doctrine as 'rejected theories'. 7 Young Forbes must relinquish his 
ambitions for a career in traditional medicine since doors of conventional opportunity will shut with the 
opening of this 'door which never can be closed again. His hesitation at the brink of habit recalls 
Algernon Blackwood's formidable 'brick walls erected by routine' (and the more frivolous vacillation of 
T. S. Eliot's Prufrock 'Do I dare to eat a peach? ') The implication is that boundaries are formed by 
convention rather than necessity: the risk is less sanity than status. Dion Fortune figures the door into 
6wider consciousness' as remaining open, which suggests a blurring of the threshold and invites a 
redefinition of the marginal. 
it is an invitation which I take up in this chapter, exploring occultism as a neglected discourse which 
investigates 'wider consciousness' and deserves inclusion alongside more acknowledged forms of 
thinking about the self, current in the 'modem thought' of the early twentieth century. Through a reading 
of the work of Dion Fortune (1890-1941) 1 argue that occultism is a discipline which claims to both 
cross and control boundaries between selves, and the self and world, throwing into question the 
autonomy of the self while insisting upon the power of consciousness. Dion Fortune, who came to study 
4 William James, Manuscripts, Essays and Notes, The Works of William James (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1988), p. 216. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Dion Fortune, The Secrets of Doctor Taverner (first published as short stories, The Royal Magazine, 1922; 
repr. 1926; Wellingborough: Aquarian Press, 1989), p. 222. 
7 Richard Cavendish, A History of Magic (London: Sphere Books, 1978), p. 66. 
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and practice occultism after training in psychology, was alert to the negative connotations of occultism 
and her writing attempts a cultural re-evaluation of the term. A practising occultist, psychologist and 
writer of occult theory and fiction, she was born Violet Mary Firth, but assumed the Latin motto Deo 
Non Fortuna (by God not luck) when she joined the Golden Dawn, and subsequently abbreviated her 
name to Dion Fortune. 8 A prominent figure in occult circles of the early and mid-twentieth century, with 
successive affiliations to various esoteric societies, she founded her own occult fraternity in 1927, named 
the Society of the Inner Light, which continues to promote her writings today. 9 As Richard Cavendish's 
History of Magic describes, a much broader popular interest in occultism developed between the wars 
during which period Dion Fortune was 'the best known magician in Britain'; elsewhere she is named 
'one of the most interesting occult personalities of this century'. 10 The recent reissuing of almost her 
entire works signals a significant contemporary resurgence of interest. 
II 
Dion Fortune's ideas concerning subjectivity, the subtle interrelations between mind and body, and the 
negotiation of boundaries between self and others justify her inclusion in a discussion which has 
previously invoked slightly more conventional, if still non-canonical writers. I propose that many of the 
issues she explores dovetail intriguingly into the aesthetic debates of modernism, and that Dion 
Fortune's esoteric doctrine, with its admixture of psychoanalysis, represents a specifically modem occult 
engagement with the self, designating a domain that is less foreign to the concerns of modernism than 
commonly supposed. Dion Fortune's occult writing records her own apparent traversal of the 'narrow 
limits, of human consciousness into the 'expanse of wider consciousness' (variously designated as the 
'fringe reef' in William James' model of consciousness, the subliminal in Myers) which is further 
invoked by her fiction. This region of 'wider consciousness' - with the 'huge horizons' envisaged by 
Blackwood - indexes an occult psychic topography which is both an extensive and intensive 
investigation of consciousness. While uncharacteristic of modernist prose, Dion Fortune's writing lends 
an interesting, if curious, inflection upon the aesthetic debate played out within the canon of modernism. 
8 Dion Fortune's less esoteric works are published under her maiden name V. M. Firth: Machinery of the Mind 
(1922), Psychology of the Servant Problem (1925), The Soya Bean (1925), The Problem of Purity (1928). 
Fortune joined the Alpha and Omega Lodge, an offshoot of the Golden Dawn in 1919, later leaving to join the 
London Temple of Moina Mathcrs - Ilenri Bergson's sister. 
9 Initially advertising itself as a branch of the Theosophical Society called the The Christian Mystic Lodge, by 
1927 it was called the Community of the Inner Light: 'a fraternity whose purpose it is to pursue the study of 
Mysticism and Esoteric Science. Its ideals are Christian and its methods are Western' (advertisement, Occult 
Review in Alan Richardson, Priestess: The Life and Magic of Dion Fortune, Wellingborough: Aquarius, 1987, 
plate facing p-160). The Society of Inner Light states its present-day aim as 'the expansion of consciousness', 
and a dedication to the 'process of evolutionary character training, that each individual may become a 
talismanic leavening centre in the life of the Nation' ('The Society of the Inner Light: its work and aims', 
introductory pamphlet received from S. I. L. in response to a membership enquiry). 
10 Richard Cavendish, A History of Magic, p. 177; Bernard Bromage, 'Dion Fortune', Light (Spring 1960), 
p. 12. 
II Recent editions under the imprint of Ilarper Collins: Fortune's fiction: The Sea Priestess, 1989 [1938], The 
Secrets of Doctor Taverner, 1989 [1926], The Demon Lover, 1989 [1927], The Goat-Foot God, 1989 [19361, 
The fringed Bull, 1989 [1935], Moon Magic, 1989 [19561, The Sea Priestess, 1989 [19381; occult studies: 
Psychic Self-Defence 1995 [1930], Applied Magic and Aspects of Occultism, 1995 [19621, The Mystical 
Qabalah 1987 [1935], The Esoteric Orders and Their Work and The Training and Work of an Initiate 1987 
[1928,19301; Cosmic Doctrine [1949], Esoteric Philosophy of Love and Marriage and Problem of Purity 
[1924,19281, Avalon of the Heart [19341, Through the Gates of Death and Spiritualism in the Light of Occult 
Science [1957,19311. The S. I. L. (Society of the Inner Light) publish Machinery of the Mind 1995 [19221. 
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Today, as almost a century previously, the term occultism invokes a plethora of associations with the 
weird, being commonly employed as generic description for what is 'other' to rational discourse. 
Witness Freud's plea to Jung in 1911 that they make the psychoanalytic theory of sexuality an 
Gunshakeable bulwark... [a]gainst the black tide of mud[ ... ] of occultism': 
just as Freud suggested that 
, intangible quantities' associated with 'oceanic' feeling were foreign to the work of psychoanalysis here 
he represents his own theories as sturdy, tangible 'bulwarks' to contrast an uncertain, formless 'mud'. 
Jung later comments: 'what Freud seemed to mean by "occultism" was virtually everything that 
philosophy and religion, including the rising contemporary science of parapsychology, had learned about 
the psyche. To me the sexual theory was just as occult, that is to say, just as unproven. 'I 
2 In defence of 
occultism, Jung proposes to subsume everything under its mantel, pointing to the occult, or 'unproven', 
nature of all theories of the psyche. The 'tide of mud' cannot help but evoke the 'oceanic': Jung 
interprets Freud's outburst as 'the eruption of unconscious religious factors' against which he needs 
assistance in 'erecting a barrier'. 
13 While occultism threatens Freud, Jung casts himself as the 
vanquishing hero: occultism. is another field we shall have to conquer' Jung writes to Freud, and one 
which he is only too ready to plunder: 'I shall return laden with rich booty for our knowledge of the 
human psyche. '14 These differences over 'occultism' were crucial in the splitting apart of the two men 
and of 'our knowledge of the human psyche', with Jung incorporating elements of the 'rich booty' only 
into his own system-15 Critics rereading literary modernism in context of the historical emergence of 
psychoanalysis tend to neglect the correspondences between Jung and modernist aesthetic doctrine. 
Jung's deviations from the psychoanalytic outlawing of the transcendent display a proximity to a 
, modem' occult discourse which itself, as we will see, was endorsed by certain forms of modernist 
writing. 
In a previous chapter we saw Freud marginalising the oceanic, having had no experience of it himself, so 
in this context he comments, 'my own life [ ... ] has been particularly poor in an occult sense. '16 
Considering the empirical emphasis of twentieth-century occultism, (Dion Fortune believes 'an ounce of 
experience is worth a pound of theory'), Freud's disclaimer is well chosen. 
17 However much occultism 
is associated with the irrational and 'unproven', modem occult writers were themselves unanimous in 
depicting it as an empirical science. W. E. Butler, a former student of Dion Fortune, describes occultism 
as a science which studies the 'Inner Worlds': 'it observes, deduces, formulates laws, carries out work 
based on these experiments in both the outer and inner worlds, and is to a great extent an exercise of the 
12 Jung, Memories, Dreams and Reflections, trans. Aniela Jaffe (London: Fontana, 1983), p. 173. 
13 Ibid. p174 
14 Letter 254J, 8 May 1911 in The FreudlJung Letters: The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and 
Carl Jung, ed. W. McGuire, trans. Ralph Manheim and R. F. C. 11all (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1974), p42 1; Letter to Ferenczi (the 'you' was directed at Ferenczi and Jung), II May 1911, cited Ernest Jones, 
Sigmund Freud. ý Life and Work, iii, p. 415. 
15 'Jung can be seen as the culminating point of the late 19th-century occult revival' (Cavendish, The History 
of Magic, p. 126). 
16 Sigmund Freud, 'Psycho-Analysis and Telepathy' (1921; trans 1941) in Standard Edition, xviii (London: 
Ilogarth Press), 173-194, p. 193. 
17 Fortune, Psychic Set(-Defence: A Study in Occult Pathology and Criminality (1930; repr. Wellingborough: 
Aquarian Press, 1998) p. 18. 
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rational faculty of man. '18 More plainly, occultism is a 'science which deals with extended 
consciousness, and the experiences which that extended consciousness opens up'. With its focus upon 
extended consciousness affinities are immediately apparent with abnormal psychology: as Fortune 
declares 'unless we have a proper concept of the nature of consciousness, we can never hope to 
understand occultism. '19 But, as we go on to see, Dion Fortune's regard for psychology is not 
unbounded, and in this, as in her concern to expand the narrow limits of consciousness there are parallels 
to be drawn with both Evelyn Underhill and May Sinclair. 
owing to the similarities between mysticism and occultism it was important, for writers on both sides, 
that they be told apart. Whereas Evelyn Underhill's mystical experience finds its meaning in relation to 
the transcendent, such a category is redundant for the occultist: 'there is nothing supernatural about 
occult science' insists Fortune. Instead occultism extends our knowledge of the natural world, ascribing 
such experiences as beyond - or 'super' - the normal rather than natural limits: the secrecy with which 
occultism is traditionally associated is a concealment of method rather than ineffable content. Indeed, 
unlike the characteristic gulf' which persists at the heart of writing on mysticism, Fortune deliberately 
demystifies her subject: 'it is merely a branch of knowledge that has not been generally taken up, and 
which has this peculiarity, that its professors do not hasten to publish their results., 
20 
We have seen Underhill's distinction that magic wants to 'get', mysticism wants to 'give': the object of 
magic, again in Underhill's words, being 'power, first over self, then over the world and fate. 
21 In this 
Underhill sets occultism absolutely against mysticism: recall her definition of mysticism as: 
'the abolition of individuality; of that hard separateness, that "I, Me, Mine" which makes 
of man a finite, isolated thing. It is essentially a movement of the heart, seeking to 
transcend the limitations of the individual standpoint... for no personal gain., 22 
if mysticism renounces, or disguises the ego, by contrast occultism keeps it in view. More candid in 
acknowledging a 'personal gain', or at least recognising what is of the self's own making, Dion 
Fortune's modem occultism more visibly engages with the appropriative ethics of power and possession 
- recall Vernon Lee's insistence upon the ego's 'lust of appropriation' - which mysticism relinquishes 
along with the 'abolition of [ ... 11, Me, Mine. " As I have mentioned, Underhill's own magical 
beginnings give her an insider's understanding of magic: this is employed first in its defence and then 
later to more effectively define its difference from her own way of mysticism. 23 The disavowal of an 
occult relation is evident in both psychoanalysis and mysticism: in the former for the threat which it 
18 W. E. Butler, Practical Magic and the Western Mystery Tradition: Unpublished Essays, cd. by Dolores 
Ashcroft-Nowicki. (Wellingborough: Aquurian, 1986), p. 39. Butler, trained by Dion Fortune, founded the 
Servants of the Light (S. O. L. ), a contemporary magical order now led by Dolores Ashcroft-Nowicki with 
worldwide membership. 
19 Fortune, Sane Occultism, (1929; Wellingborough: Aquarian Press, 1982), p. 90. 
20 Fortune, The Secrets of Dr Taverner, p. 79. 
21 Mrs Stuart Moore (Evelyn Underhill), 'Magic and Mysticism of Today', Ilibbert Journal (1908), p. 385. 
22 Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism (1930), p. 71. 
23 Evelyn Underhill, 'A Defence of Magic'. Fortnightly Review, 82 (1907), pp. 754-765. 
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poses to the integrity of the ego and in the latter for its insistence upon such an ego. Occultism is 
perceived by its detractors as over-emphasising in turn both the materiality and immateriality of self. 
Ronald Hutton's recent history of modem pagan witchcraft emphasises the Christian mystical elements 
present in Fortune's approach. 24 Fortune herself compares the mystic and the occultist as seeking the 
same goal by different methods: 
ITbere are two paths to the Innermost: the way of the mystic, which is the way of devotion 
and meditation, a solitary and subjective path; and the way of the occultist, which is the 
way of concentration, and of the trained will; upon this path the co-operation of fellow 
workers is required, firstly for the exchange of knowledge, and secondly because ritual 
magic plays an important part in this work., 25 
Going against popular conception, and certainly against Underhill's definition, here we see Fortune 
recommending not individualism but 'co-operation' in the name of occultism. 26 She defines the mutual 
aim as an 'urge towards universal isation', in other words, to 'function as an organized part of the cosmic 
whole'. 27 This 'co-operation' at times reads closer to an enforcement of a totalitarian 'cosmic' will: in 
Dion Fortune's novel The Demon Lover (1927) this is the 'will of Nature', who works with the 'group 
as her unit, ' disliking an individual to alienate himself from the social organisation. 28 Yet we also see 
that in Fortune's occult doctrine individual consciousness is already inextricably a part of the 'cosmic 
whole'. She presents a model of the psyche which describes this connectedness: 
'We need to realize that the human consciousness is not a closed vessel, but like the body, 
has a continual intake and output. The cosmic forces are circulating through it all the time, 
like sea-water through a living sponge., 29 
The image of human consciousness as 'living sponge, ' which is at once porous but keeps its own form, 
conveys the occult understanding of self which emphasises openness - 'it is not a closed vessel' - but 
without dissolution. The metaphor of the psyche as 'living sponge' absorbs, so to speak, the dual 
properties which were seen to crack May Sinclair's crystal image apart. Again Dion Fortune describes: 
'A man's soul is like a lagoon connected with the sea by a submerged channel; although to 
all outward seeming it is land-locked, nevertheless its water-level rises and falls with the 
tides of the sea because of the hidden connection., 30 
24 Ronald Hutton, The Triumph of the Moon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 180-8. 
25 Fortune, Esoteric Orders And Their Work, (1928; Wellingborough: Aquarian, 1985), p. 56 See also 
A. E. Waite, 'The life of the mystic', Occult Review, (1905). 
26 The essence of occultism is its belief that 'the inmost of the inmost of you is a god'. an irrefutably 
immanent spirit (Richard Kirby, The Mission of Mysticism, London: SPCK, 1979, pi 1). 
27 Fortune, Esoteric Orders And Their Work, p. 18. 
28 Fortune, The Demon Lover, (1927; Wellingborough: Aquarian, 1989), p. 49. 
29 Fortune, Psychic SeV-Defence, p. 127. 
30 Fortune, The Mystical Qabalah, (1935; Wellingborough: Aquarian Press. 1987), p. 17- 
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An occult model of self 
Dion Fortune's own occult cosmology NNas supposedly communicated to her through the 'inner planes' 
from 1923 to 1924 and this 'esoteric knowledge' was used as the basis for her occult training, published 
only after her death as The Cosmic Doctrine. Warned that the 'vastness of its conception... is beyond the 
limitations of our concrete minds', the reader is advised to study the 'laws of magnetism, electricity, 
physics, chemistry, biology etc' for its elucidation. However complex and eclectic the 'Cosmic 
Doctrine', the practice behind the theory is less obscure. As Alan Richardson defines: 'The art of making 
an inner contact[ ... ] 
is the art of achieving some empathy with the target. It is less a matter of faith or the 
proper application of some exquisite technique from the so-called "science" of occultism, than the talent 
for achieving some sort of rapport via the imagination., 
31 The description of the occult is remarkably 
close to an empathic aesthetic. Again there is an emphasis upon contact and rapport which associates it 
with the 'other' modemisms. Yet whereas Vernon Lee's empathic aesthetic finally belied the possibility 
of contact by slipping into an enfoldment back into her own past, we will see that the occultist's 
4rapport' is, more successfully from the start, a relationship. 
(i) Race-tides and alternating currents 
The 'Demon Lover', in Fortune's novel of that title, is Justin Lucas, a man who is described as 'not 
quite human' by virtue of having no ties. 
32 It is this complete detachment, or autonomy, to which his 
employee Veronica - the heroine of the novel - ascribes her horror of him and which accounts for him 
mercilessly exploiting Veronica's own sensitivity in order to facilitate his 'ultra-human or infra-human 
aim, altogether outside the scope of our earth-life'. 
33 Lucas uses Veronica, literally as an object, in a 
process described as the installing of an 'occult telephone' by which 'the impulses of other people's 
minds' are made to 'control [her] vocal cords. 
34 In deep hypnosis, Veronica's 'astral body' thus 
eavesdrops upon secret meetings of chief occultists. Yet in the course of the novel, Lucas' unearthly aims 
are undermined by his more earthly interest in Veronica and this quietly sabotages his astral pursuits. 
'That thing had befallen him against which he had carefully guarded himself all his life; he 
had formed a tie, some external object had become necessary to his inner being, the subtle 
barriers were down, and through the breach, narrow as yet, the race-tides were beginning to 
pour in ... It was the beginning of the end., 
35 
While, as we will go on to see, the 'subtle barriers' and 'race-tides' speak of a particularly occult form of 
connectedness, might we not also read LIiis passage, and Lucas' initial unconnected state not only as a 
reminder of Evelyn Underhill's Dweller in the Innermost who is uncomprehending of human attachment, 
but also - and more provocatively - as a valediction to the modernists identified by Peter Nicholls in 
Modernisms as the 'Men of 1914'? If occultism proposes a model of self as continuous with the world, 
31 Richardson, Priestess, p. 141. 
32 Fortunc, The Demon Lover, p. 41. 
33 Ibid. p. 44. 
34 Ibid. p. 43. 
35 Ibid. pp. 48-9. 
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in this respect it can be said to explore those forms of identification forbidden by the male modernists. I 
suggest that the occult paradigm, providing an unambiguous model of self as continuous with world 
makes explicit, in terms of content, the more esoteric possibilities of selfhood suggested by the stylistic 
and formal experiments of the women modernists. 
These further possibilities of selfbood extend in the Demon Lover, to a trans-temporal identity: 
Veronica's abhorrence of Lucas fades as it becomes clear to her that they shared an intimate bond in a 
previous lifetime when they both worked rituals in the same occult order. These former attachments 
influence their relationship in the present, developing along with Veronica's recollection of her former 
psychical powers which we are told entail accepting 'a new set of values in life; the body, the world, 
held cheap and made to serve an end of which no hint had hitherto reached her. 
36 However these values 
are not upheld by the narrative: unlike Underhill's The Column of Dust where the spiritual vision saw 
through the illusion of the material world, in Demon Lover the world retains its value and on the 
contrary 'the body' is soon restored with corporeal interest. Lucas, not dissimilar to Constance in 
Underhill's novel, chooses a willing death, in lieu of being pursued by the occult forces for his astral 
eavesdropping: he dies and his spirit is banished from his physical form. Yet Lucas's death is not a 
heroic sacrifice: rather it is a punishment, and it is also a mistake. Once banished from his body, Lucas 
(for his spirit still lives) regrets its loss: his primary desire being to return to his body so that he can 
pursue a physical relationship with Veronica which is more fulfilling than drifting about her as a gust of 
wind, or a panting bloodhound. Lucas and Veronica between them work a gruesome ritual, digging up 
Lucas's corpse and finally restoring his spirit to the inert form. Despite these radical propositions 
regarding the usual 'proprieties' of identity - both across time and space - the narrative resolves itself 
firmly on the material plane, or in the body - in this case, two bodies. As we will see, Dion Fortune's 
occultism is as much constituted by in-the-body as out-of-body experiences: indeed, contrary to 
expectation, occultism is a doctrine of self which is firmly embodied. As I will go on to suggest, this 
embodiment -a substantiating of the insubstantial which we tend to read as reductive - while it is partly 
that, also entails rethinking the limits to which we habitually ascribe the body. 
A novel in which echoes of past lives are received through the unconscious, the Demon Lover can also be 
read as haunted by past novels: the final reconciliation finds Lucas blind (his eyes having been removed 
at the post-mortem) and Veronica promising to marry him, in a ghostly echo of Jane Eyre. More 
welcome to a feminist reappraisal of Dion Fortune is a different aspect of the conclusion which sees 
Veronica's election as an invaluable first female member of an occult fraternity. The initiation of women 
is represented as being long overdue with their exclusion being identified as 'exactly where the trouble 
has originated[ ... ] They must have women 
in the Fraternity; it has been the greatest mistake to exclude 
them., 37 Women's involvement in occult and spiritualist organisations, as Alex Owen has shown, was 
often a way to experience status and power unattainable elsewhere and to express, 'often gcnder-related 
36 Ibid. p. 91. 
37 Ibid. p. 219. 
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social concerns'. 38 In concluding her first novel with Veronica's election, Dion Fortune's social 
comment is also a comment upon the powerful role of women within occult practice: as Ronald Hutton 
observes with each of Fortune's novels the women become progressively stronger and stronger. 
39 In The 
Demon Lover, although Lucas initially wields power over Veronica, we see Veronica emerge from a 
position of weakness to become the stronger one of the partnership. As Lucas realises: 'it was Veronica 
who was pulling the strings of his nature, not he of hers; it was the deep fountains of his being that were 
unsealed... she was now exalted far above him and he was reaching up to her'. 
40 
Veronica's exaltation as the female goddess is sealed by her invocation as 'Priestess of Isis! '41 In Dion 
Fortune's cosmology, the goddess Isis 'is the cause of creation, for she awakeneth the desire of the All- 
Father and for her sake he createth'. 
42 Avoiding the question of female desire, Dion Fortune ascribes an 
anterior claim of potency to women which displaces a passive role with another stereotyped figure: 
priestess or seductress who, in initiating action, is responsible rather than responsive. According to Dion 
Fortune this dynamic relationship between the sexes demonstrates the law of alterity or alternating 
polarities which ensures a constant energetic exchange of power. In her later novel The Sea Priestess 
Fortune cites the opinion of the 'ancients' who 'said that the soul was bisexual, and that as one or the 
other aspect manifested in the world of form, the alternative aspect was latent in the world of the 
spirit%43 Beyond the binary gendering of difference (and its association with Jung's archetypes), Fortune 
describes a further magnetic relationship of flow and return between every aspect of self and a 
corresponding aspect in the cosmos where again 'the charge passes backwards and forwards as an 
alternating current, never with a permanent one-way flow,. 
44 Whether the relationship is of difference or 
correspondence, Fortune teaches that 'we must accustom ourselves to the idea of a perpetual change of 
state.. to maintain the sense of zest which tells us that the forces are flowing freely'. 
45 In Applied Magic 
this idea of an 'alternating current' is presented as one of the 'real keys' not only to magical power but to 
life itself. 46 Equally in The Demon Lover: 'it opened up new vistas, new possibilities of experience, this 
action and reaction of two, as opposed to the solitary working of the one., 
47 
Confirming Veronica's initial horror of a man with no 'ties' we find that such 'ties' are a principle of the 
occult doctrine which promises apocalyptic 'new vistas' and 'huge horizons': 'this action and reaction of 
two, as opposed to the solitary working of the one. ' With such an emphasis, occultism represents a 
38 Richard Noll, The Jung Cult: Origins of a Charismatic Movement (London: Fontana, 1994), p. 58. See also 
Alex Owen, The Darkened Room: Women, Power and Spiritualism in Late Victorian England (London; Virago, 
1989). 
39 Ifutton, The Triumph of the Moon, p. 186. 
40 Fortune, The Demon Lover, p. 96. 
41 Ibid. p. 204. 
42 Fortune, Aspects of Occultism, p. 13 1. 
43 Fortune, The Sea Priestess (1938; Wellingborough: Aquarian Press, 1989). 
44 Fortune, Applied Magic and Aspects of Occultism (London: Aquarian Press, 1962), p. 33. 
45 Ibid. p. 35. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Fortune, The Demon Lover, p. 94. 
To Turn The Mind Loose... ' 181 
model of self as dynamically connected to the other without loss of identity: it is a two-step 'action and 
reaction' rather than a becoming of one. 
(ii) Universal interdependence/ If 'we begin with sympathy of thought' 
Dion Fortune's valorising of the 'action and reaction of two opposed to the solitary working of the one' 
recollects the aesthetic distinction made by Nicholls between the Men of 1914 and the 'other' 
modernisms. Of the women mentioned by Peter Nicholls whose writing falls outside the Men of 1914, 
one of these is H. D. In her case this 'feminine' modernism play itself out, according to Nicholls, as a 
'thoroughly mobile' relationship of self to world - in contrast to the prized autonomy of the models 
striven for by Eliot, Pound and Lewis. 
48 Nicholls contrasts Pound's Imagism as 'all about modes of 
differentiation' while for H. D. he comments that 'what seems other [ ... ] turns out to be the same'. 
49 
Fundamental to occult thinking is the doctrine of correspondences which is a belief in a vast system of 
symbolic and real correspondences found to exist on every level between visible and invisible, inner and 
outer worlds. This can be described as a principle of 'universal interdependence' in which man and 
nature, or self and other, exist not as dichotomies but in relationship: accordingly Dion Fortune holds 
that 'Nature [has] no breach of continuity, and aura interpenetrates with aura'. 50 These correspondances 
could be said to corroborate an aesthetic process where 'what seems other [ ... ] turns out to be the same, 
issuing in a spectre of connectedness which could be said to haunt - or menace - the male modernist: 
absolutely antithetical to the 'isolated units' of Imagist verse which seek to confirm the integrity of 
selfbood. Translated into literary practice the theory of universal interdependence is the use of analogy 
which similarly emphasises resemblance over difference. Evelyn Underhill herself makes this connection 
between occultism and literature: 
'Our best critics are at one with the magicians in proclaiming [the importance of analogy]. 
"Intuitive perception of the hidden analogies of things, " says Hazlitt, in English Novelists, 
11[ ... ], is perhaps what stamps the character of genius on the production of art more than 
any other circumstance. ", 51 
if finding the "hidden analogies of things" while recognisable as one account of poetic writing per se, is 
also an occult practice (and of course the art of the critic) then in the above passage Underhill is 
demonstrating the occult art herself. In identifying this analogy, or sympathetic relation, between 'our 
best critics' and 'magicians' Underhill tells us these two quite dissimilar crafts 'are at one'. This raises 
the question of where sympathy, or hidden analogies might lead. On the one hand the risk is to discover 
we are less different from the other than we would like to think: an avoided discovery which seems 
pertinent to both Underhill and Freud's lack of 'sympathy' for occultism. To deny connections between 
things is equivalent then to denying the occult. On the other hand, the alternative danger of analogy, 
48 Peter Nicholls, Modernisms, p. 200. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Fortune, The Demon Lover, p. 105. 
51 Underhill, 'A Defence of Magic', p. 761. 
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which is the one risked by occultism (and, by association, by literary criticism? ) is that in conferring 
meaning through connections it makes too much sense of a world of difference. 
The occult doctrine of correspondances, or 'perception of the hidden analogies of things' describes a 
network of sympathies, or a sympathetic relation: indeed the earliest associations of the word 'sympathy' 
were in relation to magic - the idea that I like attracts like' is at the basis of sympathetic magic. Nicholls' 
reference to 'what seems other... turns out to be the same' is a comment about H. D. 's poetry. A passage 
from H. D. 's 'Notes on Thought and Vision' (1919) suggests that correspondences, or analogy, are 
fundamental to poetry: as she puts it 'we begin with sympathy of thought'. 52 H. D. recounts how Lo-Fu, 
the Chinese poet, contemplates one branch of an apple tree. With an artist's 'intensity and concentration 
of a special order' he sees it in its minutest detail, reaching even to the 'continents' held within each leaf. 
Linking back to the problems of knowing the other raised by Vernon Lee's exploration of empathy, Lo- 
Fu's is a seeing which promises an intricate knowing: 'when he knew the skeleton of that leaf, the rivers, 
as it were, furrowing that continent, his mind was content. But', H. D. continues, 'it had only begun its 
search. Between each river there lay a fair green field - many, many little fields, each with an 
individuality, each with some definite feature setting it apart from every other little plot., 53 His study of 
the branch is as rich as the natural world itself, to which the branch corresponds; what he discovers is not 
sameness but endless diversity and distinction - 'each with an individuality. From seeing so intently 
Lo-Fu's consciousness shifts; the branch becomes the body of his mistress so that, as it were, in 
knowing the branch he knows his lover. H. D. describes the poet using the apple branch as a means of 
approach to something else'. If, as Nicholls suggests in H. D. 's poetry 'what seems other turns out to be 
the same', the reverse is also true, that what seems the same turns out to be other. The branch is and is 
not his lover: the world of the poet becomes a theatre of mirrors in which one thing is never only itself. 
Even Lo-Fu's study of the branch corresponds to something else: in describing his experience, II. D., I 
suggest, is describing the study of a branch of the Qabalah, or Tree of Life. This mystical system is at 
the heart of Western esoteric thought: Dion Fortune describes it as a network of symbols which hold in 
relation 'every force and factor in the manifest universe and soul of man'. 
54 The change in Lo-Fu's 
consciousness after concentrating upon the branch 
iinds an analogy in the occult practice of meditation 
through visual symbols. Dion Fortune explains: 
'The aspirant who uses the Tree as his meditation-symbol establishes point by point the 
union between his soul and the world-soul. This results in a tremendous access of energy 
to the individual soul; it is this which endows it with magical powers., 55 
52 II. D., 'Notes on Thought and Vision'. in Scott (ed. ), The Gender of Modernism, p. 95. 
53 II. D., 'Notes on Thought and Vision', p. 105. 
54 Fortune, Psychic Self Defence, p. 88. 'The curious symbol-system known to us as the Tree of Life is an 
attempt to reduce to diagrammatic form every force and factor in the manifested universe and the soul of man 
[ ... 1. In 
brief, the Tree of Life is a compendium of science, psychology, philosophy, and theology' (Fortune, The 
Mystical Qabalah, p. 13). 
55 Fortune, The Mystical Qabalah, p. 18. 
'To Turn The Mind Loose... ' 183 
In this context, a poet's concentration upon an object bears close resemblance to an occult art. When 
H. D. observes: 'We begin with sympathy of thought' she refers both to aesthetic and magical practice. 
56 
We 'begin with sympathy' but, we might ask, with what do we end? The story of Lo-Fu suggests that 
we end with something different. Indeed, ending with something different is the aim of any occult 
practice: meditation upon the Qabalah 'results in a tremendous access of energy'. 
H. D. 's occult analogy becomes less hidden: 
I [T]he fruit tree and the human body are both receiving stations, capable of storing up 
energy, overworld energy. That energy is always there but can be transmitted only to 
another body or another mind that is in sympathy with it, or keyed to the same pitch., 
57 
What is specific to occultism is the praxis rather than theory. In occult practice, the correspondences 
come alive when directed by the will or imagination: active imagination 'like a catalyst or a chemical 
indicator puts into action networks of cosmic and divine analogies and homologies'. 
58 The law of 
interdependence describes a dynamic, and transformative, interplay between self and world in which, in 
Antoine Faivre's words, 'the entire universe is a huge theatre of mirrors': an image which is also 
evocative of Leo Bersani's reference to 'the pleasure of at once losing the self and discovering it 
elsewhere, inaccurately replicated'. 
59 In Algernon Blackwood's short story 'The Regeneration of Lord 
Ernie' - recommended by Dion Fortune, and which opens this chapter - the elements of wind and fire 
are invoked in a dramatic crowd ritual which energises and inspires Lord Ernie, who was formerly 
lethargic and unimaginative. In this instance what Blackwood is proposing furthers the principle with 
which Vernon Lee begun her research of aesthetic empathy: in other words through deliberate imitation 
you can identify with something which is outside you. Yet whereas Lee's empathy intended to feel 'into' 
the other, the occult aim is to draw something in which is not your own: 'If you copy the movements 
and gestures of a person you discover the emotion that causes them. You share it. ' So, it follows, that in 
imitating the movements associated with wind and fire, the force of these elemental powers is attracted 
'into [your] own system., 60 
As we can see there are strong links to be made between Dion Fortune's occultism and II. D. 's text. 
Notes on Thought and Vision which remained unpublished until 1981, constitute one of the more 
eccentric versions of the modernist enquiry into subjectivity. Fascinating, though disjointed and uneven, 
it records H. D. 's attempt to classify forms of consciousness, starkly described in the opening statement 
as: 'Three states or manifestations of life: body, mind, over-mind' and more conclusively as : 'sub- 
conscious mind, conscious mind, over-conscious mind., 
61 I include H. D. 's 'Notes' here to suggest that 
56 H. D., 'Notes on Thought and Vision', p. 95. 
57 Ibid. p. 106. 
58 Antoine Faivrc, Access to Western Esotericism (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), p. 34. 
59 'A Conversation with Leo Bersani' with Tim Dean, Hal Foster, Kaja Silverman, October, 82 (Fall 1997), 3. 
16, P. 6. 
60 Blackwood, 'The Regeneration of Lord Emie', Incredible Adventures, p. 55. Fortune refers to 'this very 
interesting story' (Psychic Self Defence, p. 86). 
61 H. D., 'Notes on Thought and Vision', p. 93, p-107. 
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Dion Fortune's combination of the psychological and the esoteric - her insistence that 'There is more to 
man than mind and body'- can be contextualised within the conceptual domain of modernism, 
demonstrating continuities with occultism within the canon, in addition to the tangents to be struck 
without. 62 
it is H. D. 's experience of an 'over-conscious mind' or 'over-mind' which - in exceeding the usual 
categories of experience - impelled her to write it down as 'an interesting bit of psychological data. 
63 
Named her 'jelly-fish' experience, it occurred while on holiday with Bryher in the Scilly Isles in July 
1919: 
I could visualise or describe that over-mind in my own case, I should say this: it seems 
to me that a cap is over my head, a cap of consciousness over my head, my forehead, 
affecting a little my eyes 
That over-mind seems a cap, like water, transparent, fluid yet with definite body, 
contained in a definite space. It is like a closed sea-plant, jelly-fish or anemone. 164 
H. D. Is overmind approximates what an occultist might call an experience of the subtle, or non-physical 
astral body; both attempt to map a relationship of self beyond the physical. In searching for a language 
to describe her sensations H. D. 's choice of the jelly-fish metaphor retains the indistinction of ego 
boundaries associated with the oceanic (while in this state' things about me appear slightly blurred as if 
seen under water') while giving the experience 'definite body': note how similar this is to Dion 
Fortune's representation of consciousness as a 'living sponge'. 
65 If human consciousness does not cease 
at the limits of our material form that is not to say it becomes formless. The 'definite body' suggests the 
concretisation of the experience - the occult embodiment of states of consciousness - along with its 
reference to a definite body of theory. Later in the 'Notes' the 'jellyfish' metaphor is exchanged for the 
further defined symbol of a 'pearl': now 'concentrated in the center of my forehead, inside my skull, and 
it was small and giving out a very soft light' - an image which corresponds to the 'third eye' of the 
energic chakra structures, also forming part of the western esoteric teaching. 
According to H. D. the 'overmind', or 'jelly-fish' state denotes the 'world of vision' which she identifies 
primarily with artists. 
66 The jellyfish 'cap' has long feelers, or 'super-feelings' which pictorially describe 
an increased sensitivity to the vibrations beyond the usual spectrum of the senses. These 'super- feel i ngs' 
bring perceptory awareness of the 'subtle' world where the subject sees things which are no longer 
material. 'Vision' can mean both 'sight' and 'illusion': its definition straddles the extremes of reliability 
62 Fortune, Psychic Self Defence, p30. Compare Kermode's own description of Joycean epiphanies- 'Joyce put 
into Ulysses all those "unexpected simultaneities" that hint at an order in a world. Without order, no integrity. 
consonance, clarity - no epiphanies. Unless the world is a network of correspondence there is no joy' (Frank 
Kermode, 'Puzzles and Ephiphanies', Puzzles and Epiphanies: essays and reviews, London: Routledge, 1962, 
p. 88). 
63 ILD., Tribute to Freud, (1956; Manchester: Carcanet, 1985), p. 130. II. D. sent 'Notes on Thought and Vision' 
to Havelock Ellis but was disappointed by his lack of interest in her experiences (ibid). 
64 H. D., 'Notes on Thought and Vision', p. 93. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. p. 103, p. 95. 
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and unreliability between which the word pivots. Further associations of vision as 'out of touch with 
reality' complete this epistemological trajectory from fact to fantasy, or more accurately to imagination, 
in the context of occultism. The indeterminate region denoted by vision is familiar to the occultist 
whose experiences are more normally dismissed as 'out of touch with reality'. As I will argue H. D. 's 
6visionary' aesthetic, of which we can see Dion Fortune's writing as an extension, occupies a similarly 
ambivalent terrain as that conjured by the expression 'seeing things': a phrase which undermines the 
materiality of the object and certainty of the eye as instrument. Yet, as I suggest, against the mystic 
vision as a 'seeing through'; 'seeing things' more aptly describes the materiality and immateriality of the 
occult vision. Dion Fortune gives these experiences 'definite body': a concrete and or objective, form 
which is very close to what modernist narrative does in its stress upon subjective states. 
Susan Stanford Friedman comments that Notes missed the opportunity to be 'an influential articulation 
of modernist poetics in its own time' yet it sustains its relevance to a retrospective aesthetics of 
modernism in its emphasis upon 'the unconscious, sexual difference, and desire'. 
67 Susan Stanford 
Friedman describes H. D. 's Notes as recommending a 'pro(creative) poetic in which mind and body are 
inseparably part of one another' which heralds an 'dcriture feminine', or 'writing of the body' in 
anticipation of Helene Cixious and Luce Irigaray. 
68 Once 'Notes' is read less as a proclamation of a 
gendered aesthetic than as one in sympathy with occult theory, the question of the indivisibility of mind 
and body is eclipsed by the focus on 'over-mind', or 'vision': an experience which, in occult discourse 
might refer to the 'subtle body'. This is not to reduce H. D. 's aesthetic to occultism but merely to point 
out the slippage between what can be appropriated as a document of modernist poetics and what can 
simultaneously be read as an occult text. And to suggest that the understanding of the body in recent 
feminist re-readings of modernist writers has perhaps not asked precisely enough: which body - or what 
kind of body - is being talked about? 
(iii) A Controlled Going Out Of One's Mind 
As we have seen, Fortune's occult doctrine constitutes the self as neither closed nor autonomous, yet her 
model of the self is neither nebulous nor vague, nor is it one whose mobile relationship to the world 
compromises the authority of self. We have already seen, in Underhill's references to Bergson's work, 
how complex a metaphor 'mapping' can be for modernist philosophic and aesthetic thought. In the case 
of occultism, rather than remaining a region to be conjectured at a distance Dion Fortune presents the 
possibility of a willed entry into the world beyond self, a controlled journeying into the unknown 
landscape with map and guide - less at sea than the watery metaphors might suggest. Furthermore, it is 
an art which can be acquired: according to Fortune, the primary method of occultism is a training of the 
imagination to achieve the necessary 'rapport' or 'inner contact'. Through meditation upon symbols the 
trained occultist learns to select and restrict his imagination so that he is able to 'swing instantly clear' 
of the personal symbolism which is the stuff of dreams. The occultist confines his imagination to the 
67 Susan Stanford Friedman, 'Introduction' to II. D., Scott (ed. ), The Gender of Modernism, p. 88. 
68 Ibid. 
To Turn The Mind Loose... ' 186 
pathways of the Qabalah: 'the picture is evoked from a limited set of symbols to which consciousness is 
rigidly restricted by a highly trained habit of concentration., 69 
Contrary to Romantic associations of imagination with freedom and spontaneity, the occult imagination 
is disciplined and 'rigidly restricted'. As Dion Fortune identifies: 'It is this peculiar power to turn the 
mind loose within determined limits which constitutes the technique of occult meditation., 
70 This 
controlled letting go -a 'peculiar power to turn the mind loose within definite limits' - incorporates the 
contradictions which are inherent within occultism. Occultism intriguingly reinforces the notion of the 
self - even as a continuity across time - and the power of consciousness to affect reality, while 
diminishing the stronghold of its boundaries: constituting itself as boundary crosser and controller 
extraordinary. This occult letting go is insistently told apart from the involuntary 'bursting of 
boundaries' which heralds madness. Fortune recognises that psychism can easily shade into a 
psychopathology, '"when the girders of the mind are unloosed, " with unpredictable, often destructive 
results'. 71 Set against such chaos is a 'going out of one's mind' which is fully controlled: a willed and 
disciplined journey quite unlike madness: 
'dissolution of the Ego[ ... ] involves an esoteric, deliberate and fUlly-controlled 'going out 
of one's mind' into the Cosmic Whole the Ego with knowledge and dedication is 
consciously dissolved., 72 
The dissolution and preservation of boundaries between selves is a dual preoccupation for 'modem' 
occult writers. Dion Fortune's student W. E. Butler describes: 
'For the purposes of analysis we must make some line of demarcation between ourselves 
and others... This boundary is manifest in what is known as the 'aura' or field of force 
which surrounds each one of us. [ ... 
] We may, however, lower or remove our barrier, so 
that others may come through..., 
73 
According to occult thinking the power of the will to affect states of consciousness - crucial to the 
6mind-cure' movement - does not stop at one's own mind. When Dion Fortune advocates the 'hygiene 
of right thinking' to prevent the '[poisoning] of each other with harmful suggestion' we see moral purity 
and thought again explicitly linked as in May Sinclair's work. 
74 The ethics of 'mental trespassing' are 
addressed by Dion Fortune in a series of articles which argue for the practice of a 'sane' and responsible 
occultism. Dion Fortune had first-hand experience of 'irresponsible' practice: she gives an account in 
Psychic Sey'-Defence, (1930) of herself as the victim of an experience of 'peculiar and unique horror' 
which she terms a 'psychic attack'. 
75 Dion Fortune's 'psychic attack' occurred while she was employed 
by a woman who used occult techniques of mind-influence to control and manipulate her employees. 
69 Fortune, The Mystical Qabalah, p. 96. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Fortune, Applied Magic andAspects of Occultism, p. 88. 
72 Ibid. p. 55. 
73 W. E. Buder, Practical Magic, p. 127. 
74 Fortune, Applied Magic and Aspects of Occultism, pp. 157-8. 
75 Fortune, Psychic Self-Defence, p. 10. 
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After a lengthy interrogation and being stared at intently Fortune describes herself suffering from strange 
feelings of unreality and a narrowing of vision, followed by intense fear and exhaustion. Having entered 
the office in good health, we are told that she left it a 'mental and physical wreck and was ill for three 
years'. Such a dramatic collapse is retrospectively interpreted in terms both of the 'characteristic 
phenomenon of hysteria' and as a damaging of the 'etheric double': an unusual espousal of the language 
and theories of occultism alongside those of psychopathology. Such language as 'psychic self-defence', 
6psychic attack' and 'powers of the mind' evokes a militarism in observing psychic boundaries to 
suggest the vigilance of an inter-war culture in which the violations of war were still present in memory. 
Fortune's Dr Taverner alludes to 'curious stories in connection with the Great War' in which men were 
&got at... by the channel of their subconscious minds' by the 'exercise of secret pressure, 76 Compare 
Freud's own combative analogy: 
'Think of the difference between 'the front' and 'behind the lines', as things were during 
the war. We were not surprised then that some things were different at the front from what 
they were behind the lines, and that many things were permitted behind the lines which 
had to be forbidden at the front. The determining influence was of course the proximity of 
the enemy'. 77 
In relation to occultism this both comments upon the phenomena of psychic attacks and suggests one 
way of viewing the popularity of occultism between the wars as both a release and a fencing off of the. 
mind. In both cases the proximity of an external enemy determines what we see, or what is 'permitted' 
to become visible, not just externally but inside and between minds. 78 
occult extensions of psychology 
occurring in 1911, Fortune's 'psychic attack' alerted her to 'the little-known powers of the mind' and 
motivated her to study the 'new' psychology with the purpose of furthering her understanding of these 
dpowers' - or ascertaining the 'proximity of the enemy'. 
79 Fortune describes herself as 'one of the 
earliest students of psychoanalysis in this country', following initially the work of Francis Aveling, and 
subsequently Freud, and his then disciples Adler and Jung. After attending a lecture course in the new 
theories of psychoanalysis just before the First World War, Dion Fortune became a practising lay analyst 
at the East London Clinic in 1918, and gave a series of public lectures. Later published as The 
Machinery of the Mind (1922), these brief essays intended to introduce the wider public to 
psychoanalytic models of the psyche using predominantly mechanistic and homely metaphors. 80 
76 Fortune, The Secrets of Dr Taverner, p. 74. 
77 Freud, 'The Question of Lay Analysis', (1926) in Standard Edition xx, p. 196, q. v. Jacqueline Rose, 
'Introduction' to Moustapha Safouan, Jacques Lacan and the Question of Psychoanalytic Training, 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2000), p. 18. 
78 Ronald Hutton describes a 'general fear of contamination by other nations, races, or classes which runs 
through [Fortune's] books [ .... I hardly rare in the inter-war years yet strong enough to count as a personality 
quirk' (Triumph of the Moon, p. 182). 
79 Fortune, Psychic Seýf-Defence, p. 10. 
80 An alternative to recurring metaphors of the mind as unexplored territory, Fortune compares the three levels 
of the conscious mind to the contents of a kitchen: 'the foreconscious being the cupboard, the fringe of 
consciousness the table, and the focus of consciousness the mixing basin; and the ideas upon the three levels 
may be represented by the ingredients of the pudding, some of which'are put away in the cupboard, some lie 
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Dion Fortune was not alone, as I have shown, in looking to psychoanalysis for potential strategies of 
control offered by study of its patterns. Fortune echoes Sinclair's demand of psychoanalysis that it 
provide a 'synthesis', and Underhill's charge that psychoanalysis 'only tells half the story': 
6psychoanalysis may take a mind to pieces expertly enough, but it does not very frequently succeed in 
putting it together again and making it work. To my way of thinking, it is a method of diagnosis rather 
than treatment. '81 As we will see, Dion Fortune's fiction challenges even the method of diagnosis. All 
three women encountered the limits of the psychoanalytic project. 82 Yet although Fortune's subsequent 
publications (The Esoteric Philosophy of Love and Marriage (1924); Esoteric Orders and their Work 
(1928); Sane Occultism (1929); The Training and work of an Initiate (1930); Psychic Self-Defence 
(1930)) witness a significant shift of allegiance from the science of psychology to occultism; she always 
considered herself a student of psychology as well as occultism. Bernard Bromage remembers 'Dion 
Fortune never ceased to impress on me that she considered psychology to be the operative word. She 
herself, she said, had attained the greater part of her knowledge of magical techniques solely by a study 
of psychological principles., 
83 
it is increasingly common for scholarship to trace the roots of psychoanalysis in hypnosis and 
spiritualist practice so as to suggest a lapsed historical acknowledgement, reading Freud, and still more 
profitably Jung for their continuities with occult techniques. Turning this inside out, as it were, Fortune 
proposes instead that occultism can resume where psychoanalysis ends: it develops beyond the limits of 
psychoanalysis rather than being a defunct relic from the history of the science: 'We can define occultism 
as an extension of psychology, for it studies certain little known aspects of the human mind and the 
mind side of Nature., 84 Occultism which moves into the 'little known aspects' is represented as a 
dilation of psychoanalysis which Fortune reads as being insufficiently 'wild', not straying far enough 
from the centre. Dion Fortune relates how in studying 
'the dissection of the mind under psycho-analysis, I realized that there was very much more in 
the mind than was accounted for by the accepted psychological theories. I saw that we stood in 
the centre of a small circle of light thrown by accurate scientific knowledge, but around us was a 
vast, circumambient sphere of darkness, and in that darkness dim shapes were moving., 85 
Her image of the mind observed under the microscope of science describes a lens which only partially 
illuminates the subject to leave a surrounding, animated arc in darkness. Elsewhere Fortune describes 
ready to the hand upon the table, and others are actually in the mixing basin being stirred' (Fortune, 
Machinery of the Mind London: S. I. L, 1995, p. 19). Machinery of the Mind was compulsory reading for those 
embarking on an occult training with Society of the Inner Light. 
81 Fortune, Aspects of Occultism, p. 157. 
82 Dion Fortune elaborates the principles of kundalini as an alternative to the psychoanalytic theory of 
libido: kundalini is the life-force coiled serpent-like at the base of the spine which can be consciously aroused 
and directed at will to awaken higher states of consciousness. It conveniently suits the purposes of 
sublimation since it can be directed away from sexual to apparently philanthropic ends. Fortune gives a 
graphic example of visualising streams of energy pouring directly from the base of the spine, to the crown of 
the head and out into the collecting boxes of the Save the Children Fund (Fortune, The Problem of Purity, 
London: Rider, 1928). 
83 Bernard Bromage, 'Dion Fortune', p. 7. 
84 Fortune, Sane Occultism, p. 14. 
85 Fortune, Psychic SeiV-Defence, p. 18. 
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how in the course of her studies of psychoanalysis 'the ends of a number of threads were put into my 
hands, but ... the threads disappeared 
into the darkness that surrounded the small circle of light thrown 
by exact scientific knowledge'. 86 Whereas Nicholls describes a 'modernist antagonism' towards the new 
science of psychoanalysis, which accused Freud of digging too deep into the murky recesses of the 
psyche, Fortune's cavil with psychoanalysis is that it does not go far enough. Not all modernists 
recoiled from the area of investigation: Nicholls does suggest that 'there was a sense that psychoanalysis 
produced an excessively rational account of areas which modernism itself was exploring'. 
87 Dion 
Fortune's proposition that there is life beyond the psychoanalytic mind engenders the possibility of 
tgoing out of one's mind' with impunity. Yet how far does occultism really go? 
Dion Fortune's introduction to psychology for the lay-man, Machinery of the Mind, addresses the 
psychoanalyst's stopping short at the limits of the personal and its avoiding of both present and future in 
a return to the past. She describes man as being in a stage of transition: between primitive man who 'lies 
at the base of our being' and 'divine man' who 'stands at its apex'. 
88 Modem man is engaged in an 
ascent, between the subconscious and superconscious: 'Psychotherapy may begin with the primitive, but 
it must end with the divine, for both are integral factors in the human mind. '89 This also carries striking 
resonances with May Sinclair's account of sublimation: both attempt to incorporate the 'divine' or 
&visionary' aspect into a model of the human psyche. Fortune ascribes psychotherapy's failure to its 
ignoring the 'data of evolution', its failure to recognise a gradual evolution of higher states of 
consciousness as an inevitable corollary of man's psychic development. Against Adomo's diagnosis in 
'Theses Against Occultism' of occultism as 6a symptom of the regression in consciousness' can be 
placed Dion Fortune's construction of the occultist as 'boundary-rider of evolution', * 
at the vanguard of 
the development of higher forms of consciousness. 
90 Fortune's views on evolution borrowed much from 
theosophical doctrine which extends evolutionary theory onto a spiritual plane: in this, the task of 
individual evolution towards a state of perfection occurs within a vastly complex cosmology which 
accepts humanity's Darwinian loss of divine origins yet replaces it with the prospect of a divine end. Of 
course Jung is very close here: in 'The Spiritual Problem of Modem Man' he describes the aim of life is 
to be conscious 'to a superlative degree'. 
91 H. D. 's characterisation of the over-mind in Notes on 
Thought and Vision corresponds to further occult interests which include an evolutionary optimism 
evident in references to the developing capacities of consciousness and a hierarchy of spirit forces where 
'Spirits of a higher world have access into a lower world'. 92 
86 Fortune, The Secrets of Dr Taverner, p. 9. 
87 Peter Nicholls, Modernisms, p. 193. 
88 Fortune, The Machinery of the Mind, p. 68. 
89 Ibid. p. 70. 
90 Theodor Adorno, 'Theses Against Occultism', The Stars Down to Earth and other essays on the Irrational 
in culture ed. Stephen Crook (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 128. 
91 Jung, 'The Spiritual Problem of Modem Man' (1928; trans. 1933, 'Modern Man in Search of a Soul'), 
Collected Works of Jung, x, 74-94, p. 75. 
92 I-I. D., 'Notes on Thought and Vision', p. 102. 
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The occult 'extensions' which Dion Fortune appends beyond psychoanalytic theory include a 'broader 
view' of the subconscious mind. This is foremost in its capacity to remember beyond the individual life 
time, reaching not only to the shared, ancestral memories of a 'World Soul' but, further, to experiences 
related to previous incarnations: memories of former lives which are not exactly transpersonal nor 
incorporated by the psychoanalytic unconscious: 
'The subconscious mind is infinitely richer than the conscious mind, containing as it does 
everything we have ever forgotten, everything which has ever impinged on a sense organ 
[ ... I and also, according to occult science, the experiences of the astral 
body during sleep 
and the memories of past incarnations., 93 
The idea of subconscious memory as endlessly capacious is most effectively represented in the 
Theosophists' occult theory of the Akashic Records in which an impression of every experience in the 
universe which has ever occurred is recorded in a cosmic memory. 94 Whereas for Vernon Lee we saw 
that the notion of the past effected an occluding of the self back into ego, Dion Fortune's idea of 
memory in which the subject is in touch with an infinity of past epochs suggests a historical 
expansiveness of self in connection to memory. Dion Fortune was also attentive to the more direct 
inheritance: 'She was remarkably alive to the importance of heredity: "work on their grandmother was a 
favourite maxim of hers! 95 
When Dion Fortune receives a communication of occult teachings and the memory of all her previous 
incarnations she records it: 
6as it appeared to me, though I ask my readers to believe that I am not so naive as to think 
that what I perceived was an actual representation of what occurred, for how can a 
consciousness, habituated to form, produce a simulacrum of That which has no form? It 
has to rely on the images already stored in its memory to produce a symbolic equivalent; 
it can approach no closer than this. ' 
This is comparable to Freud's explanation of the dream narrative as being no more than a pictorial and 
linguistic representation of that which has no such vocabulary. Yet it also evokes Lee's reversion of the 
self to inner, remembered time as the limits of an empathic understanding: is inner, remembered time the 
, limit' here also? 
Recall Underhill's plea in the name of mysticism, noted by Eliot, to lessen the significance of symbolic 
forms: 'cease, once for all, to regard visions and voices as objective'. 96 If inherent within occultism is 
93 Fortune, Sane Occultism, p. 32. 
94 'The Akashic Records are not contained within one great Book, but are impressions of every word, scene 
and action which has ever occurred, in the Universal Ether or "Astral Light", (Sylvan Muldoon and llcrcward 
Carrington, The Projection of the Astral Body, London: Rider, 1929, p. 220). Compare this to Freud: 'in mental 
life nothing which has been once formed can perish -[... I everything is somehow preserved and in suitable 
circumstances it can once more be brought to light' (Civilisation and its Discontents, p. 256). 
95 Bernard Bromage, p. 9. See Virginia Woolf's comment that 'we think back through our mothers If we arc 
women' (A Room of One's Own, London: Grafton, 1977, p. 72-3). 
96 Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism: A Study in the Nature and Development of Alan's Spiritual Consciousness 
(1911; revised edition London: Methuen, 1930), p. 271. 
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the objectification of imaginative forms, their making real, then along with the acceptance that 
consciousness 'can approach no closer than this' is the idea that these symbolic equivalents are as real as 
it gets. This comparative relation to 'symbolic equivalents' and the imagination is helpfully described by 
Antoine Faivre. Whereas the mystic 
taspircs to the more or less complete suppression of images and intermediaries because for 
him they become obstacles to union with God [The occultist] appears to take more interest 
in the intermediaries revealed to his inner eye through the power of his creative 
imagination than to extend himself essentially toward the union with the divine. He 
prefers to sojourn on Jacob's ladder where angels (and doubtless other entities as well) 
climb up and down, rather than climb to the top and beyond. '97 
Again, the mystic's ascetic vision aspires to a complete 'seeing through' of all substitutes, material and 
symbolic which are 'obstacles' to God; while the occult vision of 'seeing things' makes real the 
imagination without seeking for something beyond. 
The peculiar art of occultism 
Fortune's Secrets ofDr Taverner, is a collection of short stories, or fictional case histories, which we are 
told are based on her own work in the field of abnormal psychology. 
98 They are all cases for which the 
specialist knowledge of an occultist is required, including episodes of vampirism, astral travel, 
possession and obsession for which the techniques of psychoanalysis are deemed insufficient or 
unsuitable to remedy the cause. Fortune's 'Introduction' enunciates 'two standpoints' from which the 
Secrets ofDr Taverner may be read: 
'They may be regarded as fiction... or they may be considered to be what they actually are, 
studies in little-known aspects of psychology put in the form of fiction because, if 
published as a serious contribution to science they would have no chance of a hearing. '99 
Some would argue that Freud used the reverse technique in his case histories: putting his narratives in 
the form' of scientific discourse to ensure their serious reception. Whereas Freud seizes upon the 
authority of science to as it were 'mask' his more speculative research, Fortune suggests she masks 
science as fiction: her stories are 'composite photographs' from 'innumerable snapshots of actual 
happenings' and are 'a serious study in the pathology of ultra-consciousness'. 100 Dr Taverner himself is 
a 'composite' figure with characteristics drawn from Fortune's first teacher 'on the Inner Planes', a 
maverick 'Dr' Moriarty; yet he also has a more fictional genealogy reminiscent of the mystery-solving 
Sherlock Holmes - the creation of the confirmed spiritualist Conan Doyle - and of Algernon 
Blackwood's fictional healer, the enigmatic Mr John Silence. 
97 Antoine Faivre, 4ccess to Western Esotericism, p. 12. 
98 Dion Fortune suggested that Dr Taverner was modelled upon Theodore Moriarty, her mysterious first 
teacher 'on the Inner Planes' (Richardson, Priestess, p. 93). 
99 Fortune, The Secrets of Dr Taverner, p. 9. 
100 Ibid. pp. 9-10. 
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Algernon Blackwood's John Silence, the 'Physician Extraordinary' refuses identification with both 
occultism and psychopathology. He responds to a woman who has come to him for help by asking: 
'And what makes you think I could be of use in this particular caseT asked Mr John 
Silence, looking across somewhat sceptically at the Swedish lady in the chair facing him. 
I Your sympathetic heart and your knowledge of occultism -' 
10h, please - that dreadful wordV he interrupted, holding up a finger with a gesture of 
impatience. 
'Well, then, ' she laughed, 'your wonderful clairvoyant gift and your trained psychic 
knowledge of the processes by which a personality may be disintegrated and destroyed - 
these strange studies you've been pursuing all these years Cý 
'If it's only a case of multiple personality I must really cry off, ' interrupted the doctor 
again hastily, a bored expression in his eyes. 'I 01 
Written at a time when theories of multiple personality were still preoccupying the medical 
establishment, with cases made famous by psychologists such as Theodore Flournoy, Morton Prince and 
William James, and with populist autobiographical accounts such as Mollie Fancher's Who Am 12, John 
Silence's wearied dismissal of the dissociative states which were considered to be introducing radically 
new theories'of subjectivity into the study of psychology situates him intriguingly beyond the avant- 
garde. 102 Similarly, in 1922, Fortune's Dr Taverner is unimpressed by psychoanalysis: Taverner, 
6unlike the psychoanalysts, never asked questions': considering them 'such clumsy machinery'. With 
both of these 'doctors' much remains unspoken with the implication that their wisdom about human 
nature is derived from a finely-tuned sensitivity which renders language redundant. Blackwood's naming 
of John 'Silence' is perhaps a deliberate riposte to Freud's celebrated 'talking-cure'. 
For Fortune the significance of words diminishes in favour of a communication through thought- 
transference and thought-reading which overlooks boundaries between minds. Taverner's 'peculiar art' 
consists in using 'his trained intuition to explore the minds of his patients as another man might use a 
103 One could argue however that his clinical art' microscope to examine the tissues of their bodies'. &ý 
disregards its infringement of privacy - in the text any opprobrium towards its invasive technique is 
evaded by the suggestion that it is reassuring to be known. Implicit is a desire for the mind to be 
readable, like the body, and not only by its external symptoms but, like the tissues under a microscope, 
for the internal causes to be made known; in this respect, Taverner's 'peculiar art' would fulfil Vernon 
Lee's fantasy of a 'psychological microtome', which we have seen described in a previous chapter. The 
intuition which in Bergsonian thought is tantamount to a mystical experiencing of reality is brought 
10 1 Algernon Blackwood, John Silence: Physician Extraordinary, (London: Eveleigh Nash, 1908), p. 1. 
102 See Morton Prince, The Dissociation of Personality (1906; repr. with intro. by Charles Rycroft, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1978); 'The Development and the Genealogy of the Misses Beauchamp, PSPR, 15 
(1900-1), 466-83; Thdodorc Flournoy, From India to the Planet Mars: A Case of Multiple Personality with 
Imaginary Languages [1901] trans. Daniel Dermilye and ed. by Sonu Shamdasani (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994); Ian Hacking, Rewriting the Soul (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Ruth 
Leys, 'The Real Mrs Beauchamp: Gender and the Subject of Imitation' in Judith Butler & J. Scott, Feminists 
Theorize the Political (London: Routledgc, 1992). 
103 Fortune, The Secrets of Dr Taverner, p. 48. 
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down to earth, and made accessible in occultism as an acquired skill. Recalling an experience in a 
meditation class when the images which arose in her mind corresponded exactly to the images chosen by 
the group leader, Dion Fortune describes her first acquaintance with thought transference: 'I realized that 
if thought transference were a fact, it had a very important bearing upon psychotherapy... I saw that in 
thought-reading we have a method which would enable us to discover dissociated complexes without the 
use of the cumbersome and painful method of psychoanalysis. '104 Trained intuition, like the 
&microtome' slices through the intervening methods of psychoanalysis, and reaches directly to the 
unconscious. Thought-reading proposes an apparent simplification of the unwieldy process of analysis, 
promising 'a 'short-cut' to the knowledge of other people's minds. 105 
The method of thought-transference used by Taverner differs from hypnosis in dispensing with formal 
technique; yet Freud too found he no longer needed to use the method of hypnosis in order to access his 
patients' unconscious memory. Linking back to Bemheim's psychological model of hypnosis, which 
marked suggestibility as the defining characteristic of the unconscious, Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen suggests 
that we could re-read Freud's discovery of the unconscious as an uncovering of his own unspoken 
influence. Echoing Frangois Roustang, he questions whether psychoanalysis may not after all be 'long- 
drawn-out suggestion? '106 Occultism makes obvious the dynamics of influence operating at an 
unconscious level about which psychoanalysis, according to Borch-Jacobsen, maintains a covert silence, 
disclaiming collusion in the name of scientific observation. 107 Both Dion Fortune and Algernon 
Blackwood candidly identify the operation of thought-influence as the healer's method of both diagnosis 
and recovery. 
When Freud writes to Ferenczi in 1909 in relation to 'thought-transference', 'I am afraid you have begun 
to discover something big' we are in no doubt, owing to more recent critical accounts tracing Freud's 
ambivalence towards telepathy, that this 'something big' is 'too' big. 108 Freud did incorporate the 
theory of transference - the unspoken passage of thoughts from one person to another - into 
psychoanalysis but thought-transference remains distinct from telepathy since, as Roustang 
distinguishes, 'at no time does the thought of one person become the thought of another'. 109 Instead, 
the analyst, in Freud's words 'like a mirror that should show nothing but what is shown to him', records 
the thoughts as the patient's, avoiding the danger of passing to 'the knowledge, feelings and experience 
104 Fortune, Journal of the Society of the Inner Light, n. d., q. v. Richardson, Priestess, p. 67. 
105 See Nick Royle, Telepathy and Literature: Essays on the Reading Mind (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991). 
See Noll, The Jung Cult, p205. 
106 Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, The Emotional Tie: Psychoanalysis, Mimesis and Affect (Stanford. California: 
Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 57. 
107 Franqois Roustang, Psychoanalysis never lets go, trans. Ned Lukacher (Baltimore & London, John 
Hopkins University Press, 1983), p. 52, p. 51. See Freud on the effect of 'mental influences': 'The processes of 
volition and attention are [ ... 
I capable of exercising a profound effect on somatic processes' ('Psychical (or 
Mental) Treatment', 1890 [19051, Standard Edition vii, p. 288). 
108 Letter from Freud to Ferenczi, 6 Oct 1909, The FreudlJung Letters: The Correspondence between Sigmund 
Freud and Carl Jung, p. 255 n. 8. 
109 Roustang, Psychoanalysis never lets go, p. 52. 
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of the other' as his own. 110 Roustang identifies Freud's fear as of an uncanny doubling. It is also a 
retreat from the 'action and reaction of two', the process which works both ways which we have 
identified as intrinsic to occult thought. Might the threat be better characterised by the anxiety voiced in 
Oscar Wilde's Dorian Gray: 
'If thought could exercise its influence upon a living organism, might not thought exercise 
an influence upon dead and organic things? Nay, without thought or conscious desire, 
might not things external to ourselves vibrate in unison with our moods and passions, 
atom calling to atom in secret love of strange affinity? 'l II 
As we have seen, occult practice accepts that thought-influence, or affinities, works in both, or all, 
directions, it is not about 'the solitary working of the one'. Dr Taverner is heedful of this 
interpenetration of minds: 
"'All thoughts are not generated within the mind that thinks them, " said Taverner. "We are 
constantly giving each other unconscious suggestion, and influencing minds without 
knowing it, and if a man who understands the power of thought deliberately trains his 
mind in its use, there are few things he cannot do. 'I 12 
As we see from the above passage, occultism is not an invitation to a liberal transfusion between minds. 
Fortune's occultism is hyperbolically aware of the threat of invasion or contamination from without, 
which it meets with its own full armoury of defences (other than Freud's denial of telepathic links). 
Thoughts are indeed powerful but it remains crucial to occultism, as much as to psychoanalysis, that the 
thinker is not usurped. We are told that the inimitable John Silence's 'power' lies 'in the knowledge, 
first, that thought can act at a distance, and, secondly, that thought is dynamic and can accomplish 
material results. 'Learn how to think, ' he would have expressed it, 'and you have learned to tap power at 
its source'. 113 Roustang suggests that Freud! s experiences of thought-transference 'led him to the edge of 
depersonalization' and in response to this threat, he 'cultivated [a] sacred egotism'. 1 14 In one of 
Blackwood's stories, John Silence's assistant is led to such an edge because he is unlearned in the art of 
vigilance, and control: 
'Uncommon thoughts kept beating on my brain like tiny hammers, soft yet persistent, 
seeking admission; their unbidden tide began to wash along the far fringes of my mind, 
the currents of unwonted sensations to rise over the remote frontiers of my consciousness. 
I was aware of thoughts, and the fantasies of thoughts, that I never knew existed. Portions 
of my being stirred that had never stirred before, and things ancient and inexplicable rose 
to the surface and beckoned me to follow. I felt as though I were about to fly off, at some 
immense tangent, into an outer space hitherto unknown even in dreams. 'I 15 
110 Ibid. p. 51; citing Freud, 'The Uncanny', (1919) Standard Edition, xvii, 217-56. 
111 Oscar Wilde, Dorian Grey, (189 1; rcpr. Flarmondsworth: Penguin, 1994), p. 123. 
112 Fortune, The Secrets of Dr Taverner, p. 100. 
113 Blackwood, John Silence, p. 5. 
114 Roustang, Psychoanalysis never lets go, p. 5 1. 
115 Blackwood. John Silence, p. 214. 
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While the occult fiction which we are looking at represents the real possibility of thought-transference in 
ternis of conscious control, or 'unwonted' invasion, telepathy most frequently figures in contemporary 
literary criticism as an uncanny form of communication, an unconscious thinking. Nicholas Royle's 
mode of writing about telepathy - in the lineage of Derrida, and Abraham and Torok - describes a 
permeation of the terms telepathy and literature in which telepathy is interchangeable with uncertainty, a 
glamour of never knowing to whom one speaks: he describes a 'telepathic structure' - what exactly he 
envisages is deliberately uncertain - 'without knowing where it is going, who is speaking or who is 
listening, or at what distance'. 116 Compare then Dion Fortune's rather colourless explanation: 'We all 
have our own particular rate of vibration [ ... ] thought is an electrical process and must be capable of 
transmission. 'I 17 Or again: 'the essence of telepathy consists in the sympathetic induction of 
vibration. 'I IS We might say that both psychoanalysis and literary criticism are more occult, and less 
scientific than occultism itself when it comes to addressing the subject of telepathy. 
Dr Taverner's omniscience fulfils a fantasy not only of knowledge, but of the possibility of being fully 
known, and understood, without the 'clumsy machinery' of words. Symptoms, however mysterious, are 
always found to have a cause: 'When confronted by a mental state for which he could find no adequate 
cause in the present, it was his custom to investigate the past, getting the record of the previous lives of 
his patient by those secret means of which he was master. 'I 
19 Dr Taverner knows not only the minds of 
his patients in the present, but the psychic disposition of their previous incarnations, limited by neither 
spatial nor temporal bounds. Contrary to the chaos this might suggest in terms of overflowing 
boundaries it is the extent of the occultist's control which is remarkable: 'the secret means of which he 
was master. ' The Occult doctrine can offer tremendous reassurance: as with the Akashic Records, nothing 
is ever truly lost. In fact, Dion Fortune's emphasis revokes traditional associations of occultism with 
mystery; it is about the possibility of knowing the unknown, not living with it. The threads she 
describes as left dangling by psychoanalysis are followed not into darkness but into increased areas of 
light. This purging of unknowns and unknowability in the psychic domain is given an developmental 
perspective through the work of Christopher Bollas who, stressing the unknowable dimension of the 
psyche, states 'the idea that we understand one another is illusory' and argues that recognition of this is a 
condition of maturity. 
120 The occultist's relationship to his patient can be compared to the infant 
described by Bollas who needs to maintain the illusion of understanding, and to believe that he is 
known from within, held in a perceptivc embrace, so that what is dcreative misperception' by another 
passes for 'perceptive understanding. But for Dr Taverner, closer to the form of knowing interpretation 
Bollas is critiquing, there is no question of playing with meaning, or not-knowing, which is how Bollas 
describes the more creative adult response to this predicament, drawing upon Winnicott's theory of 
transitional experiencing. Taverner's occult practice does not even interpret, it diagnoses, identifying a 
1] 6 Royle, Telepathy and Literature, p. 26. 
117 Fortune, Aspects of Occultism, p. 115. 
118 Fortune, Psychic Set(-Defence, p. 132. 
119 Fortune, The Secrets of Dr Taverner, p. 49. 
120 Christopher Bollas, 'Violent Innocence', Being A Character: Psychoanalysis and Self Erperience 
(London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 186-7. 
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cause rather than producing meanings, in a way which risks being more reductive, and less creative, than 
those moments of psychoanalysis which stop - most famously in Freud's Interpretation of Dreams - 
short at the edge of the unknown,, where meanings proliferate. 
121 In this respect, psychoanalysis could 
at moments be said to be more occult than occultism. But the aim of occultism is less to create 
meanings, than to make sense. Although occultism takes the challenge of dissolution of boundaries to 
its extreme, what results is not dissolution but a preservation of the ego. It is notable that Taverner's 
technique is described as his 'peculiar' art. 'Peculiar' is frequently used by Fortune - it refers both to the 
unusual or odd, and also describes something which is particularly one's own, its Latin root meaning 
6private property'. A 'peculiar' occultism announces a conservatism towards the self at the same time as 
proposing a radical dissolution of boundaries. 
Becoming more of a body in leaving it 
Wyndham Lewis impeaches modernist thinking for 'always trying to get into the skin of somebody 
else'; in Fortune's 'The Subletting of the Mansion' this is quite literally the diagnosis. 
122 'The 
Subletting of the Mansion' describes the real possibilities of going out of one's mind, and out of one's 
body, which are encompassed by occult theory, demonstrating as fact the assertion that the body is not a 
prison for the occultist since occultism provides practical methods of escape. A. P. Sinnett writing in The 
occult World, (18 8 1), proposes: 
'The body is the prison of the soul for ordinary mortals. We can see merely what comes 
before its windows; we can take cognisance only of what is brought within its bars. But 
the adept has found the key of his prison and can emerge from it at pleasure. It is no 
longer a prison for him - merely a dwelling. In other words, the adept can project his soul 
out of his body to any place he pleases with the rapidity of thought., 
123 
The title of the story refers most obviously to the property neighbouring Taverner's nursing home which 
has been newly let; however, the narrative also describes an exchange of tenancy transacted on a more 
macabre level of property: the body. The narrative is framed by Rhodes' weekly walks to the letter-box 
situated at the end of the nursing-home garden and surrounded by wild and barren country: here Rhodes 
posts his communications to the 'outer world' reminding us how remote we are from the outer world and 
suggesting that the events of the story take place in a different, or inner plane or world. The narrative 
begins at the post box where Rhodes watches Mrs and Mr Bellamy moving in to the next-door house, 
which has been left vacant by its German owners during the war. This historical allusion suggests again 
the unsettling effect of war - in disturbing established tenancies, in this instance of physical property but 
also as we will see, upon the property of the mind. A week later when Rhodes is again at the post-box - 
this time with Taverner - they see Mrs Bellamy 'slipping softly through the narrow opening' of the 
121 'There is at least one spot in every dream at which it is unplumbable -a navel, as it were, that is its point of 
contact with the unknown' (Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, 1900, in Penguin Freud Library, 4, trans. 
James Strachey, flarmondsworth: Penguin, 1991, p. 186). 
122 Wyndham Lewis, Time and Western Man (London: Chatto & Windus, 1927), p. 268. 
123 A. P. Sinnett, The Occult World, p. 15. On Alfred Percy Sinnet (1840-1921) journalist and occultist in 
British India, see Peter Washington, Mine Blavalsky's Baboon: Theosophy and the Emergence of the Western 
Guru (London: Secker & Warburg, 1993), pp. 61-61. 
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gates who is 'obviously coming to the post, but, seeing us, hesitated'. Exiting one's property becomes 
charged with significance, the post-box acting as observation point between inner and outer world. The 
sight of Mrs Bellamy's face provokes Dr Taverner's diagnosis of a 'tragedy' being worked out in the 
mansion: 'Not clairvoyance this time, Rhodes, but merely common sense. If a woman's face is younger 
than her figure, then she is happily married; if the reverse, then she is working out a tragedy. ' There is a 
reminder here of Agatha Verrall's searching Rodney's face for revealing 'marks' -a perceptiveness which 
was understood to be the nature of her 'gift'. Blackwood's John Silence explains: 'All perception, as you 
know, is the result of vibrations; and clairvoyance simply means becoming sensitive to an increased 
scale of vibrations. '124 Explained as an increased sensitivity, clairvoyance is an extension, or 
development of common sense: an uncommon sense as it were. Yet the elision between common sense 
and clairvoyance can point in another direction: Taverner's diagnosis of Mrs Bellamy also recalls Henry 
James' narrator of The Sacred Fount. His theory that one person in a couple will always show physical 
signs of being drained by the other carries 'commonsense' to a point where it is indistinguishable from 
madness. 125 Seeing connections between things, which as we have seen, is the art of occultism, unifies 
the disparate, but it can also be a symptom of a psychic disunity where every sign bears a message to the 
self. 
increasingly Rhodes is accompanied on his strolls by Winnington, one of the residents, who feels 
unaccountably attracted to Mrs Bellamy. Winnington is 'not quite in the position of an ordinary patient', 
being a member of the same occult fraternity as Dr Taverner and suffering from tuberculosis rather than 
one of the more bizarre psychic complaints. As Winnington's health deteriorates he is confined to his 
bed yet he ensures his continued sightings of Mrs Bellamy by other means. Entering into a deep trance 
state he leaves behind his physical body and ventures on 'one of those strange psychic expeditions' in 
astral form which culminates in a spooky m6nage-A-trois when he materialises as a misty shape in the 
bedroom of Mrs Bellamy and her husband. This deliberate projection of a phantom or astral body out of 
the physical body while retaining full consciousness is graphically detailed in Hereward Carrington's 
occult text book The Projection of the Astral Body. 126 Dion Fortune's occult theory describes the astral 
plane as connected by thought and imagination. In this story, conscription of this astral voyage to the 
purely imaginary, or subjective domain is disallowed by the narrative which raises questions about what 
we designate as imaginary. When Mr Bellamy's previously concealed drug-habit entails the calling out 
of Rhodes in his capacity as physician Rhodes sees for himself the shadowy form of Winnington 
hovering over Mr Bellamy's bedside. 
Psychic visitations may be a commonplace phenomena in the occult world but what ensues is a more 
troubling residency. Winnington waits for Bellamy to involuntarily leave his body while in a drug- 
124 Blackwood, John Silence, p. 15. 
125 Henry James, The Sacred Fount (London: Methuen, 1901). 
126 Muldoon, Sylvan and Carrington, Hereward, The Projection of the Astral Body (London: Rider, 1929). 
Freud writes to Hereward Carrington: 'if I had my life to live over again I should devote myself to psychical 
research rather than psycho-analysis' (Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, New York: Basic 
Books, 1957, iii, p. 392). 
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induced stupor, then takes the opportunity to occupy the physical body of the man, as Dr Taverner later 
describes: he 'slipped in, obsessed him, in fact leaving Bellamy to wander houseless'. 127 Slipping into 
another body, is no more arduous than slipping through the gates of one's house. Meanwhile, Bellamy 
(or what we should refer to as the 'houseless' or, the 'subtle' body of Bellamy) allured by the scent of 
drugs follows Rhodes back to the nursing home dispensary. Noticing a shadowy form and judging it to 
be Winnington on one of his astral travels, Rhodes mistakenly coaxes Bellamy back into, what is of 
course, some one else's body. In consequence we are left with an irascible drug addict in a tuberculitic 
body and a gentle disposition in a strong and resilient body: a narrative conclusion which can be read as 
a rather unusual eugenic solution. When the physical body of Winnington wakes up behaving as if it 
were Mr Bellamy, Rhodes initially diagnoses the case as: 'A wish- fulfilment.. Winnington is in love 
with Bellamy's wife; he wishes he were Bellamy in order to possess her, therefore his delirium expresses 
the subconscious wish as an actuality, the usual Freudian mechanism, you know - the dream as wish- 
fulfilment. '128 
Yet this interpretation is bound by the theoretical limits of its own theories: occultism takes more 
literally the possibility of wish-fulfilment. Upon realising 'the true explanation of the phenomena' 
Rhodes is anxious to deal with the illegal tenancy and 'get the men sorted back into their proper bodies, ' 
the necessary evictions being the obvious method to restore the rightful proprieties. 
129 At this point 
Taverner intervenes to question the advisability of such a rehabilitation. Rhodes' concern to abide by a 
morality as defined by the law of the land is countered by our occult physician: 
'No, Rhodes, we will have to seek deeper than that for our standards. ' 
'Then, ' said 1, 'how would you define immorality? ' 
'As that.. which retards the evolution of the group soul of the society to which one 
belongs. There are times when law-breaking is the highest ethical act. '130 
There remains an implicit comment upon the inappropriate ownership of the English mansion by 
Germans during the war (one of the patients arrives suffering from shell-shock) suggesting that the 
tenants have a more rightftil occupation than the legal property holders. 
The 'Subletting of the Mansion' concludes with the happy prospect of Mrs Bellamy together with her 
6new' husband. In Fortune's Secrets of Dr Taverner however extraordinary the narrative becomes on a 
non-material plane, however transgressive the action of the characters in their 'subtle' bodies, the 
dilemmas are resolved quite conventionally in the 'material' body, most frequently with a wedded union 
of former strangers. Consequently, the strange phenomena which occur on the 'astral' plane, function less 
as symptoms of dissociation than clues for integration. Although Adorno's reproval of occultism was 
predominantly levelled at the practices of spiritualism which rely upon external manifestations in the 
material world as proof of the spiritual, his denunciation of the system by which 'the soul becomes a 
127 Fortune, The Secrets of Dr Taverner, p. 147. 
128 Ibid. p. 146. 
129 Ibid p. 147. 
130 Ibid p. 148. 
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cheap imitation of that from which it had achieved a false emancipation' seems most apposite here. He 
argues that the spiritual is comprehended and represented only through an unremitting materialism which 
then obviates the difference. The concept of the 'astral body' is installed since '[o]nly in the metaphor of 
the body can the concept of pure spirit be grasped at all, and is at the same time cancelled. 13 1 Adomo's 
critique collapses occultism into the materialism from which it hopes to escape. Fortune's fictional case- 
studies of occult pathology always resolve themselves in the physical body which is brought into 
coincidence with its astral partner. Yet need the metaphor of the body cancel the spirit? Recall Vernon 
Lee's protest at the body having been made a scapegoat. Adorno's critique adheres to the Cartesian 
hegemony of mind/body: a system into which occultism - or one aspect of occultism - does not fit. 
HD's overmind was neither mind, nor body; Fortune asserted 'There is more to man than mind and 
body. ' As we will see, what is perhaps most radical about occult thinking, - and nothing whatsoever to 
do with transcendence - is that once you allow the body to exceed what we think of as a body- in 
making real imaginative states and 'super-feelings' - it is no longer a question of 'seeing things' for 
there are - materially - things to be seen. Pure spirit takes up an embodied - but not, as in Adorno's 
critique, bodily reductive - form. 
But aren't states of consciousness real? 
Whereas the 'male' type of modernism defined by Nicholls appeals to the visual and objective in order to 
affirm distance and difference, Fortune's work subverts the distinctions between the subjective and the 
objective with her idea of 'objective imagination' which conflates one category into another. Such a 
move is the target of Adorno's critique of occultism as 'subjectivity mistaking itself for its object' which 
would also seem to be the male modernists' critique of poets such as Swinburne. 132 Eliot castigates 
Swinbume's verse for drowning the object in sentiment so to speak. 133 When we see Dion Fortune, s 
own fondness for Swinbume this further reinforces the connections: a section from her novel Afoon 
Magic entitled 'A Study in Telepathy' is prefaced with Swinburne: 
my heart yearns baffled and blind, moved vainly towards thee, and moving 
As the refluent seaweed moves in the languid exuberant stream. ' 134 
These lines in which feeling ebbs and flows with the 'moving' stream and where the movement itself is 
of the heart perhaps conveys precisely just such an emotional absorption of self in object in which, as 
Nicholls describes, 'language.. loses touch with the visual world.. leaving the self immersed in .. his 
own confused desires. '135 
A further story from the Taverner collection more vividly demonstrates the making real of the subjective: 
the way occultism gives its imagining a status which belies this critique. In 'The Sea Lure' Rhodes 
becomes involved in a case which has been conventionally diagnosed as a case of 'hysterical stigmata': a 
131 Adorno, 'Theses Against Occultism', The Stars Down to Earth, p. 13 1. 
132 Adorno, 'Theses Against Occultism', p. 130, p. 129. 
133 T. S. Eliot, Selected Essays, p. 321. 
134 Fortune, Moon Magic (London: S. I. L., 1995), p. 6. 
135 Nicholls, Modernisms, p. 195. 
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woman has been ascribed an '[i]magination so vivid that it actually affects the tissues of the body'. 
13 6 
The psychoanalytic interpretation, however radical a conception itself, is evinced only to demonstrate its 
inadequacy. This lies not in its under-estimation of the powers of imagination but its assumption of the 
insularity of imaginary activity, or its failure to take account of imaginative possibilities between selves. 
The woman patient, who remains nameless, is introduced to Rhodes by a fellow-medical student; she 
has two bullet wounds in her shoulder which mysteriously appeared while she lay asleep: no bullets were 
found in the wounds, nor was there any bleeding. Recognising her as being gifted with the same psychic 
sensitivity which enables Dr Taverner to enter a state of deep trance in order to leave his body, Rhodes 
becomes interested in her case, noting above all a marked affinity with the sea in her appearance 'her 
strange sea-green eyes', 'like deep sea-water ... [which] gazed unseeing into a distance where I have no 
doubt the gulls were flying and calling and the Atlantic rollers coming in from the West'; and the 
strength of her dreams, which she admits 'are the realest part of my life,. 137 Rhodes invites her to visit 
Dr Taverner's convalescent home, and in the meantime is sent by Taverner on an urgent journey to help a 
man who has signalled that his life is at risk. It is indicated to the reader at the outset that this adventure 
is more than a narrative sub-plot: it involves what could be interpreted as 'the grossest kind of 
coincidence', yet it is upon axes such as these that many of these stories pivot. Rhodes defers to Dr 
Taverner's interpretation of coincidences which judges them 'not as fortuitous as they appeared to be, 
but... due to causes which operated invisibly upon the subtler planes of existence, and whose effects 
alone were seen in our material world'. 
13 8 
Rhodes' journey takes him to a sea-swept coastal town, and to a cavern hewn into the cliff-edge where 
his learned host lives. He has been studying 'elemental forces.. the semi-intelligent entities behind the 
potencies of nature' and in the course of invoking these cosmic powers has contacted a water elemental 
who, on certain nights, appears swimming towards him through the tumultuous waves outside his 
cavern. The creature 'wills' him to join her in the black, rocky waters yet although he desperately wishes 
to do so, he knows he would be killed by the treacherous tides. In torment he has waited for her - the 
object of his fear and desire - only to shoot at her with small silver bullets which he has made in a small 
crucible with which he has wounded her twice in the shoulder. When Rhodes joins him on a moonlit 
vigil he sees for himself the woman who swims through the waves, her sea-green eyes and seaweed-like 
hair, and recognises her as the same woman whom he saw lying in the dingy hospital ward in South 
London with the 'hysterical stigmata'. He is obliged to reconsider the former diagnosis: for the woman's 
fantasies can no longer be consigned to her own psyche. The self-enclosed activity of the imagination is 
13 6 Fortune, The Secrets of Dr Taverner, p. 164. 
137 Ibid. p. 166. 
138 Ibid. p. 168. Taverner's theory of meaningful coincidence can be compared to Jung's theory of 
6synchronicity'; it is interesting to note Jung's definition of synchronicity as an 'acausal connecting 
principle' which suggests that the 'invisible causes' of an occult cosmology have been eradicated only in 
name, to be replaced by an acausal principle which operates as if there were a causal connection between a 
series of events. Here we see Jung assimilating the 'rich booty' of occultism into his own system - 
maintaining an occult belief without retaining the accompanying theory. See Jung, Synchronicity, (1952), in 
Collected Works of C. G. Jung, viii, 417-519. 
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challenged with the necessary question: whose imagination had the power to wound her physical body? 
Discovering the earthly existence of his 'elemental' the man replies: 
"Good Lord, doctor, I am indeed out of my depth! I don't believe I ever thought in my 
heart that the things I was studying were real, I thought they were just states of 
consciousness. ' 
'But aren't states of consciousness realT 
'Yes, of course they are, on their own plane, that is the whole teaching of occult science. 
But I always thought they were entirely subjective, experiences of the imagination. It never 
occurred to me that anyone else could share them. " 139 
This dilemma over the 'reality' of 'states of consciousness' and the astral plane highlights the 
ambiguities inherent in occult teaching which blur distinctions between inner and outer experience. It 
also questions the use of the term 'subjective' to describe 'experiences of the imagination' which are no 
longer the imaginative property of the subject; 'The Sea Lure' proposes a transpersonal sharing of images 
and fantasies and a dissolution of the privacy of one's own imaginings. Rhodes replies to his host: 'You 
- we - both - seem to have shared in this girl's dreams, for she escapes from her dreary reality by 
imagining herself swimming in the sea'. 140 In this story, the woman literally swims against the tides 
into the two men's reality, although whether she is entering their dreams or waking reality is unclear; 
having spoken to her in the water, Forbes finds himself on the floor of the cavern recovering from a 
trance-like state. Predictably enough the story is resolved on the material plane, with sea- woman and 
cave-man each meeting in the flesh, quite literally, the man and woman of their dreams. 
The proposition that states of consciousness are real 'on their own plane' introduces a disarming 
qualification of reality. Astral planes, also called 'inner planes', nominate a non-material realm where 
occult experiences occur. Yet in Dion Fortune's fiction astral journeyings occur both on a psychic level 
and elsewhere, proposing a confluence between internal and external reality, or the subjective and 
objective which is usually designated as psychotic. Yet, while unsettling a unified reality, occultism's 
specification of states of consciousness as real 'on their own plane', surely finds an echo in Freud's 
concept of 'psychical reality' which would likewise answer in the affirmative to the question: 'Aren't 
states of consciousness real? '141 Adorno calls occultists 'irremediable realists' yet it is an extensive 
reality in which anything can happen. Fortune describes her own experience of finding a hairy grey beast 
pressing against her as she lay resting. This creature was 'tangible - even to the dog-like odour' yet what 
marks it apart is a thin line of ectoplasm which stretches from its belly to her own: 'I was told I had 
made this Thing out of my own substance through revengeful thought. and that it was really a part of 
myself extruded and that I must at all costs recall it and reabsorb it into myself. '142 Is this indeed 
13 9 Fortune, The Secrets of Dr Taverner, p. 175. 
140 Ibid. 
141 See Freud on the relationship between psychical with material reality: 'we should equate phantasy and 
reality and not bother to begin with whether the childhood experiences under examination arc the one or the 
other [ ... 
j These Mental [ ... ] productions possess a reality of a sort' (Freud, Introductory Lectures to Psycho- 
Analysis. 1915-17, in Standard Edition, xv-xvi, p. 368). 
142 p. 54 
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subjectivity mistaking itself for objectivity or has the occult plane of reality taken something outside 
itself and made it - objectively - its own? The frank acceptance that this Thing is 'part of myself' is a 
striking instance of ownership. Believing in the self might involve taking the further limits of what can 
belong to the self more seriously - for'Underhill and Sinclair although the 'Thing' was materialised, it 
remained something dispossessed, which neither of them, unlike Fortune here, could appropriate or own. 
Fortune tells us that, whether a projection of his own or another's making, the adept is instructed to 
'absorb it into himself through compassion'. 143 
Dion Fortune explains that occultism 'teaches us to regard all things as states of consciousness, and then 
shows us how to gain control of consciousness subjectively; which control, once acquired, is soon 
reflected objectively. By means of this control we are able to manipulate the plane of the human 
mind. ' 144 Again, contrary to expectation, despite the dissolution of boundaries an emphasis on the 
power of the mind reinforces power of consciousness, or ego. Dion Fortune's 'objective imagination' 
grants empirical reality to the subjective without denying its internal provenance. 
'The entrance to the 
Path is to be sought within, not without for it is a state of exalted consciousness. But once that 
consciousness is attained, the Path is objective as well as subjective. '145 Her ascribing of objectivity to 
imagination subverts the conventional dismissal of subjective phenomena as not real. Similarly 
modernist literary narrative challenged notions of narrative objectivity, replacing the objective with an 
equally valid, yet subjective representation of experience. Indeed, one might say that modernist narrative 
is albeit implicitly, making a similar, almost occult claim by objectifying and giving material form and 
recognition to subjectives states, making them the concrete embodied form of the writing. 
modcrn occultism 
Leon Surette in The Birth of Modernism: Ezra Pound, T. S. Eliot, W. B. Yeats and the Occult aptly refers 
to a scholarly phobia of the occult'and proposes a rehabilitation of the subject for literary scholarship 
through a study of occultism as 'metaphysical speculation.. about the nature of ultimate reality and of 
our relation to it., 
146 Surette stresses the glorification of the past by the occult tradition, which, with 
the concomitant belief in historical process as degenerative, attempts to preserve the ancient wisdom of 
esoteric texts, embalming them in a tradition of secrecy. It seems pertinent that Surette's study of the 
relationship between literary modernism and the occult founds itself partly upon the work of Eliot and 
Pound, Nicholls' 'men of 1914'. Consequently there are significant distinctions to be made between 
Surette's characterisation of the 'occult' in terms of its allegiance to the past, and Dion Fortune's living 
tradition. While Surette seeks to reintroduce occultism as a legitimate scholarly tradition, Fortune's 
approach foregrounds the practical applications of occultism to everyday lived experience, recommending 
active engagement rather than speculation. Evelyn Underhill's emphasis in her mysticism upon the 
143 p. 60. 
144 Forlune, Sane Occultism, p. 21. 
145 Fortune, Esoteric Orders, p. 90. 
146 Surettc, The Birth of Modernism, p. 16 1,. p. 13. 
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individual's experience of transcendence, can be compared to Dion Fortune's concern to communicate 
occultism as a discipline which offers the individual access to altered states of consciousness: she regards 
occultism as the 'real key to psychology. '147 Committed to the popular dissemination of occult ideas, 
Fortune objects to the deliberate withholding of teachings by a self-elected elite; she holds that 'this 
selfishness and exclusiveness is the bane of the occult movement rather than its safeguard', maintaining 
that 'ample time and ample cash' should not determine access to the sacred wisdom. Indeed, Fortune's 
writings in their project to popularise, or make public the formerly well-kept secrets of occultism, run 
counter to the root meaning of the term occult, that is 'hidden'. Leon Surette's rehabilitation of the 
occult makes it relevant to the work of Eliot and Pound, or early modernism; I am suggesting that Dion 
Fortune's occultism differs at points from the traditional version of occultism in similar ways to which 
the women modernists diverged from the aesthetic of the traditional modernists. 
Dion Fortune acknowledges the historical origins of much occult doctrine while insisting that the 
modem occultist 'must re-interpret doctrine and re-formulate method in the light of the present 
dispensation if the heritage he has received is to be of any practical value to him'. 148 She is concerned 
that the occult maintain a contemporary relevance: a modem, or modernist, engagement with the present- 
day, and judges the vitality of a tradition by its powers of assimilation: 'It is only a dead faith which 
remains uninfluenced by contemporary thought., 
149 This engagement with contemporary thought 
distinguishes her from the traditional occult writer's attachment to the archaic. Although much of Dion 
Fortune's material is not original, her approach is to 'de-historicise' it, transferring custody of the 
contents from the annals of the past to her present-day readers. Concerning her interpretation of the 
Qabalah, which itself means 'tradition', she writes: 'for me it is a living system, not a historical 
curiosity', 'a growing system, not a historic monument'. 
150 While acknowledging her sources for The 
mystical Qabalah in the scholarship of Macgregor Mathers, Wyn Westcott and A. E. Waite, she refuses 
to hold their anteriority in awe: 
11 care not one jot for the authority of tradition if it hampers the free development of a 
system of such practical value as the Holy Qabalah, and I use the work of my predecessors 
as a quarry whence I fetch the stone to build my city. Neither am I limited to this quarry 
by any ordinance that I know of, but fetch also cedar from Lebanon and gold from Ophir if 
it suits my purpose. 'I 51 
tier avowed eclecticism renders former works as quarry for her own constructions; historical structures are 
collapsed into the ground, with a disregard for both temporal and generic orthodoxies. Fortune's 
pillaging of the past argues for an attitude of creative freedom towards tradition which can be read against 
notions of academic scholarship and as challenging the ideas made famous by T. S. Eliot's much cited 
'Tradition and Individual Talent' of 1919. Although Eliot does not recommend a blind inheritance, he 
147 Fortune, Psychic Set(-Defence, p. 9. 
148 Fortune, The Mystical Qabalah, p. 2. 
149 Ibid. p. 3. 
150 Fortune, The Mystical Qabalah, p. 19, p. 16. 
151 Ibid. p. 20. 
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firmly upholds the individual's relationship to past tradition as to an 'ideal order' made by existing 
monuments. The task of the artist is to achieve a 'historical sense' of this monolithic past, while 
bringing it into the present. 152 
Dion Fortune compares her work to that of an archaeologist (as did Vernon Lee, and more famously 
Freud): 
, In working upon this storehouse of ancient knowledge we are in the position of excavators 
working on the site of a buried temple; we are digging up fragments rather than studying a 
coherent system; for the system... was broken and scattered and defaced by the persecution 
of twenty centuries of unenlightened bigotry and spiritual jealousy. 'I 53 
Her role is to make available for scholarship the 'rescued fragments'. 154 While Eliot is referring 
specifically to a Western, literary tradition, the fragmented system which Dion Fortune is reclaiming and 
making new refers as much to forgotten psychic structures as to a body of written knowledge, and in this 
we see a link with Freud's archaelogical metaphors. Yet a passage in Esoteric Orders and their Work 
describes Dion Fortune's response to a classical aesthetic tradition. Couched in a description of the seven 
Rays, or aspects which make up the Western esoteric tradition, each influencing a different aspect of 
human consciousness, she sets the Celtic, or artistic Ray against classical forms of beauty, voicing a 
populist critique of high culture. 
Dion Fortune identifies the 'classical' aesthetic with a culture of privilege from which the 'common man' 
is excluded: 'Many generations of British intellect have been nourished upon the classical tradition, and 
consequently have produced that remote, antique and alien type of artistic or literary beauty which is 
called classical. This is a type of beauty for whose appreciation a special culture is required... and 
therefore it does not appeal to the common man who has not built up these contacts within his soul., 155 
Whether or not intended as a comment upon the early modernists, the 'remote, antique and alien' form of 
beauty could describe their intended aesthetic: density of reference and classical allusion making Eliot 
and Pound problematic reading for those without the 'special culture'. Is this in response to Eliot's 
requirement that a writer achieve familiarity with 'the whole of the literature of Europe from Ilomer'? l 56 
Eliot's aesthetic culminates in a rapprochement with classicism considered as a 'goal towards which all 
good literature strives'. 
157 This, as Levenson argues, upholds his dominant preoccupations: 'the 
ascendancy of reason over emotion.. and the need for an outer authority to restrain inner caprice. '158 
Fortune proposes a more accessible, populist aesthetic for the 'common man' which, in its preference for 
the 'native' and spontaneous, further glosses her designation of the classical tradition as Galien': 
152 T. S. Eliot, Selected Prose, p. 23. 
153 Fortune. The Mystical Qabalah, p. 92. 
154 Ibid. p. 93. 
155 Fortune, Esoteric Orders, p. 34. 
156 T. S. Eliot, Selected Prose, p. 23. 
157 Levenson, A Genealogy of Modernism, p. 212. 
158 Ibid. p. 210. 
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'But that which derives from our native folk tradition springs up like water from the soil, 
made alive by the good, brown earth ... ; it springs, 
it sparkles, and the wayfaring man, 
though dull, cannot but rejoice therein, for it is native to him; he needs no commentary to 
tell him its beauties; he loves it because he enjoys it; and he enjoys it because it vitalizes 
his nature. '159 
Read as an alternative to Eliot's advised pedantry, Fortune's aesthetic earns its approbation from the 
&common man': hedonistic rather than heuristic, a tradition which is inherited not learrit, this form of 
artistic expression 'needs no commentary' (unlike The Waste Land). This panegyric to the 'native folk 
tradition' sets against classicism the Romantic tradition in which inspiration is an expression of the 
close bond between man and nature: the natural forces speaking through him. But the idea of a 'native' 
aesthetic, or occult, tradition, linked directly through the soil, 'the good, brown earth', carries far more 
ominous associations. Both Andrew Samuels' The Political Psyche and Richard Noll's The Jung Cult 
have pointed out Jung's literal belief in the influences of soil on national psychology and physiology: 
'The soil of every country holds some such mystery. We have an unconscious reflection of this in the 
psyche; just as there is a relationship of mind to body, so there is a relationship of body to earth. 'l 
60 
This relation between mind and earth - in Fortune's case art and earth - which Noll links to a 'Olkish 
mysticism', sanctions an idea of rootedness which easily lends itself to a nationalist politics and the 
anti-Semitism of which Jung is accused: Jung, according to his 'mystical geology, ' demands of the Jew: 
Gwhere has he his own earth underfoot? '161 As Dion Fortune's 'common' or, more precisely 'native' 
man is vitalised by his contact with the soil, so 'artistic or literary beauty' which is 'native' is 
regenerative: 'Yes, they are literally alive' Dion Fortune says of such art, 'ensouled with elemental 
essence in a way that a machine-made object is not,. 
162 Rootlessness, conversely, stigmatises a person 
as 'being deprived of the life force and thus lacking a properly functioning soul,. 
163 This concretising of 
a connection between soil and man suggests the political direction in which a literalising of occult 
6analogies between things' can take. 
In The Occult Review Fortune refers to 'our native occultism' and stresses "Do not let it be forgotten that 
traditions are racial'. 164 Yet a 'native' tradition is complicated for an occultism whose eclectic roots 
range from Qabalah to Kundalini. Under a heading marked 'The Jewish Peril', Dion Fortune suggests 
that anti-Semitic feeling on the continent damns occultism by association for its prominent Jewish 
membership (in part owing to the foundation of the Western Esoteric tradition in the 'mystical wisdom 
of Israel'). While heavyhanded in attributing racial characteristics to both Jews and Aryans, Fortune 
concludes that esoteric tradition 'should admit no exclusiveness'. She reminds the anti-Semite that if 
159 Fortune, Esoteric Orders, p. 35. 
160 C. G. Jung, 'The Role of the Unconscious', (1918), p. 13, Civillsation in Transition, Collected Works, x, 
(London, RKP, 1964). See also Jung, 'Mind and Earth' (1927) in CF. and H. G. Baynes (trans. and ed. ), 
Contributions to Analytical Psychology (London & N. Y: 1928); Richard Noll, The Jung Cult, pp. 95-103. 
161 Jung, 'The Role of the Unconscious', p 18. See Fortune, 'The "Jewish Peril"', Applied Magic, pp. 74-77. 
162 Fortune, Esoteric Orders, p. 35. 
163 George Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York: Grosso 
and Dunlap, 1964), p. 15. 
164 Fortune, 'Secrecy in Occultism', Occult Review, 44 (July 1926), p315. 
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occultism has its 'cultural roots' in Judaism, this is no less than Christianity. Dion Fortune's newsletter 
to her Society members during the Second World War proposes that the occult tradition should delight 
in diversity of type, the greater, the richer. Less than enamoured with what she sees as the lethargic 
national psychology she suggests there is something to be learned from both 'Kelt' and 'Jew. Although 
Dion Fortune's emphasis upon the principle of diversity in unity aimed to encompass difference within 
the esoteric tradition the more grave implications of Dion Fortune's celebration of a native aesthetic are 
borne out in today's manifesto of the Society of the Inner Light which reveals a strongly ethnocentric, 
nationalistic and radically conservative bias towards its membership, welcoming only those who 
'support and protect the British tradition', are heterosexual, solvent, and in short, display 'A love of 
things British'. 165 
and an occult modernism? 
The following passage, written in the wake of the First World War, voices a fantasy of destruction, to be 
effected by an initiated elite which echoes Algernon Blackwood's envisaged transfon-nation of 'modem 
thought' with which this chapter begun: 
'Two or three people, with healthy bodies and right sort of receiving brains, could turn the 
whole tide of human thought, could direct lightning flashes of electric power to slash 
across and destroy the world of dead, murky thought. '166 
Again we see tenets fundamental to occultism: belief in the ability of a few minds to influence a 'whole 
tide' of thought; thought conceived of as an electrical energy; 'lightning flashes' which evoke the 'flash' 
connecting the kabbalistic system of symbols; the 'right sort of receiving brains' alluding to the 
heightened attunement - as a kind of 'occult telephone'; while the reference to a powerful elite with 
'healthy bodies' and 'right sort' of minds points to the more sinister eugenic subtext. We should no 
longer be surprised to find that this text is written by the modernist H. D. from her "Notes on Thought 
and Vision". 
H. D'. s radical stratifications of the psyche in 'Notes' ramify a more conservative structuring of the 
social. She couples the over-mind with intrinsic superiority, assuming what John Carey in The 
Intellectual and the Masses censures as the 'natural aristocracy' of the intellectual. 167 As we saw in 
Underhill's poetry, everyday consciousness becomes vilified as a property of the everyday or middle- 
classes, while access to the overconscious is the prerogative of the 'visionaries'. By representing the 
limitations of the conscious mind as suburban monotony, H. D. 's metaphor conveniently conflates an 
elitism associated with the esoteric (reinforcing its meaning of 'a few') with a condemnation of 'the 
masses', not infrequently found in modernist prose: 
165 'The Society of the Inner Light: its work and aims'. 
166 N. D., 'Notes on Thought and Vision', in Scott (ed. ) The Gender of Modernism, p. 97. compare the lightning 
flash which links the symbols of Kabbalah: 'the first initiation consists of the flash of cosmic consciousness 
... 
I and comes from within' (Dion Fortune, Esoteric Orders, p. 93). 
167 John Carey, The Intellectuals and the Masses: Pride and Prejudice among the Literary Intelligentsia, 
1880-1939, (London: Faber, 1992) p. 71. 
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'Our minds, all of our minds, are like dull little houses, built more or less alike -a dull 
little city with rows of little detached villas, and here and there a more pretentious house, 
set apart from the rest, but in essentials, seen from a distance, one with the rest, all drab, 
all grey. Each comfortable little home shelters a comfortable little soul - and a wall at the 
back shuts out completely any communication with the world beyond. ' 
Man's chief concern is keeping his little house warm and making his little wall 
strong. '168 
Lawrence Rainey's critique of H. D. as 'coterie' poet settles on her use of 'we' as indulging an already 
implicated readership in their identifications with an initiated elite. 169 The above passage is, perhaps, 
less gratifying to his own reading: for here 'our' minds are all as 'dull' as each other. Furthermore, for 
the adept access to the 'world beyond' is a privilege of training not class. As we have seen, homes reveal 
much about the self. here, despite being almost identical, each remains isolated in a 'detached' autonomy 
which is blind to the endemic sameness 'of the rest'. If this is the antithesis of the vision of the poet Lo- 
Fu who discovers individualities in every leaf, we can read this as H. D. 's own critique of the Men of 
1914, or at least the poet whose aesthetic vision does not begin with sympathy. Whereas the world 
within each house is drab yet comfortable, the 'world beyond' promises Dionysiac pleasures and the 
corollary subversive threat of carnival: 'Outside is a great vineyard and rioting and madness and 
dangers. '170 There is, we could say, a critique inside HD's writing, of her own elite aesthetic if we 
attend more carefully to what, not miles from what we have seen in this chapter in writings of Fortune, 
she is saying about the potential openness of the mind. 
In H. D. 's vision the step from the bourgeois to the bacchanalian - from the banality of the kitchen-sink 
to the heights of Greek drama - is prohibited by 'a wall at the back' which protects, or imprisons, the 
'comfortable little soul'. Compare Yeats' disparagement of the 'modem' self. 'Our souls that were once 
naked to the winds of heaven are now thickly clad, and have learned to build a house and light a fire 
upon its hearth, and shut-to the doors and windows. ' 
171 In Dion Fortune's The Secrets of Dr Taverner 
Forbes says: 
'I had, as it were to enter the house of my soul and walk out through the back door. I 
cannot describe it better than that - the curious intuming which I felt I had to perform.... 
And then, spontaneously and without effort, I opened the back door to my soul and 
stepped out into the wide and starry astral night. '172 
Forbes' 'way' makes requisite a 'curious inturning' in order to achieve the final egress, which suggests 
the preliminary work of 'sympathy', the establishing of an 'inner contact'. Forbes embarks upon his rite 
168 H. D., 'Notes of Thought and Vision', p. 103. 
169 Lawrence Rainey, Institutions of Modernism: Literary Elites and Public Culture (New I laven & London, 
Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 162-165. 
170 H. D., 'Notes on Thought and Vision', p. 104. 
171 W. B. Yeats, 'Magic' (1901) in Essays and Introductions, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1961), p. 41 
172 Fortune, The Secrets of Doctor Taverner, p. 221. 
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of passage into 'the wide and starry astral night' through the 'back door' -a means of exit unavailable to 
the soul who H. D. depicts as imprisoned by the 'wall at the back'. 173 
The 'wall at the back' is the wall through which contact with the 'astral night' is possible. I suggest that 
this visionary or occult aesthetic reappears in H. D. 's notes from her analysis with Freud in 1933 when 
she mentions the 'problem of the fourth dimensional'. 174 The 'problem of the fourth dimensional' is 
that it cannot, so to speak be brought into the three-dimensional room of analysis: 'About the greater 
transcendental issues' she warns 'we never argued. But there was an argument implicit in our bones. 'I 75 
Yet H. D does bring the fourth dimension or 'the wall at the back' into Freud's domain when she speaks 
to him of her 'jellyfish' experience: 
'I told him of the[ ... ] transcendental feeling I said I supposed it was some form of 
prenatal fantasy. Freud said, 'Yes, obviously; you have found the answer, good - 
good. 'l 76 
Having seen the 'wider horizons' of occult thinking with which H. D. had already connected her 
experience, in Freud's response the door is closed upon such correspondences, limiting sympathy, even 
if the interpretation with which he nods his agreement describes a 'limitless' feeling. Yet it could be 
argued that the fourth dimensional is brought more concretely into the analysis when H. D. compares it 
to the room of analysis itself where the fourth wall is 'largely unwalled'. 177 In this instance it could be 
said that the fourth dimensional is already there: the 'unwalled' wall is built into the structure of 
psychoanalysis so to speak. Yet being 'largely unwalled' it is of course not visible and to see it would 
be to be to risk the charge of 'seeing things'. What can be seen - and this leads us partly into the next 
chapter - is that H. D. was not alone in her vision: as she notes in her diary: 'The vision would not have 
happened if I had been alone, it was being with Bryher that projected the fantasy. ' 178 Although 
Lawrence Rainey imputes H. D. 's entire career to 'being with Bryher' here I suggest that we see again the 
6action and reaction of two' which Dion Fortune identified as one of the 'real keys' to magical powers 
and, I am suggesting, provides at least one of the ways in, or out, of the modernist asesthetic . 
A passage excluded from the writings which were published as H. D. 's The Gij? returns to the image of 
the door to describes two kinds of aesthetic representation determined by its 'openness': 
'The dream is four-dimensional, you cannot relegate it to a collection of dried memories 
and relate it to this one, to that one[ ... ]. The dream, the memory... must be allowed to 
sway backward and forward... in the wind of whatever emotion or idea is entering a door, 
left open. The wind blows through the door, from outside, through long, long corridors of 
personal memory, of biological and of race-memory. Shut the door and you have a neat 
173 Ibid. 
174 H. D., Trihule to Freud, (Manchester: Carcane% 1985). p. 100. 
175 Ibid. p. 13. 
176 Ibid. p. 168. 
177 Ibid. p. 23. 
178 Ibid. p. 130. 
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flat picture. Leave all the doors open and you are almost out-of-doors, almost within the 
un-walled province of the fourth-dimensional. This is creation in the truer sense. '179 
179 II. D., 'The Dream', Contemporary Literature, 10: 4 (1969). See Linda Dalrymple Henderson, 'Mysticism, 
Romanticism and the Fourth Dimension' in Maurice Tuchman (cd. ), The Spiritual in Art: Abstract Painting 
1890-1985 (New York: Abbeville Press, 1986). 
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FIVE 
'By contacts we are saved': 
Jane Ellen Harrison and the social soul 
'Freedom for ourselves must involve freedom for others, else it ceases to be sacred - it is no 
longer social. 'I 
'The me becomes us, 2 
The introduction to A Thousand Plateaus, by Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari begins: 'The two of us 
wrote Anti-Oedipus together. Since each of us was several, there was already quite a crowd. ' Playing 
upon the idea of self as constituted by numerous subjectivities, rather than one identity, it becomes 
possible to form a crowd of one. This post-modem, post-Freudian model of the $crowd' signifies 
multiplicities, the endlessly several: it is a hymn to difference, in marked distinction from nineteenth- 
century theories to which the crowd signalled a threatening homogeneity. Deleuze and Guattari continue, 
describing their aim: 'To reach, not the point where one no longer says 1, but the point where it is no 
longer of any importance whether one says 1. We are no longer ourselves[ ... ] We have been aided, 
inspired, multiplied., 3 The suggestion is that numbers are enhancing: multiplication enables creativity, 
and collaboration allows self forgetfulness to the point where 'we are no longer ourselves'. 
This postmodernist conception of self in terms of multiples reinvigorates an earlier and - in the case of 
Katherine Mansfield's and Virginia Woolf's comments in the Introduction - more jaded 
acknowledgement of 'any number'of second selves. Yet whereas Mansfield and Woolf were referring to 
an internal multiplicity we can find a different, modernist precursor to this idea of self which includes 
and is inspired by others in the work of Jane Harrison. Primarily known - when limited to a single 
identity - as a classicist, Jane Harrison's major texts were published between 1903-1921. Her enthusiasm 
for the inspiring presence of others is voiced in a lecture given in 1912 where she endorses the doctrine 
1 Jane Harrison, 'Epilogue on the War', Alpha and Omega (London : Sidgwick & Jackson, 1915), p. 252. 
2 Jane Harrison, 'Crabbed Age and Youth', Alpha and Omega, p. 13. 
3 Gilles Deleuze and Fdlix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schi. -ophrenia (London: Athlone 
Press, 1988), p-3. 
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of the Unanimists, a pre-war group of French poets. The Unanimists claim: 'The real things of today are 
born when there are many men. They are breathed forth, exhaled, from multitudes., 4 The Unanimists 
held that physical proximity with other people subsumes individuality in an experience of enhanced 
vitality or emotion, held to be the mark of a group soul. The 'real things' engendered by these 
multitudes amount to a religion such that a god of the group is born in the breath of men. Jules 
Romains, one of the aforementioned poets, describes the worship of a hierarchical divinity which 
increases in moment according to the numerical increase in people present. The group transmits a force 
to its participant members and it is this enhanced force which is worshipped as a god. Walter Benjamin 
describes Unanimism as an 'admired late flowering' of the fldneur's endowing of the crowd with a soul; 
there are also parallels with an occult belief in the power of the group-mind. 5 The dual influences upon 
Unanimism were the work of Henri Bergson and of the sociologist Emile Durkheim. While Bergson's 
ideas are more familiarly yoked to a modernist aesthetic, Durkheim's name is less frequently invoked in 
association with modernism. Durkheim ascribed the origins of religious feeling to the sensation of 
4collective effervescence' experienced by a group of people engaged in performing the same activity, or 
ritual. 6 Durkheim's 'collective effervescence' is the expression of group-emotion. This idea of a group 
creating its own divinity, neither from imagination nor intellect, but from communal physiological 
presence is intrinsic to the Unanimists and also to a consideration of Jane Harrison. Yet where Deleuze 
and Guattari claim 'we are no longer ourselves', Jules Romains' unanimist poem 'Le ThdStre' describes 
'Et moi je suis en lui': with the notable difference being that the self here is less easily abandoned. 7 Jane 
Harrison captures the essence of Unanimist doctrine with a statement in fact borrowed from Christian 
thought: 'Where two or three are gathered together there am I in the midst'. 8 Again, while this could 
also be a postmodem manifesto of subjectivity, it still carries an idea of the centrality of the subject and 
it is this which distinguishes Harrison and the Unanimists from the dexterous postmodem mobilisations 
of the category of self. It is also this which makes her a crucial figure for this thesis' examination of the 
boundaries of subjectivity as variously self-enclosed, empathetic, or transcendent. 
Jane Harrison was an enthusiastic supporter of Romains and the other Unanimistes poets (Rend Arcos, 
Charles Vildrac, Georges Duhamel); more due to a mutual veneration for Emile Durkheirn and Henri 
Bergson whose ideas motivated the poetry than for the verse itself. Taking its name from La Vie 
Unanime a collection of poetry by Jules Romains published in 1908, Unanimism affirmed the 'oneness 
4 Jane Ellen Harrison, Tanimism and Conversion', Alpha and Omega, p. 51. For unanimist poetry, see: Jules 
Romains, Le Vie Unanime (1908), Un itre en marche (1913); Charles Vildrac, Livre d'amour (1910); Georges 
Duhamel and Charles Vidrac, Notes sur la lichnique po6tique (1909). For critical texts on unanimism: P. J. 
Norrish, Drama of the Group: a study in unanimism in the plays ofJules Romains (Cambridge, 1958). Marccl 
Raymond, De Baudelaire au Surrialisme (Paris, 1947), pp. 193-213; Leon Somville, Devanciers du 
Surrialisme: les groups d'avant-garde et le mouvement poilique 1910-1925 (Droz, 1971); Bernart 
Lcchcrbonnicr et a], Litterature XXe sikle: Textes et Documents, (Nathan, 1989), pp. 80-83. 
5 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations (London: Fontana, 1977), p. 195 n. l. 
6 Emile Durkhcim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, (1912) trans. Joseph Ward Swain (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1976), p. 227. Durkheim was Professor of social philosophy at the Sorbormc, Paris 
1906-1917. 
7 Jules Romains, Te Thddtre', La Vie Unanime (1908), p. 48. 
8 Harrison, 'Unanimism and Conversion', p. 47. 
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of spirit' which connects humanity. The Unanimists shared a vision of the individual as part of a 
collective spirit denoting unity and solidarity, rather than multiplicity. In reaction against the perceived 
emotional solipsism of the symbolists, the Unanimists - crucially diverging here from Imagism - 
proclaimed their poetry as written for, and in praise of fellow men (it was also dubbed 'Whitmaniste' 
due to its acknowledged debt to Whitman's Leaves of Grass, and Song of MyseU). F. S. Flint, the 
Imagist poet, introduced these contemporary French poets to English readership in an article written in 
1912 for The Poetry Review, where he heralds Jules Romains as a 'prophet of a religion that may in time 
be the religion of the world. '9 This auspicious tone is echoed by Jane Harrison in her lecture which 
celebrates the spirit of the Unanimists and describes their aesthetic doctrine in terms of religious creed: 
their appeal according to her formulation is that: 'The focus of interest is all shifted from the ego, from 
the inside to the outside; therein is their salvation. '10 The shift from inside to outside redeems the self 
from solipsism, and delivers it to the social, in what is represented as a religious awakening. Lines from 
a poem written by Charles Vildrac express the sentiment which impels Harrison's critical position: 
'I am weary of deeds done inside myself, 
I am weary of voyages inside myself. 'I I 
This shift from inside to outside - away from the the mire of subjectivism - earned a certain approbation 
from the Imagist school: but in describing a move away from one kind of formlessness only to move 
into another, the affinities between Imagism and Unanimism were limited. We have seen that Eliot 
opposed Middleton Murry's championing of such 'voyages inside myselr by advocating impersonality 
and adherence to external authority; instead the Unanimists proposed a journeying into each other: 
6ses mouvements me sont intdrieurs 
Et moi je suis en lui,. 12 
Unsurprisingly, Pound was not enamoured with what he described as a 'passion for unity[ ... ]a 
confusion and melting together of things which a good mind will want kept distinct'; nevertheless he 
was impressed by the vitality of the movement, and particularly, the leadership of Romains, describing 
the Unanimists as the only group in Paris 'anywhere nearly so cnergised as the Blast group in 
London. '13 Pound at first contrasts Jules Romains and Wyndham Lewis as representing opposite poles 
of the modernist argument: 'these men hold the two tenable positions: the Mountain and the Multitude'; 
yet he then adds that perhaps Romains is just as much on a 'Mountain', only that he has specialised in 
the 'Multitude' as his subject matter. 14 For Harrison, as for the Unanimist poets, the social offers 
prospect of adventure beyond the insular self, both as an aesthetic and ethical category. Yet however 
much Jane Harrison campaigns against individualism and the saying too much of T, her praise of the 
plural (or in her terms the social, for the social is about unity rather than difference) does not escape its 
9 F. S. Flint, 'Contemporary French Poetry', Poetry Review, (Aug. 1912), 355-392, p. 382. 
10 Harrison, 'Unanimism and Conversion', p. 47. 
I Charles Vildrac, 'Commentary', trans. Gilbert Murray in Harrison, 6Unanimism and Conversion', p. 57. 
12 Romains, Te Thddtre', La Vie Unanime (1908), p. 48. 
13 Ezra Pound, 'A Study in French Poets', Egoist 4 (Feb 1918), 1-61, p. 55, p. 59. 
14 Ibid, p. 60. 
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structuring by conceptions of T and 'we'. Once again we will see how intractable and obdurate these 
categories are. 
In her endorsement of Unanimist doctrine, Jane Harrison supports a social anti-individualism which 
lends a crucially different inflection to the modernist critique of the ego. As we will see, this conception 
of a social anti-individualism became harder to sustain - in part undermined by the Freudianism which 
increasingly dominated modem versions of the psyche, and in part in reaction to the shifting 'social' 
category effected by the war. Yet, as we will see, Harrison is situated firmly within the modernist debate 
which we have been tracing: more perhaps than any of the other writers in this thesis, her work was 
widely read, and was patently influential upon the most well-known of the modernists. Virginia Woolf's 
high regard for Jane Harrison is evidenced in the following statement which she made in protest to 
Arnold Bennet's claim for women's essential intellectual inferiority to men. 'The Intellectual Status of 
Women' published in The New Statesman, 2 October, 1920 was Woolf's rejoinder: 'When I compare the 
Duchess of Newcastle with Jane Austen, the matchless Orinda with Emily Bronte, Mrs Heywood with 
George Eliot, Aphra Ben with Charlotte Bronte, Jane Grey with Jane Harrison, the advance in 
intellectual power seems to me not only sensible but immense; the comparison with men not in the least 
one that inclines me to suicide; and the effects of education and liberty scarcely to be overrated. 'l 
5 
With the notable exception of Camille Paglia's glowing praise for Jane Harrison - 'I rank Jane Harrison 
among the greatest women writers' - Jane Harrison's reputation was eclipsed in the second half of the 
twentieth century, at least in terms of her relevance for modernism. 
16 However, Mary Beard's recent 
biography suggests that Jane Harrison has enjoyed great fame as a classicist - at least compared to other 
women scholars who have passed into obscurity. 17 Harrison's contribution to the study of the primitive 
origins of Greek religion gave her a prominent role among a Cambridge group of academics known as 
the Cambridge Ritualists for their prioritising of ritual in the long-running debate over the anteriority of 
myth or ritual. By foregrounding ritual and focusing on social practice, Jane Harrison was adopting the 
'new way' practised by anthropologists (in turn beholden to social psychology and sociology). This new 
way demanded the construction of a 'social selfhood' in order to contextualise the rituals studied, in 
contrast to the 'old way', exemplified by Frazer's method in the Golden Bough, which placed thought, 
or belief at the origin of religious practise. 
18 By prioritising ritual over myth, thought was made an 
effect of action - myths being the secondary elaboration of an activity which preceded language. 
15 Woolf, The Diary of Virginia Wootf, ii, p. 339. 
16 Camille Paglia, 'Sexual Personae: The Cancelled Preface', Sex, Art and American Culture: Essays, (London: 
Viking, 1992), pp. 10 1- 125, p. 114. '1 am indebted to the entire Cambridge School of Anthropology but above 
all to Jane Harrison, whose Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion I consider one of the books of the 
century' (ibid. ). 
17 See Mary Beard, The Invention of Jane Harrison, (Cambridge: Mass: I larvard University Press, 2000). 
18 R. R. Marett, 'The Birth of Humility', The Threshold of Religion (London: Methuen, 1929), p. 174. On the 
polemical debate between R. R. Marett (Reader in Social Anthropology, Oxford University) and Sir James Frazcr 
over the anteriority of myth or ritual, see Steve Connor, 'The Birth of Humility: Frazer and Victorian 
Mythography' in Robert Fraser (ed. ), Sir James Frazzer and the literary imagination: essays in affinity and 
influence (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990). 
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Ritualism was considered an 'irrationalist account' of the origin of religion, since it undermined belief in 
the continuous development of reason: 'in place of the isolated and culturally advanced reasoning 
individual[ ... ] it envisaged a subordination to 
"the mass of cultural institutions" which "embody and 
express a kind of collective soul". '19 
Jane Harrison's scholarship was foremost into the origins of Greek religion; yet this work engages with 
many of the preoccupations which we have seen to be central to a modernist aesthetic. Harrison uses 
Durkheim's idea about religion as social practice to describe the ritual-based religion which preceded the 
classical Greek gods. Although, she writes, 'We are accustomed to regard religion as a matter intensely 
spiritual and individual... in its origin it is not spiritualized and individual, but social and collective., 
20 
Unanimism can be read as a contemporary application of the same theories which were behind Harrison's 
reconstruction of the origins of religion: indeed, in the preface to Themis (1911) Harrison acknowledges 
her own 'double' intellectual debt to 'Professor Bergson and to Professor Emile Durkheim. "I 
I have suggested that the individual is implicated in the social and we see this ambiguity in Durkheim's 
theory of 'collective effervescence. ' According to Durkheirn religious experience is never purely 
individual yet at the same time the individual is indispensable to the production of the feeling: 'the 
collective force is not entirely outside of us; it does not act upon us wholly from without; but rather, 
since society cannot exist except in and through individual consciousness, this force must also penetrate 
us and organise itself within us; it thus becomes an integral part of our being and by that very fact this 
is elevated and magnified., 22The collective force is 'not entirely outside'; it both dominates and tries to 
burst out. Again, 'man in a crowd feels within him an abnormal over-supply of force which overflows 
and tries to burst out from him; sometimes he even has the feeling that he is dominated by a moral force 
which is greater than he. "' The psychological experience itself is similar both to the mystic experience 
and to descriptions of crowd behaviour, but Durkheim insisted that collective effervescence was 
incompatible with psychological theories of collective irrational behaviour; it being reliant on the 
intrinsically necessary mediation of the external social env ironm ent. Whatever its precise origin, 
$collective effervescence' is an effect of a social practice. Representation of a god comes about through 
the projection of this collective feeling. Transferring these ideas to the study of Greek ritual, Harrison 
describes 'the emotion [the dancers] feel collectively, the thing that is more than any individual emotion, 
they externalise, project; it is the raw material of god-head. '24 In contrast to Frazer's rationalising of the 
19 Steven Connor, 'The Birth of Ilumility', p. 71, quoting Marett, The Birth of Humility, p. 5. Connor suggests 
that Marett's emphasis upon ritual signals an 'attack on the sovereignty of the reasoning self-aware subject' 
comparable to that effected by Freud's championing of the unconscious (ibid. ). 
20 Harrison, Themis: A Study of the Social Origins of the Greek Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1912), p. 28. 'I begin to see, please do not say no, that Thernis [... ] is part of the socialising of things* 
(Letter from Jane Harrison, October, 1910, in Jessie Stewart (ed. ), Jane Ellen Harrison: A Portrailfrom Letters, 
London, 1959, p-89). 
21 Harrison, Themis, p. xiii. 
22 Emile Durkheim, The Elemeniary Forms of the Religious Life, (1912), p. 209. 
23 Ibid. plIO. 
24 Harrison, Themis, p. 46. 
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origins of religion, Harrison's theory of religion founds itself upon an experience of the social , which 
maintains a 'religious' content yet one which is neither instinct nor an original theology; it is in this 
sense she can describe herself as 'a deeply religious Atheist'. 25 Harrison overrides the ambiguity of 
Durkheim's definition which de-mystifies religion by locating it in group feeling; instead Harrison 
hallows the social feeling as religious. 
Jane Harrison approached her subject not through the established method of textual criticism but through 
combining archaeology, with anthropology, (influenced by R. R. Marrett, and William Robertson Smith), 
drawing on contemporary philosophers and sociologists (notably Bergson and Durkheim) and her own, 
often speculative, insights. The resulting work was provocative: Themis (1912) was inspired by 
deciphering the inscription of a 'Hymn' found during one of her field visits and claimed to uncover 
social and matriarchal origins behind classical Greek religion. In conservative circles it was considered a 
'dangerous book', one reviewer criticising the boldness with which she applied the theories of 
Durkheim, Bergson and Marett, and suggesting that the 'mental atmosphere' in which it was written was 
more appropriate for poetry and art than a, supposedly, scientific treatise. 26 Harrison's work engages 
with the reader through irony, hurnour and autobiographical references: her writing is reminiscent at 
times of Woolf's non-fiction: Three Guineas, and Room of One's Own. Given the male dominance of 
classical scholarship Harrison never became an 'accepted orthodox authority', yet Prolegomena to the 
Study of Greek Religion (1903) was a book which apparently 'transformed the whole approach to the 
study of Greek religion' and joined the reading list for the classics syllabus. 21 Her scholarly excavations 
into the Greek pre-history of religion can be read as a sustained investigation into questions of identity 
and of the self where tracing religious worship back to its origins replicated a move to explore the nature 
of social and individual experience: both inter and intra psychic relations. It provided a framework in 
which to contribute to discussions about the early development of the self (a project Freud was 
undertaking in Totem and Taboo), and to inflect the social category upon notions of the modem 
individual present in the modernist aesthetic. 
In an article written in 1918, 'Euripedes and Professor Murray', T. S Eliot aptly describes the polymathic 
field of disciplines from which the Cambridge Ritualists drew inspiration. Reviewing Gilbert Murray's 
new translation of Euripides he writes: 
'As a Hellenist, he is very much of the present day, and a very important figure in the day. I"his 
day began, in a sense, with Tylor and a few German anthropologists; since then we have acquired 
sociology and social psychology, we have watched the clinics of Ribot and Janet, we have read 
books from Vienna and heard a discourse of Bergson; a philosophy arose at Cambridge; social 
emancipation crawled abroad; our historical knowledge has of course increased; and we have a 
25 Ilarrison, Alpha and Omega, p. 207. 
26 Farnell, 'Themis', Hibhert Journal, p. 453, p. 454. 
27 Gilbert Murray, 'Jane Ellen Harrison: an address', dclivered at Newnham College, 27 Octobcr 1928 
(Cambridge; lieffer & Sons, 1928), P. 11, p. 13. 
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curious Freudian-social-mystical-rationalistic-higher-criticaI interpretation of the Classics and 
what used to be called the Scriptures. 929 (italics mine) 
This diary of the historical 'day' in its potted account of the intellectual events of cultural moment, pays 
tribute to the European and multi-disciplinary influences which have issued in a 'present-day' classical 
scholarship worthy of such adjectival medley as 'curious Freudian-social-mystical-rationalistic-higher- 
critical'. This 'curious' melange encompasses the fashionable theories of 'the day' and is exemplified by 
the work of the Cambridge Ritualists: 'Few books, ' Eliot continues, 'are more fascinating than those of 
Miss Harrison, Mr Comford, or Mr Cooke when they burrow in the origin of Greek myths and rites'. 29 
Eliot's recommendation is a worthy indication of how their work engaged with early twentieth century 
debates, and it also rids classics of its monolithic image. Jane Harrison echoes the sentiment: 'My own 
subject, classics, which used to be a garden enclosed, and wellnigh a hortus siccus, is now saved. 
Thanks to archaeology, to anthropology, it is now open to all the winds of heaven; its half-stifled life 
breathes fresh. By contacts we are saved., 30 Redemption through 'contacts' characterises Jane Harrison's 
ethics of personal as well as professional conduct. Her work consistently develops a dialectic between 
individual and social, egoism and altruism, isolation and community. 'By contacts we are saved! ' carries 
an appropriately evangelical ring, emphasising Harrison's bias for communitas, yet she was to conclude 
that 'the whole art of living is a delicate balance between the two. ", 
Jane Ellen Harrison's representations of the self were inspired by the presence of others: both in terms of 
the significance of the concept of the social in her work, and more concretely, through a collaborative 
process of working which enacts her theory of salvation through contacts. Present-day historians of 
classical scholarship, for whom there has been a recent revival of interest in the Cambridge group, have 
described numerous intellectual cross fertilisation and supportive friendships which existed between Jane 
Harrison and the other men in the group: Gilbert Murray, Francis Comford, and less significantly, AB 
Cook. 32 Although none of her primary works were collaborations, she habitually included appendices or 
chapters by one of her colleagues, frequently adopting ideas or citing their work and she later co-wrote a 
children's book The Book of the Bearwith her former student, and later partner, Hope Mirrlees. This 
interchange of ideas suggests a fruitful network of relationships, mutually indebted, which is born out in 
her letters, and also recalls Deleuze and Guattari in praise of collaboration. On the advantages of 
companionship in the thought process, Jane Harrison admits: '[One's] thoughts are... self begotten by 
some process of parthenogenesis. But there comes often to me, almost always, a moment when alone I 
28 T. S. Eliot, 'Gilbert Murray', The Sacred Wood: essays on poetry and criticism (1920; London: Methuen, 
1957), p. 75- 
29 Ibid. 
30 Harrison, 'Scientiae Sacra Fames', Alpha and Omega, p. 136-7. 
31 'Fully to enjoy our humanity we need both spirits' (Ilarrison, Aspects, Aorists and the Classical Tripos, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1919). 
32 See Robert Ackerman, The Myth and Ritual School: JG. Frazer and the Cambridge Ritualists (London & 
New York, 1991); Robert Ackerman, 'The Cambridge Group: Origins and Compositions'. in W. M. Calder, The 
Cambridge Ritualists Reconsidered (Atlanta, 1991); Renate Schlesier, 'Prolegomcna to Jane Harrison's 
Interpretation of Ancient Greek religion', in Calder (ed. ); Sandra Peacock, Jane Ellen Harrison: The Alask and 
the Seýf (New I lavcn: 1988). 
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cannot bring them to the birth, when, if companionship is denied, they die unborn., 33 The need for 
companionship in tier own thinking process, described as a matter of life or death, connects Harrison's 0 
personal methodology with her theory of the salvation provided by the social category. Interestingly, one 
biographer describes 'without tier there would have been no group', and another that 'the Ritualist circle 
revolved around Jane Harrison' adding that 'groups become more than a sum of their parts' implying 
that Harrison's emphasis on collective experience simultaneously predicates and surpasses her own 
centrality. 34 
However, Harrison approves the experience of loss of coherent selfhood and argues that such a 
dissolution of self can enable a passage into connection with others, recalling Vernon Lee's empathic 
aesthetic. Jane Harrison's 1912 lecture in praise of Unanimism connects the poets' aesthetic doctrine 
with the early twentieth-century revival of mysticism which as we have already seen also offered - 
however questionably - an experience of release from self and reinforced vitality. Yet where unanimism 
is a religion of the social, twentieth century mysticism, as we have seen, was popularly defined as a 
religion of individual experience. The formal characteristics of the mystic experience described by 
Harrison are those enumerated by Evelyn Underhill's Mysticism and William James' Varieties of 
Religious Experience: a set rhythm moves from depression through to exaltation, and the extraordinary 
elation of the culminating, involuntary experience itself. Jane Harrison describes: 'There is a new and 
marvellously illuminating focus, and the old focus is only with difficulty reseized. Morally and 
emotionally this takes the form of a sensation of oneness. Individuality seems some how submerged, 
partitions are broken down, there is a boundless sense of escape and emancipation from self., 35 
Yet Harrison provides a strikingly different interpretation of the identical experience: one which neither 
concurs with Underhill's version of mystical experience as a union of the individual with the Absolute, 
nor with the diagnosis made by psychologists of religion, that the mystic experience is a surfacing into 
consciousness of the subliminal rather than the spiritual. 36 Harrison's interpretation disregards both 
metaphysics and pathology suggesting instead that mystic experience marks a union of the individual 
33 Harrison, 'Scientiae Sacra Fames', p. 130-1. On 'birthing' metaphor: 'it's biological, one can't help it; the 
act of parturition isn't complete till the thing is published or produced - you'll see' (Ilopc Mirrlccs, The 
Counterplot, London: 1923, p. 189). Harrison continues: 'The moment.. is when you want to disentangle them 
from yourself and your emotions, when they are sending out such a welter of feelers in all directions setting up 
connections so profusely and recklessly that you hold your sanity with both hands, and yet it seems going' 
('Scientiae Sacra Fames', p. 13 1). 
34 Robert Ackerman, 'The Cambridge Group: Origins and Compositions', p. 10, p. 17. 
35 Harrison, 'Unanimism and Conversion', p. 63. 
36 The alternative figuration provided by psychologists where the sensations of merging, loss of boundaries 
are read as an 'uprush' from the subliminal, or the symptoms of an inadequately, or unadvisedly repressed 
libido, is invoked by a character in Counterplot -a novel by Jane I larrison's close friend and companion I lope 
Mirlees which endorses Harrison's personal doctrines and intellectual discoveries - who instances the 
'TRAGIC conflict' of a woman whose 'drab spinsterhood' is relieved by nightly and satisfying spiritual 
communion with an invisible 'Friend': 'slowly she began to test her mystical experiences by the theories of 
Freud and Co. and was forced in time to admit that they sprang entirely from cr suppressed er EROTIC desires. I 
gather the modem school of psychologists hold all so-called mystical experiences do' (MirrIccs, Counterplot, 
p. 122). The speaker is an Oxford don characterised by cynical atheism and rationalism. 
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with the social group: 'the individual spirit is socialized. The self is thereby submerged'. 
37 Mysticism 
is thus founded upon a social rather than an individual experience. The larger whole of which the self 
feels itself to be an indivisible part is human: the spiritual conception of a cosmic Whole being 
exchanged for a social reality. Mystical experience is no longer denoted by a turning inwards and away 
from the world, a purely personal phenomena, but movement towards it, or more specifically towards 
the world of fellow beings. Replacing an experience of 'god', or 'the subconscious' with an experience of 
'fellowmen', Harrison makes social the effects of the sacred, or the subliminal. If we recall how the 
mystic experience of 'oneness' or loss of boundaries was described by William James as a plunging into 
the 'mother-sea' of consciousness (against which our individuality builds but accidental fences) and later 
by Freud as 'oceanic ' feeling, characterising a regression to the pre-oedipal, we could say that Jane 
Harrison adds her own variant to the 'oceanic' metaphor. James' 'mother sea' and Freud's 'oceanic 
feeling' are reformulated: instead 'the converted man swims out as it were into the open sea of other 
people's emotions., 
38 As I suggested in relation to Underhill, where the personal stream of 
consciousness was stylistically indispensable, the oceanic, as counterpart can be said to thematically 
haunt the modernist aesthetic in its preoccupation with the mystic experience. The representation of such 
marginal states of consciousness which challenge self-unity are intrinsic to the literature of modernism 
specifically in texts engaging with heightened or mystical, moments of consciousness. Harrison offers 
her own crucial inflection of these terms with a more collective, social orientation. 
According to Harrison the study of the contemporary field of new psychology (which she later identifies 
as the science which could best address the questions with which she engaged) leads us to believe 6we 
are not as individual as we used to think. " It comes in answer, almost, to William James who himself 
challenges: 'And why is the being-an-individual in some inaccessible metaphysical way so much prouder 
an achievement?, 40 James advocates that we maintain ourselves for pragmatic purposes 'as ir we are 
individual, closed units even though it belie the true nature and experience of identity. This radical 
suggestion, we have seen, is similar to Bergson's proposition that the demarcations, or spatialising of 
time misrepresent our true experience of the fluidity of durde. On reading James' Principles of 
Psychology (1899), which heralded the collapse of previously held categories of identity, Harrison 
responds, 'I had felt so sure of the solid existence of one thing at least, of myself, and suddenly I 
seemed to go to pieces, to lapse into a stream of consciousness, an ill-defined compound, or tendency, 
partly myself, partly other people. '41 Harrison's version of stream of consciousness offers a new reading 
of the familiar expression, to suggest not a dissolved selfhood but the dissolution of self into the social: 
6partly myself, partly other people. ' 
37 Ilarrison, 'Unanimism and Conversion', p. 65. 
38 Ibid. p. 66. 
39 Ibid. p. 44. 
40 William James, The Principles of Psychology, i, p. 350. 
41 Ibid. p. 45. 
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Harrison's favoured description of the mystic experience is that man's soul is congregational ized: the 
soul is made into what is defined as, 'a body of persons assembled for religious worship' although in 
this instance the act of joining into 'one body' stands in for the religious experience itself. Similarly the 
group of people in Romain's poem VEglise' worship the god they have become: when, speaking of the 
congregation, he says 'Dieu, c'est lui' this can be read as a making literal of Durkheim's projected social 
form S. 42 Harrison takes the expression 'His soul is congregationalized' from a translation by her 
colleague Professor Verrall describing the rapture of initiated young men in the Bacchic rites. 43 The 
experience of the Bacchic initiates is Jane Harrison's original 'mystic' experience. Thus bridging 
millennia, and cultures, theories developed in connection with her work on pre-classical Greece, are made 
relevant to a modem context. The mystic experience of the early twentieth century can be more profitably 
understood, according to Harrison, with reference to the initiation rituals of primitive societies. In this 
context, the mystic experience comes to represent a 'conversion': rather than a recurring phenomenon it 
marks a particular transition, with its origins in rituals marking the rite of passage of the individual into 
the group. The rituals enact a death and renewal, indicating that the passage into the group represents a 
&new birth'. 
The 'new birth' was a phrase also used by theologians in the early twentieth century to refer to the 
specifically Christian effect of the mystic experience. 
44 In a personal letter, Jane Harrison describes an 
experience she underwent which carries all the classic notes of such a 'conversion'. 
'Last night I was awake all night with misery and utter loneliness such as often comes upon me 
now that I have to go about alone - only it was worse than anything I had ever felt - like a black 
despair... I fell asleep at last and woke about six bathed in a most amazing bliss and feeling that 
all the world was new and in perfect peace. I can't describe it - the 'New Birth' is the best - it 
was what they all try to describe, and it is what they mean by communion with God. Only it 
seems senseless to me to give it a name and yet I do not wonder for it is so personal. Something 
physical has happened... but something not physical too... I can't put it into psychology yet. 
What I feel most is that a wall of partitions is broken down and a whole crust of egotism gone, 
melted away, and that I have got hold of something bigger than me that I am part of . But it was 
all done in my sleep - not by me at all. What is it? I will never call it God - that name is 
defaced, but it is wonderful., 
45 
42 Jules Romains, VEglise', La Vie Unanime (1908). 
43 A. W. Verrall, Bacchants of Euripedes, p. 39, q. v. I larrison, Themis, p. 48. Verrall's wife, Mrs A. W. Vcrrall, was a 
practising psychic and close friend of Jane I larrison. See Chapter 3, note 209. 
44 Newton 11. Marshall objects to the subliminal theory of conversion with the argument that faith does not 
need darkness: God works with what we know not in the 'unknowable region' (Conversion or the New Birth, 
London: 1909, p. 196). 
45 Letter to Gilbert Murray, undated, probably September 1912 (Stewart (ed. ). Jane Ellen 11arrison: A Portrait 
from Letters, p. 113). What are we to make of the note that she was 'undergoing Rothlisbcrger's electric 
treatment at Geneva' (ibid. )? In 1908 when Jane Harrison was in Thompson's Lane Nursing Home awaiting an 
operation, she writes, 'May Verrall is going to be here with me when I am subconscious to see %%hat occurs' (30 
Jul. 1908, ibid. p-55). 
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Jane Harrison's description evokes an experience which is beyond psychology ('I can't put it into 
psychology yet'), and language ('senseless to me to give it a name') and religion, yet pertains to all I 4D 
three; it is both 'physical' and 'not physical', 'so personal' and yet 'not by me at all'. This irreducible 
experience which will become defined by Harrison as the prototypical 'conversion' to the social, 
suggests a complex and contradictory domain. It is indicative of the work which 'social' must perform 
as a unifying category of reference. 
Harrison shares with other modernist writers a distrust of the category '1'. According to Harrison the 
subjects of modem 'conversion' are the 'egotists, the people in whom self is inordinately strong, who 
are over individualized'. 46 St Therese and St Augustine, the mystics celebrated by Evelyn Underhill, are 
labelled as egotists, guilty of pronouncing '1,1,1': in this Harrison echoes May Sinclair's similar 
accusation. Egotism according to Harrison's ethical code represents everything against which unanimism 
is in reaction. Harrison pursues the scourge of egotism elsewhere: in youth's propensity for self- 
enhancement, the exclusivity of the sex-instinct (le grand egoisme A deux), and the indulgence of fin-de- 
si6cle art. 47 Indicting fin-de-si6cle literature for its lack of detachment from the artist's emotions, she 
accuses it of a 'lyrical egotism', for being mired in personal sensation, forever 'savouring' instead of 
living, which of course recalls the similar critique levelled by one strand of modernism. The artist is 
charged with presuming to 'call his soul his own,. 
48 As an alternative she proposes the social, altruism, 
and knowledge as bracing, expanding and uplifting. 
However the relation between egotism and altruism as between any binaries, as we have seen, is 
mutually implicating. 'Altruism', as enlisted by Harrison, supposedly bypasses consideration of the self, 
thinking only of others in a deliberate self forgetfulness: the counterpoint emotion to the 11,1, P of the 
mystic saints. Yet Freud's theory of 'ambivalence', which Jane Harrison embraced after reading Tolem 
and Taboo, also operates in Freud's interpretation of the psychology of group-feeling. 'Group 
Psychology and the Ego' (1921) suggests an intimate yet uncomfortable relationship between altruism 
and envy. Freud attacks the plausibility of the herd instinct proposed by Trotter: group-feeling, social 
justice or altruism, is read by Freud as the reaction-formation to envy, (itself produced by rivalry for the 
father's love): in other words it is the reversal of a hostile feeling. Crucially, Freud argues that the 
human being is not social, but individual, by nature. Desire for social justice thus includes a demand ror 
fairness to self -a safeguarding of one's own interests in the desire for equality. As John Forrester 
argues, the desire for equality which structures a just society can be read as the transrormation, or 
repression of envy. 49 Harrison herself confesses in the preceding autobiographical passage to a 'crust of 
egotism': the conversion which signifies the passing from one state to the other suggesting their 
46 Harrison, 'Unanimism and Conversion', p. 67. 
47 Harrison, 'Homo Sum', Alpha and Omega, p. 97. 
48 Harrison, Ancient Art and Ritual (1913; London: Williams & Norgate, 1919), p. 245. 
49 John Forrester, 'Justice, Envy and Psychoanalysis', Dispatches From The Freud Wars: Psychoanalysis and 
Its Passion (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 15-43. 
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intimate coexistence on either side of a 'wall of partitions'. Yet egotism is only a 'crust', implying that 
the social is a deeper reality: Harrison's fellow Ritualist Gilbert Murray refers to her as being 'so eager to 
penetrate beneath the surface that she almost grew to dislike the surface itself and to love what lay below 
- and the deeper below the surface the better'. --'o 
This methodological preference is most explicit in Jane Harrison's study of Greek religion. Prolegomena 
to the Study of Greek Religion (1903) contends that behind the idealised face of Olympian classical 
Greek religion could be discovered a chronologically earlier phase of worship, based on seasonal 
rhythms, earth cults, darker spirits: 'Greek religion for all its superficial serenity had within it and 
beneath it elements of a darker and deeper significance., 51 She termed this primary phase, or strata of 
ritual 'chthonic' - of the earth - in contradistinction to the Olympian, anthropomorphic religion. 
Frequently overlooked as decadent, according to Harrison it 'is primitive and lies at the very root and 
base of Greek religion., 52 Although she adopts the terms 'higher' and 'lower' strata (combining 
description of the superimposing of the Olympian on the earlier phase, and the dwelling-place of the 
Olympians in the 'upper air' compared to the 'snakes, and ghosts and underworld beings', of the earth) 
these epithets do not correspond to her hierarchy of preference. Despite describing the rites of this 'lower 
stratum' as 'primitive, barbarous, even repulsive' this judgement passes as a formality and it is these 
rites upon which Jane Harrison stakes her interest and which accordingly 'lent to Greece its deepest and 
most enduring religious impulse'. 53 Early worship was based on nature cycles, rituals were connected 
with harvest and practical needs: Harrison uses the term 'Eniautos-Daimon' or 'year-spirit' to represent 
the generic pre-classical god associated with yearly cycles of death and rebirth. The Olympian gods 
superseded, and overlaid the more ancient worship, retaining elements of the earlier strata yet altering 
their form in an adoption into the 'male-fashioned Olympus'"Although stressing the clear division she 
is also tracing a process of development which charts the 'survivals' of the lower in the upper strata. 
These 'survivals' based on an evolutionary model of development also serve to connect one stage with 
another and make the idea of stages less feasible. 
The individual god is fashioned upon the idea of self as separate and independent with the Olympians 
embodying articulate consciousness, monarchical deism. Harrison applies Bergson's distinction between 
the temporal and the spatial, to the two types of Greek god so that the year-demons embody 
mysterious, unknowable, durde, while the Olympians replicate the effect of conscious intelligence upon 
what is unrepresentable. They represent the fixing of time in space, which necessarily incurs loss. Going 
50 Gilbert Murray, 'Comford', PBA, 29 (1943), 42-25. 
51 Jane Harrison, Prolegomena to the Stu4y of Greek Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1903), p. 10. 
52 Ibid. p7. 
53 Ibid. p. 29. 
54 Harrison notes particular losses to the roles of the goddesses who shifted rrorn the roles of husbandless 
goddesses, mothers and lovers to abject and amorous. The excavations by Evans and Schlicmann confirmed 
Harrison's speculations about the matriarchal origins of religion. Freud too responded imaginatively to the 
discoveries, with archaeological metaphors appearing in his theories of the survival of memory traces from 
earlier stages of development in the individual and racial mind. 
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against the tendency to see anthropomorphism as a humane advance, for Jane Harrison we see the 
passage of the year-spirits into human form representing a loss of 'formless, monstrous mystery': 
twentieth-century mysticism then, according to Harrison is a contemporary impulse to regain this prior 
oneness. The divisions which Jane Harrison makes between the chthonic and Olympian marks the 
beginnings of the dualisms which structure her writing. 55 The chthonic, or mystery cults accumulate 
association with the social, mysterious, emotional, matriarchal, unconscious; the Olympian gods are 
synonymous with what is individualistic, anthropomorphic, masculine, conscious. 56 
Harrison is another writer whose thought is dramatically inflected by her contact with psychoanalysis. 
With the emergence of Freud's topography of the psyche, Harrison's dialectic previously represented by 
the individual/social increasingly becomes an inner dynamic: 'The subconscious makes for fusion, 
union, emotion, ecstasy; the conscious for segregation, discrimination, analysis, clarity of vision. On 
the action and interaction of these two our whole spiritual validity would seem to depend'. 57 Although 
initially Harrison maintains her own version of the unconscious, resisting the pull of Freud's 'sexual 
mud', it is noticeable that as Freud's theories emerged as the dominant account of the psyche, 
psychoanalytic meaning gradually replaced Harrison's previous, more open-ended theory of the 
unconscious. What Harrison meant by 'contact' becomes threatened or usurped by Freud's notion of the 
unconscious. 58 Once it becomes contaminated by the psychoanalytic account, Harrison as we will see 
has to make a set of moves to wrest it back yet in so doing loses something of her vision of the social. 
Harrison, as we will see in her later work, acknowledges explicit debts to Freud, in particular Totem and 
Taboo and she increasingly adopts the language of individual psychology, defining the function of art in 
terms of the individual's need to transform desire, or passion, into art or religion. Unable to sustain her 
unique conception of a social anti-individualism, within the Freudian libidinous economy (as with 
Sinclair and Underhill), Freud's theory of sublimation is invoked as remedial, and the drive towards 
anti-individualism or anti-egotism becomes a discourse about the quenching, or sublimation of desire. in 
'Religion of Today' which was one of Harrison's last essays, we see her commending ascetism for the 
'betterment of life' with affinities to Underhill's tone. 59 
Towards a social aesthetic 
Harrison's investment in the social was in part informed by anthropology's study of primitive societies 
claiming social origins for the individual in prehistory. The privileging of origins, a mode of enquiry 
endemic to late-Victorians, endorsed the social category arguing that we were social before we were 
55 Jane Harrison is 'our first modern and inspired structuralist' (G. H. Hartman, Beyond Formalism, 1976). 
56 The oppositions which run throughout Harrison's texts: between the Apolline and Dionysian; Olympians 
and Eniautos-Daimon (year-spirit); eikonic and aneikonic; civilisation and primitivism; conscious and 
subconscious; individual and social; egotism and altruism; theology and religion; dogma and ritual; thought 
and action; intellect and emotion; insulations and contact; logical and analogical; subjective and objective; 
spatialising of time and dur6e. 
57 Harrison, 'Alpha and Omega', p. 205. 
58 1 larrison, Reminiscences of a Student's Life (London: 1925), p8l. 
59 Harrison, Epilogemena, p38. 
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individual. Using the comparative methods of anthropology, Harrison associates the pre-individual stage 
of Greek religion with an idealised description of primitive consciousness where 'constant and 
continuous identity' is experienced, with no distinction between self and other. The 'savage is never 
impersonal, never abstract. His whole being, his whole personality, is as it were involved, submerged in 
action., 60 The things of which the savage is mainly conscious are not envisaged as external objects, they 
are parts of his doing, of his 'warm stream of consciousness., 
61 Harrison's preoccupation with the 
category of the social or idealisation of the primitive experience can also be read as a form of desire for 
the pre-oedipal, the comfort of the undifferentiated, pre-linguistic realm. Harrison's description of 
primitive consciousness, an experience of being at the 'warm excited centre', has an echo in an 
autobiographical passage about her childhood experience in which she describes her own experience of 
being ousted from her father's attentions by a new stepmother. 'There is no such devastating, desolating 
experience as to have been at the centre, warm and sheltered, and suddenly to be at the outmost 
circumference. 161 To simply read the childhood experience in its affinities with primitive experience of 
6contacts' is misleading; Harrison continues: 'It needs a new heart, it spells conversion., 63 Harrison is 
referring to the necessary loss of the 'egocentrism' of youth rather than an early idealised 'social' 
experience of 'contacts'. However there certainly seems to be confusion here between the approved 
dissolution of self into the social circle and the egotistic experience of overstaying one's welcome in the 
middle. 
The 'dwindling of conscious individual personality' which Freud names a negative effect of group 
experience, was for Harrison an advantage in its counteracting of egotism. In support of her position 
Harrison cites Lewis Nettleship's claim: 'The times when one feels one is most truly oneself are just 
those in which one feels that the consciousness of one's own individuality is most absolutely swallowed 
up, whether in sympathy with nature or in the bringing to birth of truth or in enthusiasm for other 
men., 64 To feel 'most truly oneseir when one does not feel oneself at all, recalls the ethics of TH 
Green: 'lie that loses his life shall find it. ' Importantly for Harrison it is the latter part of Nettleship's 
statement which holds most meaning. 
In a lecture of 1909 Harrison makes herself the proponent of a 'new altruism' which embraces a different 
kind of herd politics and gives the psychology of the herd a relevance to the modem age of science, 
rescuing it from late nineteenth century connotations with tradition. The solution founds itself on the 
idea of an organic, rather than mechanical unity which is based upon Durkhcim's Division of Labour 
and proposes that society need not be homogeneous: differentiation occurs yet unity is maintained 
through co-operation and association: 'at the crossroads, as it were, his individuality emerges'. 65 
60 Harrison, Themis, p. 475. 
61 ]bid. p. 473. 
62 Harrison, 'Crabbed Age and Youth', Alpha and Omega, p. 12 
63 Ibid. 
64 Lewis Ncttleship, Remains, i, p. 53, q. v. I larrison, Alpha and Omega, p. 196. 
65 Harrison, 'Heresy And Ifurnanity'. p. 38. 
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Harrison uses the ethics of the social to recommend a democratic conservatism, linking socialism with 
tradition. As with the other writers, in this study, the psychological permutes into aesthetic questions. 
In this case it is manifestly in reaction to a failure of the earlier theorisation. The social and psychic 
appear to be implicated in one another, prompting the question: is the social just another frame of mind? 
Harrison's enthusiasm for the social was mitigated once she saw the practical applications of 
collectivism manifested in the war-spirit. 
Ten years after what Harrison describes as 'a perfect orgy of egotism and individualism' the widespread 
desire for a 'new birth' and 'action' has arisen; but it is in Harrison's judgement, a belated and troubling 
reaction: in her eyes a noble collectivism has been transmuted to an ignoble imperialism. In 'Epilogue 
on the war', written in 1915, Harrison admits to being 'rather bored' with what she calls 'collectivism', 
having preached it for five long years. 66 She is now alert to the perils of the doctrine she has been 
preaching, evidenced in what she describes as the 'modem reaction': Collectivism is now termed 
4collective militancy and mysticism': it urges people to 'cultivate the small, combative herd-emotions. ', 
and speaks of 'purgation through primary sensations., 67 
As we have seen, according to Jane Harrison, following Bergson and her own binary structuring of 
experience, egoism is an effect of the individualised-spatialised-consciousness: with language arrives 
division, and distinction, including demarcations between me and you. Yet, more problematically, 
knowledge is also a function of this division: Harrison cites Levy-Bruhl's remark that 'connaitre, c'est 
objectiver'; to know is to objectify, to place something outside oneself. 68 This suggests that the 
intellectual process provides distance from emotion and egotism. While the warin stream of primitive 
consciousness represents an ideal of 'contacts', Harrison's other demand on the social is that it defies 
egoism, through the purging of individual emotion. Thus the renunciation of the aneikonic, however 
charged with imaginative vigour and enthusiasm, becomes significant: if lane Harrison was looking for 
an antidote to egotism in collective experience, she also located it in the pursuit of knowledge, and in 
art. Aesthetic distance (which is not dissimilar from the intellectual function of spatialising) is also seen 
to provide freedom from egotism. Jane Harrison cites Gilbert Murray approvingly: 'The love of 
knowledge must be a disinterested love; and those who are fortunate enough to possess it, just in 
proportion to the strength and width of their love, enter into a great kingdom where the strain of 
disturbing passions grows quiet, and even the persecuting whisper of egotism dies at last almost 
completely away., 69 
66 Harrison, 'Epilogue on the War', Alpha and Omega, p. 234. 
67 Ibid. p. 238, p. 236. 
68 Tonnaltre en gdneral, c'est objectiver; objectiver, c'est projeter dehors de soi. comme quclque chose 
d'dtranger, ce qui est A connaltre' (Levy-Bruhl, Les Fonctions Mentale dans ks Socielis Infirleures, citcd by 
Harrison, Themis, p. 475). 
69 1 larrison, 'Homo, Sum, * Alpha and Omega, p. 205. 
'By Contacts We Are Saved' 225 
Art, when not egoistic, can serve the same function as the original religious sensation: it can be social. 
Thus the social category reappears as the redeeming factor of art, in the same way that it was the 
salvation of religion ('by contacts we are saved'). According to Harrison: 'In the eighties and the 
nineties... The divorce between art and the community was wellnigh complete; ... [the poet's and artist's] 
method was that of megalomania, the enhancement of individuality by exclusion, seclusion by 
concentration on the ego., 70 Now, Harrison detects a growing momentum in art towards the 'social 
aesthetic': art which displays a 'social sense', which is 'impatient of mere individual emotion, beginning 
to aim at something bigger, more bound up with a feeling towards and for the common weal., 71 As 
exemplars of this 'bigger' intention Harrison cites Galsworthy, BenneM Masefield and their forebears 
Dickens, Thackery, Tennyson, Tolstoy. Wyndham Lewis found in Harrison everything he was in 
reaction against. In so far as Pound contrasted Lewis to Romains - the mountain against the multitude - 
a similar opposition can be identified between Lewis and Harrison. 72 
Art can be moral for Jane Harrison in two respects: one being its function, based on its social and 
collective origins, to unite; the other in its capacity to 'purify' through the expurgation of the emotions. 
'It purifies through cutting off the motor-reactions of personal desire., 73 In this respect creative art and 
unanimist religion: 'are very near, though, of course, largely distinct. Both mean a hard thing - the 
standing out away from self. One function of all art and all religion is to distract attention from that 
divinity which is ourselves., 74 
Although the social occupied a privileged position in Harrison's thinking, the experience of the social as 
the original religious feeling, with which her theory begins, becomes a founding but fleeting moment in 
the development of ritual into religion and art. As Jane flarrison developed her psychology of the 
individual alongside the social, the origin of all religious representations, and of art was located in 
unsatisfied desire. Unsatisfied desire usurps religious representation which now results from the 'space 
between impulse and reaction': 'If an impulse finds instantly its immediate satisfaction, there is no 
representation. it is out of the delay, just the space between the impulse and the reaction, that all of our 
mental life, our images, ideas, our consciousness, our will, most of our religion arise. If we were utterly, 
70 Harrison, 'Unanimism and Conversion', pp. 46-7; Harrison, Ancient Art and Ritual p. 215. 
71 Ibid. p. 245. 
72 See Wyndham Lewis, 'The Dithyrambic Spectator: an essay on the origins and survivals of art' in The 
Diabolical Principle and The Dithyrambic Spectator (London: Chatto & Windus, 1931), 161-238. A 
6confusion arises from [Harrison's] desire to reconcile that part of her mind %hich conforms emotionally to the 
democratic ideals of her time, with that part emotionally snobbish about art' (ibid. p23 1). 
73 Harrison, Ancient Art and Ritual, p. 218. It was no doubt this incipient ascctism which provoked D. H. 
Lawrence to mitigate his praise for the book with the remark 'You have no idea how much I got out of that 
Ritual & Art book - it ja a good idea - but a school marmy woman who writes it' (Letter to Arthur Macleod, 2 
Dec, 1913, D. H. Lawrence, Letters, ii, June 1913-Oct 1916, ed. George J. Zytaruk and James Boulton, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 198 1, p. 119). 
74 Harrison, 'Unanimism and Conversion', p. 68. 
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instantly satisfied, if we were a mass of well contrived instincts, we should have no representations, no 
mernory,.. no drama. Art and Tel igion alike spring from unsatisfied desire. '75 
Yet the artist is caught in a double-bind: Harrison describes the necessary, and laudable detachment that 
an artist feels from his subject in order to fulfil the function of art to enhance life for others (as we have 
seen it is this aesthetic distance which creates art), yet, at the same time 'The suspension of motor- 
reactions to the practical world isolates the artist, cuts him off from his fellow-men, makes him in a 
sense an egotist. '76 The artist embodies contradictory positions. He characterises the intellectual 
isolation which Harrison has been inveigling against while at the same time the artistic process provides 
a detachment which depersonalises and frees the individual 'soul'. The suspension is not an invitation 
for the artist 'to feed on his own vitals, but rather to free him for contemplation. All great art releases 
ftom self. 77 Is release from self then the function of art (the same as 'conversion') or merely the process 
which fulfils what Harrison explicitly denotes as its social goal: the transmission of 'good emotion' to 
promote the unity of man, to enhance life through mutual sympathy, and to purify. 78 Release from self 
can again be read both as an egotistical desire, and altruistic gesture suggesting that in a sense, the self 
always stays in the centre. I do not mean to reduce Harrison's motivation to a desire to escape egotism 
but to suggest that 'egotism' is not an easy category from which to escape. What is egotism if, to invert 
Daniel Pick's suggestion that 'I' cannot be thought of without you, 'you' cannot be thought of without 
'1,? 79 This is also to return us to Vernon Lee's failure of empathy. 
Harrison's aesthetic can be further understood through her interest in the psychologist Edwin Bullough's 
elaboration of psychical distance as an aesthetic principle. According to Bullough, psychical distance 
permits a difference of outlook: it is a form of contemplation where the personal response to an object is 
filtered, as if seen from a distance. He describes the two ways in which a fog at sea can be experienced: 
as physically unpleasant, cold and damp or in terms of shapes, form, images. The shift to the aesthetic 
vision is: 'like a momentary switching on of some new current, or the passing ray of a brighter light, 
illuminating the outlook upon perhaps the most ordinary and familiar objects - an impression which we 
experience sometimes in instants of direst extremity... we watch the consummation of some impending 
catastrophe with the marvelling unconcern of a spectator. '80 Although the 'marvelling unconcern of a 
spectator' is with difficulty reconciled to the social function of art, Harrison adopts Bullough's theory of 
aesthetic distance for supporting the idea that 'art is cut off from practical action': by this she means that 
75 Harrison, Ancient Art and Ritual, p. 245; Themis, p. 44. See also Epilogemena, p. 28; Ancient Art and Ritual, 
p. 53, p. 41. 
76 Harrison, Ancient Art and Ritual, p. 242. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. p. 238. 
79 Daniel Pick, 'Freud's Group Psychology and the History of the Crowd', Ifistory Workshop Journal, 40 
(1995), pp. 42-3. 'The point is that "my" relation to others, is itself basic to the very constitution of "me" as 
subject' (ibid. p. 3). 
80 Edward Bullough, 'Psychical Distance as a Factor in Art'. British Journal of Psychology. 5 (June 1912), 
p. 89. 
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the artist does not respond directly to the object: the desire which it arouses is suspended, and instead 
transformed into art. 81 Thus aesthetic distance slays desire. You cannot be an artist or a unanimist until 
'you have slain desire. ' Her earlier representation of the social transmutes to a Freudian economy of 
individual desire, with everything based on the negotiation of desire, its avoidance and sublimation, 
with which we are familiar from the work of May Sinclair. In her later work she acknowledges her debt 
to Freud's Totem and Taboo and increasingly adopts what amounts to the language of individual 
psychology, defining the function of art in terms of the individual's need to transform desire, or passion, 
into art, or religion. Is the triumph, yet again, of sublimation as Freud's most popular theory? Is 
Harrison's anti-egotism answered by the idea of its sublimation into art, religion, science or does it 
witness, as we have already seen for May Sinclair, a failure to sustain her own ideas in the face of 
Freud's popular theory. 'Religion of Today' in Epilogemena commends asceticism for the 'betterment of 
life', coinciding with Evelyn Underhill's later approach. 82 
Bullough's description of psychical distance as 'the momentary switching of some new current, ' 
suggests that the aesthetic experience of the artist shares something with the mystic experience. This 
connection is further explored in Hope Mirrlees' novel Counterplot which interweaves Harrison's ideas 
into its narrative and recreates the aesthetic distancing effect. Teresa, the heroine of the novel who owns 
great literary pretensions, spends her time observing the daily life of her family and their coterie of 
friends; she hopes to find a pattern which will make sense of the process of living, similar to a 
experience she remembers when 
'the practical relation between her and the shabby familiar furniture suddenly snapped, and 
she looked at it with new eyes - the old basket chair, the horse-hair sofa... they were now 
merely arrangements of planes and lines, and, as such, startlingly significant. For the first 
time, she was looking at them aesthetically, and so novel was the sensation that it felt like 
a mystical experience., 83 
The mystical/aesthetic comparison is made explicit, suggesting that 'distance' is the key to the mystic 
experience: if this comparison was pursued, in Harrison's case the object of which she is made spectator, 
not participant, in her mystical experience is the social group. As Harrison puts it in 'Epilogue on the 
War': 'You must be alone to think. Leaming severs us. You cannot think when you are in a crowd, or in 
a rage, or in love., 84 To privilege impersonal distance is to go against the hallowing of the Bergsonian 
durde, the aneikonic. 
is the function of art not also to represent this durde, the aneikonic, the impossible? Looking to Hope 
Mirrlees' novel we see this dilemma: 'Think of all the things happening everywhere... but there are such 
gaps that we can't feel the process - even in ourselves; we can only register results and that isn't living, 
81 See Roger Fry, 'An essay in aesthetics', New Quarterly Review, (April 1909). 
82 Harrison, Epilogemena To The Study of Greek Religion, p. 38. 
83 Hope Mifflees, Counterplot, p. 86. 
84 Harrison, 'Epilogue on the War', Alpha and Omega, p. 23 1. 
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and it's frightfully unaesthetic. '85 Miff lees is suggesting that art should not only embody 'that living 
tangle' but 'purge and order it, by complexities of tone and rhythm hitherto unattempted'. But, in Art 
and Ritual Harrison points out the pragmatic function of intellect: letter kills the spirit, but the spirit is 
perhaps too complex to live: 'If we saw and realised the whole of everything, we should want to do too 
many things. The brain allows us not only to remember, but.. to forget and neglect; it is an organ of 
oblivion. '86. The necessity for the brain to act as 'blinkers. ' is strikingly resonant of Woolf's memorable 
injunction to 'Have no screens', and at the same time urging their necessity: 'If we had not this device 
for shutting people off from our sympathies, we might, perhaps, dissolve utterly. Separateness would be 
impossible. ' 
Hope Mirrlees incorporates many of Harrison's theories into her fiction. Mirrlees is described as JEH's 
6ghostly' daughter : is this a ghostly collaboration? In Counterplot (1923) Teresa writes a play which is 
then staged on the lawn of her parent's house: she hopes to transpose life into art in order to make sense 
of its complexity, however this conscious aesthetic intention is undercut by the simultaneous function 
the creative process performs by 'expressing in symbols the desires of which one is ashamed', namely 
, the function assigned to dreams by Freud. 197. Hope Mirrlees' novel dramatises the same undermining 
effect of psychoanalytic theory upon the aesthetic intention as we have witnessed played out in Jane 
Harrison's thought. The plot of the play, set in 'old Spain' has its own momentum, and presents a 
bizarrely incongruous spectacle of characters dressed as jousting knights, Spanish priests and wayward 
nuns watched by ladies from the Women's Institute, and the 'gentry', introducing themes of time, 
history, cycles, life and plots bearing strong comparison with Woolf's later Between the Acts: 'And 
what was Time but a gigantic rose, shedding, one by one, its petalsT 
A room of our own 
Harrison's representation of the social group inevitably demands consideration in terms of late 
nineteenth, early twentieth-century crowd studies to whom the crowd represented the whitewashing of 
individuality. However, not all group experience was theorised in negative terms. I larrison cites Trotter's 
essays on the herd instinct in the Sociological Review of 1908 which describe the benefits of 
... sensitiveness to the behaviour of [your] fellows', and 'an unanalysable primary sense of comfort' 
concomitant to losing the structure of individual identity. 88 Trotter insists that 'man as a solitary 
animal is unknown to us,. 89 Thus he claims there is no such thing as individual psychology: 'the social 
and the individual - are regarded here as absolutely continuous. ' Against Trotter's notion of 
gregariousness as an beneficial human instinct, the psychologist Boris Sidis, proposes in The 
85 Hope Mifflees, Counterplot. p. 36. 
86 Ilarrison, Ancient Art and Ritual, p. 134. 
87 Mifflees, Counterplot, p. 184. 
88 W. Trotter, 'Herd Instinct and Its Bearing on the Psychology of Civilised Man', Sociological Review, 1 
(1908), 227-248, p. 240-1. 
89 Ibid. p. 227. 
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Psychology of Suggestion that sociability is only enabled by the suggestibility of the subconscious self. 
Given the associations of suggestion with mental disaggregation sociability does not come 
recommended. It carries the negative connotations of lacking conscious will-power, implying that the 
individual is sociable in spite of himself: he concludes that 'hence society presupposes a cleavage of the 
mind. '90 Sidis' formulation of sociability as abnormal or at least a function of the inferior subconscious 
is developed according to an ideal of autonomy, and unsuggestibility familiar to modernism represented 
by the men of 1914. In Trotter's words, Sidis 'looks upon suggestibility as a disreputable and disastrous 
legacy of the brute and savage, undesirable in civilised life. '91 Borch-Jacobsen in Remembering Anna 0, 
more recently, suggests that all psychoanalysis is rooted in suggestion - which recalls its associations, or 
dissociation with occultism. 
Against a liberal humanist background of the early twentieth century giving prominence to the notion of 
the individual as autonomous subject, Harrison can be read as cutting against the grain in her insistence 
upon the relevance of the social. The modernist doctrine, or at least the men of 1914, defined the self as 
intransigently independent and autonomous. At one extreme we find Wyndham Lewis' assertion that 
everything 'free and rational in history is the achievement of individuals'. 
92 Her stance as an anti- 
individualist subverts the more common modernist dialectic which makes the masses or the crowd the 
scapegoat or 'other'. In an interesting reversal she makes the collective the preferred good and the 
individual representative of the vicissitudes of the 'other' although these divisions are troubled. Does 
Harrison's eliciting of the social suggest an unusual bias, or is this the 'other' version of modernism 
which Peter Nicholls, in Modernisms, suggests we gender as female? 
93 
More perhaps than the other writers considered in this thesis, Harrison makes the gendering of her 
philosophy and its accompanying aesthetic specific. 94 An essay written in 1914 responds to the charge 
made by a male writer (whose name, in true anti-individualist spirit, Harrison cannot remember) that 
twoman is more resonant than man, more subject to induction from the social current. Man is better 
insulated, more independent, more individualized. ' Woman is required to be tactful: quite literally to 'be 
socially 'in touch"; man is reserved, keeping himself to himself. Harrison asks whether these attributes 
are the servile virtues of the subordinate, or a biological characteristic, in other words are they the 
outcome of status or sex? Leaving the question of essential origins unresolved, Harrison offers a 
revaluation of these gendered characteristics which associate woman with the characteristics negatively 
90 Boris Sidis, The Psychology of Suggestion: a research into the subconscious nature of man and society 
(New York: D. Appleton, 1898), p. 310. 
91 Trotter, 'llerd Instinct and Its Bearing on the Psychology of Civilised Man', p. 239. 
92 Wyndham Lewis, Time and Western Man, p. 322. 
93 Hope Mirrlees' protagonist Teresa makes the gloomy prediction 'that some day we should all sharc in a flat 
and savourless communism of apprehension' (Counterplot, p. 80). 
94 For the significant differences between 'crowd' 'masses' and a more general sense of 'group'. or 'social' 
category. see Daniel Pick's essay 'Freud's Group Psychology and the History of the Crowd'. 111VJ, 40 (Autumn 
1995). 
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ascribed to group behaviour by nineteenth-century crowd theorists. 95 'Resonance', and an aptitude for 
being 'in touch' are heralded by Harrison as desirable, essentially 'modem' qualities. By comparison, the 
more autonomous male is characterised as 'insular', bide-bound and conservative. 
This dichotomy is expressed in the domestic arrangement of the middle-class house which Jane Harrison 
admits to finding 'deeply depressing., 96 Although man and wife share the dining room the 'wife's 
room' is the drawing room and the man's room is the study: the drawing room is 'not a room to 
withdraw into, by yourself, but essentially the room in which you can't possibly settle down to think, 
because anyone may come in at any moment. The drawing-room is the woman's province; she must be 
able and ready to switch her mind off and on at any moment, to anyone's concern. ' The study, by 
contrast, is 'a place inviolate... There man thinks, and learns, and knows. ' However, '[o]ne of the most 
ominous signs of the times is that woman is beginning to demand a study. '97 The word 'ominous' 
ironically anticipates an anti-feminist response. Yet she is not proposing that women replicate men's 
characteristics: in her vision of the future the metaphoric and structural door will be kept open. She 
advocates a merging of categories: not dispensing with the study, but keeping it in communication with 
the body of the house. Man's occupation of the physical room of the study becomes a metaphor for the 
cloistering of the mental activity itself, keeping thought separate from emotion. This suggestion is 
upheld by her endorsement of the modem relevance of a different kind of knowledge where intellectual 
leaming does not obviate the emotions. She emphasises the pedagogic effects of emotion: 'To feel 
keenly is often an amazing intellectual revelation, ' and conversely the emotional rewards of leaming: 
'Intellect is never wholly and separately intellectual. It is a thing charged with, dependent on, arising out 
of, emotional desire... Anyone who makes even a very small mental discovery can note how, at the 
moment of the making, there is a sudden sense of warmth, an uprush of emotion, often a hot blush and 
sometimes tears in the eyes. Who can say that a process so sensuous so emotional, or at ]cast attended 
by concomitants so sensuous, is insulated from a thing as interpenetrating as sex?, 98 Jane Harrison 
predicts a modem movement which coincides and supports 'this being closer in touch. '99 Insularity and 
isolation is incompatible with the new disciplines advocating open systems of thought, differentiation, 
and development: 'And what is psychology but the science of human behaviour, of human reaction, of 
contacts, not insulations. ' 100 
95 Jane Harrison cannot recall the author whose words she remembers: 'Woman is more resonant than man. 
more subject to induction from the social current. Man is better insulated more independent, more 
individualized' ('Scientia sacra Fames', Alpha and Omega, p. 126). 
96 Ibid. p. 128. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. pp. 140-1. 
99 Ibid p. 133. 'Like all things humans' it brings gain and loss: 'it is intellectually useful to be able to insulate 
yourself, to go out into the shadows wearing your blinkers, bearing your dark lantern intent on your specialist 
investigation. It is also intellectually fruitful to turn on your searchlight, to be in touch with practical issues. 
it was Mr Sidney Webb who once said ... 'What is the matter with all you University lecturers is that you utterly 
cut loose from all practical affairs, you spin your webs across an empty space' (ibid. p. 134). 
100 Ibid. p. 137. 
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A reviewer describes Alpha and Omega as 'instinct with so many conflicting tendencies, that it is not 
easy to give it a name. Is it an emotional stoicism, or an altruistic individualism, an idealistic realism, 
or a benevolent anarchism? Is Miss Harrison a Mystical Positivist, or a Calvinistic Darwinist, or a 
Unanimist Heretic? '101 
Jane Ellen Harrison identifies psychology as the science which could best address the questions with 
which she engaged. Bound by the terms of her own argument, which is structured upon distinct binary 
categories, she envisages an apocalyptic illumination of the most intriguing 'cardinal mystery': 
'new facts are accumulating, facts about the formation and flux of personality, and the 
relations between the conscious and the subconscious. Any moment some great 
imagination may leap out into the dark, touch the secret places of life, lay bare the cardinal 
mystery of the marriage of the spatial with the non-spatial. 'I 02 
Harrison's essay certainly seems to foreshadow Woolf's Room of One's Own in which text Jane Harrison 
herself is commemorated as the ghostly J_ H_. 103 Jane Harrison's method of proceeding with her 
argument - looking in books written by men for evidence of women's biological intellectual inferiority, 
and switching into ironic narrative voice 'Being a woman ,I felt I could not solve the difficulty, so I 
asked a really thinking man' - suggests further comparisons with Woolf s text. There is a second 
instance in Room of One's Own when Harrison's name is enlisted, this time in full, to demonstrate that 
6women no longer write novels solely. There are Jane Harrison's books on Greek archaeology; Vernon 
Lee's books on aesthetics, Gertrude Bell's books on Persia. ' 104 1 hope to have suggested that the 
relevance of Jane Harrison's work to a study of modernism, is not in spite of her not writing novels, but 
in part, due to her not writing novels: as Virginia Woolf, remarks, that women no longer write novels 
solely is a symptom of modem changes in consciousness, and in this respect Harrison's work represents 
a significant challenge to the aesthetic categories we have come to expect from the modernist canon. 
10 1 G. A. Johnston, 'Review' of Alpha and Omega, International Journal of Ethics, 28 (1917-1918), 127-9, 
p. 127. 
102 Harrison, 'The Influence of Darwinism on the Study of Religion', p. 177. 
103 Woolf, A Room of One's Own, p. 76. 
104 Ibid. 
CONCLUSION 
'Outside, inside, at the border" 
When I am satisfied that I have got the soul safely done up in brown paper with a bit of 
string round it, then I will tie a label to it, but not before. Until then, I think signposts are 
safer and less likely to let one in for foolishness; for they point the direction, which is 
helpful, but set no limits, which is a futile thing to do in the present state of our 
knowledge., 2 
William James left his own written work as open-ended as his theory of consciousness: "'There is no 
conclusion. What has concluded, that we might conclude in regard to it? There are no fortunes to be told, 
and there is no advice to be given. - Farewell! ", 
3 With this, James ended his last published piece of 
work, 'The Pluralistic Mystic, ' an essay on Benjamin Blood whose maverick insight into the 
'anaesthetic revelation' James so much admired. Appropriately, in accordance with his own literally 
&open-minded' thinking, James' parting words are not in fact his own. Or, they are his own but they are 
also someone else's. In a culture within which last words become famous - as if to finally mark a mortal 
edge to one's own selfhood - James suitably blurs the event by citing Blood's own words as his own: 
'Let my last word, then [.. ] be his word. ' Nor was even this a conclusive farewell: in the years following 
James' death, as too after Myers', several mediums purported to receive spirit communications from both 
men beyond the grave. 4 In this final essay, James takes more than his last words from Blood, he 
enthusiastically adopts Blood's 'pluralistic' thinking, the gist of which is the vital nature of difference 
and the unexpected. He cites approvingly: 'Certainty is the root of despair. The inevitable stales 
Not unfortunately the universe is wild. '5 j 
In a letter to Wilhelm Fliess, Freud writes that he is relieved to hear at last of the reason for his friend's 
lapse from their regular correspondence: Fliess' exhaustion has indeed mirrored Freud's own: 
I D. W. Winnicott, Playing and Reality, p. 2. Taken from Winnicott's 'notes on the place of the infant's 
first not-me object' (ibid. ). 
2 Dion Fortune, Sea Priestess, p. 176. 
3 William James, 'A Pluralistic Mystic' in Memories and Studies (New York: Longmans, Green, 1911), 
p. 41 1. 
4 These include Helen Dallas, Mors Januae Vitae? (1910); Friend, 'William James', Unpopular Review, 
iv (July 1915). 
5 Benjamin Blood, q. v. William James, 'A Pluralistic Mystic', p. 409. 
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'Your sleepiness now explains to me my own simultaneous state. Our protoplasm has 
worked its way through the same critical period. How nice it would be if this close 
harmony between us were a total one; I would always know how you are and would never 
expect letters without disappointment., 
6 
If this last sentence reads oddly, the editor's notes point out that 'Freud undoubtedly meant to write that 
he would never be disappointed'. 
7 Freud may well have meant to write something else, but the fact that 
he did not is of course more intriguing: a slip and a discovery which - in this instance - really were 
Freud's own. What we do read in the letter, which is resonant of Vernon Lee's fantasy of bleeding into a 
friend's veins in order to achieve an impossible closeness, is that if such 'close harmony' were 'a total 
one', Freud would always expect Fliess' letters with disappointment. We can take this two ways: it is 
disappointing to find that you are always the same as me, for how then can we tell each other apart?; or: 
letters would always disappoint since, knowing how you are, words can only reveal less than I already 
know. 
If this dialogue between Freud and Fliess symptomatically comments on one of the ambiguities at the 
heart of this thesis, recent psychoanalytic and literary theory have inherited the concern with boundaries 
which has been the preoccupation of each of the writers explored here. Winnicott identifies a tendency in 
psychoanalysis to focus either on an individual's relation to objects, or the inner psychic life. "Here are 
two places, then, the inside and the outside of the individual. But is this all? "8 As we have seen, 
Winnicot proposed a third, transitional realm of play, yet his work continues to explore the movement 
between separateness and contact. His question: 'how to be isolated without having to be insulatedT 
echoes William James' crucial question: 'what are the conditions of individuation or insulation in this 
4mother-sea? 9 
Adam Phillips describes 'something bewitching' about the 'kinds of definition that the idea of inside 
and outside can give us'. 10 He suggest that the language of intra- and interpsychic boundaries and 
limits, speaking primarily about difference, is promoted by psychoanalysis so presenting us with 'a 
picture of a person' - May Sinclair's Agatha Verrall could be seen as exemplary or typical - 'informed by 
the languages of purity and property'. II Is it possible, he asks, to think about self 
6 Freud to Wilhelm, Fliess, 10 Mar. 1898, The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 
1887-1904 (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 301. 
7 Ibid., p. 302 n. 2. 
8 D. W. Winnicott, Playing and Reality, (London: Tavistock, 197 1), p. 122. 
9 D. W. Winnicott, 'Communicating and Not Communicating Leading to a Study of Certain Opposites' 
(1963), in Winnicott, The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment: Studies In the 
Theory of Emotional Development (London: Hogarth Press, 1965), p187; William James, 'The 
Confidences of a 'Psychical Researcher" (1909), Essays in Psychical Research, p. 344. 
10 'Keeping it Moving: Commentary on Judith Butler' in Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of PoWer 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), p. 158-9. 
II Ibid. 
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6without needing the idea of exclusion... that is to say, without our ideas of the self being 
informed by notions of purity. All versions of the self that I can see are versions of not 
getting one's hands dirty, not being in free association with other people or with certain 
parts of oneself. " 12 
While to a large extent this project - edges of the mind - has been constituted upon a notion of 
boundaries, and I have been confessedly bewitched by the notion of inside and outside, it has also been 
an attempt to follow a kind of thinking, often pre-psychoanalytic, about self which goes beyond these 
binaries - whether going beyond is still to stay attached to, or even inside, the paradigm 
is another 
question. 
it is not only psychoanalytic thought which is both limited by and reliant upon divisions. Ken Wilber, 
transpersonal psychologist, suggests that the more boundaries we make the more we alienate ourselves 
from our starting point of union with the object. Yet if creating divisions leads to hierachies and 
exclusion, so too is there an inherent elitism, or sense of unique privilege, in the 'mystic' state of being 
without any. 13 The charm of thinking about boundaries also works as a curse. Specifically, recent 
psychoanalytic debate is still torn in arguments about what constitutes the inner and outer limits of the 
mind. 'Inter-subjectivist' theory argues 
'The defense of projection[ ... ] involves a translocation of psychological attributes 
from the 
self to others or to the world experienced as outside of oneself, and thus presupposes a 
stable boundary demarcating the limits of one's own selfhood. The essence of projection is 
the attribution of the disowned to the realm of the 'not-I'; if what is T and what is tnot-1, 
have no stable boundary defining and separating their distinctive provinces, it makes little 
sense to speak of a projection from one to the other. '14 
This is an argument against Victor Tausk's 1919 paper 'The Origin of the Influencing Machine in 
Schizophrenia' which gave an early interpretation of the psychotic dissolution of ego boundaries. 15 More 
broadly, both within contemporary psychoanalysis and humanistic psychology we can see a move to take 
the self out of itself, so to speak, with an increasing emphasis upon the idea of self as constituted by 
relationships rather than innate contents: 
16 
"Unlike both Freud and his erstwhile son Jung, contemporary approaches to the dynamics 
of personality begin with interpersonal experience rather than with the individual as a 
12 Anthony Molino (ed. ), Freely Associated: Encounters in Psychoanalysis, (London: Free Association 
Books, 1997), p. 147. 
13 Ken Wilber's cartographies of consciousness privilige 'higher' states of undifferentiated awareness 
(Wilber, No Boundary). 
14 Atwood, Orange, Stolorow, Working Intersubjectively: contextualism in psychoanalytic practice 
(Hillsdale, New Jersey: The Analytic Press, 1997), p. 60. See Psychoanalytic Treatment: An 
Intersubjective Approach (Analytic Press, 1987). 
15 Victor Tausk, 'The Origins of the Influencing Machine in Schzophrenia, in Robert Fliess (ed. ), A 
Psychoanalytic Reader (London: Hogarth, 1950), p. 47. 
16 Recent observational studies in the field of psychology suggest that 'effective' psychotherapy is 
linked to core aspects of the therapeutic relationship rather than a specific core of theory. See Michael 
Kahn, Between Therapist and Client: The New Relationship (New York: Freeman, 1996). 
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heuristically self-contained system of instinctual or archetypal forces.... Such models shift 
the focus of psychoanalytic understanding from the isolated individual to the process of 
interaction, viewing the self as constellated from internalized interpersonal episodes. " 
17 
Likewise, more recent debates on modernism and modernity also bring these issues into play. 
18 Leo 
Bersani, who has written, amongst other subjects, on Freud, Baudelaire, Klein and Proust, locates the 
limitations of psychoanalysis in its difficulty of imagining that we can find ourselves already in the 
world - not confined or, in more comforting terms, held to our own place; perhaps, Bersani argues, we 
are already inaccurately represented everywhere. This is both different from a narcissistic longing for the 
oceanic which reformulates world as self, but it also provides an antidote to the psychoanalytic notion of 
world as hostile, or inherently other. Bersani envisages a relation between self and world described as 
'extensibility' which is not an attempt to eliminate or antagonise the differences. It is not about 
identification - the totalitarian belief that other is the same as me, or the more self-dislocating belief that 
I am the same as the other - instead it proposes a 'non-appropriative ethics', a pleasurable connectedness, 
where we find ourselves in fragments of forms, already there - but, to recall William James' borrowed 
phrase, 'ever, not quite'. 
19 Again this holds striking resonances with all of the writers in this thesis, 
and the debate which turns upon definitions of egoism and altruism. 
20 
This thesis has been an exploration of the 'other' modernisms but one could almost write a parallel 
narrative of 'other' subsequent psychologies. In literary criticism, we tend to give Freudian readings a 
monopoly. Psychology did not stop at Freud yet we pay little attention to the other forms of thinking 
which challenged his hegemony: they are written out of the centre, as were the 6other' modernisms by the 
literary orthodoxy. Many students of Freud who went on to found their own practices were undoubtedly 
profoundly influenced by the psychoanalytic model, yet their divergences are significant for being 
restitutive of what became lost in Freudian psychoanalysis. 
if the psychoanalytic language of boundaries is primarily about exclusion, or not getting one's hands 
dirty, we can also see the opposite formulation present in Fritz Perls' Gestalt psychotherapy which 
suggests that the self comes into being only at its own boundary when it comes up against the other. 
The 'contact boundary' is the point of possible intimacy or isolation: a different figuration from the 
inifinte intimacy offered by the oceanic. We can see links here with Vernon Lee's writing in her own 
exploration of physical, emotional and psychic forms of connection with the other. Gestalt is a primarily 
17 James W. Jones, Contemporary Psychoanalysis and Religion: Transference and Transcendence (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 199 1). 
18 See Pamela Thurschwell, 'Ferenczi's Dangerous Proximities: Telepathy, Psychosis, and the Real 
Event', Differences 11 (1999), 150-78; 'Henry James and Theodora Bosanquet: On the Typewriter, In 
the Cage, at the Ouija Board, Textual Practice, 13 (Spring 1999), 5-23. 
19 Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, 'The Freudian Subject from Politics to Ethics', The Emotional Tie 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992). 
20 Leo Bersani, 'A Conversation', October 82 (Fall 1997) 3-17. See also Bersani and Dutoit, 
Caravaggio's Secrets, (Cambridge, Mass: October, 1998). 
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experiential method, in which minute personal awareness is developed, similar to Vernon Lee's detailed 
self-observations. 21 Notably, 'empathy' is specifically discouraged in this psychotherapeutic setting, or 
at least only combined with a degree of frustration, to prevent a 'confluence' of boundaries. This is just 
one of the developments from psychoanalytic thinking which connects to my writers. Wilhelm Reich's 
theory of character armour in which unconscious resistances are held in the musculature of the body, also 
link with Vernon Lee's interest in the organic memory theories of the nineteenth century. 
What led me to each of my chosen writers was their interest in exploring, as William James' put it, the 
, boundaries of individuality'. One thing which emerges from this thesis which I have not explored in 
sufficient depth is the relationship between this disturbance of mental categories and the fact of the war. 
it is a real challenge whether one can follow modernist experimentation with mind to its outer limits and 
retain some grip on these historical actualities. What seems to be the case in the thesis is that the 
disturbance by the war, the challenge to civilisation, partly allows the destruction of mental and psychic 
boundaries. Elizabeth Bowen, referring to the Second World War, describes its effect as 'general rocking 
of London and one's own mind'. 
22 
As we have seen, the argument between the 'Men of 1914' and the women modernists set up by Peter 
Nicholls is a reductive gender stereotyping most starkly shown up by Vernon Lee's own avowed 
prcferences: 
'I dislike adjectives suggestive of sweet, soft, qualities, or those suggestive of touching, 
particularly touching yielding [ ... ] textures. I like visible things, the evidence of 
resistances, even a little roughness to the touch, of resilience and the power of breaking 
clean., 23 
Not only are these distinctions less than fixed themselves, as we have seen, further, they form part of a 
much larger question of how to define self in relation to other and world which we find at the heart of 
not only psychological, but also philosophical inquiry in the early twentieth century. Questioning the 
edges of the mind, inevitably leads to the edges of the body. Vernon Lee, Dion Fortune and Jane 
Harrison can each be read as pushing for a more integrative aesthetic which includes both mind and body 
- Dion Fortune notes the recent research into endocrine system and its relation to emotions. Jane 
Harrison is alone in proposing that this is a specifically female psychology. Furthermore, while 
autonomy for Freud is equivalent to maturity and he judges attachment and dependence as 
developmentally inferior, and associated with women, we have seen Harrison's quite different take. As 
she makes clear, there are mature forms of interdependence. 
21 F. S. Perls, R. F. Hefferline, and P. Goodman, Gestalt Therapy (London: Souvenir, 1951). Pcrls' ideas 
were formed in the Austro-Germanic world (1893-1970) although he took a very divergent path from 
psychoanalysis. 
22 Elizabeth Bowen, The Heat of the Day, p. 90, q. v. Jacqueline Rose, 'Bizarre Objects: Mary Butts and 
Elizabeth Bowen, Critical Quarterly, 42 (Spring 2000), p. 84. 
23 Vernon Lee, 'Aesthetics, my confession', (a twenty-page manuscript listing Lee's likes and dislikes), 
Vernon Lee Papers. 
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Furthermore the shared interest of all these writers - some more dedicated than others - in sublimation 
also questions one dominant way of conceptualising women's relationship to writing. H&ne Cixious, 
echoing Freud, holds that women are more body than men because they do not need to sublimate. 24 
According to that formulation we could say that several of these women are no body at all since they are 
so preoccupied with sublimation. Furthermore Vernon Lee, Evelyn Underhill, May Sinclair, Dion 
Fortune and Jane Harrison, with different motives, describe the particular experience of a woman outside 
of the institution of marriage. Fortune, Underhill and Sinclair are most concerned with the unmarried 
woman in relation to sublimation. Differently Vernon Lee laments the news that her friend Hyacinth 
Bentinck is to get married and 'the little hospital is to be broken up': 'that seems the rule of women's 
life: there comes nearly always a personal relation which sweeps away art, study, slumming hospital etc. 
& brings them to the egoisme A deux without which the world would have no inhabitants. '25 Jane 
Harrison displayed a similar aversion to couples - 'la grande egoisme A deux' - 'Marriage is exclusion 
and jealousy, state-sanctioned., 26 
During the writing of this thesis, each of the women studied have been brought further in from the canonical 
edges by recent literary scholarship: the last year has seen publication of both May Sinclair's new biography 
by Suzanne Raitt, and Mary Beard's The Invention of Jane Harrison; Gillian Beer's and Catherine 
Maxwell's articles on Vernon Lee, while the last remaining titles of Dion Fortune's complete works are 
again in print and she is included in Ronald Hutton's Triumph of the Moon, the f irst social history of pagan 
witchcraft. 27 Evelyn Underhill, while commemorated worldwide by the Anglican community, is 
increasingly acknowledged in modernist studies. 28 
This project has changed over time. Initially a study of women's diaries, broadening into women's 
autobiography, I was looking for representations of the 'hidden' part of self, the inner life, out of 
awareness. Diary writing became a too obvious place to look. The twentieth century can be read as a 
psychological epoch, which saw the development not just of psychoanalysis but psychology as a subject. 
if, according to Katherine Mansfield, cited at the beginning of this thesis, a 'fury' of autobiographical 
24 'More so than men who are coaxed toward social success, toward sublimation, women are body. 
More body hence more writing' (H&ne Cixious, 'The Laugh of the Medusa', trans. K. and P. Cohen, in 
Elaine Marks and Isabelled de Courtivron (eds. ), New French Feminisms (Brighton; Harvester, 1980), 
254-64, p. 257. 
25 Vernon Lee, Letter to Clementina Anstruther-Thomson (C. A. T. ), June 1899, Vernon Lee Papers. 
26 Jane Harrison, 'Homo Sum'; 'Epilogue on War', p. 255. 
27 Suzanne Raitt, May Sinclair., A Modern Victorian (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000); Mary Beard, The 
Invention of Jane Harrison (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000); Gillian Beer, 'The 
Dissidence of Vernon Lee: Satan the Waster and The Will to Believe', in Trudi Tate and Suzanne Raitt 
(eds. ), Women's Fiction and The Great War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Catherine Maxwell, 
'From Dionysus to "Dionea": Vernon Lee's portraits' Word & Image, 13 (July 1997), 253-269. 
28 Delroy Oberg, 'Evelyn Underhill: 1875-1941: Two Addresses Given At The Commemoration of the 
50th Anniversary of Her Death at the Society of the Sacred Advent, Brisbane, June 15,1991: 1 'The 
Enigma of Evelyn Underhill - And her Contribution to Modem Spirituality'; 11 'The Making of a Mystic 
(Was Evelyn One? )% Privately printed booklet, Pleshey Library, Chelmsford Diocesan House of Retreat. 
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writing in the early twentieth century sought to consolidate identity, it can equally be said that such an 
enterprise, or exploration, stretched much wider across literary and disciplinary genres. In response then 
to the dominance by the psychoanalytic model over our thinking about the unconscious part of self I 
looked for representations of the 'unconscious' in women's writing prior to, or concurrent with the 
influence of Freud's psychoanalytic theories. This study of the openness of minds has increasingly 
become a narrative which charts the difficulty of representing such an experience and witnesses 
repeatedly, the mind folding back into itself. 
In this thesis, over and again, we have witnessed an experience of consciousness, as May Sinclair put it, 
'far from ordinary' and each time differently understood: whether Vernon Lee's feeling of the past, 
Evelyn Underhill's mystical experience of the divine, May Sinclair's willing herself out of the body, 
Dion Fortune's occult vision, Jane Harrison's socialising moment, or William James' anaesthctic 
revelation. 29 Freud was no exception. I would like to conclude with one last account of an experience of 
consciousness beyond the normal- this time Freud's own. Again in a letter to Fliess he writes: 
'During an industrious night last week when I was suffering from that degree of pain 
which brings about the optimal condition for mental activities, the barriers suddenly lifted, 
the veils dropped, and everything became transparent- from the details of the neuroses to 
the determinants of consciousness. Everything seemed to fall into place, the cogs meshed, 
I had the impression that the thing now really was a machine that shortly would function 
on its own., 30 
In Freud's revelation his own theory of the neuroses becomes apparent to him. What he sees once the 
'barriers are lifted' is that his own 'thing' that is to say, psychoanalysis, 'shortly would function on its 
own'. A variant upon the 'influencing machine', Freud's experience is a revelation of the autonomy of 
his own creation. What all the writers examined here suggest is that there is - he had - much further to 
go. 
29 May Sinclair, 'The Poems of F. S. Flint', holograph copy, May Sinclair Papers. 
30 Sigmund Freud, Letter to Fliess, 20 Oct. 1895, The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm 
Fliess 1887-1904, p. 146. 
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